Polish README with enhanced formatting and new sections

Improvements:
- Add badges (Go version, Caddy version, License, Tests)
- Add "Why SIP Guardian?" comparison table vs traditional approaches
- Add collapsible sections for long config examples and API docs
- Add Troubleshooting section with 5 common issues and solutions
- Add Changelog section tracking v0.1.0 through v0.3.0
- Add emoji icons for feature categories
- Improve tables with severity indicators (colored dots)
- Add "What It Hides" before/after comparison table
- Add Debug Mode instructions
- Use horizontal rules for better section separation
- Add minimal config example alongside full config
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# Caddy SIP Guardian
A comprehensive Caddy module providing SIP-aware security at Layer 4. Protects your VoIP infrastructure with intelligent rate limiting, attack detection, message validation, and topology hiding.
[![Go Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?style=flat&logo=go)](https://go.dev/)
[![Caddy](https://img.shields.io/badge/Caddy-2.10+-22b638?style=flat&logo=caddy)](https://caddyserver.com/)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/Tests-60%20passing-success)](https://git.supported.systems/rsp2k/caddy-sip-guardian)
> **A comprehensive Caddy module providing SIP-aware security at Layer 4.**
> Protects your VoIP infrastructure with intelligent rate limiting, attack detection, message validation, and topology hiding.
---
## Why SIP Guardian?
Traditional SIP security (like fail2ban) parses logs *after* attacks reach your PBX. SIP Guardian operates at **Layer 4**, blocking threats *before* they touch your infrastructure:
| Traditional Approach | SIP Guardian |
|---------------------|--------------|
| Log parsing delay | Real-time blocking |
| Regex-based detection | Protocol-aware analysis |
| Separate fail2ban config | Single Caddyfile |
| No topology protection | Full B2BUA-lite hiding |
| Manual IP management | Auto-ban with API control |
---
## Features
### Core Protection
- **Layer 4 SIP Proxying**: Handle SIP traffic (UDP/TCP/TLS) before it reaches your PBX
- **Intelligent Rate Limiting**: Per-method token bucket rate limiting with burst support
- **Automatic Banning**: Ban IPs that exceed failure thresholds
- **Attack Detection**: Detect common SIP scanning tools (SIPVicious, friendly-scanner, etc.)
- **CIDR Whitelisting**: Whitelist trusted networks
- **GeoIP Blocking**: Block traffic by country using MaxMind databases
### 🛡️ Core Protection
- **Layer 4 SIP Proxying** Handle SIP traffic (UDP/TCP/TLS) before it reaches your PBX
- **Intelligent Rate Limiting** Per-method token bucket rate limiting with burst support
- **Automatic Banning** Ban IPs that exceed failure thresholds
- **Attack Detection** Detect common SIP scanning tools (SIPVicious, friendly-scanner, etc.)
- **CIDR Whitelisting** Whitelist trusted networks
- **GeoIP Blocking** Block traffic by country using MaxMind databases
### Extension Enumeration Detection
- **Count-based Detection**: Block IPs probing too many unique extensions
- **Sequential Pattern Detection**: Detect numeric extension scanning (100, 101, 102...)
- **Rapid-fire Detection**: Catch high-speed enumeration attempts
- **Configurable Exemptions**: Whitelist common extensions like voicemail
### 🔍 Extension Enumeration Detection
- **Count-based Detection** Block IPs probing too many unique extensions
- **Sequential Pattern Detection** Detect numeric extension scanning (100, 101, 102...)
- **Rapid-fire Detection** Catch high-speed enumeration attempts
- **Configurable Exemptions** Whitelist common extensions like voicemail
### SIP Message Validation
- **RFC 3261 Compliance**: Enforce required headers and message structure
- **Injection Prevention**: Block NULL bytes and binary injection attacks
- **Content-Length Validation**: Detect body/header mismatches
- **Multiple Modes**: Permissive, strict, or paranoid validation
### SIP Message Validation
- **RFC 3261 Compliance** Enforce required headers and message structure
- **Injection Prevention** Block NULL bytes and binary injection attacks
- **Content-Length Validation** Detect body/header mismatches
- **Multiple Modes** Permissive, strict, or paranoid validation
### Topology Hiding (B2BUA-lite)
- **Via Header Rewriting**: Hide internal proxy chain
- **Contact Header Rewriting**: Mask internal IP addresses
- **Sensitive Header Stripping**: Remove P-Asserted-Identity, Server, etc.
- **Call-ID Anonymization**: Prevent dialog correlation attacks
- **Private IP Masking**: Automatically hide RFC 1918 addresses
### 🔒 Topology Hiding (B2BUA-lite)
- **Via Header Rewriting** Hide internal proxy chain
- **Contact Header Rewriting** Mask internal IP addresses
- **Sensitive Header Stripping** Remove P-Asserted-Identity, Server, etc.
- **Call-ID Anonymization** Prevent dialog correlation attacks
- **Private IP Masking** Automatically hide RFC 1918 addresses
### Observability
- **Prometheus Metrics**: Comprehensive metrics for monitoring
- **Webhook Notifications**: Real-time alerts for security events
- **SQLite Persistence**: Durable ban storage across restarts
- **Admin API**: RESTful API for management and stats
### 📊 Observability
- **Prometheus Metrics** — Comprehensive metrics for monitoring
- **Webhook Notifications** — Real-time alerts for security events
- **SQLite Persistence** — Durable ban storage across restarts
- **Admin API** — RESTful API for management and stats
---
## Architecture
```
Internet
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Caddy SIP Guardian (Layer 4)
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐│
│ │ 1. SIP Matcher - Identifies SIP traffic │
│ │ 2. Ban Check - Reject banned IPs │
│ │ 3. Whitelist Check - Skip checks for trusted IPs │
│ │ 4. GeoIP Check - Block by country │
│ │ 5. Validation - RFC 3261 compliance │
│ │ 6. Pattern Detection - Scanner fingerprinting │
│ │ 7. Enumeration Check - Extension scanning detection │
│ │ 8. Rate Limiting - Per-method token buckets │
│ │ 9. Topology Hiding - Header rewriting (optional) │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘│
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ FreePBX / Asterisk / Kamailio
│ (Protected from scanners, enumeration, and topology leaks) │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Internet
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Caddy SIP Guardian (Layer 4) │
│ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
│ │ 1. SIP Matcher ─ Identifies SIP traffic │
│ │ 2. Ban Check ─ Reject banned IPs │
│ │ 3. Whitelist Check ─ Skip checks for trusted IPs │
│ │ 4. GeoIP Check ─ Block by country │
│ │ 5. Validation ─ RFC 3261 compliance │
│ │ 6. Pattern Detection ─ Scanner fingerprinting │
│ │ 7. Enumeration Check ─ Extension scanning detection │
│ │ 8. Rate Limiting ─ Per-method token buckets │
│ │ 9. Topology Hiding ─ Header rewriting (optional) │
│ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FreePBX / Asterisk / Kamailio │
(Protected from scanners, enumeration, topology leaks)
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
```
---
## Quick Start
```bash
# Clone the repository
git clone https://git.supported.systems/rsp2k/caddy-sip-guardian.git
cd caddy-sip-guardian
# Build the custom Caddy image
make build
@ -77,13 +107,38 @@ make run
# View logs
make logs
# Run tests
# Run tests (60 tests)
make test
```
---
## Configuration
### Complete Caddyfile Example
### Minimal Configuration
```caddyfile
{
layer4 {
udp/:5060 {
@sip sip
route @sip {
sip_guardian {
max_failures 5
ban_time 1h
whitelist 10.0.0.0/8 192.168.0.0/16
}
proxy udp/asterisk:5060
}
}
}
}
```
### Full Configuration
<details>
<summary><strong>Click to expand complete Caddyfile example</strong></summary>
```caddyfile
{
@ -201,6 +256,8 @@ make test
}
```
</details>
### Environment Variables
| Variable | Default | Description |
@ -211,6 +268,8 @@ make test
| `SIP_GUARDIAN_FIND_TIME` | `10m` | Time window for counting failures |
| `SIP_GUARDIAN_BAN_TIME` | `1h` | Ban duration |
---
## Feature Details
### Extension Enumeration Detection
@ -230,9 +289,14 @@ enumeration {
```
**Detection Methods:**
1. **Count Threshold**: Too many unique extensions from one IP
2. **Sequential Pattern**: Consecutive numeric extensions indicate scanning
3. **Rapid Fire**: High-speed probing is clearly automated
| Method | Trigger | Use Case |
|--------|---------|----------|
| **Count Threshold** | 20+ unique extensions | Catches slow scanners |
| **Sequential Pattern** | 5+ consecutive numbers | Detects `svwar` immediately |
| **Rapid Fire** | 10+ in 30 seconds | Catches fast automated scans |
---
### SIP Message Validation
@ -250,23 +314,29 @@ validation {
```
**Validation Modes:**
- **Permissive**: Log violations, only block critical attacks
- **Strict**: Enforce RFC 3261 required headers
- **Paranoid**: Additional heuristics for edge cases
| Mode | Behavior |
|------|----------|
| **Permissive** | Log violations, only block critical attacks |
| **Strict** | Enforce RFC 3261 required headers |
| **Paranoid** | Additional heuristics for edge cases |
**Validation Rules:**
| Rule | Severity | Action |
|------|----------|--------|
| `null_bytes` | CRITICAL | Immediate ban |
| `binary_injection` | CRITICAL | Immediate ban |
| `missing_via` | HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_from` | HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_to` | HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_call_id` | HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_cseq` | HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `content_length_mismatch` | HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `oversized_message` | HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `invalid_request_uri` | MEDIUM | Reject only |
| `null_bytes` | 🔴 CRITICAL | Immediate ban |
| `binary_injection` | 🔴 CRITICAL | Immediate ban |
| `missing_via` | 🟠 HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_from` | 🟠 HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_to` | 🟠 HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_call_id` | 🟠 HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `missing_cseq` | 🟠 HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `content_length_mismatch` | 🟠 HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `oversized_message` | 🟠 HIGH | Count toward ban |
| `invalid_request_uri` | 🟡 MEDIUM | Reject only |
---
### Topology Hiding
@ -281,60 +351,87 @@ sip_topology_hider {
# Internal PBX (never exposed)
upstream udp/192.168.1.100:5060
# Enable Via header insertion
rewrite_via
# Replace internal Contact URIs with proxy address
rewrite_contact
# Remove headers that leak internal info
strip_headers P-Preferred-Identity P-Asserted-Identity Remote-Party-ID Server User-Agent X-Asterisk-HangupCause
# Replace RFC 1918 addresses in all headers
hide_private_ips
# Optional: Randomize Call-IDs (prevents dialog correlation)
# anonymize_call_id
rewrite_via # Add proxy Via, remove on response
rewrite_contact # Replace internal Contact URIs
strip_headers P-Preferred-Identity P-Asserted-Identity Server User-Agent
hide_private_ips # Replace RFC 1918 addresses
# anonymize_call_id # Optional: randomize Call-IDs
}
```
**What It Hides:**
- Internal IP addresses (192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x)
- Via header chain revealing internal proxies
- Contact URIs pointing to internal hosts
- Server/User-Agent revealing software versions
- P-Asserted-Identity revealing internal extensions
| Header/Field | Before | After |
|--------------|--------|-------|
| Via | `192.168.1.100:5060` | `proxy.example.com:5060` |
| Contact | `<sip:100@192.168.1.100>` | `<sip:100@proxy.example.com>` |
| Server | `Asterisk PBX 18.x` | *(removed)* |
| P-Asserted-Identity | `<sip:100@internal.lan>` | *(removed)* |
**Request Flow:**
```
External UA → Caddy → Asterisk
─ Adds Via: SIP/2.0/UDP proxy.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK...
─ Rewrites Contact: <sip:proxy.example.com:5060>
└─ Strips: Server, P-Asserted-Identity
External UA ──────► Caddy ──────► Asterisk
─ Adds Via: SIP/2.0/UDP proxy.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK...
─ Rewrites Contact: <sip:proxy.example.com:5060>
└─ Strips: Server, P-Asserted-Identity
```
**Response Flow:**
```
Asterisk → Caddy → External UA
─ Removes top Via (proxy's)
└─ Dialog state routes response correctly
Asterisk ──────► Caddy ──────► External UA
─ Removes top Via (proxy's)
└─ Dialog state routes response correctly
```
---
## Admin API
### List Banned IPs
### Endpoints
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/sip-guardian/bans` | List all banned IPs |
| `GET` | `/api/sip-guardian/stats` | View statistics |
| `POST` | `/api/sip-guardian/ban/{ip}` | Manually ban an IP |
| `DELETE` | `/api/sip-guardian/unban/{ip}` | Remove IP from ban list |
| `GET` | `/api/sip-guardian/enumeration/stats` | Enumeration statistics |
| `GET` | `/api/sip-guardian/validation/stats` | Validation statistics |
### Examples
<details>
<summary><strong>List Banned IPs</strong></summary>
```bash
curl http://localhost:2020/api/sip-guardian/bans
```
### View Stats
```json
{
"bans": [
{
"ip": "185.224.128.0",
"reason": "scanner_detected",
"banned_at": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
"expires_at": "2024-01-15T11:30:00Z"
}
],
"total": 1
}
```
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>View Stats</strong></summary>
```bash
curl http://localhost:2020/api/sip-guardian/stats
```
Response:
```json
{
"total_requests": 15234,
@ -346,31 +443,33 @@ Response:
}
```
### Manually Ban IP
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>Manually Ban IP</strong></summary>
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:2020/api/sip-guardian/ban/192.168.1.100 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"reason": "manual_ban", "duration": "24h"}'
```
### Unban IP
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>Unban IP</strong></summary>
```bash
curl -X DELETE http://localhost:2020/api/sip-guardian/unban/192.168.1.100
```
### View Enumeration Stats
```bash
curl http://localhost:2020/api/sip-guardian/enumeration/stats
```
</details>
### View Validation Stats
```bash
curl http://localhost:2020/api/sip-guardian/validation/stats
```
---
## Prometheus Metrics
```
```prometheus
# Core metrics
sip_guardian_requests_total{method="REGISTER"}
sip_guardian_blocked_total{reason="banned"}
@ -392,52 +491,13 @@ sip_guardian_message_size_bytes
sip_guardian_geoip_blocked_total{country="CN"}
```
## Detected Attack Patterns
The module automatically detects and flags:
- **SIPVicious** (`sipvicious`, `friendly-scanner`)
- **SIPScan** (`sip-scan`, `sipcli`)
- **Asterisk scanners** (`Asterisk PBX`)
- **Common test extensions** (100, 1000, 9999)
- **Sequential extension probing**
- **NULL byte injection**
- **Binary payload injection**
## Building from Source
```bash
# Using xcaddy
xcaddy build \
--with github.com/mholt/caddy-l4 \
--with git.supported.systems/rsp2k/caddy-sip-guardian
# Or with local development
xcaddy build \
--with github.com/mholt/caddy-l4 \
--with git.supported.systems/rsp2k/caddy-sip-guardian=/path/to/local/module
```
## Testing
```bash
# Run all unit tests
make test
# Test enumeration detection
make test-enumeration
# Test validation
make test-validation
# Test with SIPVicious (in sandbox)
make sandbox-up
make test-scanner
```
---
## Integration Examples
### With FreePBX/Asterisk
<details>
<summary><strong>FreePBX / Asterisk</strong></summary>
```caddyfile
{
layer4 {
@ -456,14 +516,21 @@ make test-scanner
}
```
### With Kamailio (as SBC)
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>Kamailio (as SBC)</strong></summary>
```caddyfile
{
layer4 {
udp/:5060 {
@sip sip
route @sip {
sip_guardian { ... }
sip_guardian {
max_failures 5
ban_time 1h
}
sip_topology_hider {
proxy_host sbc.example.com
proxy_port 5060
@ -478,7 +545,11 @@ make test-scanner
}
```
### High Availability Setup
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>High Availability Setup</strong></summary>
```caddyfile
{
layer4 {
@ -502,24 +573,206 @@ make test-scanner
}
```
</details>
---
## Troubleshooting
### Common Issues
<details>
<summary><strong>Legitimate users getting banned</strong></summary>
**Symptoms:** Users report being unable to connect; they appear in ban list.
**Solutions:**
1. Add their network to the whitelist:
```caddyfile
whitelist 10.0.0.0/8 192.168.0.0/16 YOUR.NETWORK.0.0/16
```
2. Increase `max_failures` threshold
3. Check if their client sends malformed packets (validation logs)
4. Temporarily unban: `curl -X DELETE http://localhost:2020/api/sip-guardian/unban/IP`
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>SIP traffic not being matched</strong></summary>
**Symptoms:** Traffic passes through but SIP Guardian doesn't process it.
**Solutions:**
1. Verify the matcher syntax:
```caddyfile
@sip sip {
methods REGISTER INVITE OPTIONS
}
```
2. Check Caddy logs for matcher errors
3. Ensure traffic is arriving on the correct port (UDP vs TCP)
4. Test with `tcpdump -i any port 5060` to verify traffic flow
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>Topology hiding breaks calls</strong></summary>
**Symptoms:** Calls connect but audio is one-way or missing.
**Solutions:**
1. This is usually an RTP/media issue, not SIP signaling
2. Ensure RTP ports are forwarded through your firewall
3. Check if `hide_private_ips` is replacing IPs in SDP body
4. Verify NAT traversal settings on your PBX
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>High memory usage</strong></summary>
**Symptoms:** Caddy process memory grows over time.
**Solutions:**
1. Dialog/transaction state cleanup runs automatically, but check TTL settings
2. Reduce `extension_window` to clean up enumeration tracking faster
3. Check for memory leaks with `go tool pprof`
4. Ensure cleanup goroutines are running (check logs)
</details>
<details>
<summary><strong>GeoIP database not loading</strong></summary>
**Symptoms:** Country blocking not working; errors about mmdb file.
**Solutions:**
1. Download the database:
```bash
wget https://download.maxmind.com/app/geoip_download?edition_id=GeoLite2-Country&suffix=tar.gz
```
2. Verify path in config matches actual file location
3. Check file permissions (Caddy needs read access)
4. Ensure you're using GeoLite2-Country, not City database
</details>
### Debug Mode
Enable verbose logging:
```caddyfile
{
debug
layer4 {
# ... your config
}
}
```
Check logs:
```bash
docker logs caddy-sip-guardian 2>&1 | grep -E "(sip_guardian|topology)"
```
---
## Building from Source
```bash
# Using xcaddy
xcaddy build \
--with github.com/mholt/caddy-l4 \
--with git.supported.systems/rsp2k/caddy-sip-guardian
# Or with local development
xcaddy build \
--with github.com/mholt/caddy-l4 \
--with git.supported.systems/rsp2k/caddy-sip-guardian=/path/to/local/module
```
### Running Tests
```bash
# Run all unit tests (60 tests)
make test
# Run with verbose output
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/app -w /app golang:1.25 go test -v ./...
# Test specific feature
go test -v -run TestEnumeration ./...
go test -v -run TestValidation ./...
go test -v -run TestTopology ./...
```
---
## Changelog
### v0.3.0 (2024-12)
- ✨ **Topology Hiding** — B2BUA-lite functionality for hiding internal infrastructure
- ✨ **SIP Message Parsing** — Full RFC 3261 compliant parser with header manipulation
- ✨ **Dialog State Management** — Stateful response routing for topology hiding
- 🐛 Fixed PRNG overflow in branch generation
### v0.2.0 (2024-12)
- ✨ **SIP Message Validation** — RFC 3261 compliance checking
- ✨ **Injection Detection** — NULL byte and binary injection blocking
- ✨ **Validation Modes** — Permissive, strict, and paranoid modes
### v0.1.0 (2024-12)
- ✨ **Extension Enumeration Detection** — Sequential pattern and rapid-fire detection
- ✨ **Per-method Rate Limiting** — Token bucket with configurable burst
- ✨ **GeoIP Blocking** — Country-based blocking with MaxMind
- ✨ **Prometheus Metrics** — Comprehensive observability
- ✨ **Webhook Notifications** — Real-time security alerts
- ✨ **SQLite Persistence** — Durable ban storage
---
## Security Considerations
1. **Whitelist Internal Networks**: Always whitelist your internal networks to prevent self-blocking
2. **Start Permissive**: Begin with permissive validation mode and tighten after monitoring
3. **Monitor False Positives**: Watch metrics for legitimate traffic being blocked
4. **Regular Updates**: Keep GeoIP databases current
5. **Webhook Alerts**: Configure webhooks for immediate security event notification
| Consideration | Recommendation |
|---------------|----------------|
| **Whitelist internal networks** | Always add your LAN to prevent self-blocking |
| **Start permissive** | Begin with permissive validation, tighten after monitoring |
| **Monitor false positives** | Watch metrics for legitimate traffic being blocked |
| **Keep GeoIP updated** | Refresh MaxMind databases monthly |
| **Use webhooks** | Configure alerts for immediate security notification |
| **Protect admin API** | Don't expose `:2020` to the internet |
---
## Detected Attack Patterns
SIP Guardian automatically detects:
| Pattern | Detection Method |
|---------|------------------|
| **SIPVicious** | User-Agent fingerprinting |
| **friendly-scanner** | User-Agent fingerprinting |
| **sipcli / sip-scan** | User-Agent fingerprinting |
| **Sequential scanning** | Extension pattern analysis |
| **NULL byte injection** | Binary content inspection |
| **Malformed packets** | RFC 3261 validation |
---
## License
MIT
MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE) for details.
## Contributing
Contributions welcome! Please see CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.
Contributions welcome! Please:
1. Fork the repository
2. Create a feature branch
3. Add tests for new functionality
4. Submit a pull request
## Related Projects
- [caddy-l4](https://github.com/mholt/caddy-l4) - Layer 4 proxy for Caddy
- [Caddy](https://caddyserver.com/) - The HTTP/2 web server with automatic HTTPS
- [SIPVicious](https://github.com/EnableSecurity/sipvicious) - SIP security testing tools
- [caddy-l4](https://github.com/mholt/caddy-l4) Layer 4 proxy for Caddy
- [Caddy](https://caddyserver.com/) The HTTP/2 web server with automatic HTTPS
- [SIPVicious](https://github.com/EnableSecurity/sipvicious) — SIP security testing tools (for testing your setup)