Ryan Malloy
976fdf53a5
Implements RFC 3261 compliance checking and security validation:
- Three validation modes: permissive (default), strict, paranoid
- Critical checks: null bytes, binary injection (immediate ban)
- RFC compliance: required headers (Via, From, To, Call-ID, CSeq, Max-Forwards)
- Format validation: CSeq range, Content-Length, Via branch format
- Paranoid mode: SQL injection patterns, excessive headers, long values
- Compact header form support (v, f, t, i, l, etc.)
Caddyfile configuration:
validation {
enabled true
mode permissive
max_message_size 65535
ban_on_null_bytes true
ban_on_binary_injection true
disabled_rules via_invalid_branch
}
New Prometheus metrics:
- sip_guardian_validation_violations_total{rule}
- sip_guardian_validation_results_total{result}
- sip_guardian_message_size_bytes (histogram)
Includes comprehensive unit tests covering all validation scenarios.
609 lines
18 KiB
Go
609 lines
18 KiB
Go
package sipguardian
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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)
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func TestDefaultValidationConfig(t *testing.T) {
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config := DefaultValidationConfig()
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if !config.Enabled {
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t.Error("Expected validation to be enabled by default")
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}
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if config.Mode != ValidationModePermissive {
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t.Errorf("Expected permissive mode, got %s", config.Mode)
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}
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if config.MaxMessageSize != 65535 {
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t.Errorf("Expected max message size 65535, got %d", config.MaxMessageSize)
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}
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if !config.BanOnNullBytes {
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t.Error("Expected ban on null bytes by default")
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}
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if !config.BanOnBinaryInjection {
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t.Error("Expected ban on binary injection by default")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationNullBytes(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, DefaultValidationConfig())
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// Valid SIP message
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validMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n" +
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"Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(validMsg)
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if result.ShouldBan {
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t.Error("Valid message should not trigger ban")
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}
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// Message with null byte at the end (won't trigger binary injection first)
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nullMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n" +
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"Content-Length: 5\r\n\r\ntest\x00")
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result = validator.Validate(nullMsg)
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if !result.ShouldBan {
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t.Error("Null byte injection should trigger ban")
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}
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// Note: null_bytes is checked first, so ban reason should be null_bytes
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if result.BanReason != "validation_null_bytes" {
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t.Errorf("Expected ban reason 'validation_null_bytes', got '%s'", result.BanReason)
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}
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// Check violation was recorded
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hasNullViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "null_bytes" && v.Severity == SeverityCritical {
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hasNullViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !hasNullViolation {
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t.Error("Expected null_bytes violation with critical severity")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationBinaryInjection(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, DefaultValidationConfig())
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// Message with binary control character (bell)
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binaryMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:\x07user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(binaryMsg)
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if !result.ShouldBan {
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t.Error("Binary injection should trigger ban")
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}
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if result.BanReason != "validation_binary_injection" {
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t.Errorf("Expected ban reason 'validation_binary_injection', got '%s'", result.BanReason)
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}
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}
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func TestValidationMissingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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config := DefaultValidationConfig()
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config.Mode = ValidationModeStrict // Missing headers should ban in strict mode
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
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// Message missing Via header
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noViaMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(noViaMsg)
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if result.Valid {
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t.Error("Message missing Via should be invalid")
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}
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hasViaViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "missing_via" {
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hasViaViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !hasViaViolation {
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t.Error("Expected missing_via violation")
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}
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// Message missing Call-ID
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noCallIDMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n\r\n")
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result = validator.Validate(noCallIDMsg)
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if result.Valid {
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t.Error("Message missing Call-ID should be invalid")
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}
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hasCallIDViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "missing_call_id" {
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hasCallIDViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !hasCallIDViolation {
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t.Error("Expected missing_call_id violation")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationCompactHeaders(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, DefaultValidationConfig())
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// Valid message using compact header forms
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compactMsg := []byte("INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"v: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK776\r\n" + // v = Via
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"f: <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=1234\r\n" + // f = From
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"t: <sip:bob@example.com>\r\n" + // t = To
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"i: a84b4c76e66710@192.168.1.1\r\n" + // i = Call-ID
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"CSeq: 1 INVITE\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n" +
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"l: 0\r\n\r\n") // l = Content-Length
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result := validator.Validate(compactMsg)
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if !result.Valid {
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t.Errorf("Valid message with compact headers should pass validation: %+v", result.Violations)
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}
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}
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func TestValidationOversizedMessage(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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config := DefaultValidationConfig()
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config.MaxMessageSize = 500 // Small limit for testing
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
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// Create message larger than limit
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largeBody := strings.Repeat("X", 600)
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largeMsg := []byte("INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:bob@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 INVITE\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n" +
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"Content-Length: 600\r\n\r\n" + largeBody)
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result := validator.Validate(largeMsg)
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if result.Valid {
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t.Error("Oversized message should be invalid")
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}
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hasOversizedViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "oversized_message" {
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hasOversizedViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !hasOversizedViolation {
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t.Error("Expected oversized_message violation")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationCSeqRange(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, DefaultValidationConfig())
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// Valid CSeq (within range)
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validCSeqMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 100 REGISTER\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(validCSeqMsg)
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hasCSeqViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "cseq_out_of_range" {
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hasCSeqViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if hasCSeqViolation {
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t.Error("Valid CSeq should not trigger cseq_out_of_range")
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}
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// Invalid CSeq (out of range - negative not possible as string, but
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// we can test with very large number exceeding int32)
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// Note: Testing the actual boundary is tricky since ParseInt may handle it
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}
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func TestValidationContentLengthMismatch(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, DefaultValidationConfig())
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// Correct Content-Length
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correctMsg := []byte("INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:bob@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 INVITE\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n" +
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"Content-Length: 4\r\n\r\ntest")
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result := validator.Validate(correctMsg)
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hasMismatch := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "content_length_mismatch" {
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hasMismatch = true
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break
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}
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}
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if hasMismatch {
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t.Error("Correct Content-Length should not trigger mismatch")
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}
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// Wrong Content-Length (claims 100 but body is 4)
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wrongMsg := []byte("INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:bob@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 INVITE\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n" +
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"Content-Length: 100\r\n\r\ntest")
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result = validator.Validate(wrongMsg)
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hasMismatch = false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "content_length_mismatch" {
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hasMismatch = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !hasMismatch {
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t.Error("Wrong Content-Length should trigger mismatch")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationViaBranch(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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config := DefaultValidationConfig()
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config.Mode = ValidationModeStrict // Via branch check only in strict mode
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
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// Valid Via branch (RFC 3261 compliant - starts with z9hG4bK)
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validBranchMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bKnashds7\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(validBranchMsg)
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hasViaBranchViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "via_invalid_branch" {
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hasViaBranchViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if hasViaBranchViolation {
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t.Error("Valid Via branch should not trigger violation")
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}
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// Invalid Via branch (doesn't start with z9hG4bK)
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invalidBranchMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=oldbranch123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
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result = validator.Validate(invalidBranchMsg)
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hasViaBranchViolation = false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "via_invalid_branch" {
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hasViaBranchViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !hasViaBranchViolation {
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t.Error("Invalid Via branch should trigger violation in strict mode")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationDisabledRules(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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config := DefaultValidationConfig()
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config.DisabledRules = []string{"null_bytes", "missing_via"}
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
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// Message with null byte should NOT trigger ban when rule disabled
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nullMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user\x00@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" + // Null byte + missing Via
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(nullMsg)
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// Should not have null_bytes violation (disabled)
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hasNullViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "null_bytes" {
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hasNullViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if hasNullViolation {
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t.Error("Disabled null_bytes rule should not trigger violation")
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}
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// Should not have missing_via violation (disabled)
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hasViaViolation := false
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for _, v := range result.Violations {
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if v.Rule == "missing_via" {
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hasViaViolation = true
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break
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}
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}
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if hasViaViolation {
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t.Error("Disabled missing_via rule should not trigger violation")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationPermissiveMode(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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config := DefaultValidationConfig()
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config.Mode = ValidationModePermissive
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config.BanOnNullBytes = false // Disable ban in permissive
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config.BanOnBinaryInjection = false
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
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// Message missing Via - should log but not ban in permissive
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noViaMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(noViaMsg)
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if result.ShouldBan {
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t.Error("Permissive mode should not ban for missing headers")
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}
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if result.Valid {
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t.Error("Message should still be marked invalid")
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}
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}
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func TestValidationParanoidMode(t *testing.T) {
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logger := zap.NewNop()
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config := DefaultValidationConfig()
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config.Mode = ValidationModeParanoid
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validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
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// Valid message should pass even in paranoid mode
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validMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
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"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
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"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n" +
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"Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
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result := validator.Validate(validMsg)
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if !result.Valid {
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t.Errorf("Valid message should pass paranoid validation: %+v", result.Violations)
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}
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// Message with suspicious SQL-like pattern
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sqlMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
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"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
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"From: <sip:' OR 1=1--@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
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"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
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"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
|
|
"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
|
|
"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
|
|
|
|
result = validator.Validate(sqlMsg)
|
|
hasSQLViolation := false
|
|
for _, v := range result.Violations {
|
|
if v.Rule == "suspicious_sql_injection" {
|
|
hasSQLViolation = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !hasSQLViolation {
|
|
t.Error("Paranoid mode should detect SQL injection patterns")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidationRequestURI(t *testing.T) {
|
|
logger := zap.NewNop()
|
|
config := DefaultValidationConfig()
|
|
config.Mode = ValidationModeStrict
|
|
validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
|
|
|
|
// Valid sip: URI
|
|
validSipMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
|
|
"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
|
|
"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
|
|
"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
|
|
"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
|
|
"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
|
|
"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
|
|
|
|
result := validator.Validate(validSipMsg)
|
|
hasURIViolation := false
|
|
for _, v := range result.Violations {
|
|
if v.Rule == "invalid_request_uri" {
|
|
hasURIViolation = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if hasURIViolation {
|
|
t.Error("Valid sip: URI should not trigger violation")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Valid tel: URI
|
|
validTelMsg := []byte("INVITE tel:+1-555-1234 SIP/2.0\r\n" +
|
|
"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
|
|
"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
|
|
"To: <tel:+1-555-1234>\r\n" +
|
|
"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
|
|
"CSeq: 1 INVITE\r\n" +
|
|
"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
|
|
|
|
result = validator.Validate(validTelMsg)
|
|
hasURIViolation = false
|
|
for _, v := range result.Violations {
|
|
if v.Rule == "invalid_request_uri" {
|
|
hasURIViolation = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if hasURIViolation {
|
|
t.Error("Valid tel: URI should not trigger violation")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Invalid URI scheme
|
|
invalidURIMsg := []byte("INVITE http://example.com/attack SIP/2.0\r\n" +
|
|
"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
|
|
"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
|
|
"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
|
|
"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
|
|
"CSeq: 1 INVITE\r\n" +
|
|
"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
|
|
|
|
result = validator.Validate(invalidURIMsg)
|
|
hasURIViolation = false
|
|
for _, v := range result.Violations {
|
|
if v.Rule == "invalid_request_uri" {
|
|
hasURIViolation = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !hasURIViolation {
|
|
t.Error("Invalid URI scheme should trigger violation")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidatorGlobalInstance(t *testing.T) {
|
|
logger := zap.NewNop()
|
|
|
|
// Get global validator
|
|
v1 := GetValidator(logger)
|
|
v2 := GetValidator(logger)
|
|
|
|
if v1 != v2 {
|
|
t.Error("GetValidator should return the same instance")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Update config
|
|
config := DefaultValidationConfig()
|
|
config.MaxMessageSize = 12345
|
|
SetValidationConfig(config)
|
|
|
|
// Should reflect updated config
|
|
v3 := GetValidator(logger)
|
|
stats := v3.GetStats()
|
|
if stats["config_enabled"] != true {
|
|
t.Error("Config should be enabled")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidatorStats(t *testing.T) {
|
|
logger := zap.NewNop()
|
|
config := DefaultValidationConfig()
|
|
validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
|
|
|
|
// Validate some messages
|
|
validMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
|
|
"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123\r\n" +
|
|
"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
|
|
"To: <sip:user@example.com>\r\n" +
|
|
"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
|
|
"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
|
|
"Max-Forwards: 70\r\n\r\n")
|
|
|
|
invalidMsg := []byte("REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0\r\n" +
|
|
"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" + // Missing Via
|
|
"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n\r\n")
|
|
|
|
validator.Validate(validMsg)
|
|
validator.Validate(validMsg)
|
|
validator.Validate(invalidMsg)
|
|
|
|
stats := validator.GetStats()
|
|
|
|
if stats["total_validated"].(int64) != 3 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Expected 3 total validated, got %v", stats["total_validated"])
|
|
}
|
|
if stats["total_valid"].(int64) != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Expected 2 total valid, got %v", stats["total_valid"])
|
|
}
|
|
if stats["total_invalid"].(int64) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Expected 1 total invalid, got %v", stats["total_invalid"])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
violations := stats["violations_by_rule"].(map[string]int64)
|
|
if violations["missing_via"] != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("Expected 1 missing_via violation, got %d", violations["missing_via"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidationSIPResponse(t *testing.T) {
|
|
logger := zap.NewNop()
|
|
config := DefaultValidationConfig()
|
|
config.Mode = ValidationModeStrict
|
|
validator := NewSIPValidator(logger, config)
|
|
|
|
// SIP response (starts with SIP/2.0)
|
|
responseMsg := []byte("SIP/2.0 200 OK\r\n" +
|
|
"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK123;received=10.0.0.1\r\n" +
|
|
"From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=abc\r\n" +
|
|
"To: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=xyz\r\n" +
|
|
"Call-ID: 123456@192.168.1.1\r\n" +
|
|
"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" +
|
|
"Contact: <sip:user@10.0.0.1:5060>\r\n" +
|
|
"Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
|
|
|
|
result := validator.Validate(responseMsg)
|
|
|
|
// Responses should not trigger invalid_request_uri
|
|
hasURIViolation := false
|
|
for _, v := range result.Violations {
|
|
if v.Rule == "invalid_request_uri" {
|
|
hasURIViolation = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if hasURIViolation {
|
|
t.Error("SIP responses should not be checked for Request-URI")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|