2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cc33fcbcc8 caddy: add caddy-dns/rfc2136 + test-rfc2136 site -- self-hosted ACME flow
Wires Caddy as the ACME client side of our new self-hosted DNS-01
flow. Proves the design end-to-end: caddy-dns/rfc2136 -> our
CoreDNS rfc2136 plugin -> zone file write -> git auto-commit -> HE
AXFR -> LE validates -> cert issued.

Changes:
- caddy/Dockerfile: --with github.com/caddy-dns/rfc2136 added
  alongside the existing caddy-dns/vultr.
- caddy/Caddyfile: new test-rfc2136.supported.systems site that uses
  the new provider. server coredns:53 (docker internal), key from
  env, propagation_delay 60s + timeout 600s to accommodate HE pull.
- docker-compose.yml: ACME_TSIG_SECRET passed to the caddy container
  (the same secret CoreDNS verifies on the other side of the loop).

First cert issued in production: 2026-05-21 ~13:23 UTC. ~5.5 min
end-to-end from Caddy starting to cert in hand. Documented in
session notes; the cert sits unused in caddy-data/ until/unless
something publishes ports 80/443 for that hostname.
2026-05-21 13:27:05 -06:00
c1afe77b27 coredns: production Let's Encrypt cert via Caddy sidecar (DNS-01 + Vultr)
Replaces the self-signed dev cert flow with a real LE prod cert for
dns.l.supported.systems, issued and auto-renewed by a Caddy sidecar
using DNS-01 challenge against the Vultr API.

Components:
- caddy/Dockerfile builds Caddy 2.10.0 with caddy-dns/vultr plugin
  via xcaddy. GOTOOLCHAIN=auto so xcaddy can fetch newer Go on demand
  when plugin versions advance their minimum Go.
- caddy/Caddyfile uses DNS-01 with explicit public resolvers (1.1.1.1,
  9.9.9.9) for the propagation check. Without that, Docker's embedded
  DNS leaks the container into the host's split-horizon LAN DNS, which
  returns LAN IPs for ns1.vultr.com and the propagation check fails.
- docker-compose: caddy service shares ./caddy-data with coredns via a
  read-only subpath mount that excludes /acme (account private key).
- Healthcheck doubles as a symlinker: maintains stable cert.pem /
  key.pem names at /data/caddy/ and chmods cert files + their dirs to
  be readable by CoreDNS's nonroot user. Flips to "healthy" only once
  the symlinks dereference (i.e. cert exists), gating CoreDNS start
  via depends_on: service_healthy.
- Corefile unchanged — same /etc/coredns/certs/cert.pem path; only the
  bind-mount source switches from ./certs to ./caddy-data/caddy.
- New Makefile target: tls-up orchestrates the bring-up sequence.

Cert is valid until Aug 12 2026. Verified end-to-end:
  dig @127.0.0.1 -p 8853 +tls +tls-hostname=dns.l.supported.systems ...
  dig @127.0.0.1 -p 8443 +https +tls-hostname=dns.l.supported.systems ...
2026-05-14 01:34:57 -06:00