Ryan Malloy 57c8366b7f coredns: document why HE-IP restriction lives at firewall, not CoreDNS
Goal was to restrict AXFR to Hurricane Electric's five secondary
nameserver IPs. Tried several CoreDNS Corefile syntaxes:

  transfer { to 216.218.130.2 ... 216.66.1.2 }       # space-separated
  transfer { to 216.218.130.2 \n to 216.218.131.2 }  # multi-line
  transfer { to 216.218.130.2 }                       # single IP
  transfer { to * 216.218.130.2 ... }                 # mixed

Every form with a specific IPv4 address silently breaks server-block
startup — the auto plugin still loads zones into memory but the
:53/:443/:853 listeners never bind. Reproducible on coredns/coredns
1.11.3 AND 1.12.2 with the (common) snippet + auto + forward shape.
Only `to *` results in healthy listener startup.

Even if we got CoreDNS-side filtering to work, Docker's default
userland-proxy rewrites source IPs to the bridge gateway, which would
break IP-based filtering anyway short of `network_mode: host`.

Decision: keep `to *` in CoreDNS, push HE-only filtering to the
FortiWiFi firewall (source-IP-restricted VIP/DNAT for WAN:53/tcp).
This is correct-layered defense — the perimeter does the IP work
before packets ever reach dell01.
2026-05-16 16:04:44 -06:00
Description
Hidden-primary DNS for ~91 zones: CoreDNS + custom rfc2136 plugin for self-hosted ACME DNS-01. Source of truth for zones/, Corefile, deploy configs.
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