Ryan Malloy
4ed92efd69
Cospas-Sarsat specification summaries moved to reference/ for internal use only. Links updated to point to official cospas-sarsat.int site. The extracted images remain in public/ for use in other pages.
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---
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title: "R023: C/S R.023 - Issue 1"
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description: "Official Cospas-Sarsat R-series document R023"
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sidebar:
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badge:
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text: "R"
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variant: "note"
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# Extended Cospas-Sarsat metadata
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documentId: "R023"
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series: "R"
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seriesName: "Reports"
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documentType: "report"
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isLatest: true
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documentDate: "February 2018"
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originalTitle: "C/S R.023 - Issue 1"
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---
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> **📋 Document Information**
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>
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> **Series:** R-Series (Reports)
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> **Date:** February 2018
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> **Source:** [Cospas-Sarsat Official Documents](https://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/documents-pro/system-documents)
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---
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COSPAS-SARSAT 406-MHz MEOSAR SYSTEM
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DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION
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PHASE II REPORT
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Issue 1
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COSPAS-SARSAT 406-MHz MEOSAR SYSTEM
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DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION
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PHASE II REPORT
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HISTORY
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Issue
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Revision
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Date
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Comments
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Approved by the Cospas-Sarsat Council (CSC-59)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Page
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History
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Table of Contents
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List of Tables
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List of Figures
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1.
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BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................1-7
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1.1
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MEOSAR System Description ...................................................................................1-7
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1.2
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The Cospas-Sarsat MEOSAR Demonstration and Evaluation Plan ...........................1-7
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1.3
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The Phase II of the Cospas-Sarsat MEOSAR D&E ...................................................1-8
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1.3.1
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Objective of the D&E Phase II ......................................................................1-8
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1.3.2
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Report of the D&E Phase II ...........................................................................1-8
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2.
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CONDUCT OF PHASE II AND MEOSAR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION ...............2-1
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2.1
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Tests Conducted During the Phase II .........................................................................2-1
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2.2
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Participants in the D&E Phase II ................................................................................2-5
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2.3
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Configuration of the D&E Phase II ............................................................................2-8
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2.3.1
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Experimental Space Segment ........................................................................2-8
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2.3.2
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Experimental Ground Segment ......................................................................2-8
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2.3.3
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Beacon Simulators and Test Beacons ..........................................................2-10
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2.4
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Test Coordination .....................................................................................................2-10
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2.5
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Operational Issues Encountered during the Phase II Testing ...................................2-10
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2.6
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Data Collection .........................................................................................................2-10
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3.
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RESULTS OF THE TECHNICAL TESTS AND DISCUSSION ..................................3-1
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3.1
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Test T-1 (Processing Threshold and System Margin) ................................................3-1
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3.1.1
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Analysis .........................................................................................................3-1
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3.1.2
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Interpretation ..................................................................................................3-1
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3.2
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Test T-2 (Impact of Interference) ...............................................................................3-5
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3.2.1
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Analysis .........................................................................................................3-5
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3.2.2
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Interpretation ..................................................................................................3-5
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3.3
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Test T-3 (Valid/Complete Message Acquisition).......................................................3-6
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3.3.1
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Analysis .........................................................................................................3-6
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3.3.2
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Interpretation ..................................................................................................3-7
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3.4
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Test T-4 (Independent 2D Location Capability) ......................................................3-10
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3.4.1
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Analysis .......................................................................................................3-10
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3.4.2
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Interpretation ................................................................................................3-10
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3.5
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Test T-5 (Independent 2D Location Capability for Operational Beacons) ..............3-13
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3.5.1
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Analysis .......................................................................................................3-13
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3.5.2
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Interpretation ................................................................................................3-14
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3.6
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Test T-6 (MEOSAR System Capacity) ....................................................................3-18
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3.6.1
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Analysis .......................................................................................................3-18
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3.6.2
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Interpretation ................................................................................................3-18
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3.7
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Test T-4/T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage) ....................................................3-21
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3.7.1
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Analysis .......................................................................................................3-21
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3.7.2
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Interpretation ................................................................................................3-22
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3.8
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Test T-5/T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage) ....................................................3-24
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3.8.1
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Analysis .......................................................................................................3-24
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3.8.2
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Interpretation ................................................................................................3-24
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4.
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RESULTS OF THE OPERATIONAL TESTS AND DISCUSSION ............................4-1
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4.1
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Expected MEOLUT Configuration and Time Periods ...............................................4-1
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4.2
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MCC Configuration ....................................................................................................4-1
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4.2.1
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France ............................................................................................................4-1
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4.2.2
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Italy ................................................................................................................4-2
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4.2.3
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Japan ..............................................................................................................4-2
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4.2.4
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Norway ..........................................................................................................4-3
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4.2.5
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Spain ..............................................................................................................4-4
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4.2.6
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USA ...............................................................................................................4-5
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4.3
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Test O-1 Potential Time Advantage ...........................................................................4-6
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4.3.1
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O-1 Test Result ..............................................................................................4-6
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4.3.2
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O-1 Test Result Interpretation .....................................................................4-13
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4.4
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Test O-2 Unique Detections by MEOSAR System as Compared to
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Existing System .........................................................................................4-20
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4.4.1
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O-2 Test Result ............................................................................................4-20
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4.4.2
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O-2 Test Result Interpretation .....................................................................4-27
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4.5
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Test O-3 Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert Traffic in the Cospas-Sarsat
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Ground Segment Network .........................................................................4-32
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4.5.1
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O-3 Test Result ............................................................................................4-32
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4.5.2
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O-3 Test Result Interpretation .....................................................................4-39
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4.6
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Test O-4 406 MHz Alert Data Distribution Procedures ...........................................4-42
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4.6.1
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O-4 Test Result ............................................................................................4-42
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4.6.2
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O-4 Test Result Interpretation .....................................................................4-45
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4.7
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Test O-5 SAR/Galileo Return Link Service .............................................................4-47
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4.8
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Test O-6 Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Benefits of the MEOSAR System .......4-48
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4.8.1
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Incident 1 – Brazil........................................................................................4-49
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4.8.2
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Incident 2 – New Zealand ............................................................................4-50
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4.8.3
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Incident 3 – New Zealand ............................................................................4-51
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4.8.4
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Incident 4 – New Zealand ............................................................................4-52
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4.8.5
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Incident 5 – Norway ....................................................................................4-53
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4.8.6
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Incident 6 – New Zealand ............................................................................4-54
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4.8.7
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Incident 7 – Australia ...................................................................................4-55
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4.8.8
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Incident 8 – Italy ..........................................................................................4-56
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4.8.9
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Incident 9 – New Zealand ............................................................................4-57
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4.8.10 Incident 10 – Australia .................................................................................4-58
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4.8.11 Incident 11 – Australia .................................................................................4-59
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4.8.12 Incident 12 – Brazil......................................................................................4-60
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4.8.13 Incident 13 – New Zealand ..........................................................................4-61
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4.8.14 Incident 14 – Argentina ...............................................................................4-62
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4.8.15 Incident 15 – Australia .................................................................................4-64
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4.8.16 Incident 16 – New Zealand ..........................................................................4-65
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4.8.17 Incident 17 – Australia .................................................................................4-66
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4.9
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Test O-7 MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution – Impact on Independent
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Location Accuracy .....................................................................................4-67
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4.9.1
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O-7 Test Result ............................................................................................4-67
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4.9.2
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O-7 Test Result Interpretation .....................................................................4-71
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5.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................................5-1
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5.1
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Conclusion ..................................................................................................................5-1
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5.1.1
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Test T-1 (Processing Threshold and System Margin) ...................................5-1
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5.1.2
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Test T-2 (Impact of Interference) ..................................................................5-1
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5.1.3
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Test T-3 (MEOLUT Valid/Complete Message Acquisition) ........................5-1
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5.1.4
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Test T-4 (Independent Location Capability)..................................................5-2
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5.1.5
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Test T-5 (Independent 2D Location Capability for Operational Beacons) ....5-2
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5.1.6
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Test T-6 (MEOSAR System Capacity) .........................................................5-4
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5.1.7
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Test T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage) ................................................5-5
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5.1.8
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Test T-8 (Combined MEO/GEO Operation Performance (Optional)) ..........5-5
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5.1.9
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Test O-1 Potential Time Advantage ..............................................................5-5
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5.1.10 Test O-2 Unique Detections by MEOSAR System as Compared to
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Existing System .............................................................................................5-6
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5.1.11 Test O-3 Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert Traffic in the
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Cospas-Sarsat Ground Segment Network .....................................................5-6
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5.1.12 Test O-4 406 MHz Alert Data Distribution Procedures ................................5-8
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5.1.13 Test O-5 SAR/Galileo Return Link Service ................................................5-10
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5.1.14 Test O-6 Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Benefits of the
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MEOSAR System ........................................................................................5-10
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5.1.15 Test O-7 MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution – Impact on Independent
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Location Accuracy.......................................................................................5-10
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5.2
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Recommendations for the Conduct of Subsequent D&E Phases .............................5-11
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5.2.1
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Test T-1 (Processing Threshold and System Margin) .................................5-11
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5.2.2
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Test T-2 (Impact of Interference) ................................................................5-11
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5.2.3
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Test T-3 (MEOLUT Valid/Complete Message Acquisition) ......................5-11
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5.2.4
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Test T-4 (Independent Location Capability)................................................5-11
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5.2.5
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Test T-5 (Independent 2D Location Capability for Operational Beacons) ..5-11
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5.2.6
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Test T-6 (MEOSAR System Capacity) .......................................................5-12
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5.2.7
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Test T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage) ..............................................5-12
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5.2.8
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Test T-8 (Combined MEO/GEO Operation Performance (Optional)) ........5-12
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5.2.9
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Test O-1 Potential Time Advantage ............................................................5-12
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5.2.10 Test O-2 Unique Detections by MEOSAR System as Compared to
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Existing System ...........................................................................................5-12
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5.2.11 Test O-3 Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert Traffic in the
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Cospas-Sarsat Ground Segment Network ...................................................5-12
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5.2.12 Test O-4 406 MHz Alert Data Distribution Procedures ..............................5-12
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5.2.13 Test O-5 SAR/Galileo Return Link Service ................................................5-12
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5.2.14 Test O-6 Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Benefits of the
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MEOSAR System ........................................................................................5-13
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5.2.15 Test O-7 MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution –Impact on Independent
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Location Accuracy.......................................................................................5-13
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LIST OF ANNEXES
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ANNEX A DETAILED LOG OF PHASE II TESTS ................................................................... A-1
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ANNEX B LIST OF ACRONYMS FOR OPERATIONAL TESTS .......................................... B-1
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LIST OF FIGURES
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Figure 1: The MEOSAR System Concept ..........................................................................................1-7
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Figure 2: Phase II Test Planning (as Run) ..........................................................................................2-3
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Figure 3: MEOLUTs Involved in Phase II Technical Testing with 3,000 km Radius Circles ...........2-9
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Figure 4: Beacon Simulators Used in the MEOSAR D&E Phase II (MEOSAR Visibility
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Circles at Five Degree Elevation) .....................................................................................2-10
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Figure 5: Location of the 35 Operational Beacons Deployed for T-5 and T-5/T-7 Phase 2
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in April 2015 .....................................................................................................................3-14
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LIST OF TABLES
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Table 1: List of Technical Tests, Test Coordinators and Test Reports ...............................................2-1
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Table 2: List of Operational Tests, Test Coordinators and Test Reports ............................................2-2
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Table 3: Participation in MEOSAR D&E Phase II Technical Tests ...................................................2-6
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Table 4: Participation in MEOSAR D&E Phase II Operational Tests ...............................................2-7
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Table 5: List of Experimental MEOSAR Satellites Used During the MEOSAR D&E Phase II ........2-8
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Table 6: MEOLUTs Participating in MEOSAR D&E Phase II Tests ................................................2-9
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DOCUMENT SUMMARY
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This document provides the report of Phase II of the Cospas-Sarsat MEOSAR Demonstration and
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Evaluation (D&E), tests which were conducted from April 2014 to June 2015.
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Section 1 provides background on the MEOSAR system and reference material.
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Section 2 reviews the planning and conduct of the tests, noting the list of participants, MEOSAR
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space and ground assets configuration used during the tests and information of interest on the
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coordination of the tests.
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Section 3 details, for each D&E technical test the key results and interpretations as provided by each
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test participant that contributed to this Report (Canada, France, Russia, Turkey and USA). The
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underlying sub-sections were provided under the responsibility of these administrations and,
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therefore, were not reviewed nor commonly agreed by the Phase II technical test participants.
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Section 4 details, for each D&E operational test the key results and interpretations as provided by
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each test participant that contributed to this Report: France, Italy, Norway, Japan, Russia, Spain and
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USA. The underlying sub-sections were provided under the responsibility of these administrations
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and, therefore, were not reviewed nor commonly agreed by the Phase II operational test participants.
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Additionally, the following participants contributed with SAR Reports to the O-6 test: Argentina,
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Australia, Brazil, Italy, New Zealand and Norway.
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Section 5 provides, for each test, the conclusions and recommendations agreed by the Phase II test
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participants, as well as general recommendations regarding the implementation of the MEOSAR
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system.
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1-7
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1.
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BACKGROUND
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1.1
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MEOSAR System Description
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Figure 1 provides a graphical summary of the MEOSAR concept. This picture shows the relay of
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beacon signals, via multiple satellites, to the MEOLUT. Beacon data is processed by the MEOLUT
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to derive the beacon locations, and passed onto the MCC, which in turn notifies the RCC.
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Figure 1: The MEOSAR System Concept
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1.2
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The Cospas-Sarsat MEOSAR Demonstration and Evaluation Plan
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The Cospas-Sarsat Council (CSC) has directed that a demonstration and evaluation (D&E) be
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performed to confirm the expected capabilities and benefits of a satellite system in medium-altitude
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Earth orbit (MEO) that uses onboard repeater instruments to relay distress alert signals emanating
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from 406 MHz distress radiobeacons. The CSC further directed that the D&E should establish the
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technical and operational performance characteristics of the MEOSAR system.
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The framework for the D&E of the MEOSAR system is provided in document C/S R.018 “Cospas-
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Sarsat Demonstration and Evaluation Plan for the 406 MHz MEOSAR System”. In particular,
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documents provide guidelines for:
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•
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conducting the D&E of the MEOSAR system in a standard manner among the participants,
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1-8
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•
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collecting a set of results from individual participants, using compatible formats, that can be
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consolidated into a final report for review by Cospas-Sarsat participants and other interested
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parties,
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•
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analysing and translating the results into a set of recommendations for a decision by the
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Cospas-Sarsat Council to enter the Initial Operational Capability Phase.
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Additional resources regarding the MEOSAR system (e.g., space segment information) are available
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in document C/S R.012 “Cospas-Sarsat 406 MHz MEOSAR Implementation Plan”.
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CSC-49 agreed to divide the MEOSAR D&E Phase into three phases:
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•
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Phase I, during which the participants perform only technical tests,
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•
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Phase II, during which the participants perform technical and operational tests,
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•
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Phase III, during which the participants replicate the tests of the Phases I and II, when
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satellites with L-band downlinks are widely available.
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1.3
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The Phase II of the Cospas-Sarsat MEOSAR D&E
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1.3.1
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Objective of the D&E Phase II
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In MEOSAR D&E Phase II, participants performed technical and operational tests (see the detailed
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definition in document C/S R.018) to characterise the technical and operational performance of the
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MEOSAR system. Due to the limited space segment available, some tests had to be coordinated and
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the processing be tuned accordingly, in particular capacity tests.
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1.3.2
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Report of the D&E Phase II
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The D&E Phase II report was produced with inputs from the Phase II Test participants where some
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of the review and drafting work was achieved by a Correspondence Working Group with the support
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of the Secretariat, based on:
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•
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the reports on the conduct of the technical and operational tests provided by the test
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coordinators (see Table 1 and Table 2),
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•
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contributions from the technical test participants, which provided their interpretation of the
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test results (see section 3),
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•
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contributions from the operational test participants, which provided their interpretation of the
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test results (see section 4),
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•
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agreement among the participants on common conclusions and recommendation for the D&E
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Phase II (see section 5).
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- END OF SECTION 1 -
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2-1
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2.
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CONDUCT OF PHASE II AND MEOSAR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
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2.1
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Tests Conducted During the Phase II
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Table 1 and Table 2 provides the list of technical and operational tests planned for the Phase II,
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respectively, their completeness status, the participants undertaking the role of test coordinator and
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the reference to the test reports written by the test coordinators. The detailed conduct of each test can
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be found in the test coordinator’s reports. Figure 2 provides a Gantt chart of the D&E testing
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campaign.
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Test
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Definition
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Run
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Status
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Test
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Coordinator
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T-1
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Processing Threshold and System
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Margin
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Completed in February 2015
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USA
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T-2
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Impact of Interference
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Records available only for tests T-1, T-3
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Run
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Canada
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T-3
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Valid/Complete Message Acquisition
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Completed in February and March 2015
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France
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T-4
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Independent 2D Location Capability
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Completed in March and April 2015
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USA
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T-5
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Independent 2D Location Capability
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for Operational Beacons
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-
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Completed in March and April 2015
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Turkey
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T-6
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MEOSAR System Capacity
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Completed in June 2015
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France
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T-7
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Networked MEOLUT Advantage
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Completed in April and May 2015
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USA
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T-8
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Combined MEO/GEO Operation
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Performance
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-
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Discarded
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Turkey
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Table 1: List of Technical Tests, Test Coordinators and Test Reports
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2-2
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Test
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Definition
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Test
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Coordinator
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Test Report Reference
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O-1
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Potential Time Advantage
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||
France
|
||
Section 4.3 of this report
|
||
O-2
|
||
Unique Detections by MEOSAR System as Compared to
|
||
Existing System.
|
||
USA
|
||
Section 4.4 of this report
|
||
O-3
|
||
Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert Traffic in the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
Ground Segment Network
|
||
Spain
|
||
JC-29/Inf 28
|
||
O-4
|
||
406 MHz Alert Data Distribution Procedures
|
||
USA
|
||
Section 4.6 of this report
|
||
O-5
|
||
SAR/Galileo Return Link Service
|
||
France
|
||
(SGDSP)
|
||
Test O-5 has been postponed to
|
||
Phase III
|
||
O-6
|
||
Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Benefits of the MEOSAR
|
||
System
|
||
Australia
|
||
Section 4.8 of this report
|
||
O-7
|
||
MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution –Impact on Independent
|
||
Location Accuracy
|
||
USA
|
||
Section 4.9 of this report
|
||
Table 2: List of Operational Tests, Test Coordinators and Test Reports
|
||
|
||
2-3
|
||
|
||
Figure 2: Phase II Test Planning (as Run)
|
||
|
||
2-5
|
||
|
||
2.2
|
||
Participants in the D&E Phase II
|
||
Table 3 provides the participants in each run of technical test, which provided at least raw data as per
|
||
Table J.1 of document C/S R.018 or a technical test report. Some participants did not provide
|
||
technical test results and/or technical test report. Table 3 also provides the test during which
|
||
spectrum of the 406 MHz band was recorded. For test T-5, the participation in test T-5 is identified
|
||
either in supplying test beacons or in involving MEOLUTs.
|
||
|
||
2-6
|
||
|
||
Test
|
||
Definition
|
||
Run
|
||
T-2: Impact of
|
||
Interference
|
||
(by Canada)
|
||
France
|
||
EC/France
|
||
Russia
|
||
Turkey
|
||
USA
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
Florida
|
||
Maryland
|
||
T-1
|
||
Processing Threshold and System
|
||
Margin
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
T-3
|
||
Valid/Complete Message
|
||
Acquisition
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
T-4
|
||
Independent 2D Location
|
||
Capability
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
T-5
|
||
Independent 2D
|
||
Location
|
||
Capability for
|
||
Operational
|
||
Beacons
|
||
Test beacon
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
MEOLUT
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
T-6
|
||
MEOSAR System Capacity
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
T-4/T-7
|
||
Networked MEOLUT
|
||
Advantage
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
T-5/T-7
|
||
Networked MEOLUT
|
||
Advantage
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
Table 3: Participation in MEOSAR D&E Phase II Technical Tests
|
||
|
||
2-7
|
||
|
||
Table 4 provides the participants in each run of operational tests, which provided raw data using the O-test spreadsheet described in
|
||
section 5 of document C/S R.018, or have provided reports to be included in the O-6 section.
|
||
Test
|
||
Definition
|
||
Period
|
||
Argentina
|
||
Australia
|
||
Brazil
|
||
France
|
||
Italy
|
||
Japan
|
||
New
|
||
Zealand
|
||
Norway
|
||
Spain
|
||
USA
|
||
O-1
|
||
Potential Time Advantage
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
O-2
|
||
Unique Detections by MEOSAR System
|
||
as Compared to Existing System
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
O-3
|
||
Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert
|
||
Traffic in the Cospas-Sarsat Ground
|
||
Segment Network
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
O-4
|
||
406 MHz Alert Data Distribution
|
||
Procedures
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
O-5
|
||
SAR/Galileo Return Link Service
|
||
|
||
|
||
O-6
|
||
Evaluation of Direct and Indirect
|
||
Benefits of the MEOSAR System
|
||
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
O-7
|
||
MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution –
|
||
Impact on Independent Location
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
|
||
X
|
||
X
|
||
Table 4: Participation in MEOSAR D&E Phase II Operational Tests
|
||
|
||
2-8
|
||
|
||
2.3
|
||
Configuration of the D&E Phase II
|
||
2.3.1
|
||
Experimental Space Segment
|
||
Table 5 provides the list of experimental MEOSAR satellites available for testing during MEOSAR
|
||
D&E Phase II.
|
||
MEOSAR
|
||
Constellation
|
||
Satellite
|
||
(C/S ID)
|
||
Satellite availability status for Phase I or launch date
|
||
DASS (GPS-II)
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available
|
||
|
||
Available subsequent to launch on 4 October 2012
|
||
|
||
Available subsequent to launch on 15 May 2013
|
||
|
||
Available subsequent to launch on 21 February 2014
|
||
|
||
Available subsequent to launch on 15 May 2014
|
||
|
||
Available subsequent to launch on 2 August 2014
|
||
|
||
Available subsequent to launch on 29 October 2014
|
||
Galileo
|
||
|
||
Available for testing from January 2015 (without ephemeris)
|
||
|
||
Available for testing from March 2013
|
||
|
||
Available for testing from March 2013 (without ephemeris)
|
||
Glonass
|
||
|
||
Available with limitations (no ephemeris data available)
|
||
|
||
Available with limitations (no ephemeris data available)
|
||
Table 5: List of Experimental MEOSAR Satellites Used
|
||
During the MEOSAR D&E Phase II
|
||
2.3.2
|
||
Experimental Ground Segment
|
||
The ground segment equipment in place for the Phase II of the MEOSAR D&E consisted of
|
||
experimental MEOLUTs located in Brazil, Cyprus, Canada, France, Norway, Russia, Spain, Turkey,
|
||
the UK and the USA. Table 6 provides the MEOLUTs available for testing, their number of
|
||
antennas, their software configuration and their availability (note that some participants may have
|
||
experienced unexpected down periods for some channels, thus limiting their participation in
|
||
particular tests; see the Test Coordinators reports for more detail).
|
||
|
||
2-9
|
||
|
||
Country/
|
||
Organisation
|
||
Location
|
||
Number of
|
||
Antennas
|
||
Configuration
|
||
Available for
|
||
D&E testing since
|
||
Brazil
|
||
Brasilia
|
||
|
||
[to be completed]
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
Ottawa
|
||
|
||
HGT MEOLUT 600
|
||
Spectrum Monitoring Only
|
||
|
||
Cyprus
|
||
Larnaca
|
||
|
||
HGT MEOLUT600 LP v2.0 / SP v2.0 / FP v2.0
|
||
|
||
France
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
|
||
HGT MEOLUT600 LP v1.7b / SP v1.5 / FP v1.5
|
||
|
||
Norway
|
||
Svalbard
|
||
|
||
HGT MEOLUT600 LP v2.0 / SP v2.0 / FP v2.0
|
||
|
||
Russia
|
||
Moscow
|
||
|
||
4 antennas
|
||
(for more information see relevant sections of
|
||
test reports)
|
||
|
||
Spain
|
||
Maspalomas
|
||
|
||
HGT MEOLUT600 LP v2.0 / SP v2.0 / FP v2.0
|
||
|
||
Turkey
|
||
Ankara
|
||
|
||
6-channel (1-2-4-5-6-7)
|
||
HGT MEOLUT600 LP v1.8 / SP v1.8 / FP v1.8
|
||
|
||
USA
|
||
Florida
|
||
|
||
McMurdo MEOLUT v1.0
|
||
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
|
||
McMurdo MEOLUT v1.0
|
||
|
||
Maryland
|
||
|
||
McMurdo MEOLUT v1.0
|
||
|
||
Table 6: MEOLUTs Participating in MEOSAR D&E Phase II Tests
|
||
Figure 3: MEOLUTs Involved in Phase II Technical Testing with 3,000 km Radius Circles
|
||
|
||
2-10
|
||
|
||
2.3.3
|
||
Beacon Simulators and Test Beacons
|
||
Four beacon simulators were used during the Phase II testing, located in Florida, Hawaii and
|
||
Maryland, USA and Toulouse, France. After each test, the beacon log files were provided by each
|
||
administration providing beacon simulators.
|
||
Figure 4: Beacon Simulators Used in the MEOSAR D&E Phase II
|
||
(MEOSAR Visibility Circles at Five Degree Elevation)
|
||
2.4
|
||
Test Coordination
|
||
A smooth progression of the D&E planning and tests has been observed thanks to the active
|
||
participation of the Test Coordinators and Test Participants. No formal D&E test had to be
|
||
postponed or re-scheduled due to a coordination issue.
|
||
However, a dry-run test encountered some difficulty because of the work simultaneously being
|
||
performed by the Galileo Programme. In addition to this particular case, other tests had been planned
|
||
by Test Participants at times similar to those of SAR/Galileo commissioning tests, requiring an active
|
||
coordination between France and EC/ESA in order to avoid the simultaneous transmission of beacon
|
||
signals.
|
||
2.5
|
||
Operational Issues Encountered during the Phase II Testing
|
||
No operational issue was encountered during the conduct of the Phase II tests.
|
||
2.6
|
||
Data Collection
|
||
For the technical tests, the participants collected the following data:
|
||
•
|
||
beacon simulator log data to collect the beacon IDs transmitted (if applicable),
|
||
|
||
2-11
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
MEOLUT raw data as per csv format defined in Table J.1 of document C/S R.018,
|
||
•
|
||
MEOLUT location data as per csv format defined in Table J.2 of document C/S R.018,
|
||
•
|
||
MEOLUT pass schedule data as per csv format defined in Table J.3 of document C/S R.018.
|
||
For the operational tests, the participants collected raw data from the MEOSAR-ready MCCs as
|
||
requested in section 5 of document C/S R.018. Then participants used the spreadsheet provided in
|
||
order to produce the operational test tables needed for the analyses presented in this report.
|
||
All the data provided by the test participants were saved on the MEOSAR D&E FTP server.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 2 -
|
||
|
||
3-1
|
||
|
||
3.
|
||
RESULTS OF THE TECHNICAL TESTS AND DISCUSSION
|
||
The following sections provide, for each test:
|
||
•
|
||
references to the test participant’s reports presenting the results of the MEOSAR D&E
|
||
tests conducted during the Phase I testing,
|
||
•
|
||
a summary of the interpretation of the test analyses, as provided by each administration.
|
||
3.1
|
||
Test T-1 (Processing Threshold and System Margin)
|
||
3.1.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
“C/S D&E Phase 2 T-1 Test Report - Processing Threshold and System Margin”,
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-911-CNES\_01\_01
|
||
Russia
|
||
T-1 Run-1 Test Participant report\_Russia.pdf
|
||
Turkey
|
||
T-1 Phase 2 TRMEO Report v1 - 20.12.2015.doc
|
||
USA
|
||
Maryland MEOLUT Participant Report T1 Run01- ver2 03 June 2015
|
||
TG-3/2015/Inf.14 - Maryland MEOLUT Results for Tests T-1, T-3, and T-4
|
||
T1 USA Florida MEOLUT Report rev1.0 22 May 2015
|
||
T1 USA Hawaii MEOLUT Report rev1.0 22 May 2015
|
||
3.1.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.1.2.1 France
|
||
The configuration of the L-Band Space Segment was not improved since Phase I, which implies
|
||
the L-Band satellites analysis was still very limited.
|
||
Regarding the automatic pass-schedule processing, the MEOLUT antennas track sometimes less
|
||
than 4 satellites even if 4 or more satellites are in visibility conditions. This leads us to the
|
||
conclusion that the optimization algorithm for computing the tracking plan of the French
|
||
MEOLUT is not performant enough to provide coherent satellite tracking and this fact is
|
||
degrading both detections and locations of the ground station.
|
||
The following summarizes the results obtained for Phase I and Phase II.
|
||
|
||
3-2
|
||
|
||
Phase I
|
||
Phase II
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
Run1
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
Run2
|
||
Maryland
|
||
Run1
|
||
Maryland
|
||
Run2
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
Run1
|
||
Maryland
|
||
Run1
|
||
Florida
|
||
Run1
|
||
Number of single satellite channels
|
||
|
||
|
||
Mean throughput probability of valid
|
||
message at 37 dBm (%)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Mean throughput probability of complete
|
||
message at 37 dBm (%)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Percentage of single satellite channels for
|
||
which the system margin is defined (valid
|
||
messages) (%)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Percentage of Single Satellite channels for
|
||
which the system margin is defined
|
||
(complete messages) (%)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Test T-1 Phase I and Phase II Results Summary
|
||
As observed during Phase I Run2, the throughput probability curves are strongly jagged, probably
|
||
due to a frequency sweeping radar with a pulse period equal to 200 ms. The new parameter
|
||
setting (from 0 to 2) of the bit error tolerance on bits 1 to 15 does not improve significantly the
|
||
results. Consequently, we assume that many messages are out-filtered before the decoding
|
||
process. This issue reduces both detection performances and location performances.
|
||
Valid Message Probability vs Antenna Number - Toulouse Transmission
|
||
In almost all the single satellite channel cases, the system margin value is undefined because the
|
||
throughput detection probability never reaches the criteria of 70%. Consequently, it is not
|
||
possible to determine a significant value representing the MEOSAR system margin.
|
||
|
||
3-3
|
||
|
||
The detection performance is improved using multi-antennas combination and a margin above the
|
||
70% threshold was achieved when at least two antennas were used.
|
||
The throughput probabilities computed from the Maryland and Florida transmissions at the
|
||
nominal power were better than the results obtained from the Toulouse transmission.
|
||
At beacon level, the antenna pattern null at high elevation angle is a system limitation which was
|
||
observed for both Phase I and Phase II runs.
|
||
As observed during Phase I Runs, an important gap between the throughput probability of valid
|
||
and complete messages was observed even if the SP software version was updated. We can note
|
||
that this issue is fixed on the SP software version of the European MEOLUTs.
|
||
The probability to detect processing anomaly was around 14.3·10-4 (requirement: 10-4) during
|
||
Toulouse transmission. This high value seems to be due to the low transmission power of most of
|
||
the bursts. No processing anomaly was detected from 2 or more satellites but 1 anomaly was
|
||
detected by 2 antennas which tracked the same satellite. All the processing anomalies correspond
|
||
to 2-bit errors on the field PDF1/BCH1.
|
||
3.1.2.2 Russia
|
||
The interpretation of results of the test indicated that the Processing Threshold in a standalone
|
||
MEOLUT analysis varied from 22 to 28 dBm and System Margin therefore ranged from 9 up to
|
||
15 dB and was subject to number of antennas and beacon simulator locations.
|
||
With respect to a single-satellite channel statistics, the System Margin varied from 8 to 15 dB and
|
||
more. In several cases the anomalous values of less than 7 dB were observed. The additional
|
||
analysis of a Toulouse beacon emission showed that after including the antenna gain variation
|
||
information into account factors adversely affecting the Processing Threshold were:
|
||
•
|
||
Interferences, that might temporarily or fully block the reception at a MEOLUT by
|
||
overlapping with the beacon signal in frequency and time;
|
||
•
|
||
Drop-off of the C/N0 values that triggered the reception of invalid messages in the
|
||
MEOLUT signal processor in the range of 270˚-310˚ azimuth degrees and 5˚-60˚
|
||
elevation degrees, where the effective beacon EIRP was less than expected possibly due
|
||
to unknown reduction of the antenna gain value, presence of local obstructions or out-of-
|
||
band interferences that could break in the GPS satellite repeater band (S-band repeater).
|
||
The investigation of anomalous occurrences in USA-based transmissions was not conducted as
|
||
the beacon antenna gain patterns for USA beacon simulators was not available at the time of
|
||
writing of the report.
|
||
3.1.2.3 Turkey
|
||
For the Toulouse transmission of 3-4 February 2015, the 6-channel Ankara MEOLUT reached
|
||
the 70% system throughput threshold aimed by test T-1 at 26 dBm for valid messages and at 28
|
||
dBm for complete messages with corresponding average C/No values of 34.2 dB-Hz and 35.1
|
||
dB-Hz respectively.
|
||
|
||
3-4
|
||
|
||
Taking the valid messages into consideration, the results seemed to indicate a processing
|
||
threshold of 26 dBm and a system margin of 11 dB. When complete messages were considered,
|
||
the processing threshold became 28 dBm whereas the system margin decreased to 9 dB.
|
||
3.1.2.4 USA
|
||
Single Channel (i.e., a single satellite through a single antenna) results were provided to the
|
||
MEOSAR D&E FTP server, but not repeated in the Maryland Participant Report because they
|
||
vary considerably due to the following factors. They are affected by the beacon EIRP in the
|
||
direction of the satellite, which is a combination of the transmit power, the antenna pattern, and
|
||
any ground blockage. They are also affected by the amount of noise reaching the satellite’s
|
||
receive antenna along with the beacon signal. This noise varies but seems to have different
|
||
characteristics based on the portion of the globe covered by the receive antenna. Therefore, single
|
||
channel results are not all the same but vary as these variables change for a given satellite pass.
|
||
For instance, a satellite pass that does not pass through the null of the beacon’s antenna pattern
|
||
will produce better results than one that does.
|
||
Multi-channel results (from the Maryland MEOLUT with four antennas) from the Maryland and
|
||
Florida beacon simulators show that beacons that transmit at the minimum allowable power
|
||
(35 dBm) and are within reasonable proximity to the Maryland MEOLUT have a greater than
|
||
77% probability of recovering a valid message on a single burst. The threshold for recovering a
|
||
valid message on a single burst of 70% is achieved at a beacon transmit power of 30 dBm for the
|
||
Maryland beacon simulator and 33 dBm for the Florida beacon simulator.
|
||
Even beacons transmissions from Hawaii show that for a beacon that transmit at the minimum
|
||
allowable power (35 dBm) and are at great distances away from the MEOLUT (7,780 km), the
|
||
probability of recovering a valid message on a single burst is 68%.
|
||
|
||
3-5
|
||
|
||
3.2
|
||
Test T-2 (Impact of Interference)
|
||
3.2.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
Canada
|
||
JC-31/10/3
|
||
3.2.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.2.2.1 Canada
|
||
Due to the Canadian MEOLUT at Shirley’s Bay not being operational for the majority of the
|
||
MEOSAR D&E Phase II, spectrum monitoring files were only available for tests T-1 and T-3 and
|
||
these were made available on the MEOSAR D&E FTP server. Unlike during Phase I testing,
|
||
little use of the plots was made by other D&E participants, most likely due to the fact that tests T-
|
||
1 and T-3, being single channel tests, did not yield significantly different results from Phase I –
|
||
with one exception. As described at TG-3/2015/Inf.1 – Corr.1, when T-testing is performed
|
||
coincidental with CTEC B.8 Testing (Translation and Transmitter Frequencies) interference will
|
||
likely be observed on any channels tracking satellites with CTEC in their footprint. The B.8
|
||
transmission is in the upper half of the band, and does not interfere with operational beacons,
|
||
however, in one case it did impact reception of T3 test transmissions.
|
||
The figure below provides an example of the interference which was observed.
|
||
|
||
3-6
|
||
|
||
Strong Interferences During T-3 Test on 5 March 2015 – observed at French MEOLUT
|
||
3.3
|
||
Test T-3 (Valid/Complete Message Acquisition)
|
||
3.3.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
MEOSAR D&E Phase 2 Test T-3 REPORT - Valid/Complete Message Acquisition
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-913-CNES\_01\_01
|
||
Russia
|
||
T-3 Run-1 Test Participant report\_Russia.pdf
|
||
Turkey
|
||
T-3 Phase 2 TRMEO Report v1 - 13.12.2015.doc
|
||
USA
|
||
Maryland MEOLUT Participant Report T3 Run01-26 May 2015
|
||
TG-3/2015/Inf.14 - Maryland MEOLUT Results for Tests T-1, T-3, and T-4
|
||
T-3 USA Florida MEOLUT Report rev 1.0 22 May 2015
|
||
T-3 USA Hawaii MEOLUT Report rev 1.0 22 May 2015
|
||
37 dBm Bursts
|
||
33 dBm Bursts
|
||
|
||
3-7
|
||
|
||
3.3.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.3.2.1 France
|
||
For Toulouse transmission, the valid message detection probability within 10 minutes is
|
||
consistent with the document C/S R.012 requirement (> 99% within 10 minutes) at nominal
|
||
power 37 dBm. However, a 16 hours period was impacted by a MEOLUT software breakdown,
|
||
so the 24h coverage was not fully studied.
|
||
For US-Maryland transmission, the detection probability was degraded due to the less favourable
|
||
co-visibility conditions, as Phase I modified test. The detection probability within 10 minutes,
|
||
averaged over all 37 dBm slots, is equal to 89%. This value is not enough to consider that the
|
||
standalone French MEOLUT achieves to cover a 6,000 km radius area in term of message
|
||
detection. However, this objective should be achieved if the automatic pass schedule computation
|
||
is improved to track the maximum number of satellites.
|
||
For US-Florida transmission, the results are similar to the ones from US-Maryland transmission.
|
||
The detection probability within 10 minutes, averaged over all 37 dBm slots, is equal to 85%.
|
||
This lower value is explained by the larger beacon-MEOLUT distance (7,400 km).
|
||
The satellite segment coverage was globally satisfactory in term of message detection because
|
||
one or more satellites were in co-visibility over 24 hours for all transmissions. The future L-band
|
||
satellite deployment should improve the message detection performances thanks to a better link
|
||
budget and an increase of number of satellites in co-visibility.
|
||
Mean Detection Probability within X Minutes (slots 1-6 and 39-48) - Toulouse Transmission
|
||
The probability to detect processing anomaly was around 3.1x10-4 during Toulouse transmission.
|
||
No anomaly was detected from 2 or more satellites. All the anomalies correspond to 2-bit errors
|
||
on the field PDF1/BCH1. We also observe that the C/N0 range of the processing anomalies is
|
||
large.
|
||
|
||
3-8
|
||
|
||
3.3.2.2 Russia
|
||
The interpretation of results of the test indicated that the probability of detection of at least one
|
||
Valid/Complete Message at the MEOLUT for the beacon simulators ID = 2 and 4 (Maryland and
|
||
Florida) was 100% after 13 transmitted bursts (within 10 minutes after beacon activation) and
|
||
100% in after two transmitted bursts (within 2 minutes after beacon activation) for beacon
|
||
simulator ID=1 (Toulouse) for all considered slots and beacon emission power values.
|
||
With respect to transmission of beacon simulator ID=3 (Hawaii) the probability of detection of at
|
||
least one Valid/Complete Message at the MEOLUT was greater than 70% after seven transmitted
|
||
bursts for both 33 dBm and 37 dBm values of beacon emission power. Furthermore, it was noted
|
||
that the probability values for most of the slots did not keep increasing over time as it would be
|
||
expected but rather reached their maximum values and became flat. It was noted from the
|
||
analysis of this behavior that in every slot independently of the beacon emission power a few
|
||
beacon events had a very scanty throughput (0 to 2 bursts per antenna). The beacon events had
|
||
the following serial numbers: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 28, 30, 32 and 34 (or YYY in the beacon hex ID
|
||
9C9D000YYYD00XX). Further investigation has indicated that all beacon events with those
|
||
serial numbers were emitted at 406.07 MHz frequency, while the signal processor software was
|
||
configured to support beacon burst integration only at 406.064 ± 0.0025 MHz. A detailed
|
||
investigation was not undertaken at this time with the view to have more results to analyze after
|
||
emission from Hawaii was repeated.
|
||
3.3.2.3 Turkey
|
||
For the Toulouse transmission of 4-5 March 2015, the valid message average detection
|
||
probability of the Ankara MEOLUT increased from 96% (resp. 99%) for 1 burst to 100% (resp.
|
||
100%) for 5+ bursts (resp. for 2+ bursts) for a beacon transmission power of 37 dBm (resp. 33
|
||
dBm). The Ankara MEOLUT complete message average detection probability increased from
|
||
95% (resp. 98%) for 1 burst to 100% (resp. 100%) for 5+ bursts (resp. for 2+ bursts) for a beacon
|
||
transmission power of 37 dBm (resp. 33 dBm). Valid (resp. complete) message transfer times of
|
||
8.6 seconds (resp. 10.7 seconds) were obtained at 37 dBm, and valid (resp. complete) message
|
||
transfer times of 5.3 seconds (resp. 5.6 seconds) were obtained at 33 dBm.
|
||
The results seemed to indicate that average detection probabilities improved, as expected, with
|
||
the number of transmitted bursts. However, the expected correlation with the beacon transmission
|
||
power (i.e., higher detection rates and shorter message transfer times for higher beacon
|
||
transmission power) was not observed.
|
||
3.3.2.4 USA-Maryland
|
||
The following charts summarize the results from the Maryland MEOLUT over the entire 24-hour
|
||
period of transmission from each beacon simulator. One chart is included for each beacon power
|
||
level.
|
||
Note that the Maryland simulator did not transmit during the first 11 minutes of the test, which
|
||
corresponds to the first 25 beacon ID’s of slot1. However, we didn’t compensate for this in our
|
||
results.
|
||
|
||
3-9
|
||
|
||
The results demonstrate that the MEOSAR system is an excellent detector of beacon
|
||
transmissions.
|
||
Results from the Maryland and Florida beacon simulators show that beacons that transmit at
|
||
nominal power (37 dBm) and are within reasonable proximity to the Maryland MEOLUT have a
|
||
greater than 89% probability of detection on a single burst. Of course, after five minutes this
|
||
improves to over 98%.
|
||
|
||
3-10
|
||
|
||
Even at the other extreme of conditions, beacons transmissions from Hawaii show that for a
|
||
beacon well below the minimum allowable transmit power (33 dBm) and at great distances away
|
||
from the MEOLUT (7,780 km), the probability of detecting a beacon after a single burst is 60%
|
||
and improves to 90% after ten minutes.
|
||
3.4
|
||
Test T-4 (Independent 2D Location Capability)
|
||
3.4.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
“MEOSAR D&E Phase II Test T-4 Report - Independent 2D Location Capability”
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-916-CNES\_01\_01
|
||
Russia
|
||
T-4 Run-1 Test Participant report\_Russia.pdf
|
||
Turkey
|
||
Data results files were uploaded to the FTP site.
|
||
USA
|
||
Maryland MEOLUT Participant Report T4 Run01v2 –Maryland 10 June 2015
|
||
T4 Hawaii MEOLUT Report Rev1.0 22 May 2015
|
||
T4 Florida MEOLUT Report Rev1.0 22 May 2015
|
||
CSC-55/OPN/Inf.11 USA Florida MEOLUT results 30 November 2015
|
||
JC-29/Inf.46 USA Florida & Hawaii MEOLUT status 5 September 2015
|
||
3.4.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.4.2.1 France
|
||
The location probability within 10 min is not consistent with the document C/S R.012
|
||
requirement for Toulouse, Maryland and Florida transmissions. To achieve this requirement, it
|
||
seems necessary to improve the French MEOLUT software in terms of pass-schedule
|
||
computation, mono-channel throughput probability and location processing time. Moreover, the
|
||
multi-burst location algorithm needs to be upgraded, to take into account measurements from
|
||
several successive bursts and not only perform an average of successive single burst locations.
|
||
The location accuracy requirement (95% within 5 km) is quasi achieved by the locations
|
||
computed through 4 satellites during Toulouse transmission (93.2% within 5 km).
|
||
The number of satellites to compute the location is the main parameter in term of location
|
||
accuracy in the coverage area.
|
||
The location accuracy is slightly improved by the number of bursts used to compute the location,
|
||
but this is not verified for all cases.
|
||
|
||
3-11
|
||
|
||
Mean Location Probability within X Minutes – Toulouse Transmission
|
||
Cumulative Distribution of Location Errors Depending on the Number of Satellites Used to Compute Location
|
||
37 dBm – Toulouse Transmission
|
||
The probability to detect a processing anomaly was around 2∙10-4 during Toulouse transmission.
|
||
No anomaly was detected from 2 or more satellites. Most of the anomalies correspond to 2-bit
|
||
errors on the field PDF1/BCH1.
|
||
|
||
3-12
|
||
|
||
3.4.2.2 Russia
|
||
The interpretation of results of the test T-4 run1 can be summarized as follows:
|
||
•
|
||
the probability of producing an independent location was 0.99-1.0 after 13 bursts
|
||
(10 minutes). This exceeds the MEOSAR requirement of 0.98 probability within
|
||
10 minutes from a first beacon burst transmission;
|
||
•
|
||
the location accuracy was 1-1.5 km within 10 minutes from a first beacon burst
|
||
transmission in 95% of the cases which is up to 3 times better than a requirement (5 km).
|
||
•
|
||
average time to produce a location with errors less than 5 km was within 28-136 seconds
|
||
from a first beacon burst transmission.
|
||
•
|
||
no dependence of location and probability performance on the beacon simulator power
|
||
modes (33 and 37 dBm) was noted; and
|
||
•
|
||
a few anomalies in location performance were observed and caused:
|
||
•
|
||
mostly by poor satellite geometry (and, therefore, indicated by deviated JDOP
|
||
value); and
|
||
•
|
||
by lack of bursts or low C/N0 values of detected bursts possibly caused by high
|
||
elevation angles between beacon simulator and a satellite or reductions in beacon
|
||
simulator EIRP in a direction of a satellite caused by other factors.
|
||
3.4.2.3 USA
|
||
Maryland experienced a simulator problem during the execution of the test using the Maryland
|
||
Simulator. The initial run stopped prematurely requiring the transmission to be restarted.
|
||
Therefore, the Maryland simulator transmitted twice, run 1a and 1b. The first transmission began
|
||
as planned but stopped prematurely because of a simulator issue. The second transmission ran
|
||
for 24 hours.
|
||
In addition, the Maryland MEOLUT experienced antenna problems during the transmissions
|
||
from the Maryland simulator requiring the selection of data from two non-contiguous periods of
|
||
time. Therefore, the Maryland J.1 24-hour raw data file is data combined from two periods of
|
||
time - March 24 17:00 to March 24 24:00 UTC (7 hours) and March 25 12:00 to March 26
|
||
05:00 UTC (17 hours). These time periods were selected because Maryland experienced antenna
|
||
problems at the later ends of each Maryland simulator transmission.
|
||
Summary of Maryland MEOLUT results from Maryland Simulator
|
||
Parameter
|
||
Tx Power
|
||
13 bursts
|
||
7 bursts
|
||
5 bursts
|
||
3 bursts
|
||
2 bursts
|
||
1 bursts
|
||
Independent Location
|
||
Probability (%)
|
||
|
||
98.83
|
||
94.17
|
||
90.83
|
||
81.04
|
||
82.09
|
||
67.83
|
||
|
||
98.78
|
||
95.83
|
||
93.00
|
||
89.39
|
||
83.48
|
||
68.70
|
||
Independent Location
|
||
Probability for errors
|
||
less than 5 km (%)
|
||
|
||
88.83
|
||
83.00
|
||
75.83
|
||
66.61
|
||
59.30
|
||
48.70
|
||
|
||
93.22
|
||
86.50
|
||
79.67
|
||
70.96
|
||
61.57
|
||
45.57
|
||
Independent Location
|
||
Errors 95th Percentile
|
||
(km)
|
||
|
||
5.55
|
||
6.91
|
||
7.69
|
||
13.25
|
||
10.98
|
||
10.80
|
||
|
||
4.75
|
||
6.66
|
||
6.80
|
||
9.19
|
||
10.76
|
||
12.31
|
||
|
||
3-13
|
||
|
||
For the Maryland results from the Maryland Simulator, after ten minutes (13 bursts), we are very
|
||
close to expectations even for the low power transmission. For single burst results, the
|
||
probabilities are much lower but the errors are well bounded. The expectation is that all
|
||
probabilities will improve when more operational L-band satellites are available because of their
|
||
stronger link performance.
|
||
3.5
|
||
Test T-5 (Independent 2D Location Capability for Operational Beacons)
|
||
3.5.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
Australia
|
||
Beacon deployment report (see annex of the Beacon Deployment Report, Rev.1, dated 10
|
||
August 2015, consolidated by the test coordinator)
|
||
EU
|
||
France
|
||
“MEODAR D&E Phase II T-5 Test Report: Independent 2D Location Capability for
|
||
Operational Beacons”
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-940-CNES\_01\_00
|
||
Beacon deployment report (see annex of the Beacon Deployment Report, Rev.1, dated 10
|
||
August 2015, consolidated by the test coordinator)
|
||
Italy
|
||
Beacon deployment report (see annex of the Beacon Deployment Report, Rev.1, dated 10
|
||
August 2015, consolidated by the test coordinator)
|
||
Norway
|
||
Beacon deployment report (see annex of the Beacon Deployment Report, Rev.1, dated 10
|
||
August 2015, consolidated by the test coordinator)
|
||
Russia
|
||
T-5 Run-1 Test Participant report\_Russia.pdf, available on the FTP server
|
||
Turkey
|
||
T-5 Phase 2 TRMEO Report v1 - 11.08.2015.pdf
|
||
T-5 Phase2 Turkey Beacon Deployment Report - 10.08.2015.pdf
|
||
T-5 Phase2 Beacon Deployment Report - consolidated v2 - 20.08.2015.pdf
|
||
UK
|
||
Beacon deployment report (see annex of the Beacon Deployment Report, Rev.1, dated 10
|
||
August 2015, consolidated by the test coordinator)
|
||
USA
|
||
Maryland MEOLUT Participant Report T5 and with T7 Networking – 8 September 2015
|
||
JC-29/Inf.38 Maryland MEOLUT Results for T5, T5/T7 and T6
|
||
Beacon deployment report (see annex of the Beacon Deployment Report, Rev.1, dated 10
|
||
August 2015, consolidated by the test coordinator)
|
||
Figure 5 below provides the locations of the test beacons used for test T-5. More details on the
|
||
beacon models, beacon features and their 24-hour activation periods are available in the Beacon
|
||
Deployment Report (T-5 Phase2 Beacon Deployment Report - consolidated v2 - 20.08.2015.pdf)
|
||
consolidated by the test coordinator from test participants’ reports.
|
||
|
||
3-14
|
||
|
||
Figure 5: Location of the 35 Operational Beacons Deployed for T-5 and T-5/T-7 Phase 2 in April 2015
|
||
3.5.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.5.2.1 France
|
||
Up to 22 MEOSAR satellites (17 GPS, 3 Galileo and 2 Glonass) were configured for tracking.
|
||
The system throughput was measured between 70% and 85% for beacons located less than
|
||
8,000 km away from the MEOLUT (except for beacons located in Scotland, and in North-East
|
||
America, probably due to a low EIRP). System throughput increased to 98 % for beacons being
|
||
located less than 1,500 km away from the MEOLUT (except for Toulouse-France beacon).
|
||
The results also show that the L-band satellites generally improved the link budget in terms of
|
||
C/N0 at MEOLUT level in comparison with the DASS S-band satellites (about 4 dB higher).
|
||
It can also be noticed that some beacons were received from GPS-DASS below the threshold of
|
||
34.8 dB.Hz which could explain the lower system throughput.
|
||
Regarding the location probability, for beacons located less than 3,000 km away from the
|
||
MEOLUT, due to large variations in channel throughput, the probability of location extended
|
||
from 0% to 80%, depending on beacons. Even for the “best” beacons, the results were far from
|
||
the requirement of 98% within 10 min or 90% within 2 min.
|
||
Regarding location accuracy, the main factor is the number of satellites used for the location
|
||
process. A significant improvement from three to four satellites can be observed. The best result
|
||
is 95 % within 8 km for locations derived from four satellites. The location accuracy requirement
|
||
(95% within 5 km) was still not met in this case. The main limitation was that most of locations
|
||
are produced with only three satellites, and using a single burst location averaging method.
|
||
|
||
3-15
|
||
|
||
Average C/N0 for Beacons Detections (less than 3,000 km away)
|
||
Location Accuracy Cumulative Distribution vs. the Number of Satellites Used
|
||
(for Beacons Less than 3,000 km Away)
|
||
These results on operational beacons showed that the French MEOLUT is below expectations for
|
||
location performances (probability and accuracy) with operational beacons.
|
||
|
||
3-16
|
||
|
||
3.5.2.2 Turkey
|
||
The Ankara MEOLUT exclusively tracked the 16 DASS satellites that were available at the time
|
||
of the T-5 Phase II tests.
|
||
Regarding the detection of activated beacons, 33 out of the 35 beacons deployed were detected by
|
||
the Ankara MEOLUT during test T-5, the remaining two beacons at Papeete, French Polynesia
|
||
being located too far away from the MEOLUT. Fourteen of the 33 beacons detected were located
|
||
more than 7,000 km away from the TRMEO, thus confirming the detection benefit of the
|
||
MEOSAR system, even with a limited MEOSAR space segment.
|
||
Regarding the System Throughput (i.e., probability of burst detection with at least one satellite),
|
||
on average around 85% of the transmitted bursts were detected, increasing to 98% for beacons in
|
||
the immediate vicinity of the MEOLUT, a significant improvement over the Phase I System
|
||
Throughput results. Concerning the detection of bursts by multiple channels, only 21.1% of the
|
||
detected bursts were detected over the three days of week 1 tests through at least four satellites,
|
||
and 47.7% through at least three satellites, a significant improvement, again, over the Phase I
|
||
results even though still a concern from a location probability viewpoint.
|
||
Location probability was roughly in the 80% - 90% range for the beacons in the geographic
|
||
region of the Ankara MEOLUT (a circle with a radius of 3,500 km centred at the MEOLUT).
|
||
Location accuracy was, as expected, better within the aforementioned geographic region around
|
||
the MEOLUT, with a 50th percentile (i.e., median value) of 1 km and a 75th percentile of 2 to
|
||
3 km. However, at its 95th percentile, the location accuracy went up to the 5 to 15 km range and
|
||
sometimes beyond that range. In addition, the following observations were made:
|
||
•
|
||
No significant improvement was noticed due to the integration of up to 7 bursts. In
|
||
general, single-burst locations were almost as accurate as multi-burst locations (it was
|
||
later discovered, after the end of the T-5 Phase II test, which TRMEO was configured for
|
||
single-burst processing and averaging of single-burst locations only; the configuration
|
||
was since modified to include multi-burst processing in addition to single-burst
|
||
processing).
|
||
•
|
||
The number of satellites used in the calculation of a location seemed to be the most
|
||
significant factor determining location accuracy.
|
||
4+ satellite locations did meet the “less than 5 km 90% of the time” criterion whereas 3+ satellite
|
||
locations did not meet that criterion.
|
||
Consequently, Turkey anticipated the definition of “nominal locations” as those locations derived
|
||
from bursts obtained from four or more satellites, and “marginal locations” as those locations
|
||
derived from bursts obtained from three or fewer satellites, possibly with the use, as well, of the
|
||
DOP value in those definitions, pointing out the potential necessity for MEOLUT networking in
|
||
the real world.
|
||
If the current detection rates were not significantly improved by the future L-band satellites, four-
|
||
channel MEOLUTs might have difficulties in systematically generating locations derived from
|
||
four satellites.
|
||
|
||
3-17
|
||
|
||
Turkey recommended that the following parameters be noted and taken into account in the
|
||
ongoing work on MEOLUT Performance Specifications and Design Guidelines:
|
||
•
|
||
impact on location accuracy of the number of satellites used to calculate a location,
|
||
•
|
||
concept of “nominal” and “marginal” locations.
|
||
3.5.2.3 Russia
|
||
The interpretation of results of the test indicated that the probability of detection of valid
|
||
messages (throughput) by the MEOLUT was within 0.99 -1.0 for most of the considered beacons.
|
||
One beacon located almost 10,000 km away from the MEOLUT was received with throughput
|
||
value of 0.55. An investigation in relation to this beacon was not conducted, however, it was
|
||
noted that the lower values of throughput might be caused by:
|
||
•
|
||
satellite geometry (the beacon was not seen by more than one antenna most of the time);
|
||
and
|
||
•
|
||
possible local obstructions (the elevation angles ranged between 0˚ - 20˚ for the most part
|
||
of the visibility zone);
|
||
MEOSAR system requirement introduced in Annex E of document C/S R.012 on independent
|
||
location accuracy to be produced within 10 minutes timeframe in 95% of the time (5 km):
|
||
•
|
||
was met for all static beacon transmissions (28 out of 29) located within 3,000 km from
|
||
the MEOLUT with error less than 3 km; and
|
||
•
|
||
was not met for a Norway beacon when moved (error = 7.42 km) located within 3,000 km
|
||
from the MEOLUT.
|
||
A derivation from MEOSAR system requirement on independent location probability to be
|
||
produced within 10 minutes timeframe with errors less than 5 km (0.93):
|
||
•
|
||
was met for 26 out of 29 beacon transmissions located within 3,000 km from the
|
||
MEOLUT; and
|
||
•
|
||
was not met for a Norway beacon when moved (P = 0.85) and for two Turkish beacons
|
||
(P=0.92), all located within 3,000 km from the MEOLUT.
|
||
MEOSAR system requirement introduced in Annex E of document C/S R.012 on independent
|
||
location probability to be produced within 10 minutes timeframe (0.98):
|
||
•
|
||
was met for 26 out of 29 beacon transmissions located within 3,000 km from the
|
||
MEOLUT; and
|
||
•
|
||
was not met for one UK beacon (P=0.95) and two Turkish beacon transmissions (P=0.94
|
||
and P=0.95), all located within 3,000 km from the MEOLUT.
|
||
Accurate localization of moving first generation beacons in MEOSAR is possible if FOA
|
||
measurements from six or more satellites are used. To this end, addition of another two antennas
|
||
to Moscow MEOLUT is currently under consideration. Meanwhile, Russia is implementing
|
||
means of determining whether the beacon was static or not during transmission to ensure
|
||
locations with better accuracy.
|
||
|
||
3-18
|
||
|
||
3.5.2.4 USA
|
||
Single burst throughput is reasonable although not all beacon activations meet expectations.
|
||
Location results seem to vary in a non-predictable way that is difficult to summarize. Some
|
||
results are within expectation and some are not.
|
||
Because of the nature of the test, it is not possible to investigating the underlying causes of the
|
||
fluctuations in performance. Sometimes beacons in the same location provide different results.
|
||
This is complicated by the fact that MEOLUT hardware issues impacted the results from the
|
||
beacon activations of the most interest.
|
||
Further testing with commercial beacons may be necessary in order to collect the deployment
|
||
information necessary to better evaluate the results.
|
||
3.6
|
||
Test T-6 (MEOSAR System Capacity)
|
||
3.6.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
MEOSAR D&E Phase 2Test T-6 Report - MEOSAR System Capacity
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-930-CNES\_01\_01
|
||
Russia
|
||
T-6 Run-1 Test Participant report\_Russia.pdf, available on the FTP server
|
||
Turkey
|
||
USA
|
||
Maryland MEOLUT Participant Report T6 Run01-08 September 2015
|
||
JC-29/Inf.38 Maryland MEOLUT Results for T5, T5/T7 and T6
|
||
3.6.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.6.2.1 France
|
||
The analysis was mainly focused on the French MEOLUT results obtained during the French
|
||
simulator transmission as the space segment conditions of the document C/S R.018 were not
|
||
fulfilled for the Maryland transmission.
|
||
The results did not permit to characterize accurately the MEOSAR System Capacity as the
|
||
maximum number of simultaneous beacons is most likely higher than NB=200. Indeed, the
|
||
expected performance drop-off with the system saturation has never occurred.
|
||
The system throughput performance shows a slight influence of number NB, but the other
|
||
analyses on time to first message, or location probability/accuracy show no particular correlation
|
||
with this number.
|
||
|
||
3-19
|
||
|
||
Valid/Complete Message Detection Probability for Capacity Testing - Toulouse Transmission
|
||
Independent Location Probability - Toulouse Transmission
|
||
The probability to detect a processing anomaly was around 0.53x10-4 (requirement: 10-4) during
|
||
Toulouse transmission. No anomaly was detected from two or more satellites. All the processing
|
||
anomalies correspond to 2-bit errors on the field PDF1/BCH1. We also observe that the C/N0
|
||
range of the anomalies is large.
|
||
|
||
3-20
|
||
|
||
3.6.2.2 Russia
|
||
The results on System capacity using the MEOLUT throughput performance for both Toulouse
|
||
and Maryland transmissions indicated that:
|
||
•
|
||
if compared against the MIP requirement for detection probability the threshold of 99%
|
||
was not crossed even for a traffic load representing 200 operational beacons within
|
||
350 seconds. The System Capacity in a detection probability domain was, therefore, more
|
||
than 200 beacons, and
|
||
•
|
||
if a throughput criteria was assumed the MEOLUT throughput of 70% was reached in the
|
||
zone between 150 and 200 simultaneous beacons.
|
||
The results on System Capacity using the MEOLUT location performance for both Toulouse and
|
||
Maryland transmissions showed that no curve drop-off was identified, assuming that the value of
|
||
System Capacity was 200 beacons or more.
|
||
3.6.2.3 USA
|
||
Throughput Performance:
|
||
Probability of a Valid Message as a Function of Time for Different Values of NB
|
||
Location Performance:
|
||
Note: Only seven bursts are transmitted and available to generate the composite locations
|
||
|
||
3-21
|
||
|
||
Probabilities of any Single Burst and Composite Locations and
|
||
the Probabilities that those Locations are Less than 5 km.
|
||
The probability of generating a valid or complete message within 5 minutes after beacon
|
||
activation is 100% for at least 100 simultaneous beacons.
|
||
Single burst location probability suffers most as the number of simultaneous beacons increases
|
||
but the accuracy of those locations seems to remain fairly consistent.
|
||
The probability of generating a location five minutes after beacon activation remains fairly
|
||
consistent until the number of simultaneous beacons is between 75 and 100. Similarly, the
|
||
accuracy of those locations remains fairly consistent until then as well.
|
||
Based on this data from the four channel Maryland MEOLUT, it appears that the beacon capacity
|
||
is near 100 simultaneous beacons. However, it is reasonable to expect this value to improve with
|
||
additional antennas, which will be investigated during future testing. In addition, locations that
|
||
are generated ten minutes after beacon activation rather than the currently tested five minutes
|
||
would also likely improve results.
|
||
3.7
|
||
Test T-4/T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage)
|
||
3.7.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
EC/France
|
||
MEOSAR D&E Phase 2 Test T-4/T-7 Report - Independent 2D Location Capability in
|
||
Networked Mode
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-922-CNES\_01\_00
|
||
USA
|
||
Maryland MEOLUT Participant Report T-4/ T-7 09 June 2016
|
||
|
||
3-22
|
||
|
||
3.7.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.7.2.1 USA
|
||
The table below is a summary of the results collected for the Maryland MEOLUT using the
|
||
Maryland simulator.
|
||
Parameter
|
||
Tx Power
|
||
13 burst
|
||
7 burst
|
||
5 burst
|
||
3 burst
|
||
2 burst
|
||
1 burst
|
||
Independent Location
|
||
Probability (%) Any
|
||
|
||
70.00
|
||
54.83
|
||
54.83
|
||
52.00
|
||
48.50
|
||
43.00
|
||
|
||
69.67
|
||
76.83
|
||
71.50
|
||
73.50
|
||
65.67
|
||
47.33
|
||
Independent Location
|
||
Probability for errors
|
||
less than 5 km (%)
|
||
|
||
66.50
|
||
48.83
|
||
47.17
|
||
43.17
|
||
38.50
|
||
29.00
|
||
|
||
68.67
|
||
74.33
|
||
67.00
|
||
66.00
|
||
56.33
|
||
35.67
|
||
Independent Location
|
||
Errors 95th Percentile
|
||
(km)
|
||
|
||
8.08
|
||
7.64
|
||
8.61
|
||
8.24
|
||
9.12
|
||
14.36
|
||
|
||
5.16
|
||
4.11
|
||
5.56
|
||
6.60
|
||
7.56
|
||
7.63
|
||
This chart summarizes Time to First Location for the beacon transmit power of 37 dBm.
|
||
|
||
|
||
9 11 13 15 17 19 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 41 44 45
|
||
seconds
|
||
Slot Number
|
||
Maryland Simulator - Maryland MEOLUT
|
||
Time to First Location - NB1 and NB13 - dBm 37
|
||
T4-T7 May 04, 2015
|
||
NB1-Processing Time
|
||
NB13-Processing Time
|
||
When comparing the Maryland T-4/T-7 summary results to the Maryland T-4 summary results,
|
||
overall improvement resulting from networking can be seen. However the volume of network
|
||
|
||
3-23
|
||
|
||
data that results from the T-4/T-7 test is large because of the high density of beacon
|
||
transmissions. This caused backlogs in the MEOLUTs location processing as demonstrated by
|
||
the spikes in the Time to First Location chart above. This impacted performance and caused the
|
||
improvement from networking to be less than expected. We are investigating solutions for
|
||
handling large volumes of network data.
|
||
3.7.2.2 EC/France (European MEOLUTs)
|
||
For Toulouse transmission, at MEOLUT level, none of the three MEOLUTs reaches the 98%
|
||
probability to have an independent location within 10 minutes (requirement given by document
|
||
C/S R.012, Annex E). We can observe a lower performance at EU/Spitsbergen MEOLUT with
|
||
only 90% achieved to be compared to 95% at both others. At SGS level, the 98% probability to
|
||
have an independent location within 10 minutes is reached. For Maryland and Florida
|
||
transmission, the probability of location is still above 82% at 37 dBm.
|
||
This shows the advantage of networking for the location probability.
|
||
Mean Independent Location Probability Over All Slots
|
||
within X Minutes by each MEOLUT and the Overall SGS
|
||
The SGS curve is computed considering that a location has been produced by at least one
|
||
MEOLUT. This means that the location is potentially transmitted to one of the three MCCs
|
||
connected to a MEOLUT.
|
||
The requirement of having an independent location solution within 5 km 95% of the time is not
|
||
achieved. Indeed, 95% of the time the SGS provides a solution within 20 km. However, the
|
||
requirement is achieved with locations computed with 5 or more satellites and when using
|
||
satellites broadcasting accurate ephemeris.
|
||
|
||
3-24
|
||
|
||
Cumulative Distribution of Location Error-Toulouse Transmission
|
||
3.8
|
||
Test T-5/T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage)
|
||
3.8.1
|
||
Analysis
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
EC/France
|
||
MEOSAR D&E Phase 2 Test T-4/T-7 REPORT - Independent 2D Location Capability in
|
||
Networked Mode
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-929-CNES\_01\_00
|
||
USA
|
||
Maryland MEOLUT Participant Report T5 and with T7 Networking – 8 September 2015
|
||
JC-29/Inf.38 Maryland MEOLUT Results for T5, T5/T7 and T6
|
||
3.8.2
|
||
Interpretation
|
||
3.8.2.1 EC/France (European MEOLUTs)
|
||
Up to 19 MEOSAR satellites (16 GPS and 3 Galileo) were configured for tracking.
|
||
The system throughput was measured between 87.4% (beacons Scotland1&2) and 100% for
|
||
beacons located on the ECA area. A system throughput drop was observed at around 5,000 km.
|
||
The L-band satellites generally improved the link budget in terms of C/N0 at MEOLUT level in
|
||
comparison with the DASS S-band satellites (about 4 dB higher).
|
||
In addition to the C/S R.018 methodology, the single channel throughput depending on satellite
|
||
constellation was analysed (figure below). To suppress masking effects at low beacon-satellite
|
||
elevation angle, the transmission period was defined as the time interval between the first
|
||
detected message and the last detected message during a satellite pass. From the beacons located
|
||
|
||
3-25
|
||
|
||
on the Europe area (Tr-Ankara3 to Fr-Audinghen), the overall single channel throughput for each
|
||
downlink type was the following:
|
||
•
|
||
S-band: 44%
|
||
•
|
||
L-band: 59%
|
||
Single Channel Throughput Depending on Satellite Constellation
|
||
Regarding the location probability with error less than 10 km, for beacons located inside the ECA
|
||
area, the mean probability of location is 98%, which is compliant with the location probability
|
||
98% within 10 min.
|
||
Regarding location accuracy, the main factor is the number of satellites used for the location
|
||
process. A significant improvement from three to four satellites can be observed. The best result
|
||
is 95 % within 8 km for locations derived from 6 satellites. The location accuracy requirement
|
||
(95% within 5 km) was still not met in this case. The main limitations were that most of locations
|
||
are produced with only 3 or 4 satellites and that the TLE files are used to compute the orbits of
|
||
the satellites 418 and 420.
|
||
|
||
3-26
|
||
|
||
Location Accuracy Cumulative Distribution vs. the Number of Satellites Used
|
||
(ECA Beacons)
|
||
Improvements of the location performances should be observed in Phase III thanks to the L-Band
|
||
satellite deployment.
|
||
3.8.2.2 USA-Maryland
|
||
Beacon activations with MEOLUT data exchange enabled generally produced better results than
|
||
when data exchange was disabled. Of course, the degree of the improvement depended on the
|
||
location of the beacon relative to the MEOLUTs involved. That is, beacons that were located far
|
||
from any MEOLUT involved in the data exchange were less affected.
|
||
Further testing with commercial beacons may be necessary in order to collect the deployment
|
||
information necessary to better evaluate the results.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 3 -
|
||
|
||
4-1
|
||
|
||
4.
|
||
RESULTS OF THE OPERATIONAL TESTS AND DISCUSSION
|
||
For each operational test conducted, the following sections provide:
|
||
•
|
||
test periods and MEOLUT mode of operation expected,
|
||
•
|
||
a description of each MCC configuration, per Administration,
|
||
•
|
||
operational test results provided by each Administration, and
|
||
•
|
||
a summary of the interpretation of the test analyses, as provided by each Administration.
|
||
4.1
|
||
Expected MEOLUT Configuration and Time Periods
|
||
MEOSAR D&E Phase II Operational Tests were carried out in two parts:
|
||
Phase II
|
||
Start
|
||
End
|
||
MEOLUT
|
||
Mode of Operation Expected
|
||
Part 1
|
||
7 April 2014 00:00 UTC
|
||
12 May 2014 00:00 UTC
|
||
Standalone
|
||
Part 2
|
||
19 January 2015 00:00 UTC
|
||
20 April 2015 00:00 UTC
|
||
Standalone
|
||
20 April 2015 00:00 UTC
|
||
11 May 2015 00:00 UTC
|
||
Networking
|
||
4.2
|
||
MCC Configuration
|
||
The following information on MEOSAR-ready MCC configuration was provided by the participants.
|
||
4.2.1
|
||
France
|
||
4.2.1.1 LEO/GEO FMCC
|
||
The FMCC-LEO/GEO filters out from the processed data all the beacon IDs that correspond to
|
||
inverted sync frame (test beacons) and orbitography/reference beacons.
|
||
4.2.1.2 French MEOSAR-Ready MCC
|
||
The French MEOSAR-ready MCC filters out from the processed data all the beacon IDs that
|
||
correspond to inverted sync frame (test beacons) and orbitography/reference beacons.
|
||
It is to be noted that on the French MEOSAR-ready MCC, some of the MCCs towards which SITs
|
||
are sent are purely virtual. Those would be received if the network link was established. Actually, the
|
||
French MEOSAR-ready MCC sent data to:
|
||
CYMCC, ITMCC, JAMCC, NMCC, SPMCC, TRMCC and USMCC
|
||
|
||
4-2
|
||
|
||
In addition, the French MEO-Ready MCC receives data from:
|
||
CYMCC, ITMCC, JAMCC, NMCC, TRMCC and USMCC
|
||
The means used at the FMCC were:
|
||
•
|
||
the French MEOLUT, in version FP 1.7b, SP and LP 1.5,
|
||
•
|
||
the French MEO-ready MCC, an in-house development,
|
||
•
|
||
the French MCC v2.7 for LEOSAR and GEOSAR alert data.
|
||
4.2.2
|
||
Italy
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready ITMCC was not associated with any MEOLUT.
|
||
MEOSAR data was received via FTP/VPN from the following MEOLUTs through their associated
|
||
MEOSAR-ready MCCs:
|
||
•
|
||
Toulouse (France)
|
||
•
|
||
EU Spitsbergen (Norway)
|
||
•
|
||
Ankara (Turkey)
|
||
•
|
||
EU Larnaca (Cyprus)
|
||
•
|
||
Brasilia (Brazil)
|
||
•
|
||
Florida – Maryland – Hawaii (USA)
|
||
The Italian MEOSAR-ready MCC was available for the whole test period.
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready ITMCC:
|
||
•
|
||
Name/Manufacturer: McMurdo Inc
|
||
•
|
||
Hardware / Software: HP ML 350 running Windows Server
|
||
•
|
||
Version (Core Processing): Insarcore 6.0.2.0
|
||
•
|
||
Configuration / Status: MEOSAR ready MCC in D&E Version
|
||
4.2.3
|
||
Japan
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready JAMCC is following condition:
|
||
•
|
||
MEOSAR data was received from USMCC and FMCC during the D&E test period.
|
||
•
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready JAMCC had not provided data for anywhere.
|
||
National MEOLUT is under construction. (Not operating). Therefore, in this test period, the
|
||
MEOSAR-Ready JAMCC did not receive MEOSAR data from a national MEOLUT. JAMCC
|
||
received MEOSAR data from international MEOLUTs via USMCC and FMCC.
|
||
|
||
4-3
|
||
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready JAMCC:
|
||
•
|
||
Name/Manufacturer: Techno-Sciences Inc
|
||
•
|
||
Hardware / Software: HP ML 350 / Windows Server 2012
|
||
•
|
||
Version (Core Processing): Insarcore 6.0.0.0
|
||
•
|
||
Configuration / Status: MEOSAR ready MCC in D&E Version
|
||
•
|
||
Connected MEOLUT: Not Applicable
|
||
4.2.4
|
||
Norway
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready NMCC was connected to the four-channel EU/Spitsbergen MEOLUT through
|
||
direct FTPV link. MEOSAR data was also exchanged with the following MEOSAR-ready MCCs:
|
||
•
|
||
FMCC
|
||
•
|
||
ITMCC
|
||
•
|
||
CYMCC
|
||
International MEOLUTs from which data was received:
|
||
•
|
||
France via FMCC
|
||
•
|
||
Brasilia via BRMCC and FMCC
|
||
•
|
||
Ankara via TRMCC and FMCC
|
||
•
|
||
Florida via USMCC and FMCC
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready NMCC:
|
||
•
|
||
Name/Manufacturer:
|
||
Techno-Sciences, Inc
|
||
•
|
||
Hardware / Software:
|
||
HP ML350 Gen 8 running Windows Server 2012 64-bit
|
||
SQL Server 2012
|
||
•
|
||
Version:
|
||
Insarcore 6, 0, 2, 0
|
||
•
|
||
Configuration / Status:
|
||
Configured for D&E support
|
||
•
|
||
Connected MEOLUT:
|
||
EU/MEOLUT Spitsbergen
|
||
During part of the standalone and networked mode periods the EU/Spitsbergen MEOLUT was not
|
||
filtering orbitography or test protocol coded beacons. Nor did the Norwegian MEOSAR-ready MCC
|
||
filter out QMS data properly, resulting in a high amount of transmitted MEOSAR alert messages,
|
||
particularly to those destinations which have an orbitography beacon located in their region.
|
||
|
||
4-4
|
||
|
||
Because the EU/Spitsbergen MEOLUT was going through some heavy test campaigns
|
||
simultaneously as the D&E Operational tests occurred, it was challenging to maintain present
|
||
configuration state at all times for all subsystems. In the post processing NMCC attempted to remove
|
||
those cases from the analysis, to sustain a higher degree of reliability in the calculations.
|
||
Additionally, NMCC experienced two occasions where the MEOLUT was disconnected from
|
||
MEOSAR-ready MCC. There may also be other circumstances where we experienced reduced
|
||
availability because of conflicting SGS tests, or other anomalies, but these possible incidents are not
|
||
consistently preserved throughout the test periods.
|
||
4.2.5
|
||
Spain
|
||
Spain collected data for Phase II Part 1 and Phase II Part 2. However, given some limitations on the
|
||
participation in Part 1, the sample size was very reduced, and for this reason, only data for Phase II
|
||
Part 2 is presented.
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready SPMCC was connected and receiving MEOSAR data from the
|
||
EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT in two possible operating modes:
|
||
•
|
||
in Standalone Mode, the EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT processed data coming from the
|
||
4 MEOLUT local channels and sent alert data to the MEOSAR-ready SPMCC,
|
||
•
|
||
in Networking Mode, the EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT can combine its own generated alert
|
||
data with TOA/FOA data coming from EU/Spitsbergen MEOLUT (Norway) and/or
|
||
EU/Larnaca MEOLUT (Cyprus).
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready SPMCC was connected to the MEOSAR-ready FMCC and USMCC for
|
||
receiving MEOSAR alert data.
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready SPMCC was not configured to transmit MEOSAR data coming from the
|
||
EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT to other MCCs, because only the 30 Hex 406 MHz alert format messages
|
||
were being processed from the MEOLUT (not the 36 Hex 406 MHz format message). Therefore, the
|
||
MEOSAR-ready SPMCC was not sending real messages to any destination and all messages
|
||
generated were internally stored.
|
||
During the standalone mode period (19 January 2015 00:00 UTC – 20 April 2015 00:00 UTC),
|
||
sometimes, the MEOSAR-ready SPMCC was receiving data from the MEOLUT configured in
|
||
networking mode, or with the MEOLUT configured to send self-test alert messages to the MCC. In
|
||
those cases, either the data was removed from the statistics, considering only a group of selected time
|
||
periods for the analysis, instead of the whole period, or the MEOLUT was disconnected from the
|
||
MEOSAR-ready SPMCC.
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready SPMCC:
|
||
•
|
||
Name/Manufacturer: McMurdo Inc
|
||
•
|
||
Hardware / Software: HP ML 350p Gen8 running Windows Server 2012, 64 bits
|
||
•
|
||
SW InsarGIS: Version 8.3.0.16 – 12/June/2014.
|
||
|
||
4-5
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
SW InsarMP: Version 4.2.0.0 – 12/July/2012.
|
||
•
|
||
SW Version (Core Processing): Insarcore 6.0.2.0 – 17/Jan/2014.
|
||
•
|
||
Configuration / Status: MEOSAR-ready MCC in D&E Version.
|
||
4.2.6
|
||
USA
|
||
Part 1
|
||
The USA MEOSAR-ready MCC:
|
||
Name/Manufacturer: this is an “in house” implementation
|
||
Hardware/Software: rack mount Windows Servers running windows applications
|
||
Version (Core Alert Processing): 1.15
|
||
Configuration/Status: configured for D&E support and fully operational
|
||
National MEOLUTs participating1:
|
||
Hawaii: fully operational for full duration
|
||
Florida: fully operational until 26 April 2014, then down for maintenance
|
||
Maryland: fully operational for full duration
|
||
International MEOLUTs for which data was received:
|
||
France via FMCC: fully operational for full duration
|
||
Norway via NMCC and FMCC: fully operational for full duration
|
||
Brasilia via BRMCC: fully operational for full duration
|
||
Connections to other MEOSAR MCCs:
|
||
FMCC: two way exchange of alert data for full duration
|
||
BRMCC: two way exchange of alert data for full duration
|
||
SPMCC: US transmitted alert data for full duration
|
||
PEMCC: US transmitted alert data for full duration
|
||
JAMCC: US transmitted alert data for full duration
|
||
Part 2
|
||
The MEOSAR USMCC:
|
||
Name/Manufacturer: this is an “in house” implementation
|
||
Hardware/Software: rack mount Windows Servers running windows applications
|
||
Version (Core Alert Processing): 1.31
|
||
Configuration/Status: configured for D&E support and fully operational
|
||
1 Further information on the availability of MEOLUTs over time is provided below in Figure 1.
|
||
|
||
4-6
|
||
|
||
National MEOLUTs participating:
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
Florida
|
||
Maryland
|
||
International MEOLUTs for which data was received:
|
||
France via FMCC
|
||
Norway via NMCC and FMCC
|
||
Brasillia via BRMCC
|
||
Ankara via TRMCC and FMCC
|
||
Larnaca via CYMCC and FMCC
|
||
MEOLUTs connected when networking was active:
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
Florida
|
||
Maryland
|
||
Connections to other MEOSAR MCCs:
|
||
FMCC: two way exchange of alert data
|
||
BRMCC: two way exchange of alert data
|
||
SPMCC: US transmitted alert data
|
||
PEMCC: US transmitted alert data
|
||
JAMCC: US transmitted alert data
|
||
4.3
|
||
Test O-1 Potential Time Advantage
|
||
The test O-1 measures the elapsed time between the receipt at an MCC of MEOSAR distress alert
|
||
messages as compared to those from the existing system (LEOSAR and GEOSAR alert messages).
|
||
4.3.1
|
||
O-1 Test Result
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
JC-29/4/13 – DE Phase II part II Test O1 Report France\_04082015.pdf
|
||
Italy
|
||
JC-29/Inf. 19
|
||
Japan
|
||
Sections 4.3.1.3 and 4.3.2.3 to this document.
|
||
Norway
|
||
Sections 4.3.1.4 and 4.3.2.4 to this document.
|
||
Spain
|
||
JC-29/Inf.42
|
||
USA
|
||
Sections 4.3.1.6 and 4.3.2.6 to this document.
|
||
|
||
4-7
|
||
|
||
4.3.1.1 France
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area (in minutes)
|
||
AOI=FMCC service
|
||
area
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs LEO)
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs GEO)
|
||
Mean
|
||
-2.34
|
||
14.27
|
||
6.78
|
||
25.35
|
||
-2.01
|
||
11.60
|
||
-0.79
|
||
Median
|
||
0.37
|
||
9.73
|
||
3.87
|
||
18.23
|
||
0.74
|
||
6.12
|
||
0.65
|
||
Std Deviation
|
||
14.74
|
||
17.31
|
||
17.70
|
||
30.25
|
||
21.97
|
||
45.08
|
||
14.53
|
||
N
|
||
|
||
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area and participating MEOLUTs coverage (in minutes)
|
||
AOI=FMCC service
|
||
area + MEOLUTs
|
||
coverage
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs LEO)
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs GEO)
|
||
Mean
|
||
-0.17
|
||
14.75
|
||
10.25
|
||
25.76
|
||
-1.19
|
||
12.48
|
||
-0.88
|
||
Median
|
||
0.22
|
||
10.43
|
||
5.68
|
||
17.88
|
||
0.78
|
||
6.20
|
||
0.72
|
||
Std Deviation
|
||
2.15
|
||
17.49
|
||
16.08
|
||
31.45
|
||
21.28
|
||
45.37
|
||
14.89
|
||
N
|
||
|
||
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area (in minutes)
|
||
AOI=FMCC service
|
||
area
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs LEO)
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs GEO)
|
||
Mean
|
||
-1.13
|
||
4.29
|
||
3.31
|
||
36.15
|
||
3.62
|
||
18.80
|
||
3.27
|
||
Median
|
||
-1.13
|
||
3.87
|
||
1.72
|
||
24.80
|
||
2.47
|
||
7.61
|
||
2.74
|
||
Std Deviation
|
||
1.19
|
||
19.24
|
||
16.79
|
||
36.22
|
||
7.02
|
||
28.34
|
||
5.66
|
||
N
|
||
|
||
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area and participating MEOLUTs coverage (in minutes)
|
||
AOI=FMCC service
|
||
area + MEOLUTs
|
||
coverage
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs LEO)
|
||
PTAU
|
||
(vs GEO)
|
||
Mean
|
||
-1.13
|
||
6.92
|
||
5.05
|
||
36.15
|
||
3.70
|
||
15.05
|
||
2.96
|
||
Median
|
||
-1.13
|
||
3.87
|
||
1.72
|
||
24.80
|
||
2.47
|
||
7.37
|
||
2.27
|
||
Std Deviation
|
||
1.19
|
||
18.35
|
||
15.71
|
||
36.22
|
||
6.96
|
||
26.42
|
||
4.35
|
||
N
|
||
|
||
|
||
4-8
|
||
|
||
4.3.1.2 Italy
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
1.08
|
||
19.01
|
||
15.50
|
||
54.30
|
||
0.78
|
||
Median:
|
||
0.99
|
||
13.27
|
||
7.88
|
||
41.88
|
||
0.88
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
5.45
|
||
36.57
|
||
33.12
|
||
63.51
|
||
17.79
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
1.08
|
||
17.78
|
||
14.21
|
||
41.08
|
||
0.81
|
||
Median:
|
||
0.99
|
||
11.81
|
||
7.75
|
||
33.52
|
||
0.88
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
5.45
|
||
32.31
|
||
28.99
|
||
54.03
|
||
18.23
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
-2.37
|
||
26.95
|
||
24.75
|
||
20.35
|
||
2.23
|
||
Median:
|
||
-2.37
|
||
17.42
|
||
14.81
|
||
17.65
|
||
0.55
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
N/A1
|
||
34.19
|
||
33.48
|
||
29.06
|
||
12.00
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
-2.37
|
||
28.53
|
||
25.99
|
||
24.37
|
||
2.34
|
||
Median:
|
||
-2.37
|
||
18.58
|
||
17.42
|
||
19.94
|
||
0.55
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
N/A1
|
||
35.62
|
||
34.83
|
||
31.90
|
||
12.19
|
||
1 The number of samples for PTAE, in networking mode, was equal to one, therefore, Standard
|
||
Deviation value cannot be calculated, which is indicated as N/A in the corresponding table cell.
|
||
|
||
4-9
|
||
|
||
4.3.1.3 Japan
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
15.42
|
||
-148.91
|
||
-115.85
|
||
-178.93
|
||
-22.17
|
||
Median:
|
||
3.43
|
||
-38.10
|
||
-1.18
|
||
-43.57
|
||
2.02
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
67.02
|
||
300.21
|
||
280.99
|
||
323.19
|
||
168.82
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
-0.52
|
||
-88.87
|
||
-35.86
|
||
N/A
|
||
11.86
|
||
Median:
|
||
0.80
|
||
-88.87
|
||
0.80
|
||
N/A
|
||
3.12
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
9.89
|
||
171.25
|
||
98.60
|
||
N/A
|
||
94.17
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
-67.79
|
||
-50.31
|
||
-48.46
|
||
40.47
|
||
-13.09
|
||
Median:
|
||
3.67
|
||
0.50
|
||
0.58
|
||
3.85
|
||
4.68
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
215.85
|
||
203.21
|
||
190.95
|
||
300.77
|
||
142.10
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
-10.45
|
||
Median:
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
4.68
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
N/A
|
||
47.16
|
||
|
||
4-10
|
||
|
||
4.3.1.4 Norway
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
12.49
|
||
17.39
|
||
17.23
|
||
17.25
|
||
14.67
|
||
Median:
|
||
3.00
|
||
15.65
|
||
14.30
|
||
21.00
|
||
5.71
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
14.03
|
||
48.93
|
||
48.62
|
||
52.66
|
||
36.03
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
10.11
|
||
15.58
|
||
15.38
|
||
8.46
|
||
13.12
|
||
Median:
|
||
3.00
|
||
12.25
|
||
11.62
|
||
5.13
|
||
4.90
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
12.91
|
||
52.82
|
||
52.34
|
||
56.76
|
||
35.93
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
4.73
|
||
5.98
|
||
5.86
|
||
24.42
|
||
9.95
|
||
Median:
|
||
6.43
|
||
10.07
|
||
8.72
|
||
22.00
|
||
5.17
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
4.55
|
||
40.40
|
||
38.34
|
||
62.81
|
||
16.05
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
4.73
|
||
14.14
|
||
13.09
|
||
32.80
|
||
10.15
|
||
Median:
|
||
6.43
|
||
12.87
|
||
9.80
|
||
31.82
|
||
5.32
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
4.55
|
||
20.74
|
||
19.78
|
||
65.37
|
||
16.09
|
||
|
||
4-11
|
||
|
||
4.3.1.5 Spain
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
6.93
|
||
17.90
|
||
23.92
|
||
32.90
|
||
3.89
|
||
Median:
|
||
1.40
|
||
17.43
|
||
7.13
|
||
44.42
|
||
1.48
|
||
Standard Deviation: 22.53
|
||
134.84
|
||
97.82
|
||
133.03
|
||
86.07
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
5.08
|
||
18.21
|
||
17.94
|
||
35.14
|
||
0.50
|
||
Median:
|
||
1.40
|
||
9.83
|
||
4.57
|
||
42.22
|
||
1.22
|
||
Standard Deviation: 18.19
|
||
121.04
|
||
97.12
|
||
102.50
|
||
85.49
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean: -1.24
|
||
52.63
|
||
34.96
|
||
162.00
|
||
16.78
|
||
Median: -0.43
|
||
22.65
|
||
8.32
|
||
72.69
|
||
0.97
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
5.27
|
||
103.27
|
||
91.82
|
||
272.33
|
||
70.48
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean: -1.24
|
||
27.66
|
||
13.74
|
||
187.79
|
||
14.19
|
||
Median: -0.43
|
||
18.75
|
||
5.22
|
||
73.13
|
||
0.52
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
5.27
|
||
30.83
|
||
25.77
|
||
325.51
|
||
71.12
|
||
|
||
4-12
|
||
|
||
4.3.1.6 USA
|
||
Part 1 (Stand-Alone Only)
|
||
Part 2 – Stand-Alone
|
||
Part 2 – Networked
|
||
|
||
4-13
|
||
|
||
4.3.2
|
||
O-1 Test Result Interpretation
|
||
4.3.2.1 France
|
||
With the samples collected during D&E Phase II part II, it could be noticed that there was:
|
||
•
|
||
a potential time advantage of the MEOSAR system for location confirmation.
|
||
•
|
||
an improvement of this result when networking between MEOLUTs was ensured.
|
||
•
|
||
a potential time advantage of the MEOSAR system for location,
|
||
•
|
||
a very slight advantage of the MEOSAR system for encoded alert messages (in networking
|
||
only),
|
||
•
|
||
the trend of the analyses shows some potential time advantage to the MEOSAR system that
|
||
reaches a few minutes in most of the cases. Although the timing is sometimes better for
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR alerts, this is expected to occur rather less by the time when the
|
||
MEOSAR constellations are complete. The space segment current characteristics can explain
|
||
part of the large differences in the alert delays. The trend of the data set indicates that
|
||
MEOSAR should provide at least as good as LEOSAR/GEOSAR alert timing, but it is
|
||
expected that the time advantage be especially better for position confirmation data.
|
||
A first complementary analysis on the PTAO distributions (highest number of samples) has been
|
||
conducted. It shows that the PTAO for MEOSAR is between 0 and 5 minutes for almost 45% of the
|
||
samples. The left hand side of this histogram on the following figure illustrates the events for which
|
||
the LEOSAR/GEOSAR data was available before the MEOSAR data. Cases where the difference is
|
||
beyond 30 minutes occurred more often for beacon alerts that were first notified by the
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR system.
|
||
Overall Time Advantage in Stand-Alone Mode (FMCC Service Area)
|
||
|
||
4-14
|
||
|
||
A second complementary analysis aimed to put into perspective the Potential Time Advantage versus
|
||
the location accuracy. As the beacon’s locations are unknown, the LEOSAR/GEOSAR computed
|
||
positions are considered as references and the MEOSAR location errors are calculated relatively to
|
||
them. Therefore, the “errors” presented here represent the distance between MEOSAR and
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR computed positions.
|
||
As shown in the following figure:
|
||
•
|
||
The locations errors do not show any visible trend with respect to both PTAL and PTAC. The
|
||
general expected trend would be to have larger errors in case of high PTAs but it is not
|
||
always the case,
|
||
•
|
||
As expected, the location confirmations (PTAC) show better accuracy with time,
|
||
•
|
||
A large part of the locations “errors” are within 20 km (only 10 points >20km, and 4 points
|
||
>100 km). Most of the high error values are linked to a great distance between the locating
|
||
MEOLUT and the beacon LEOSAR/GEOSAR position. However, it is known that
|
||
MEOLUT location accuracy is currently very variable in time and depends on the space
|
||
segment/beacon/MEOLUT instant geometry: as no clear trend seems to appear, and due to
|
||
the limited amount of data to process, drawing a relevant conclusion is premature.
|
||
Distance Between MEOSAR and LEOSAR/GEOSAR Locations
|
||
vs Potential Time Advantage for MEOSAR (Stand-Alone)
|
||
|
||
4-15
|
||
|
||
4.3.2.2 Italy
|
||
The Area of Interest was defined by the portion of ITMCC Service Area covered by participating
|
||
MEOLUTs within a radius of 3,000 km.
|
||
Overall, the MEOSAR system reported a time advantage in the notification of alerts of about
|
||
1 minute, compared to the existing system.
|
||
In the computation of independent location (PTAL) and confirmation of position (PTAC), the new
|
||
system performed better reporting a median value of 14 minutes and 35 minutes, respectively. The
|
||
high standard deviation values however demonstrate the variability of results most likely due either
|
||
to the current space segment configuration or ground segment availability and performance.
|
||
The results for MEOLUTs in networking mode are based on 29 samples that are not representative
|
||
enough, however all the categories reported positive performance of the MEOSAR system, except
|
||
for PTAE where the lack of data did not make a comparison possible.
|
||
Complementary analysis showed the time delay (median value) for the LEOSAR-system-only to
|
||
detect and process a beacon compared to the MEOSAR system while comparison to GEOSAR-
|
||
system-only produced only a slight difference.
|
||
4.3.2.3 Japan
|
||
In respect of this O-1 test, participants shall report results for an AOI that coincides with the MCC
|
||
service area. However, since there are not many beacons in JAMCC service area, we shall provide
|
||
the results that includes alerts in China, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, and other areas in the
|
||
NWPDDR. In both periods, JAMCC could receive enough alerts on this area to analyse.
|
||
During the standalone mode period, JAMCC received 283 alerts.
|
||
•
|
||
With respect to PTAC, 30% of alerts show positive with Potential Time Advantage of
|
||
MEOSAR. Alert sample size was 65.
|
||
•
|
||
With respect to PTAO, 70% of alerts were positive and the median showed 2 minutes PTA of
|
||
MEOSAR.
|
||
During the network mode period, 119 alerts were received.
|
||
•
|
||
With respect to PTAC, 55% of alerts showed positive Potential Time Advantage of
|
||
MEOSAR and the median was about 4 minutes. Alert sample size was 35.
|
||
•
|
||
With respect to PTAO, 75% of alerts showed a positive MEOSAR time advantage and the
|
||
median showed 4 and a half minutes of PTA of MEOSAR.
|
||
Conclusions from results.
|
||
•
|
||
In standalone mode period, remarkable time advantage wasn’t apparent.
|
||
•
|
||
A slight time advantage was shown in the networking mode period.
|
||
|
||
4-16
|
||
|
||
4.3.2.4 Norway
|
||
The Area of Interest (AOI) was comprised of the NMCC service area consisting of supported SPOCs
|
||
and Norway covered by the EU/MEOLUT – Spitsbergen. Standalone period was based on 236
|
||
samples, while in networking period there was 59 recorded alert notifications where both MEOSAR
|
||
and LEOSAR/GEOSAR had detections for the same beacon ID. Such a small sample of data in the
|
||
networking period may not be sufficiently representative, and results from the two periods might not
|
||
be directly comparable because of the shorter test period.
|
||
From the data collected at NMCC during D&E Phase II Part 2 it could be noted:
|
||
•
|
||
A potential time advantage of about 5 minutes for all categories during standalone and
|
||
networking mode of operations,
|
||
•
|
||
For independent location (PTAL) and confirmation of position (PTAC) the MEOSAR system
|
||
demonstrated time advantages with a median of about 12 and 5 minutes, respectively, while
|
||
for MEOLUTs in networking mode the PTAL and PTAC values were 12 and 32 minutes,
|
||
•
|
||
An improvement for position confirmation when MEOLUTs in network mode,
|
||
•
|
||
A minor time advantage of the MEOSAR system for encoded alert messages.
|
||
Based on the analysis of the collected data sample there is a potential positive time advantage in
|
||
favour of the MEOSAR system. This premature conclusion should be supported by another test
|
||
campaign where the test period duration is expanded to provide more representative analyses and
|
||
results. However, the current interpretation of results is that this time advantage will be further
|
||
substantiated when the MEOSAR space and ground segment is more complete.
|
||
4.3.2.5 Spain
|
||
The dataset provided covered all the SPMCC Service Area.
|
||
During the standalone mode period (19/Jan/2015 00:00 UTC – 20/Apr/2015 00:00 UTC), sometimes
|
||
the data received from EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT suffered a processing delay at the MEOSAR-
|
||
ready MCC. When an excessive time delay was noted, this time delay was compensated, adjusting
|
||
the original delayed time tag to a time close to the transmission time of the MEOLUT. Alert
|
||
messages coming from MEOSAR-ready USMCC or FMCC did not suffer from this delay, being
|
||
processed in real-time.
|
||
For the networking mode period (20/Apr/2015 00:00 UTC – 11/May/2015 00:00 UTC), the above-
|
||
mentioned processing delay was accumulative since the very beginning, and it was not possible to
|
||
correlate, in most of the cases, the data coming from external MCCs for the same beacon activation
|
||
with the local EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT data. Therefore, for this period, and for the most of the
|
||
cases analysed, the detection, localization and confirmation messages came from external MCCs,
|
||
which did not suffer the processing delay.
|
||
Based on EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT Networking configuration, solutions provided by MEOSAR-
|
||
ready FMCC, coming from MEOSAR-ready NMCC or CYMCC, could have their origin in
|
||
TOA/FOA data computed by EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT, covering, in this way, the SPMCC AOI.
|
||
|
||
4-17
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
The data sample for standalone mode period was 225 alerts and the data sample for the
|
||
networking mode period was 58 alerts.
|
||
•
|
||
In general, the Potential Time Advantage of MEOSAR versus LEOSAR/GEOSAR is
|
||
positive, mainly in the PTAC (Potential Time Advantage Confirmation), which presented a
|
||
median value of around 43 minutes.
|
||
•
|
||
The networking mode provides an improvement in PTAL and PTAC over the positive values
|
||
already obtained for standalone mode. The median value for PTAC is increased by 30
|
||
minutes, reaching a value around 73 minutes.
|
||
•
|
||
In networking mode the PTAE values are negative. As commented above, during this time
|
||
the data from EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT was not directly available due to a processing delay
|
||
for the local data. Therefore, the data readily available at the MEOSAR-ready MCC came
|
||
from external MCCs which, due to communications latency, could produce the slight
|
||
negative PTAE figures observed.
|
||
•
|
||
The “AOI Applied” table does not show, in general, an improvement, with respect to the “All
|
||
Data” table. On the contrary, for some PTAs they are even worse in the “AOI Applied” table
|
||
with respect to “All Data” table. One possible explanation is that beacons out of the
|
||
Maspalomas AOI are located southward near the coast of Togo, and in this area, with low
|
||
latitudes, LEOSAR presents more latency, that is, the nearer a location is to the Equator, the
|
||
longer the periods between LEOSAR passes. Therefore, in these cases the MEOSAR could
|
||
provide a better PTA response than LEOSAR, however, that contribution is removed when
|
||
applying the 3000 km AOI radius. Therefore, the “All Data” versus “AOI Data” results
|
||
comparison suggests that AOI radius filtering could be increased beyond 3000 km, at least
|
||
with respect to the Potential Time Advantage of MEOSAR versus LEOSAR. In the following
|
||
table, all data within AOI have been removed, only data OUT of AOI is presented. It can be
|
||
noted the high number of positive PTAs versus negative PTAs and also the value of the
|
||
median figures. There is only one large negative sample (about -650 minutes) which makes
|
||
standard deviation increase in PTAL and PTAC.
|
||
PTA Summary Results for
|
||
All Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAE
|
||
PTAL
|
||
PTAA
|
||
PTAC
|
||
PTAO
|
||
Mean:
|
||
44.93
|
||
16.78
|
||
52.28
|
||
28.42
|
||
38.71
|
||
Median:
|
||
44.93
|
||
28.28
|
||
30.17
|
||
51.65
|
||
7.14
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
71.06
|
||
179.31
|
||
98.61
|
||
182.65
|
||
86.48
|
||
MAX PTA:
|
||
95.18
|
||
417.08
|
||
417.08
|
||
187.87
|
||
359.55
|
||
MIN PTA:
|
||
-5.32
|
||
-621.43
|
||
-67.80
|
||
-679.47
|
||
-28.15
|
||
N (Positive PTA):
|
||
|
||
|
||
N (Negative PTA):
|
||
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
An alternative analysis is provided in the following table for the standalone period with
|
||
calculations of PTAU and PTAE of MEOSAR vs LEOSAR and MEOSAR vs GEOSAR, and
|
||
it was noted that:
|
||
|
||
4-18
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
The Potential Time Advantage from MEOSAR versus GEOSAR is only slightly
|
||
positive, for both Unlocated and Encoded Located alerts (PTAUVG and PTAEVG),
|
||
which seems to indicate that in the SPMCC case at least, where the Service Area is
|
||
covered by three GEOSAR Satellites (GOES-E, M2 and M3), the improvement
|
||
provided by MEOSAR for Unlocated and/or Encoded Only alerts over GEOSAR is
|
||
not so high.
|
||
•
|
||
However, it was noted that the Potential Time Advantage MEOSAR versus LEOSAR
|
||
for Unlocated and Encoded Located alert (PTAUVL and PTAEVL) presented higher
|
||
PTA values than those obtained for MEOSAR vs GEOSAR.
|
||
•
|
||
Given that the high number of Encoded Located GEOSAR detections can bias the
|
||
PTAE global measurement, it is worth presenting PTAE values separated by PTA of
|
||
MEOSAR versus LEOSAR (PTAEVL) and PTA MEOSAR versus GEOSAR
|
||
(PTAEVG).
|
||
•
|
||
Therefore, in order to have a better perspective of the MEOSAR behaviour versus the
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR system, it is considered interesting to include, in future
|
||
spreadsheets, the analysis of the PTAEVG and PTAEVL measurements.
|
||
•
|
||
For the same reason, given that same behaviour was noted also for unlocated alerts, it
|
||
is also considered interesting to add the PTAUVG and PTAUVL to the spreadsheet.
|
||
PTA Summary Results for All
|
||
Data (in minutes)
|
||
PTAUVG
|
||
PTAUVL
|
||
PTAEVG
|
||
PTAEVL
|
||
Mean:
|
||
3.41
|
||
13.46
|
||
5.60
|
||
42.44
|
||
Median:
|
||
0.72
|
||
4.38
|
||
0.67
|
||
16.32
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
21.56
|
||
136.94
|
||
17.76
|
||
74.93
|
||
MAX PTA:
|
||
193.28
|
||
539.30
|
||
95.18
|
||
336.95
|
||
MIN PTA:
|
||
-63.45
|
||
-306.30
|
||
-5.32
|
||
-42.42
|
||
N (Positive PTA):
|
||
|
||
|
||
N (Negative PTA):
|
||
|
||
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI
|
||
Applied (in minutes)
|
||
PTAUVG
|
||
PTAUVL
|
||
PTAEVG
|
||
PTAEVL
|
||
Mean:
|
||
3.11
|
||
13.46
|
||
3.21
|
||
40.05
|
||
Median:
|
||
0.73
|
||
4.38
|
||
0.67
|
||
13.92
|
||
Standard Deviation:
|
||
21.04
|
||
136.94
|
||
8.65
|
||
77.40
|
||
MAX PTA:
|
||
193.28
|
||
539.30
|
||
36.85
|
||
336.95
|
||
MIN PTA:
|
||
-63.45
|
||
-306.30
|
||
-3.97
|
||
-42.42
|
||
N (Positive PTA):
|
||
|
||
|
||
N (Negative PTA):
|
||
|
||
|
||
4-19
|
||
|
||
4.3.2.6 USA
|
||
Part 1
|
||
MEOSAR appeared to be faster at providing unlocated alerts to the system.
|
||
MEOSAR did not show a time advantage in located alerts.
|
||
A limited satellite constellation appears to provide an explanation for the underlying cause of poor
|
||
MEOSAR performance as it relates to located alerts.
|
||
The USA O-1 results appear to diminish slightly within the AOI relative to the service area.
|
||
Part 2
|
||
Key observations on the results analysis process are as follows:
|
||
•
|
||
Removing the data with extremely large gaps improves the statistics for MEOSAR, and is
|
||
likely a more realistic measure of performance
|
||
•
|
||
Applying the AOI appears to have little or no impact on the results
|
||
•
|
||
The median appears to be a better measure of performance as the mean (or average) is easily
|
||
skewed by data with very large values, and the average should perhaps be removed
|
||
•
|
||
The category PTAO includes notifications for unlocated alerts while no other column reports
|
||
this data, and this could lead to confusion when interpreting the results, so a PTAU column
|
||
should perhaps be added
|
||
•
|
||
The time of notification for unlocated alerts is generally a minute or two faster for
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR than MEOSAR, and the suspected reasons are potential configuration
|
||
details in USA MEOLUTs as well as a slightly more efficient communications path for
|
||
GEOLUT data (MEOLUT data goes through an additional FTP server).
|
||
Conclusions determined from these results are as follows:
|
||
•
|
||
Using the median is a more practical measure of performance
|
||
•
|
||
MEOSAR provides a clear time advantage in the independent location related categories
|
||
(PTAL and PTAC) but does not with respect to detect only data
|
||
•
|
||
MEOLUT networking further increased this time advantage in the independent location
|
||
related categories
|
||
|
||
4-20
|
||
|
||
4.4
|
||
Test O-2 Unique Detections by MEOSAR System as Compared to Existing System
|
||
4.4.1
|
||
O-2 Test Result
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
France D&E Phase 2 Part 2 Operational Tests Report
|
||
Sections 6.1.2 & 6.2.2, SAR-RE-DEMEO-917-CNES
|
||
Italy
|
||
JC-29/Inf. 20
|
||
Japan
|
||
Section 4.4.1.3 and 4.4.2.3 to this document.
|
||
Norway
|
||
JC-29/4/5 O-2 additional analysis
|
||
Spain
|
||
JC-29/Inf.42 / Additional analysis on Standalone Period in Section 4.4.1.5 to this
|
||
document.
|
||
USA
|
||
Section 4.4.1.6 and 4.4.2.6 to this document.
|
||
|
||
4-21
|
||
|
||
4.4.1.1 France
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area (in minutes)
|
||
Any
|
||
Detection
|
||
Unlocated
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent
|
||
Position
|
||
Confirmed
|
||
Position
|
||
Cou
|
||
nt
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
13.15
|
||
|
||
11.33
|
||
|
||
1.05
|
||
|
||
28.30
|
||
|
||
17.11
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
68.93
|
||
|
||
80.00
|
||
|
||
94.74
|
||
|
||
38.68
|
||
|
||
18.42
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
17.92
|
||
|
||
8.67
|
||
|
||
4.21
|
||
|
||
33.02
|
||
|
||
64.47
|
||
Total
|
||
692 100.00
|
||
|
||
59.97
|
||
|
||
13.73
|
||
|
||
15.32
|
||
|
||
10.98
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area and participating MEOLUTs coverage (in minutes)
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Unlocated
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent
|
||
Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
13.74
|
||
|
||
11.14
|
||
|
||
0.00
|
||
|
||
23.47
|
||
|
||
16.39
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
67.30
|
||
|
||
80.15
|
||
|
||
100.00
|
||
|
||
40.82
|
||
|
||
21.31
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
18.96
|
||
|
||
8.72
|
||
|
||
0.00
|
||
|
||
35.71
|
||
|
||
62.30
|
||
Total
|
||
|
||
100.00
|
||
|
||
71.83
|
||
|
||
0.52
|
||
|
||
17.04
|
||
|
||
10.61
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area (in minutes)
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Unlocated
|
||
Encoded
|
||
Position
|
||
Independent
|
||
Position
|
||
Confirmed
|
||
Position
|
||
Cou
|
||
nt
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
6.39
|
||
|
||
5.82
|
||
|
||
1.75
|
||
|
||
16.28
|
||
|
||
4.17
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
81.15
|
||
|
||
89.95
|
||
|
||
96.49
|
||
|
||
48.84
|
||
|
||
33.33
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
12.46
|
||
|
||
4.23
|
||
|
||
1.75
|
||
|
||
34.88
|
||
|
||
62.50
|
||
Total
|
||
|
||
100.00
|
||
|
||
60.38
|
||
|
||
18.21
|
||
|
||
13.74
|
||
|
||
7.67
|
||
PTA Summary Results for AOI = FMCC service area and participating MEOLUTs coverage (in minutes)
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Unlocated
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent
|
||
Position
|
||
Confirmed
|
||
Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
6.29
|
||
|
||
5.82
|
||
|
||
1.96
|
||
|
||
15.00
|
||
|
||
4.55
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
81.79
|
||
|
||
89.95
|
||
|
||
96.08
|
||
|
||
52.50
|
||
|
||
31.82
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
11.92
|
||
|
||
4.23
|
||
|
||
1.96
|
||
|
||
32.50
|
||
|
||
63.64
|
||
Total
|
||
|
||
100.00
|
||
|
||
62.58
|
||
|
||
16.89
|
||
|
||
13.25
|
||
|
||
7.28
|
||
|
||
4-22
|
||
|
||
4.4.1.2 Italy
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
12.02%
|
||
|
||
0.28%
|
||
|
||
4.10%
|
||
|
||
1.41%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
64.92%
|
||
|
||
5.52%
|
||
|
||
7.21%
|
||
|
||
5.52%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
23.06%
|
||
|
||
0.28%
|
||
|
||
6.51%
|
||
|
||
12.45%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
93.92%
|
||
|
||
82.18%
|
||
|
||
80.62%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
12.04%
|
||
|
||
0.15%
|
||
|
||
3.81%
|
||
|
||
1.37%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
66.16%
|
||
|
||
5.95%
|
||
|
||
5.03%
|
||
|
||
4.88%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
21.80%
|
||
|
||
1.37%
|
||
|
||
4.42%
|
||
|
||
7.16%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
92.53%
|
||
|
||
86.74%
|
||
|
||
86.59%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
11.00%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
5.26%
|
||
|
||
0.96%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
75.12%
|
||
|
||
5.26%
|
||
|
||
9.09%
|
||
|
||
5.74%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
13.88%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
1.91%
|
||
|
||
8.61%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
94.74%
|
||
|
||
83.73%
|
||
|
||
84.69%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
10.45%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
4.48%
|
||
|
||
1.00%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
75.62%
|
||
|
||
5.47%
|
||
|
||
7.96%
|
||
|
||
4.98%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
13.93%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
3.48%
|
||
|
||
2.99%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
94.53%
|
||
|
||
84.08%
|
||
|
||
91.04%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
4-23
|
||
|
||
4.4.1.3 Japan
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
14.70%
|
||
|
||
0.84%
|
||
|
||
3.26%
|
||
|
||
3.09%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
69.09%
|
||
|
||
14.70%
|
||
|
||
1.67%
|
||
|
||
2.09%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
16.21%
|
||
|
||
0.50%
|
||
|
||
2.76%
|
||
|
||
6.02%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
83.96%
|
||
|
||
92.31%
|
||
|
||
88.81%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
11.16%
|
||
|
||
0.80%
|
||
|
||
0.60%
|
||
|
||
0.80%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
77.89%
|
||
|
||
17.53%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
0.30%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
10.96%
|
||
|
||
0.50%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
0.10%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
81.18%
|
||
|
||
99.40%
|
||
|
||
98.80%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
16.15%
|
||
|
||
0.26%
|
||
|
||
4.62%
|
||
|
||
4.10%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
68.97%
|
||
|
||
1.28%
|
||
|
||
2.82%
|
||
|
||
5.13%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
14.87%
|
||
|
||
0.26%
|
||
|
||
4.10%
|
||
|
||
5.64%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
98.21%
|
||
|
||
88.46%
|
||
|
||
85.13%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
10.51%
|
||
|
||
0.34%
|
||
|
||
0.34%
|
||
|
||
0.34%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
79.32%
|
||
|
||
0.34%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
10.17%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
99.32%
|
||
|
||
99.66%
|
||
|
||
99.66%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
4-24
|
||
|
||
4.4.1.4 Norway
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
9.07 %
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
|
||
3.46 %
|
||
|
||
3.10 %
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
85.68 %
|
||
|
||
2.98 %
|
||
|
||
2.98 %
|
||
|
||
3.10 %
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
5.25 %
|
||
|
||
0.12 %
|
||
|
||
1.67 %
|
||
|
||
2.98 %
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
812 96.90 %
|
||
|
||
91.89 %
|
||
|
||
90.81 %
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
8.55 %
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
|
||
3.25 %
|
||
|
||
2.77 %
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
86.27 %
|
||
|
||
2.77 %
|
||
|
||
3.01 %
|
||
|
||
3.13 %
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
5.18 %
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
|
||
1.33 %
|
||
|
||
2.41 %
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
807 97.23 %
|
||
|
||
92.41 %
|
||
|
||
91.69 %
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
18.14 %
|
||
|
||
3.63 %
|
||
|
||
1.08 %
|
||
|
||
11.86 %
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
79.22 %
|
||
|
||
3.24 %
|
||
|
||
0.88 %
|
||
|
||
1.37 %
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
2.65 %
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
|
||
0.59 %
|
||
|
||
1.86 %
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
|
||
93.14 %
|
||
|
||
97.45 %
|
||
|
||
84.90 %
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
18.24 %
|
||
|
||
3.67 %
|
||
|
||
0.99 %
|
||
|
||
11.99 %
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
79.78 %
|
||
|
||
3.27 %
|
||
|
||
0.79 %
|
||
|
||
1.19 %
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
1.98 %
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
|
||
0.40 %
|
||
|
||
1.09 %
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00 %
|
||
|
||
93.06 %
|
||
|
||
97.82 %
|
||
|
||
85.73 %
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
4-25
|
||
|
||
4.4.1.5 Spain
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
7.78%
|
||
|
||
0.96%
|
||
|
||
1.44%
|
||
|
||
2.99%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
58.13%
|
||
|
||
6.58%
|
||
|
||
5.38%
|
||
|
||
3.59%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
34.09%
|
||
|
||
1.44%
|
||
|
||
8.97%
|
||
|
||
17.58%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
91.03%
|
||
|
||
84.21%
|
||
|
||
75.84%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position
|
||
Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
6.97%
|
||
|
||
1.07%
|
||
|
||
1.07%
|
||
|
||
2.14%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
61.39%
|
||
|
||
7.37%
|
||
|
||
4.02%
|
||
|
||
2.28%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
31.64%
|
||
|
||
3.35%
|
||
|
||
4.69%
|
||
|
||
8.98%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
88.20%
|
||
|
||
90.21%
|
||
|
||
86.60%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
All Data
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
10.07%
|
||
|
||
0.67%
|
||
|
||
1.68%
|
||
|
||
5.37%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
67.79%
|
||
|
||
6.71%
|
||
|
||
5.70%
|
||
|
||
2.01%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
22.15%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
7.72%
|
||
|
||
10.40%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
276 92.62%
|
||
|
||
84.90%
|
||
|
||
82.21%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
AOI Applies
|
||
Any Detection
|
||
Encoded Position
|
||
Independent Position Confirmed Position
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
Count
|
||
%
|
||
LEO/GEO only
|
||
|
||
7.46%
|
||
|
||
0.76%
|
||
|
||
1.87%
|
||
|
||
2.24%
|
||
MEO only
|
||
|
||
72.39%
|
||
|
||
6.87%
|
||
|
||
5.22%
|
||
|
||
1.12%
|
||
Both Systems
|
||
|
||
20.15%
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
|
||
2.99%
|
||
|
||
3.73%
|
||
Neither System
|
||
|
||
0.00%
|
||
248 92.54%
|
||
|
||
89.93%
|
||
|
||
92.91%
|
||
Total Beacon Events
|
||
|
||
|
||
4-26
|
||
|
||
4.4.1.6 USA
|
||
Part 1 (Stand-Alone Only)
|
||
Part 2 Stand-Alone
|
||
|
||
4-27
|
||
|
||
Part 2 Networked
|
||
4.4.2
|
||
O-2 Test Result Interpretation
|
||
4.4.2.1 France
|
||
Results show that there is no difference when considering an area of interest defined by the FMCC
|
||
service area or an area of interest defined by the FMCC service area extended by MEOLUTs
|
||
coverage.
|
||
Comparison between the MEOSAR and the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system indicates a very high
|
||
number of events generated by the MEOSAR system, two thirds of those being Unlocated alerts.
|
||
The MEOLUT networking operating mode seems to degrade the situation by relatively increasing the
|
||
number of Unlocated detections that becomes 15 times higher than it is for the LEOSAR/GEOSAR
|
||
system. Compared to the stand-alone operating mode, the networking operating mode increases the
|
||
number of detections. In the data set collected during the “networking” part of the test the amount of
|
||
MEOSAR detections doubles in relative size.
|
||
However, a small proportion of MEOSAR unique detections seem to lead to unique locations.
|
||
Nonetheless, conclusions could not be taken on the realism of the MEOSAR alerts; the number of
|
||
Unlocated alerts being excessive and some further analyses needs to be carried out on the existence
|
||
of beacons located by the MEOSAR system.
|
||
|
||
4-28
|
||
|
||
Events type distribution for each system (standalone mode)
|
||
4.4.2.2 Italy
|
||
Overall the MEOSAR system detected more beacons and provided more independent locations than
|
||
the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system.
|
||
Applying the Area of Interest produced only slight differences in all categories, most likely due to the
|
||
fact that most of beacons were located inside the coverage area provided by participating MEOLUTs
|
||
within a 3,000 km radius circle.
|
||
MEOLUTs in networking increased from 65% to 75% the number of MEOSAR-only detections.
|
||
The results from a complementary analysis showed the impact of unlocated alerts over the statistics
|
||
demonstrating that 72% of beacons detected by MEOSAR-only were unlocated.
|
||
However, the LEOSAR/GEOSAR-system-only results underscored some lacks in the detection and
|
||
in the computation of independent location compared to the new system, which needs further
|
||
investigation.
|
||
4.4.2.3 Japan
|
||
There was little data in the JAMCC service area. Therefore, JAMCC analyzed beacon detections
|
||
within the NWPDDR.
|
||
In the standalone period, the number of MEOSAR detections were 1,021 and LEO-GEO detection
|
||
were 370. According to the data, MEOSAR detection were 3 times larger than LEO-GEO. And 70%
|
||
of MEO had no location information.
|
||
|
||
4-29
|
||
|
||
In the networking period, the number of MEOSAR detections were 327 and LEO-GEO detections
|
||
were 121. According to the data, MEOSAR detection were 3 times larger than LEO-GEO. And, 80%
|
||
of MEO had no location information.
|
||
The results shows that MEOSAR detects more beacons than LEO/GEO.
|
||
It is considered possible that the fact that no MEOLUT in NWPDDR caused many alerts with no
|
||
location data to be detected. There are no obvious difference between networking period and
|
||
standalone period. This also may be influenced by there being no MEOLUTs in the NWPDDR.
|
||
4.4.2.4 Norway
|
||
As noted by Norway in previous O-2 additional analysis presented at JC-29 (JC-29/4/5), there is a
|
||
high amount of unique MEO-only detections. MEO-only consists of approximately 86% of the total
|
||
beacon events in standalone mode, and about 80% of the alerts in networking mode of operation is
|
||
from MEO only detections. Most of the detections counted is from unlocated beacons, 89.4% of the
|
||
detections was unlocated beacons during standalone mode, and 94% was unlocated during
|
||
networking mode. In our interpretation of the results we find it remarkable that MEOLUTs in
|
||
networking mode seems to increase the amount of detect only cases without impacting other
|
||
categories significantly.
|
||
From the analysis results it is noted that there is little or no difference when applying an Area of
|
||
interest defined by the MEOLUT coverage area. This is most probably because the MEOLUT CA of
|
||
3000 km radius extends the NMCC service area, and the greater part of the beacons were located
|
||
inside the MEOLUTs coverage area.
|
||
Based on the collected data and analysis of unique detections by MEOSAR it is difficult to draw any
|
||
conclusions at this stage. MEOSAR for sure proves its capability of detecting beacons, and the large
|
||
amount of “phantom” beacons could be compensated by proper filtering methods at MCC and/or
|
||
MEOLUT level. However we would recommend further investigation and additional operational
|
||
tests to support and demonstrate the MEOSAR system advantages.
|
||
4.4.2.5 Spain
|
||
With respect to report JC-29/Inf.42, some refinement has been applied to the Standalone dataset, and
|
||
the figures in section 4.4.1.5 have changed slightly with respect to the figures for Standalone period
|
||
presented in JC-29 meeting report Inf.42.
|
||
A high percent of MEO Only detections was noted, that is, there were between 58% and 62%
|
||
MEOSAR Only Detections in standalone mode, and between 68% and 72% of alerts detected by
|
||
MEO Only in Networking mode of operation.
|
||
It was also noted that beacon alerts detected by both systems did not always contain the same history
|
||
in the Beacon Alert Type, that is, some beacon events detected by LEO as U (Unlocated) could be
|
||
detected by MEO as DC (DOA Confirmed) alerts.
|
||
Taking All Data detected in Standalone Mode of operation, and from those 285 alerts detected by
|
||
both systems, a break-down per alert type categories was done, obtaining the following table:
|
||
|
||
4-30
|
||
|
||
ONLY
|
||
LEO/GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
MEO
|
||
BOTH
|
||
U
|
||
E
|
||
D
|
||
ED
|
||
DC
|
||
EDC
|
||
Subtotal
|
||
|
||
U
|
||
|
||
|
||
E
|
||
|
||
|
||
D
|
||
|
||
|
||
ED
|
||
|
||
|
||
DC
|
||
|
||
|
||
EDC
|
||
|
||
|
||
Sub Total
|
||
|
||
|
||
Phase II Part 2 – Standalone Period
|
||
As it can be observed in the previous table, there is a diagonal in grey colour, which indicates which
|
||
beacon alerts detected by both systems have exactly the same alert types. Symmetric to this diagonal
|
||
appear the figures corresponding to those beacon events detected by both systems for all different
|
||
Alert Types combinations.
|
||
At this point, the comparison between MEOSAR and GEOSAR/LEOSAR systems is performed
|
||
using mirror pairs to this diagonal. As it can be observed in previous table, MEOSAR provided 37
|
||
beacon events with DOA, when those beacon events were provided as Unlocated by
|
||
GEOSAR/LEOSAR system, and the LEOSAR system provided 15 Doppler beacon events, when
|
||
those beacon events were provided as Unlocated by MEOSAR.
|
||
Phase II Part 2 – Networking Period
|
||
The previous table presents a similar analysis for the 66 beacon alerts detected by both systems,
|
||
when All Data is considered in the Networking Mode of operation.
|
||
ONLY
|
||
LEO/GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
MEO
|
||
BOTH
|
||
U
|
||
E
|
||
D
|
||
ED
|
||
DC
|
||
EDC Subtotal
|
||
|
||
U
|
||
|
||
|
||
E
|
||
|
||
|
||
D
|
||
|
||
|
||
ED
|
||
|
||
|
||
DC
|
||
|
||
|
||
EDC
|
||
|
||
|
||
Subtotal
|
||
|
||
|
||
4-31
|
||
|
||
While admitting that the data sample is small, only 66 samples, it is noted the ratio of MEOSAR
|
||
DOA detected when those alerts were detected Unlocated by LEO (15), over the number of
|
||
GEOSAR/LEOSAR Doppler detected alerts when those alerts were detected Unlocated by MEOSAR
|
||
(2).
|
||
It is also noted the number of MEOSAR Confirmed alerts with Encoded Position that were received
|
||
as Encoded Only by LEOSAR (5) over the number of Encoded Only MEOSAR that were confirmed
|
||
by GEOSAR/LEOSAR (1).
|
||
4.4.2.6 USA
|
||
Part 1
|
||
MEOSAR produces a large number of detect only cases, and a large portion of those are not detected
|
||
by the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system
|
||
The USA O-2 results do not appear to improve within the AOI relative to the service area
|
||
Lack of opportunity (i.e., visibility) does not seem to provide an explanation for the underlying cause
|
||
of many missed detections from either system
|
||
Part 2
|
||
Key observations on the results (all number references are from the complete data set) are as follows:
|
||
•
|
||
MEOSAR produces a large number of detect only cases (4829 unlocated and 783 encoded
|
||
only) relative to the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system (1144 unlocated and 129 encoded only), an
|
||
increase by factor of 4 for unlocated and 6 for encoded only, and further analysis indicated
|
||
that as much as 80% of this data appeared to be system generated anomalies
|
||
•
|
||
The number of LEOSAR/GEOSAR only cases for all categories, but in particular for
|
||
independent location (389) or confirmed positions (387), is a concern as these indicate a lack
|
||
of detections for what are most likely all real beacon activations
|
||
•
|
||
The data set is reduced, but statistics do not significantly change, when the AOI is applied
|
||
•
|
||
Networking of MEOLUTs appears to increase the amount of detect only cases, but did not
|
||
significantly impact other categories in this result set
|
||
•
|
||
The number of MEOSAR only cases where there was independent location (141) or
|
||
confirmed positions (156) demonstrates the value MEOSAR adds to the current system as
|
||
these are most likely real beacon activations that went undetected by the LEOSAR/GEOSAR
|
||
system due to gaps between LEOSAR satellite times of visibility
|
||
In the short term, concerns related to suspect alerts can be largely mitigated by appropriate filtering at
|
||
MCCs. While the lack of MEOSAR detections needs to be improved, the significant number of
|
||
MEOSAR only cases with independent location and confirmed position soundly demonstrates the
|
||
value MEOSAR adds to the current system.
|
||
|
||
4-32
|
||
|
||
4.5
|
||
Test O-3 Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert Traffic in the Cospas-Sarsat Ground
|
||
Segment Network
|
||
4.5.1
|
||
O-3 Test Result
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
France D&E Phase 2 Part 2 Operational Tests Report, sections 6.1.3 & 6.2.3
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-917-CNES
|
||
Italy
|
||
JC-29/Inf. 21
|
||
Japan
|
||
Sections 4.5.1.3 and 4.5.2.3 to this document.
|
||
Norway
|
||
Sections 4.5.1.4 and 4.5.2.4 to this document.
|
||
Spain
|
||
JC-29/Inf.42
|
||
USA
|
||
Sections 4.5.1.4 and 4.5.2.4 to this document.
|
||
|
||
4-33
|
||
|
||
4.5.1.1 France
|
||
All SIT messages sizes are assumed 1024 bytes.
|
||
Standalone Mode
|
||
Data received by the FMCC
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133
|
||
Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
(B)
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
(kbit/s)
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
89700352 0.09127159
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
19262 11659
|
||
|
||
|
||
51474432 0.05237609
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
1266 37749 19852 17059
|
||
|
||
|
||
137866 141174784 0.14364768
|
||
Data sent out by the FMCC
|
||
Networking Mode
|
||
Data received by the FMCC (Network)
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133
|
||
Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume (B)
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
(kbit/s)
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.11771571
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.15605472
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
13296 10727
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.27375194
|
||
Data sent out by the FMCC (Network)
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133
|
||
Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume (B)
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
(kbit/s)
|
||
SIT\_MEO \#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.00904303
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.07895902
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.08798943
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133
|
||
Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume (B)
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
(kbit/s)
|
||
SIT\_MEO \#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.00696201
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.03107630
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.03785096
|
||
|
||
4-34
|
||
|
||
4.5.1.2 Italy
|
||
Standalone Mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122 \#123 \#124 \#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133 \#Total Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
SIT\_MEO \#142 \#143 \#144 \#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
16170 16558080
|
||
0.016849
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.000602
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
16741 17142784
|
||
0.017444
|
||
Notes
|
||
For QMS in the LEO/GEO system please note that ITMCC sent to the nodal FMCC:
|
||
- 6928 SIT 122 messages
|
||
- 2391 SIT 125 messages
|
||
Networking Mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124 \#125 \#126 \#127 \#132 \#133
|
||
\#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
SIT\_MEO \#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144 \#145 \#146 \#147 \#136 \#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.017250
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.000433
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.017665
|
||
Notes
|
||
For QMS in the LEO/GEO system please note that ITMCC sent to the nodal FMCC:
|
||
•
|
||
1640 SIT 122 messages
|
||
•
|
||
578 SIT 125 messages
|
||
It was assumed that the size of SIT 185 is 1400 bytes based on the computation of maximum size that
|
||
the standard distress alert message could reach considering the current format, the following results
|
||
were noted about the volume of traffic for communication between ITMCC and SPOCs.
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#185
|
||
Data Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
2849000,00
|
||
0,002336
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
6854400,00
|
||
0,005618
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
9703400,00
|
||
0,007953
|
||
Summary Results from O-3 Spreadsheet - SIT 185
|
||
|
||
4-35
|
||
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#185
|
||
Data Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
2536800,00
|
||
0,002588
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
5735800,00
|
||
0,005839
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
8272600,00
|
||
0,008421
|
||
Summary Results from O-3 Spreadsheet - SIT 185
|
||
Stand-Alone MEOLUT
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#185
|
||
Data Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
312200,00
|
||
0,001334
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
1118600,00
|
||
0,004745
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
1430800,00
|
||
0,006069
|
||
Summary Results from O-3 Spreadsheet - SIT 185
|
||
Networked MEOLUTs
|
||
|
||
4-36
|
||
|
||
4.5.1.3 Japan
|
||
Calculation based on Transmitted Messages only as per document C/S R.018.
|
||
Standalone Mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133 \#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.009513
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.001606
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.011118
|
||
Networking Mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133
|
||
\#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.010172
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.003481
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.013653
|
||
Calculation based on Transmitted and Received Messages.
|
||
Standalone Mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#122 \#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125 \#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132 \#133 \#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142 \#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145 \#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136 \#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
14602 165
|
||
|
||
84912 1581 12278
|
||
|
||
1284 114939 117697536
|
||
0.119757
|
||
MEO
|
||
2585 1735 11211
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.023499
|
||
Combined
|
||
17187 1900 11274 85287 5013 15373
|
||
144 1315 137493 140792832
|
||
0.143257
|
||
Networking Mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132 \#133 \#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136 \#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.126843
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.043974
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
4439 21249 1706
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.170776
|
||
|
||
4-37
|
||
|
||
4.5.1.4 Norway
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122
|
||
\#123 \#124 \#125 \#126 \#127 \#132 \#133 \#185 \#Total Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
SIT\_MEO \#142
|
||
\#143 \#144 \#145 \#146 \#147 \#136 \#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
5237 164
|
||
1593 2
|
||
|
||
1100 17743
|
||
|
||
0.018908
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
7723 1095 3
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.019615
|
||
Combined
|
||
18564 103
|
||
|
||
6087 7887 2688 5
|
||
|
||
1100 36568
|
||
|
||
0.038522
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122 \#123 \#124 \#125 \#126 \#127 \#132 \#133 \#185 \#Total Data Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
SIT\_MEO \#142 \#143 \#144 \#145 \#146 \#147 \#136 \#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
2065 3
|
||
|
||
1238 45
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.017792
|
||
MEO
|
||
7531 60
|
||
|
||
|
||
1156 572
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.045551
|
||
Combined
|
||
9596 63
|
||
|
||
1985 1201 904
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.063327
|
||
Notes:
|
||
All QMS data included. MEO SIT 185 messages to SPOCs removed because of non-filtering
|
||
orbitography and test protocol coded beacons.
|
||
|
||
4-38
|
||
|
||
4.5.1.5 Spain
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT connected to MEO-SPMCC (28 Jan – 20 Apr, with two gaps)
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122 \#123 \#124 \#125 \#126 \#127 \#132 \#133 \#185 \#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142 \#143 \#144 \#145 \#146 \#147 \#136 \#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
3186 137
|
||
|
||
2262 264 1760
|
||
|
||
|
||
2271 10241 11340680
|
||
0.017221
|
||
MEO
|
||
5838 316
|
||
|
||
1237 1950 698
|
||
|
||
218 21142 31445 40149072
|
||
0.060967
|
||
Combined
|
||
9024 453
|
||
|
||
3499 2214 2458
|
||
|
||
499 23413 41686 51489752
|
||
0.078188
|
||
EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT NOT connected to MEO-SPMCC (Gap \#1: 19 Jan – 28 Jan, Gap \#2: 5 March – 16 March)
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122 \#123 \#124 \#125 \#126 \#127 \#132 \#133 \#185 \#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142 \#143 \#144 \#145 \#146 \#147 \#136 \#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
3412 3772880
|
||
0.017512
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
1205 1580968
|
||
0.007331
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
211 1665 4617 5353848
|
||
0.024843
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT connected to MEO-SPMCC (20 Apr – 11 May, with a gap between 29 Apr and 7 May)
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO \#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133
|
||
\#185
|
||
\#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.016674
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.045352
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.062026
|
||
EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT NOT connected to MEO-SPMCC (29 Apr – 7 May)
|
||
SIT\_LEO\_GEO
|
||
\#122
|
||
\#123
|
||
\#124
|
||
\#125
|
||
\#126
|
||
\#127
|
||
\#132
|
||
\#133
|
||
\#185
|
||
\#Total
|
||
Data
|
||
Volume
|
||
Bandwidth
|
||
kb/s
|
||
SIT\_MEO
|
||
\#142
|
||
\#143
|
||
\#144
|
||
\#145
|
||
\#146
|
||
\#147
|
||
\#136
|
||
\#137
|
||
LEO\_GEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.017793
|
||
MEO
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.020796
|
||
Combined
|
||
|
||
|
||
0.038589
|
||
|
||
4-39
|
||
|
||
4.5.1.6 USA
|
||
Part 1
|
||
Part 2 Stand-Alone
|
||
Part 2 Networked
|
||
4.5.2
|
||
O-3 Test Result Interpretation
|
||
4.5.2.1 France
|
||
The MEOSAR system generates a considerable amount of SIT messages in comparison to the
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR system. A high number of position conflicts are generated by MEOSAR. The
|
||
use of networking between MEOLUTs tends to excessively increase the volume of data transmitted.
|
||
From a technical point of view, the French MEOSAR-ready MCC is capable of handling the amount
|
||
of transiting data. However, from an operational point of view, the high number of SIT messages
|
||
may disturb the proper treatment and/or forwarding of the alert towards RCCs or SPOCs.
|
||
The trend of the analyses shows the Volume of MEOSAR distress alert traffic in the COSPAS-
|
||
SARSAT ground segment network will be considerably higher than the traffic generated by the
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR system and may cause trouble at operational level for alert treatment.
|
||
Conclusions are taken with the limitations of the D&E testing phase II part II in terms of ground
|
||
segment configuration.
|
||
|
||
4-40
|
||
|
||
MEOSAR Data Sent Daily by the FMCC in Stand-Alone (Left Side) and Networking (Right Side) Modes
|
||
4.5.2.2 Italy
|
||
SIT 185 messages generated by the MEOSAR-ready MCC were only noted and not sent to the
|
||
SPOCs.
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready MCC not associated with a MEOLUT produces an additional outbound traffic
|
||
that is negligible, compared to the current load as the outgoing messages towards other MCCs are
|
||
related to beacons located in the Buffer Zone or to NOCR messages.
|
||
In that configuration, the ITMCC estimated the impact on data volume traffic and use of bandwidth,
|
||
analysing the SIT 185 messages generated towards their RCCs and SPOCs. In fact, from a
|
||
complementary analysis, the general additional data volume and use of bandwidth increased by
|
||
around 2.2 times the current workload. With MEOLUTs in networking and MCCs set in continued
|
||
transmission, the message traffic and bandwidth increased by around 3.5 times the current load.
|
||
The maximum bandwidth load recorded during the test period was 0.017665 Kbps for the combined
|
||
MEOSAR and LEOSAR/GEOSAR systems and MEOLUTs in networking mode, being within the
|
||
minimum network capabilities of current communication paths.
|
||
4.5.2.3 Japan
|
||
As the MEOSAR-ready JAMCC isn’t connected with a MEOLUT, it has not sent SIT messages to
|
||
any MCCs. It causes low amount of MEOSAR data compared with LEO/GEO data. It also seems
|
||
that the fact that JAMCC has exchanged many SIT message of LEO/GEO for MCCs as NODAL
|
||
MCC influenced the large amount of LEO/GEO data.
|
||
With regards to bandwidth, the maximum load recorded during the test period was 0.013653kbps for
|
||
the combined LEO/GEO/MEO in networking mode.
|
||
Considered with the forthcoming LEO/GEO/MEO common use period, it seems that the impact of
|
||
data volume is not important.
|
||
4.5.2.4 Norway
|
||
Because of other EU/SGS qualification test campaigns running in parallel to the D&E phase II Part 2,
|
||
Norway experienced sometimes that the MEOSAR-ready NMCC received data from the local
|
||
|
||
4-41
|
||
|
||
MEOLUT configured in networking mode, or with the MEOLUT configured to send self-test alert
|
||
messages to the MCC. Those cases were attempted to be removed in the post-processing, which
|
||
excludes some time periods for the analysis. However due to the comprehensive test intervals the
|
||
volume of alert traffic may not be representative between the two systems at all times during
|
||
standalone and networking mode.
|
||
The MEOSAR system used more data volume and bandwidth than the current LEOSAR/GEOSAR
|
||
system. Overall the maximum bandwidth load recorded during networking was 0.063327 combined
|
||
for both LEO/GEO and MEO systems. The most significant difference of bandwidth usage between
|
||
the two systems also took place during networking, where MEOSAR reported an increase of data
|
||
volume and bandwidth of about +250% (2.5 times the current load).
|
||
From the complementary analysis, where a large amount of MEO SIT 185 messages were included,
|
||
it could be noted that the data volume and bandwidth load did not impact the processing capability of
|
||
the current MEOSAR-ready NMCC. Based on this analysis the interpretation of summary results is
|
||
that current communication links and MCC capability is suitable to cope with the additional traffic
|
||
load from MEOSAR.
|
||
4.5.2.5 Spain
|
||
The MEOSAR-ready SPMCC transmitted messages only until Location Confirmation, as it is done
|
||
for the LEO/GEO MCC system, thus, the number of SIT144 (Position Confirmation by Encoded)
|
||
and SIT147 (Position Confirmation by DOA) should have been greater if the SEND AFTER
|
||
RESOLVED configuration mode had been applied instead.
|
||
During some periods of time, the EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT data was directly available at the MCC,
|
||
and during other periods of time data was not directly available at the MCC. Given that having or not
|
||
an associated MEOLUT connected to the MCC is decisive for the amount of transmitted messages,
|
||
different tables were shown in the O-3 Traffic Analysis, depending on the connection status between
|
||
the MEOSAR-ready SPMCC and the EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT.
|
||
Taking into account the periods of time that the MEOSAR-ready SPMCC was connected to the
|
||
EU/Maspalomas MEOLUT, the maximum global traffic ratio observed was for the MCC to SPOC
|
||
communication link, with a MEOSAR traffic 9.3 larger than the LEOSAR traffic.
|
||
Several circumstances were identified which could lead to production of this large amount of
|
||
messages to SPOCs. They seem to be related with the continuous transmission of Position Updates
|
||
and Position Conflicts observed in some situations, and some SPOC areas which have double
|
||
destination addresses, leading the MCC to send the messages, intended for those areas, twice.
|
||
With the current DDP rules, about the minimum period of time of several minutes that should elapse
|
||
between consecutive position update and position conflict messages, the MCC to SPOC traffic load
|
||
should be lesser.
|
||
4.5.2.6 USA
|
||
Part 1
|
||
|
||
4-42
|
||
|
||
The results of the O-3 test imply that for the combined MEO and LEO/GEO systems, there will be a
|
||
data volume increase on the order of almost two and a half times the size of the existing LEO/GEO
|
||
system. Likewise, the communication bandwidth of the combined system load will also be two and a
|
||
half times the occupancy of the current system.
|
||
Part 2
|
||
The results of the O-3 test imply that for the combined MEO and LEO/GEO systems, there will be a
|
||
data volume increase. As the data will be merged in the LEO/GEO/MEO system, the increase will
|
||
not be as high, so the maximum increase (assuming networking is on) is perhaps 3.5 times the current
|
||
load. However, given the relatively low overall bandwidth required, the impact of the additional
|
||
traffic due to the MEOSAR system should be negligible.
|
||
4.6
|
||
Test O-4 406 MHz Alert Data Distribution Procedures
|
||
4.6.1
|
||
O-4 Test Result
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
France D&E Phase 2 Part 2 Operational Tests Report, sections 6.1.4 & 6.2.4
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-917-CNES
|
||
Italy
|
||
JC-29/Inf. 22
|
||
USA
|
||
JC-29/Inf. 26 (section 5)
|
||
|
||
4-43
|
||
|
||
4.6.1.1 France
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
Alert types repartition for the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system
|
||
Nb of sites: 215
|
||
Nb of solutions: 3425
|
||
FA
|
||
UNL
|
||
FA
|
||
ENC
|
||
FA
|
||
DOP
|
||
FA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
FA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOP
|
||
DOP
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
ENC
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
CA
|
||
DOP
|
||
DOP
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DOP
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
DOP
|
||
DIF
|
||
CT
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
RD
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
RD
|
||
UNL
|
||
TOTAL
|
||
|
||
|
||
SITE LEVEL STAT. (%)
|
||
74.42 7.91 17.2
|
||
0.47
|
||
0.00
|
||
15.81
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.47
|
||
SOLUTION LEVEL STAT. (%)
|
||
4.67
|
||
0.50 1.08
|
||
0.03
|
||
0.00
|
||
1.05 0.09 0.44
|
||
0.99
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.03
|
||
2.48 0.09
|
||
0.00 31.77 56.79
|
||
Alert types repartition for the MEOSAR system
|
||
Nb of sites: 601
|
||
Nb of solutions: 3403
|
||
FA
|
||
UNL
|
||
FA
|
||
ENC
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
ENC
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
CA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
DOP
|
||
DIF
|
||
CT
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
RD
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
RD
|
||
UNL
|
||
TOTAL
|
||
|
||
|
||
SITE LEVEL STAT. (%)
|
||
69.88 18.64 10.9 0.17
|
||
0.33
|
||
7.49
|
||
0.33
|
||
0.50
|
||
SOLUTION LEVEL STAT. (%) 12.34
|
||
3.29
|
||
1.94 0.03
|
||
0.06
|
||
1.18
|
||
0.53 1.53
|
||
1.32
|
||
0.06
|
||
0.09 16.37 6.94 1.70 33.94 18.69
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
Alert types repartition on the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system (Networking mode)
|
||
Nb of sites: 59
|
||
Nb of solutions: 910
|
||
FA
|
||
UNL
|
||
FA
|
||
ENC
|
||
FA
|
||
DOP
|
||
FA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
FA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOP
|
||
DOP
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
ENC
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
CA
|
||
DOP
|
||
DOP
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DOP
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
DOP
|
||
DIF
|
||
CT
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
RD
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
RD
|
||
UNL
|
||
COLUMN TOTALS
|
||
|
||
|
||
SITE LEVEL STAT. (%)
|
||
72.88
|
||
6.78
|
||
20.34
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.00
|
||
8.47
|
||
1.69
|
||
0.00
|
||
SOLUTION LEVEL STAT. (%)
|
||
4.73
|
||
0.44
|
||
1.32
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.00
|
||
1.43
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.33
|
||
0.55
|
||
0.11
|
||
0.00
|
||
1.98
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.00
|
||
26.70
|
||
62.42
|
||
Alert types repartition on the MEOSAR system (Networking mode)
|
||
Nb of sites: 293
|
||
Nb of solutions: 3693
|
||
FA
|
||
UNL
|
||
FA
|
||
ENC
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
ENC
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
CA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
DOP
|
||
DIF
|
||
CT
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
RD
|
||
DOP
|
||
ENC
|
||
RD
|
||
UNL
|
||
COLUMN TOTALS
|
||
|
||
|
||
SITE LEVEL STAT. (%)
|
||
72.70 19.11 8.19
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.00
|
||
6.83
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.34
|
||
SOLUTION LEVEL STAT. (%)
|
||
5.77
|
||
1.52
|
||
0.65
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.73
|
||
0.00 0.35 0.54
|
||
0.00
|
||
0.03 23.67 3.82 1.16 32.87 28.89
|
||
|
||
4-44
|
||
|
||
4.6.1.2 Italy
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
NUMBER OF SITES
|
||
|
||
NUMBER OF
|
||
SOLUTIONS
|
||
|
||
FA
|
||
UNL
|
||
FA
|
||
ENC
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
ENC
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
CA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
DOA
|
||
DIF
|
||
CT
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
RD
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
RD
|
||
UNL
|
||
COLUMN
|
||
TOTALS
|
||
|
||
|
||
SITE LEVEL
|
||
STATISTICS
|
||
67.94%
|
||
10.45%
|
||
20.34%
|
||
0.99%
|
||
0.28%
|
||
13.98%
|
||
1.55%
|
||
0.28%
|
||
SOLUTION
|
||
LEVEL
|
||
STATISTICS
|
||
7.83%
|
||
1.20%
|
||
2.34%
|
||
0.11%
|
||
0.03%
|
||
2.62%
|
||
0.52%
|
||
0.08%
|
||
1.61%
|
||
0.18%
|
||
0.03%
|
||
12.34%
|
||
44.50%
|
||
2.70%
|
||
22.65%
|
||
2.02%
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
NUMBER OF SITES
|
||
|
||
NUMBER OF
|
||
SOLUTIONS
|
||
|
||
FA
|
||
UNL
|
||
FA
|
||
ENC
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
FA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
NC
|
||
ENC
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
CA
|
||
DOA
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
ENC
|
||
DOA
|
||
CFM
|
||
CA
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
CFM
|
||
CT
|
||
DOA
|
||
DIF
|
||
CT
|
||
ENC
|
||
DIF
|
||
RD
|
||
DOA
|
||
ENC
|
||
RD
|
||
UNL
|
||
COLUMN
|
||
TOTALS
|
||
|
||
|
||
SITE LEVEL
|
||
STATISTICS
|
||
74.30%
|
||
5.88%
|
||
19.20%
|
||
0.31%
|
||
0.31%
|
||
9.60%
|
||
0.00%
|
||
0.31%
|
||
SOLUTION LEVEL
|
||
STATISTICS
|
||
20.17%
|
||
1.60%
|
||
5.21%
|
||
0.08%
|
||
0.08%
|
||
4.71%
|
||
4.45%
|
||
0.08%
|
||
2.61%
|
||
0.00%
|
||
0.08%
|
||
2.02%
|
||
3.11%
|
||
0.59%
|
||
51.76%
|
||
7.39%
|
||
|
||
4-45
|
||
|
||
4.6.1.3 USA
|
||
Note: Only Part 1 results were provided by the USA for this test.
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
Results (MEOSAR system)
|
||
Category
|
||
# of Sites
|
||
(all)
|
||
% of Total
|
||
(all)
|
||
# of Sites
|
||
(Service
|
||
Area)
|
||
% of Total
|
||
(Service
|
||
Area)
|
||
FA UNL
|
||
|
||
67.8
|
||
|
||
78.9
|
||
FA ENC
|
||
|
||
5.9
|
||
|
||
8.5
|
||
FA DOA\*
|
||
|
||
22.8
|
||
|
||
12.2
|
||
FA CFM\*
|
||
|
||
3.5
|
||
|
||
0.4
|
||
Total
|
||
|
||
100%
|
||
|
||
100%
|
||
Summary Results for First Alerts (LEOSAR/GEOSAR system)
|
||
* For the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system, “DOA” refers to Doppler and “CFM” refers to ambiguity
|
||
resolution. Figure 2 contains results for the same period as Figure 1.
|
||
4.6.2
|
||
O-4 Test Result Interpretation
|
||
4.6.2.1 France
|
||
The O-4 test results show that the number of solutions of the MEOSAR system is much higher than
|
||
that of the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system.
|
||
The LEOSAR/GEOSAR system has a large part of redundant data (89% of the alerts), whereas the
|
||
generation of alerts for the MEOSAR system is more spread among the alerts types and shows a
|
||
larger percentage of First Alerts and Position confirmation alerts than the LEOSAR/GEOSAR
|
||
system.
|
||
With the MEOLUTs networking ON, the MEOSAR system generates an excessive amount of alert
|
||
data. The proportion of redundant data increases as well as the proportion of continued transmission
|
||
confirmation while the number of first alerts was rather lower in comparison with the period of test
|
||
with the MEOLUT stand-alone mode.
|
||
|
||
4-46
|
||
|
||
O-4 Alert Types Repartition for the LEOSAR/GEOSAR System (Left Side) and
|
||
the MEOSAR System in Stand-Alone(Right Side)
|
||
O-4 Alert Types Repartition for the LEOSAR/GEOSAR System (Left Side) and
|
||
the MEOSAR System in Networking (Right Side)
|
||
4.6.2.2 Italy
|
||
The MEOSAR system detected 2.7 times the number of beacons detected by the LEOSAR/GEOSAR
|
||
system.
|
||
In the computation of an independent location, the MEOSAR system performed better than the
|
||
existing system, providing a higher percentage of alerts provided with position DOA (+7%).
|
||
The continued transmission provided a large number of solutions to the MCC that processed the data
|
||
without performance degradation, being within the capabilities of the Cospas-Sarsat communications
|
||
network, as demonstrated in the O-3 Summary results. In view of the benefits that it provides for a
|
||
continuous monitoring beacon position to the destination MCC, the above results support the
|
||
proposition that continued transmission should be the default setting for the future MCCs.
|
||
MEOLUTs in networking configuration increased the percentage of first alerts unlocated up to 74%
|
||
(+6%) as well as the number of unlocated solutions up to 20% (+12%) compared to the Standalone
|
||
mode.
|
||
|
||
4-47
|
||
|
||
First alerts with an independent position are very similar to the stand-alone mode, at around 20% of
|
||
total first alerts.
|
||
Redundant data also reported a significant increase (+ 34.5%) representing 59% of solutions in total.
|
||
4.6.2.3 USA
|
||
Note: Only Part 1 results were provided by the USA for this test.
|
||
As shown in Figure 1, most MEOSAR alerts were unlocated during the test period. For beacon
|
||
activations, about 87% of MEOSAR first alerts were unlocated, 10% of MEOSAR first alerts
|
||
contained only encoded position and 3% of MEOSAR first alerts contained independent (DOA)
|
||
position.
|
||
An appropriate area of interest (that is, all activations vs. activations in the MCC service area) should
|
||
be selected in comparing the occurrence of output alerts by category between the MEOSAR and
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR systems. This is illustrated by fact that 26.3% of LEOSAR/GEOSAR first alerts
|
||
contained Doppler location for all beacon activations vs. 12.6% of LEOSAR/GEOSAR first alerts in
|
||
the USMCC service area, as shown in Figure 2. For all beacon activations processed by the
|
||
USMCC, independent location was provided for 3.13% of MEOSAR first alerts compared to 26.3%
|
||
of LEOSAR/GEOSAR first alerts.
|
||
Based on this analysis, the USA proposed modifications to the O-4 spreadsheet in document
|
||
C/S EWG-1/2014/6/4.
|
||
It is expected that independent (DOA) location will occur more often as more MEOSAR satellites
|
||
become available for use and when MEOLUT networking is performed. The availability and use of
|
||
additional MEOSAR satellites will enable a more meaningful analysis of alert data distribution
|
||
procedures to be implemented in the operational MEOSAR system.
|
||
4.7
|
||
Test O-5 SAR/Galileo Return Link Service
|
||
This test has been postponed to Phase III.
|
||
|
||
4-48
|
||
|
||
4.8
|
||
Test O-6 Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Benefits of the MEOSAR System
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
Argentina
|
||
Sec. 4.8.14
|
||
Australia
|
||
Sec. 4.8.7, 4.8.10, 4.8.11, 4.8.15, 4.8.17
|
||
Brazil
|
||
Sec. 4.8.1, 4.8.12
|
||
Italy
|
||
Sec. 4.8.8
|
||
New Zealand
|
||
Sec. 4.8.2, 4.8.3, 4.8.4, 4.8.6, 4.8.9, 4.8.13, 4.8.16
|
||
Norway
|
||
Sec. 4.8.5
|
||
|
||
4-49
|
||
|
||
4.8.1
|
||
Incident 1 – Brazil
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
6 October 2015 12:06 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Fazenda Guanabara Airport
|
||
Mato Grosso do Sul (Brazil)
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Aircraft emergency landing.
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
ELT
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
On land
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
09:06
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
2(Alive) / 1(Dead)
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
Later
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No advantage.
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No locations for this site.
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No locations for this site.
|
||
On 6 October 2015, a single-engine aircraft made an emergency landing at Fazenda Guanabara
|
||
Airport in Brazil.
|
||
The ARCC-CW received a distress alert data from BRMCC of a registered radio beacon. During the
|
||
investigation ARCC CW received information that the aircraft fell immediately after taking off. The
|
||
aircraft was quite damaged. The crew were found alive, but one of them was seriously injured, dying
|
||
at the hospital.
|
||
The aircraft’s ELT was detected by GEOSAR at 12:06 UTC and by MEOSAR at 12:07:58, both
|
||
unlocated detections. As the ELT was registered, the search for the aircraft was able to commence.
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR did not provide a time advantage.
|
||
|
||
4-50
|
||
|
||
4.8.2
|
||
Incident 2 – New Zealand
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
24 February 2016 23:45 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Ngunguru River, New Zealand
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Injured walker
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Land
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
12:45
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Helicopter
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
Only
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Location Accuracy (1.5 NM)
|
||
On 24 February 2016, an injured walker contacted NZ Police by phone but was unable to provide a
|
||
location. The walker was carrying a PLB and was asked to activate the beacon. JRCC New Zealand
|
||
was contacted by the NZ Police but there was no LEOSAR or GEOSAR data for the beacon. JRCC
|
||
NZ contacted the AUMCC system manager and the MEOSAR system provided an encoded and
|
||
MEOSAR location. The walker was successfully rescued. The encoded location was 45 m from the
|
||
walker, the MEOSAR location was within 1.5 nautical miles. There were no LEOSAR or GEOSAR
|
||
detections of the beacon.
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR was the only detection for a successful rescue.
|
||
|
||
4-51
|
||
|
||
4.8.3
|
||
Incident 3 – New Zealand
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
1 May 2016 20:36 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Nelson Lakes National Park, New Zealand
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Hiker with a shoulder dislocated.
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Forest/cliff
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
2 May 2016 08:36
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Helicopter
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (49 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (49 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
On 1 May 2016 at 20:36 UTC, a MEOSAR alert was received for an unregistered New Zealand
|
||
beacon. The Nelson rescue helicopter was dispatched to the encoded position and located a male
|
||
tramper (hiker) who had taken a tumble and dislocated his shoulder. The man was airlifted to Nelson
|
||
Hospital for treatment. A LEOSAR alert was received at 21:05 UTC. MEOSAR provided a location
|
||
49 minutes before the LEOSAR detection.
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR provided a time advantage.
|
||
|
||
4-52
|
||
|
||
4.8.4
|
||
Incident 4 – New Zealand
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
25 April 2016 02:23 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Tararua, New Zealand
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Hiker with a broken leg.
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Difficult terrain /fall
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
16:23
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Last light / Partially Cloudy
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Helicopter
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (50 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (50 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
On 25 April 2016, JRCC NZ received a MEOSAR detection of a registered PLB about 50 minutes
|
||
before the initial LEOSAR detection. A solo tramper (hiker) was rescued just before last light.
|
||
Without the additional 50 minutes of time provided by the earlier MEOSAR detection, the rescue
|
||
would most likely have required a land search at night in difficult terrain.
|
||
Further details are available at the following web site:
|
||
http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/news/media-releases-2016/20160426a.asp.
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR provided a time advantage that was critical to a successful rescue.
|
||
|
||
4-53
|
||
|
||
4.8.5
|
||
Incident 5 – Norway
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
9 January 2015 03:30 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
North Sea
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Fishing vessel sinking
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
EPIRB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Sea / Life raft
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Drifting
|
||
Local Time
|
||
04:30 (Night)
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Ice Cold water / Rough seas
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Helicopter
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (28 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (63 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
On 9th January 2015 at 03:30 UTC JRCC-North Norway received information from the coastal radio
|
||
that the fishing vessel “Oestbanken” (MMSI 259179000) was taking on water 60 NM north of
|
||
Baatsfjord with 5 people on board.
|
||
The first MEOSAR alert was received at 03:50 UTC with a DOA position. An unlocated GEO alert
|
||
was received at 04:18 UTC and a LEO alert with A and B positions was not received until
|
||
04:53 UTC.
|
||
The crew were rescued in rough seas in a life raft at 05:45 UTC.
|
||
See document JC-29/Inf 11 for a more detailed description of this incident.
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR provided a 28 minute advantage in detection and a 63 minute advantage in
|
||
providing a location.
|
||
|
||
4-54
|
||
|
||
4.8.6
|
||
Incident 6 – New Zealand
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Retrospective
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
19 January 2016 03:26 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Mount Earnslaw, New Zealand
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Hiker heart attack
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Valley
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
16:26
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not known
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
None
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (284 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (284 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
At 03:26 UTC on 19 January 2016, the New Zealand JRCC received a LEOSAR detection for a
|
||
beacon. The beacon had an encoded location. Just after the detection arrived at the JRCC, the JRCC
|
||
was contacted by emergency services. The beacon was associated with a party of trampers (hikers),
|
||
one of whom had suffered a suspected heart attack. The party had activated their beacon around five
|
||
hours prior to detection by the LEOSAR system. After waiting for a considerable period, they ended
|
||
up raising the alarm with some of the members hiking out and calling emergency services.
|
||
The beacon was confirmed by the MEOSAR system at 22:42 UTC on 18 January, four hours and
|
||
forty-four minutes before the LEOSAR detection.
|
||
It is presumed that the beacon was not detected by any GEO satellite due to terrain shielding. The
|
||
beacon was not detected for five hours by the LEOSAR system due to terrain shielding for earlier
|
||
passes.
|
||
In this incident, if the MEOSAR data had been available to SAR authorities, MEOSAR would have
|
||
provided detection and location advantage of 4 hours and 44 minutes.
|
||
|
||
4-55
|
||
|
||
4.8.7
|
||
Incident 7 – Australia
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Retrospective
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
22 March 2016 05:40 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Bowen, Australia
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Dory broken down at anchor
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
EPIRB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Sea
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Drifting
|
||
Local Time
|
||
16:40
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
A dory
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (6 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (44 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
1st DOA Location (5.36 km)
|
||
On 22 March 2016, a distress beacon registered to a dory boat was detected in the vicinity of Dingo
|
||
Reef, 50 miles east of Bowen, Queensland, Australia. The main trawler was contacted and reported
|
||
that a dory was missing. A rescue helicopter was tasked and it located the dory which was broken
|
||
down at anchor. A second dory was directed to the scene and assistance was provided.
|
||
The first LEO unlocated alert was received at 05:46 UTC. An initial LEO alert with suspect position
|
||
data was received at 06:24 UTC; the closest Doppler position was 17.46 km from the beacon. A
|
||
resolved LEO alert was received at 06:32 UTC with a position about 670 m from the beacon.
|
||
The MEOSAR system provided an initial alert at 05:40 UTC with a DOA position 5.36 km from the
|
||
beacon. An updated location was received at 05:43 UTC with a DOA position 440 m from the
|
||
beacon.
|
||
In this incident, if the MEOSAR data had been available to SAR authorities, MEOSAR would have
|
||
provided a 6 minute advantage in detection and 44 minute advantage in time to determine location.
|
||
|
||
4-56
|
||
|
||
4.8.8
|
||
Incident 8 – Italy
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Retrospective
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
4 November 2015 05:59 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
South Sudan
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Aircraft crash
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
ELT
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Land
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
08:59
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Crash near the airport
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (23 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (20 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
On 4 November 2015 at 05:59 UTC, a cargo aircraft Antonov An-12BK, registration mark EY-406
|
||
and Tajikistan-registered crashed shortly after take-off from Juba International Airport in South
|
||
Sudan, impacting terrain about 1,100 metres past the runway end.
|
||
Thirty-seven people died including the crew of six. Only two passengers survived the crash. The
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR system detected the ELT activation and alerts were processed by ITMCC, which
|
||
informed the interested SPOCs.
|
||
The first LEOSAR detection occurred at 06:22 UTC, the first LEOSAR Doppler positions at 07:16
|
||
UTC and the first resolved position at 08:00 UTC.
|
||
The first MEOSAR detection was at 0559 UTC, the first DOA position at 06:56 UTC and DOA
|
||
position was confirmed at 07:13 UTC.
|
||
See document CSC-55/OPN/Inf.10 for a more detailed description of this incident.
|
||
For this incident, if the MEOSAR data had been available to Search and Rescue authorities,
|
||
MEOSAR would have provided a 23 minute advantage in detection time, a 20 minute advantage in
|
||
detection of first position and a 47 minute advantage in time to confirmed position.
|
||
|
||
4-57
|
||
|
||
4.8.9
|
||
Incident 9 – New Zealand
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Retrospective
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
29 March 2014 23:31 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Lake Christabel, New Zealand
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Hiker stuck
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Rocky Precipice
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
12:31
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
None
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (120 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (120 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
In April 2014, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) received a query regarding a PLB
|
||
activated in New Zealand. The owner of the beacon reported:
|
||
“I was out hunting in the weekend and I got myself into a really bad situation. I was climbing up
|
||
some steep bluffs trying to get to the top of a ridge, and all of a sudden I realised that I could neither
|
||
go up or down. I was stuck. I tried to figure out a way down, and my mate couldn't get up to me to
|
||
help. As an absolute last resort I activated my RescueMe PLB. I was perched on a rocky precipice
|
||
waiting for a helicopter.
|
||
I knew that I could not spend a night out here, so I told myself I was going to get down. I threw all of
|
||
my gear down the bluffs including my rifle. It was the scariest thing I have ever done, but I did
|
||
eventually manage to get down. It could easily have gone either way, one slip and I would have
|
||
tumbled hundreds of feet.
|
||
We then walked back out to the car and as soon as I got into reception I called 111. There had been
|
||
no reports of a PLB activated in my area.”
|
||
There were no LEOSAR or GEOSAR detections of this beacon. If the beacon had been left turned
|
||
on, the first LEOSAR detection would have occurred about 2 hours after the first detection by
|
||
MEOSAR.
|
||
At this time the New Zealand MEOLUT had not been built. The MEOLUT in Hawaii (over 7,400 km
|
||
away) detected the beacon at 23:31 UTC 29 March and had many detections of the beacon with an
|
||
encoded location from 23:34 UTC to 01:45 UTC 30 March.
|
||
In this incident, if the MEOSAR data had been available to Search and Rescue authorities, MEOSAR
|
||
would have provided an advantage of over 120 minutes in detection and location. See document
|
||
JC-28/Inf.5 for a more detailed description of this incident.
|
||
|
||
4-58
|
||
|
||
4.8.10 Incident 10 – Australia
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Retrospective
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
13 April 2016 06:15 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Deepwater, Australia
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Road accident
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Valley
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
16:15
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
None
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Later)
|
||
Only
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (43 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (43 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
A member of the public reported to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) that the
|
||
person had activated their PLB at Ten Mile Rd, Deepwater NSW Australia about 4:15 pm 13 April
|
||
2016 until approximately 4:55 pm (local times) after arriving at the site of a road accident. The
|
||
beacon was turned off when mobile phone contact was made to rescue authorities by climbing a hill.
|
||
There were no LEOSAR or GEOSAR detections of this beacon. The beacon was activated in a valley
|
||
and it is presumed that terrain shielding prevented any LEOSAR or GEOSAR detections. If the
|
||
beacon had been left turned on, the earliest LEOSAR detection would have been around 04:58 pm.
|
||
The New Zealand MEOLUT detected the PLB multiple times between 04:15 pm to 04:58 pm local
|
||
time and provided an encoded position.
|
||
In this incident, if the MEOSAR data had been available to Search and Rescue authorities, MEOSAR
|
||
would have provided at least a 43-minute advantage in detection and location compared with
|
||
LEOSAR and GEOSAR.
|
||
|
||
4-59
|
||
|
||
4.8.11 Incident 11 – Australia
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Retrospective
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
02 June 2016 04:44 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Moreton Bay, Australia
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Moving fishing boat
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
EPIRB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Sea
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Moving
|
||
Local Time
|
||
16:44
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
None
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Other)
|
||
Other
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No advantage
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No advantage
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
1st location disadvantage (325 km)
|
||
At 04:44 UTC on 2 June 2016, an unlocated beacon was detected by the New Zealand MEOLUT and
|
||
the GEOSAR system. The beacon was registered but details were unclear as the previous owner had
|
||
sold the beacon.
|
||
The LEOSAR system generated A and B positions at 04:59. A conflict was generated at 06:31 before
|
||
the LEOSAR system produced a resolved position at 06:34.
|
||
The first DOA position was generated at 05:56 UTC. The next DOA position was generated at 06:16
|
||
UTC.
|
||
The first DOA position was over 325 km from the final location of the beacon. All DOA locations
|
||
after the first location at 05:56 were in the same area as the final location of the beacon.
|
||
Information from the incident indicates that the beacon was activated in a moving recreational
|
||
fishing boat.
|
||
In this incident, if the MEOSAR data had been available to search and rescue authorities, the first
|
||
DOA location may have confused the initial response. As the beacon was registered, information
|
||
from the beacon emergency contacts (once determined) may have indicated that the first DOA
|
||
location was grossly inaccurate. The second DOA position would also have indicated that there was a
|
||
conflict in positions.
|
||
|
||
4-60
|
||
|
||
4.8.12 Incident 12 – Brazil
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
05 July 2016 21:40 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Santa Cruz Air Force Base (Brazil)
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Jet plane crash
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
ELT
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Land
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
18:40
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Other)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (8 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Encoded Advantage (5 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
1st Location (18 km)
|
||
On 5 July 2016 at 21:40:11 UTC a Brazilian Air Force jet plane crashed close to Santa Cruz Air
|
||
Force Base due to landing gear problems. Both pilots successfully ejected before the accident. The
|
||
aircraft’s 406 MHz ELT was not activated, but the 406 MHz PLB attached to the pilot’s ejection seat
|
||
was automatically activated and its alerts were detected by LEOSAR, GEOSAR and MEOSAR
|
||
Systems. See document JC-30/Inf. 26 for a more detailed analysis of this incident.
|
||
The first MEOSAR detection occurred at 21:40:17 UTC, the first MEOSAR detection with an
|
||
encoded location was at 21:43:39 UTC and the first MEOSAR location was generated at 21:53:28
|
||
UTC.
|
||
The first LEOSAR detection and Doppler locations were generated at 21:48:51 UTC.
|
||
The first GEOSAR detection which included an encoded location occurred at 22:00:15.
|
||
The encoded location matched the reported position of the PLB. The LEOSAR positions were very
|
||
close to the actual PLB location. After 36 minutes, the MEOSAR location was 959 meters from the
|
||
actual PLB location.
|
||
In this incident, both LEOSAR and MEOSAR provided location data and an encoded location within
|
||
10 minutes. GEOSAR provided an encoded location within 20 minutes. The MEOSAR location data
|
||
was less accurate than the encoded and LEOSAR location data.
|
||
|
||
4-61
|
||
|
||
4.8.13 Incident 13 – New Zealand
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
14 July 2016 18:56 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Nevada (USA)
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Moving Aircraft
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
ELT
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Air
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Moving
|
||
Local Time
|
||
12:56
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
None
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Other)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No advantage
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No advantage
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Location Disadvantage (11,000 km)
|
||
A beacon was detected by the New Zealand MEOLUT at 18:56 UTC on 14 July 2016. The beacon
|
||
had a DOA position of (37 13.8S, 164 11.0E) and an encoded position of (38 03.33N, 116 16.80W),
|
||
a difference of over 11,000 kilometres.
|
||
Later MEOSAR detections did not generate a DOA position.
|
||
Information from LEOSAR detections indicated that the encoded position was valid but on a moving
|
||
aircraft (as the encoded position changed over time).
|
||
In this incident, the MEOSAR location was invalid. If the alert had not included an encoded location,
|
||
the MEOSAR location may have resulted in an unnecessary Search and Rescue response.
|
||
|
||
4-62
|
||
|
||
4.8.14 Incident 14 – Argentina
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
04 August 2016 20:18 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Villa Llaquin, Neuquén, Argentina
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Aircraft crash
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
ELT
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Land
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
17:18
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Not reported
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Other)
|
||
First Location
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
No advantage
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Location Advantage (75 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
1st DOA Location Accuracy (5.5 km)
|
||
On 4 August 2016 at 20:18 UTC, the ARMCC received an unlocated GEOSAR alert for an
|
||
unregistered ELT.
|
||
At 20:24 UTC, the Argentina MEOLUT provided a position near Villa Llanquin town in the
|
||
province of Neuquen, inside of Argentinian Patagonia, 40 km from Bariloche.
|
||
The local SAR forces were able to locate and rescue six persons from the aircraft that had crashed
|
||
due to lack of propulsion. See document JC-30/Inf. 38 for further information.
|
||
|
||
4-63
|
||
|
||
Detection times are shown in the following table:
|
||
TIME (UTC) SYSTEM
|
||
DISTANCE
|
||
20:18
|
||
GEO Unlocated alert (GOES -13)
|
||
--
|
||
20:24
|
||
MEO DOA Position
|
||
5,5 km
|
||
20:40
|
||
MEO Confirmed
|
||
3,2 km
|
||
21:39
|
||
LEO Initial alert (S-12) – Prob. 94% - Doppler A 0,8 km
|
||
22:05
|
||
LEO Resolved alert (S-07)
|
||
3,3 km
|
||
Locations are shown on the map below:
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR provided an alert with an accurate position 1 hour and 40 minutes prior to
|
||
the LEOSAR system which contributed to a successful rescue.
|
||
|
||
4-64
|
||
|
||
4.8.15 Incident 15 – Australia
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
14 August 2016 03:41 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Jurien Bay, Australia
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Vessel broken up.
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
EPIRB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Sea
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
11:41
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Persons in water
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Helicopter
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Other)
|
||
Only
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (at least 169 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (at least 169 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Location Accuracy (0.8 km)
|
||
A beacon was detected with a DOA location by the Australian and New Zealand MEOSAR system at
|
||
03:41 UTC on 14 August 2016. An unlocated GEOSAR detection was received by the Australian
|
||
JRCC at 0359.
|
||
Although the beacon was registered, attempts to contact the emergency contacts for the beacon were
|
||
unsuccessful.
|
||
SAR resources were tasked and at 06:00 UTC, two men were rescued off Jurien Bay in Western
|
||
Australia (approximately 200 kilometres north of Perth). Both men were rescued from the water as
|
||
their vessel had broken up.
|
||
If the beacon had been left turned on, the first LEOSAR detection would not have occurred until
|
||
approximately 06:30 UTC.
|
||
The rescue helicopter reported that the MEOSAR location provided by the JRCC was within
|
||
800 metres of the actual beacon location.
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR provided a 169 minute advantage in providing a location for a rescue with
|
||
persons in the water.
|
||
|
||
4-65
|
||
|
||
4.8.16 Incident 16 – New Zealand
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
25 August 2016 21:48
|
||
Location
|
||
Mt Cook National Park, New Zealand
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Hiker bad hand injury.
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Snow
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Static
|
||
Local Time
|
||
09:48
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Ice, cold
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
DOC Alpine Cliff Rescue Team / Helicopter
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Other)
|
||
First Detection / Only Location
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage (85 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Advantage in location
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
At 21:48 UTC on 25 August 2016, RCCNZ received MEOSAR alerts for a PLB registered to the
|
||
Canterbury University Tramping Club, with positions near Ball Shelter in Aoraki Mt Cook National
|
||
Park. Contacts advised that two persons had borrowed the beacon before going back-country skiing.
|
||
The DOC Alpine Cliff Rescue Team was tasked, along with a helicopter. The crew, including a
|
||
paramedic, quickly found the pair, who had activated the PLB on behalf of an injured person they
|
||
had come across. The tramper (hiker) had fallen and sustained a bad hand injury. The person was
|
||
flown back to the SAR base for initial treatment then taken by ambulance to hospital
|
||
The only GEOSAR detection of the beacon was at 23:13 UTC with no encoded location. No location
|
||
was generated by the LEOSAR or GEOSAR systems.
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR provided an 85 minute advantage in detecting the beacon and provided a
|
||
location that enabled the rescue of an injured person.
|
||
|
||
4-66
|
||
|
||
4.8.17 Incident 17 – Australia
|
||
Type of Analysis (Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
Real-time
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
10 October 2016 05:33 UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
400 NM west of Cocos Island, Indian Ocean
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Yacht total power failure
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
EPIRB
|
||
Beacon Environment (land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Sea
|
||
Beacon Speed (static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Drifting
|
||
Local Time
|
||
11:33 (Approx)
|
||
Local Weather Conditions (winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Rough seas
|
||
Resources moved (Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Sighted by Aircraft / Picked up by Vessel
|
||
People Involved
|
||
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert (Only/First/Other)
|
||
First
|
||
Detection Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Detection Advantage (180 mins)
|
||
Location Time (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Location Advantage (>210 mins)
|
||
Location Accuracy (Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Location Accuracy varied (0.1 – 15) NM
|
||
At 05:33 UTC on 10 October 2016, the Australian JRCC received an initial alert with a MEOSAR
|
||
location in the Indian Ocean, approximately 400 nautical miles west of Cocos Island. The beacon had
|
||
a country of registration of French Polynesia and was associated with a yacht with two persons on
|
||
board. An Australian defence force aircraft was tasked to respond and a 288 metre gas carrier was
|
||
diverted to the area.
|
||
At 10:07 UTC the yacht was sighted by the aircraft and two persons were rescued by the gas carrier
|
||
at approximately 10:50 UTC. The yacht had suffered a total power failure and was abandoned.
|
||
The first GEOSAR detection was sent to the FMCC at 08:28 UTC. This alert had no location data
|
||
and was forwarded to JRCC in Tahiti (as the beacon had a country of registration of French
|
||
Polynesia).
|
||
The first LEOSAR detection was at 08:50 UTC but again had no location data. At 09:08 UTC the
|
||
AUMCC received a LEOSAR detection with two Doppler locations in the Indian Ocean. A resolved
|
||
LEOSAR alerts was received by the Australian JRCC at 10:53 UTC.
|
||
Between 05:33 UTC and 10:52 UTC, 102 MEOSAR alerts were received by the Australian
|
||
MEOSAR MCC from the Australian and New Zealand MEOLUTs. The MEOSAR location was
|
||
confirmed at 05:50 UTC.
|
||
Using the location of the yacht at 10:07 UTC when sighted by the Australian aircraft, the MEOSAR
|
||
detections ranged from 0.1 nautical miles to 15 nautical miles. Accuracy of the MEOSAR locations
|
||
varied during the incident. The LEOSAR locations were within 1 nautical mile for the Doppler A
|
||
position and the resolved position.
|
||
|
||
4-67
|
||
|
||
In this incident, MEOSAR provided a detection time advantage of three hours compared with
|
||
GEOSAR and LEOSAR. As well, MEOSAR provided a time advantage of more than three and half
|
||
hours in generating location data. The MEOSAR data allowed a successful rescue to be completed
|
||
before LEOSAR produced a resolved location for this incident.
|
||
4.9
|
||
Test O-7 MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution – Impact on Independent Location
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
4.9.1
|
||
O-7 Test Result
|
||
The following test reports were provided by the participants:
|
||
Administration
|
||
Test report reference
|
||
France
|
||
France D&E Phase 2 Part 2 Operational Tests Report, sections 6.1.5 & 6.2.5
|
||
SAR-RE-DEMEO-917-CNES
|
||
USA
|
||
Operational Test Phase II Part 1 USA Preliminary Analysis (section 6), per
|
||
document JC-28/Inf.26
|
||
USA D&E Phase 2 Part 2 Operational Tests Report, per TG-2/2016 document
|
||
“USA\_O-7 PhaseII-Part2\_Report” listed under “Other Documents”
|
||
|
||
4-68
|
||
|
||
4.9.1.1 France
|
||
Standalone mode
|
||
FMCC-MEOSAR ready Quality Factor success rate (standalone):
|
||
Category
|
||
Count
|
||
Percentage
|
||
Success#1 (better QF - better accuracy)
|
||
|
||
27.1%
|
||
Success#2 (worse QF - worse accuracy)
|
||
|
||
30.9%
|
||
Failure#1 (better QF - worse accuracy)
|
||
|
||
22.7%
|
||
Failure#2 (worse QF - better accuracy)
|
||
|
||
19.2%
|
||
Total Analyzed
|
||
|
||
10.6%
|
||
Not Analyzed (No DOA position in event)
|
||
|
||
51.0%
|
||
Not Analyzed (QF scale not comparable HGT/TSI)
|
||
|
||
1.0%
|
||
Not Analyzed (No previous DOA position recorded)
|
||
|
||
0.3%
|
||
Not Analyzed (No change in QF [for HGT scale])
|
||
|
||
47.4%
|
||
Not Analyzed (Change in QF less than 50 [for TSI scale]
|
||
|
||
0.3%
|
||
Total Not Analyzed
|
||
|
||
89.4%
|
||
Grand Total
|
||
|
||
100.0%
|
||
All Successes vs analyzed data
|
||
|
||
58.1%
|
||
D&E Phase II O-7 / FMCC-MEO Results Summary (STAND-ALONE Mode)
|
||
Networking mode
|
||
FMCC-MEOSAR ready Quality Factor success rate (networking):
|
||
Category
|
||
Count
|
||
Percentage
|
||
Success#1 (better QF - better accuracy)
|
||
|
||
32.4%
|
||
Success#2 (worse QF - worse accuracy)
|
||
|
||
33.4%
|
||
Failure#1 (better QF - worse accuracy)
|
||
|
||
17.3%
|
||
Failure#2 (worse QF - better accuracy)
|
||
|
||
16.9%
|
||
Total Analyzed
|
||
|
||
14.0%
|
||
Not Analyzed (No DOA position in event)
|
||
|
||
71.4%
|
||
Not Analyzed (QF scale not comparable HGT/TSI)
|
||
|
||
1.0%
|
||
Not Analyzed (No previous DOA position recorded)
|
||
|
||
0.1%
|
||
Not Analyzed (No change in QF [for HGT scale])
|
||
|
||
27.2%
|
||
Not Analyzed (Change in QF less than 50 [for TSI scale]
|
||
|
||
0.2%
|
||
Total Not Analyzed
|
||
|
||
86.0%
|
||
Grand Total
|
||
|
||
100.0%
|
||
All Successes vs analyzed data
|
||
|
||
65.8%
|
||
D&E Phase II O-7 / FMCC-MEO Results Summary (NETWORKING Mode)
|
||
|
||
4-69
|
||
|
||
4.9.1.2 USA
|
||
Part 1
|
||
Part 2 (Stand-Alone Only – Modified approach to analysis)
|
||
Distance
|
||
Threshold
|
||
% Success
|
||
vs. Total
|
||
Analyzed
|
||
% Success
|
||
of Grand
|
||
Total
|
||
% Failure
|
||
of Grand
|
||
Total
|
||
Grand
|
||
Total
|
||
None (0)
|
||
68.9
|
||
11.6
|
||
5.3
|
||
|
||
0.5 km
|
||
70.3
|
||
10.9
|
||
4.6
|
||
|
||
1 km
|
||
71.5
|
||
10.3
|
||
4.3
|
||
|
||
Summary Quality Factor Reliability
|
||
|
||
4-70
|
||
|
||
Quality Factor
|
||
Range
|
||
Cases
|
||
Med-
|
||
ian
|
||
50th
|
||
75th
|
||
95th
|
||
< 5km
|
||
Count
|
||
< 5km
|
||
%
|
||
< 20km
|
||
Count
|
||
< 20km
|
||
%
|
||
0 to 49
|
||
|
||
|
||
17.66
|
||
36.88
|
||
64.79
|
||
|
||
13.9
|
||
|
||
58.3
|
||
50 to 99
|
||
|
||
|
||
10.86
|
||
35.14
|
||
35.14
|
||
|
||
|
||
100 to 149
|
||
|
||
|
||
56.45
|
||
65.16
|
||
69.05
|
||
|
||
|
||
11.1
|
||
150 to 199
|
||
|
||
|
||
77.36
|
||
80.39
|
||
80.39
|
||
|
||
16.7
|
||
|
||
16.7
|
||
200 to 249
|
||
|
||
|
||
21.43
|
||
27.06
|
||
81.11
|
||
|
||
12.5
|
||
|
||
|
||
250 to 299
|
||
|
||
|
||
10.54
|
||
25.27
|
||
77.27
|
||
|
||
23.1
|
||
|
||
61.5
|
||
300 to 349
|
||
|
||
|
||
17.23
|
||
25.7
|
||
42.31
|
||
|
||
|
||
56.7
|
||
350 to 399
|
||
|
||
|
||
18.56
|
||
23.85
|
||
62.2
|
||
|
||
5.3
|
||
|
||
63.2
|
||
400 to 449
|
||
|
||
|
||
21.29
|
||
31.34
|
||
91.66
|
||
|
||
7.1
|
||
|
||
42.9
|
||
450 to 499
|
||
|
||
|
||
12.9
|
||
23.95
|
||
40.86
|
||
|
||
|
||
500 to 549
|
||
|
||
|
||
13.2
|
||
21.09
|
||
30.94
|
||
|
||
17.5
|
||
|
||
73.7
|
||
550 to 5990
|
||
|
||
|
||
7.2
|
||
13.75
|
||
31.45
|
||
|
||
|
||
85.1
|
||
600 to 649
|
||
|
||
|
||
9.99
|
||
17.6
|
||
43.73
|
||
|
||
23.8
|
||
|
||
80.6
|
||
650 to 699
|
||
|
||
|
||
6.86
|
||
13.42
|
||
27.16
|
||
|
||
39.6
|
||
|
||
85.1
|
||
700 to 749
|
||
|
||
|
||
7.78
|
||
13.08
|
||
24.67
|
||
|
||
|
||
91.2
|
||
750 to 799
|
||
|
||
|
||
5.92
|
||
9.99
|
||
18.73
|
||
|
||
41.7
|
||
|
||
96.1
|
||
800 to 849
|
||
|
||
|
||
5.11
|
||
8.62
|
||
17.19
|
||
|
||
49.4
|
||
|
||
96.8
|
||
850 to 899
|
||
|
||
|
||
4.03
|
||
6.47
|
||
11.87
|
||
|
||
60.4
|
||
|
||
99.9
|
||
900 to 949
|
||
|
||
|
||
2.96
|
||
4.52
|
||
7.58
|
||
|
||
79.1
|
||
|
||
|
||
950 to 999
|
||
|
||
|
||
1.45
|
||
1.94
|
||
4.49
|
||
|
||
98.1
|
||
|
||
|
||
0 to 249
|
||
|
||
|
||
21.92
|
||
40.58
|
||
80.39
|
||
|
||
12.7
|
||
|
||
44.4
|
||
250 to 499
|
||
|
||
|
||
16.11
|
||
25.45
|
||
54.75
|
||
|
||
|
||
58.3
|
||
500 to 749
|
||
|
||
|
||
7.91
|
||
14.19
|
||
28.8
|
||
|
||
32.4
|
||
|
||
86.3
|
||
750 to 999
|
||
|
||
|
||
4.2
|
||
7.22
|
||
14.58
|
||
|
||
57.9
|
||
|
||
98.2
|
||
Total
|
||
|
||
|
||
5.3
|
||
9.8
|
||
24.0
|
||
|
||
47.6
|
||
|
||
92.3
|
||
Florida/Hawaii MEOLUT DOA Location Errors (km) vs. Quality Factor
|
||
|
||
4-71
|
||
|
||
4.9.2
|
||
O-7 Test Result Interpretation
|
||
4.9.2.1 France
|
||
The O-7 test results fail to prove the operational and technical effectiveness of the location Quality
|
||
Factor as it is currently used at the MEOSAR MCC level. The MEOLUT manufacturers use different
|
||
scales and definitions of this factor which prevents complete analysis: in particular, in stand-alone
|
||
mode the HGT MEOLUTs can only provide four distinct values. It also appears that QF strict
|
||
dependence on the location error value is only verified in two thirds of the time (in network results
|
||
which are slightly better than stand-alone).
|
||
The results of the O-7 test depend on the proper use and definition of the Quality Factor, which
|
||
differs from the one manufacturer to another. The idea to link it directly to the error location is
|
||
working between 58% and 65% of the cases only, which is not satisfactory. This can be due to two
|
||
factors:
|
||
•
|
||
location error estimation by MEOLUT not always representative of the real error,
|
||
•
|
||
other parameters than the location error estimation used in the QF processing.
|
||
The D&E Phase II O-7 results gathered by France lead to the necessity of re-defining a formal
|
||
definition of the QF (linked to the location error and/or may be other parameters) and reaching an
|
||
agreement between the manufacturers to use the same definition in the MEOLUTs’ out-going
|
||
messages.
|
||
Location Error as Function of QF (HGT / Network)
|
||
|
||
4-72
|
||
|
||
Location Errors Increasing and Corresponding QF (TSI/Network)
|
||
4.9.2.2 USA
|
||
Part 1
|
||
For a limited dataset and using the alert site composite location in the absence of ground truth, a
|
||
significant change in quality factor was correlated with an improvement in location accuracy in
|
||
66.7% of cases. 50% of successful cases (i.e., cases where the quality factor and location accuracy
|
||
were positively correlated) involved a location accuracy improvement of at least 2 km. This suggests
|
||
that the analysis of quality factor could be refined by correlating a meaningful improvement in
|
||
quality factor with an improvement in location accuracy that is meaningful to RCCs performing
|
||
SAR.
|
||
This analysis provides evidence that a quality factor correlated with location accuracy can be
|
||
achieved. To enable different quality factors to be assessed objectively by various C/S participants,
|
||
quality factor algorithms should be distributed among C/S participants.
|
||
Keeping with the original objective of the test, the analysis is focused on redundant solutions, but it
|
||
would be useful to extend the analysis to a broader data set, so that a quality factor could be provided
|
||
to SPOCs.
|
||
Part 2 (Stand-Alone Only – Modified approach to analysis)
|
||
As shown in Figure A (see section 4.9.1.2 of this respect), a significant change in quality factor was
|
||
correlated with improved location accuracy, and the degree of correlation increased as the distance
|
||
threshold was increased. An increase in the distance threshold yielded fewer cases where success
|
||
could be determined. With a distance threshold of 1 km, the quality factor was successful in 71.5%
|
||
of applicable cases; however, this represents only 10.3% of total cases.
|
||
As shown in Figure B (section 4.9.1.2), an increase in the quality factor generally corresponds to a
|
||
decrease in location error, in particular, for higher ranges of quality factor. For example, for every
|
||
quality factor range of 50 above 700, a higher quality factor corresponded to higher location
|
||
|
||
4-73
|
||
|
||
accuracy; in particular, the 50th percentile location error decreased continuously from 7.78 km for
|
||
range 700 - 749 to 1.45 km for range 950 - 999.
|
||
Since the algorithm used to compute quality factor is vendor specific, O-7 test results for USA
|
||
MEOLUTs may differ significantly from the results for MEOLUTs provided by other vendors.
|
||
Conclusions derived from this analysis follow:
|
||
•
|
||
The correlation between change in quality factor and change in location accuracy provides
|
||
evidence that an MCC algorithm could be implemented to distribute or filter alerts based on
|
||
significant changes in the quality factor.
|
||
•
|
||
The correlation between quality factor and location accuracy, especially for higher quality
|
||
factors, provides significant evidence that RCCs could be provided with reliable quality
|
||
factor information for MEOSAR data.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 4 -
|
||
|
||
5-1
|
||
|
||
5.
|
||
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
|
||
This section provides the conclusions commonly agreed by participants in the MEOSAR D&E tests
|
||
and their recommendations for future conduct of the tests in the MEOSAR D&E Phase III and the
|
||
implementation of the MEOSAR system.
|
||
5.1
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
5.1.1
|
||
Test T-1 (Processing Threshold and System Margin)
|
||
•
|
||
System margin for single-burst throughput using single-channel results
|
||
The detection percentage produced from the single-channel testing varied enough and for most of the
|
||
MEOLUTs did not consistently surpass the 70% threshold defined in document C/S R.018. When
|
||
this threshold was reached, the system margin ranged from 0 to 15 dB. Due to difference of results
|
||
from various national administrations, it was difficult to determine a common system margin value
|
||
for a single-burst throughput using single-channel results.
|
||
•
|
||
System margin for single-burst throughput using multi-antenna results
|
||
Results for system margin were improved using multi antennas. Using the 70% threshold, the system
|
||
margin from different MEOLUTs ranged between 4-15 dB and was also dependent on the number of
|
||
MEOLUT antennas.
|
||
The resulting processing margin is between 22 and 33 dBm of beacon transmit power.
|
||
5.1.2
|
||
Test T-2 (Impact of Interference)
|
||
Due to the unavailability of the Canadian MEOLUT at Shirley’s Bay for the majority of the
|
||
MEOSAR D&E Phase II, there were fewer opportunities for T-Test participants to reconcile
|
||
anomalies and unexpected results with spectrum plots in order to confirm and correlate with
|
||
interference. However, one instance of interference during T-3 testing revealed the impact of
|
||
MEOSAR D&E T-Testing running coincidental with CTEC B.8 Testing on the Sarsat LEOSAR
|
||
SARR-1 instruments.
|
||
5.1.3
|
||
Test T-3 (MEOLUT Valid/Complete Message Acquisition)
|
||
For Phase II, the transmission script has been updated to include 13 bursts in order to be in line with
|
||
the required time frame of 10 minutes, with two slots, first one at 37 dBm level and second one at
|
||
33 dBm level.
|
||
For nominal power of 37 dBm, and for beacon simulator at distance below 3,000 km from the
|
||
MEOLUT, the results of the test T-3 has shown that the probability of detection of a valid message is
|
||
in the range [88%- 100%] after 1 burst and higher than 99% after 13 bursts, which is compliant with
|
||
expectation for minimum performance at full operational capability (FOC) contained in Annex E of
|
||
document C/S R.012 (99% after 10 minutes) for most MEOLUTs.
|
||
|
||
5-2
|
||
|
||
Depending on MEOLUT, results at 33 dBm transmitted power are sometimes better than those
|
||
obtained at 37 dBm, which was unexpected.
|
||
The main conclusions drawn from the test were the following:
|
||
•
|
||
The results are compatible with the expectation for minimum performance at full operational
|
||
capability (FOC) contained in Annex E of document C/S R.012 (MIP).
|
||
•
|
||
The average detection probabilities improved with an increase of the number of transmitted
|
||
bursts,
|
||
•
|
||
The results have shown that due to reduced co-visibility, performances are decreasing at large
|
||
distances but for a range [6,000 km- 9,000 km], the probability of detection of a valid
|
||
message in 10 minutes is still above 80%, even reaching 100% for one MEOLUT.
|
||
It is expected that the results can still be improved for large distance as the MEOSAR L-band space
|
||
segment is expanded in the future, with an increase of single channel throughput.
|
||
For Phase III, some improvements to the test could be proposed such as:
|
||
•
|
||
The better results occasionally observed at 33 dBm vs 37 dBm could perhaps be explained by
|
||
a better space segment configuration during the 33 dBm slots.
|
||
5.1.4
|
||
Test T-4 (Independent Location Capability)
|
||
Independent Location Probability
|
||
The probability that a MEOLUT provides an independent 2D location with a location error
|
||
less than X km (X = 1, 5 or 10 km) did not always reach desired values. Performance for
|
||
X = 5 km after ten minutes ranged from 82 to 99%.
|
||
Independent Location Accuracy
|
||
The 50th percentile, the 75th percentile, and the 95th percentile of the location error of 2D
|
||
locations did not always reach desired values. At least one national administration reported
|
||
results of less than 5 km for 95th percentile after ten minutes.
|
||
Time to First Independent Location
|
||
The time elapsed between the first burst transmitted and the first 2D independent location with
|
||
an error less than X km (X = 1, 5 or 10 km) was not more than 2 to 3 minutes.
|
||
Conclusions
|
||
The results were improved from Phase I results because of the greater number of available satellites
|
||
and improvements in MEOLUT processing. While not all results achieved the performance expected
|
||
for full operational capability, some met or exceeded the requirements. It is expected that the results
|
||
will improve in the future as more L-band satellites are added and MEOLUT processing is improved.
|
||
5.1.5
|
||
Test T-5 (Independent 2D Location Capability for Operational Beacons)
|
||
Detection benefit of the MEOSAR system
|
||
|
||
5-3
|
||
|
||
The tests carried out over 2 weeks with 35 operational beacons deployed worldwide soundly
|
||
demonstrated the vast geographic range of individual MEOLUTs and confirmed the detection benefit
|
||
of the MEOSAR system, even with a limited MEOSAR space segment that consisted, at the time of
|
||
the tests, of 17 DASS, 3 Galileo and 2 Glonass satellites. Some participants only tracked the DASS
|
||
satellites whereas other participants tracked all available satellites.
|
||
Detection capability (system throughput)
|
||
The MEOLUT system throughput gradually degraded as the distance between the beacons and the
|
||
MEOLUTs increased and fewer satellites became available to select from to ensure the co-visibility
|
||
of a MEOLUT, satellite and a beacon. L-band satellites generally improved the link budget in terms
|
||
of C/N0 at MEOLUT level in comparison with the DASS S-band satellites (about 4 dB higher).
|
||
System throughputs in the range of 98% to 100% were reported by some MEOLUTs for beacons
|
||
located in the geographic region around the individual MEOLUT.
|
||
Independent Location Probability
|
||
Single-burst location probabilities of 80% to 95%, and 10-minute location probabilities of up to
|
||
100%, were reported by various MEOLUTs for beacons located in the geographic region around the
|
||
individual MEOLUT.
|
||
Independent Location Accuracy
|
||
Most of the presented results for independent location accuracy provided within 10 minutes did not
|
||
meet the expectation for MEOSAR IOC/FOC minimum performance of “5 km accuracy 95% of the
|
||
time” contained in document C/S T.019. The location accuracy was, as expected, better within the
|
||
geographic region of the MEOLUTs (e.g., circle centred at the MEOLUT with a radius of 3,000 km);
|
||
location error was frequently below 5 km within that geographic region especially for locations
|
||
calculated with detections from a larger number of satellites. Composite locations calculated by the
|
||
integration of up to 13 bursts over 10 minutes offered a higher probability to obtain a location
|
||
accuracy sometimes meeting minimum performance of “5 km accuracy 95% of the time” contained
|
||
in document C/S T.019. At least one administration reported location accuracy of 1 to 3 km, 95% of
|
||
the time.
|
||
Therefore, these results confirmed the ability of a MEOLUT to meet the accuracy requirements using
|
||
a hybrid space segment consisting of L- and S-band satellites.
|
||
More than one participant expressed the view that the main factor that affected location accuracy was
|
||
the number of satellites used for the location process and that a significant improvement in location
|
||
accuracy could be observed when the number of satellites used to calculate a location moved from
|
||
three to four. However, results provided by one participant revealed that the accuracy requirement
|
||
could be met with 3 satellites in many cases. That was made possible by selection of satellites that
|
||
provided a better geometry and JDOP value.
|
||
Although the D&E assumes fixed beacons, it was also noted by a participant that movement of
|
||
beacons impact the location accuracy. Although extremely limited by the test time, location accuracy
|
||
evaluation results reported by one participant showed that for a slow-moving beacon activated in
|
||
Bodoe, Norway the location accuracy was much worse in comparison with location accuracy
|
||
obtained from fixed beacons and did not meet C/S T.019 requirements. This degradation was caused
|
||
|
||
5-4
|
||
|
||
by inability to use FOA measurements in location processing due to extra Doppler shift caused by the
|
||
beacon movement. It was noted that to produce an accurate location of a moving beacon,
|
||
measurements obtained from at least 6 satellites per burst might be required, enabling processing of
|
||
both the beacon location and the beacon velocity.
|
||
Conclusions
|
||
Phase II test results showed that:
|
||
•
|
||
the MEOSAR system’s capability to detect beacons is very good, sometimes beyond
|
||
expectations,
|
||
•
|
||
the single-burst location accuracy, although better than in Phase I, was still not good enough
|
||
to meet all the related full operational capability (FOC) requirements in document C/S T.019,
|
||
“MEOLUT Performance Specification and Design Guidelines”,
|
||
•
|
||
composite locations provided higher probability to obtain a location accuracy sometimes
|
||
meeting the minimum performance of “5 km accuracy 95% of the time” contained in
|
||
document C/S T.019,
|
||
•
|
||
location accuracy for a moving beacon was worse than for fixed beacons and did not meet
|
||
C/S T.019 requirements,
|
||
•
|
||
the results did not provide clear guidance for the specifications and parameters regarding the
|
||
exact coverage areas in which the calculated locations could meet the minimum performance
|
||
expectation for location accuracy at full operational capability (FOC) as stipulated in
|
||
document C/S T.019,
|
||
•
|
||
one reason for the limitation in the location accuracy performance was the negative impact of
|
||
interference on the channel detection rates,
|
||
•
|
||
increasing the number of MEOLUT antenna-satellites pairings would improve the location
|
||
probability and accuracy, as well as the time to locate, and
|
||
•
|
||
selection of satellites and accuracy of TOA/FOA measurements (primarily FOA) were also
|
||
very important to improve the MEOLUT performance.
|
||
5.1.6
|
||
Test T-6 (MEOSAR System Capacity)
|
||
The transmission script has been updated to include the following number of NB transmitted beacons
|
||
25, 50, 75, 100, 150, 200. Only Maryland and Toulouse simulators are able to transmit this script.
|
||
The results on System Capacity performance were not conclusive during Phase II. While there was
|
||
no identifiable curve drop-off from the MEOLUTs monitoring the Toulouse beacon transmissions,
|
||
suggesting that the value of system capacity might be 200 beacons or more, results for MEOLUTs
|
||
monitoring the Maryland beacon transmissions showed some degradation in performance even below
|
||
100 beacons.
|
||
|
||
5-5
|
||
|
||
5.1.7
|
||
Test T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage)
|
||
5.1.7.1 Test T-4/T-7
|
||
Independent Location Probability
|
||
The probability that a MEOLUT provides an independent 2D location with a location error less
|
||
than X km (X = 1, 5 or 10 km) did not always reach desired values. Performance for X = 5 km
|
||
only met the expected performance when number of satellites or processing bandwidth were not
|
||
limiting factors.
|
||
Independent Location Accuracy
|
||
The 50th percentile, the 75th percentile, and the 95th percentile of the location error of 2D
|
||
locations did not reach desired values. Some reported results for performance for 95th percentile
|
||
after ten minutes was less than 5 km.
|
||
Time to First Independent Location
|
||
The time elapsed between the first burst transmitted and the first 2D independent location with
|
||
an error less than X km (X = 1, 5 or 10 km) was typically not more than 2 to 3 minutes.
|
||
However, for some participants the volume of data caused some processing issues that need to
|
||
be resolved.
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
Many results improved as a result of networking but some results still did not achieve the
|
||
performance expected for full operational capability. It is expected that the results will improve in
|
||
the future as MEOLUT processing of network data is improved
|
||
5.1.8
|
||
Test T-8 (Combined MEO/GEO Operation Performance (Optional))
|
||
T-8 testing was not completed in Phase II.
|
||
5.1.9
|
||
Test O-1 Potential Time Advantage
|
||
All participants noted a time advantage for the independent location provided in MEOSAR alert data
|
||
versus LEOSAR alert data when the median figure was observed, with the exception of Japan during
|
||
the standalone period, which presented some negative median values in PTAL and PTAC, likely due
|
||
to MEOLUTs were located to some distance from Japan. The results also showed that, in general,
|
||
there was not a significant improvement when the AOI filtering was applied.
|
||
The MEOSAR did not show a significant time advantage with respect to detect-only data category,
|
||
where the GEOSAR system reduced the time advantage near to zero. In results provided by one
|
||
participant the MEOSAR system presented a time advantage with respect to detect-only cases
|
||
provided by LEOSAR data.
|
||
Networking period results showed a time advantage for the MEOSAR system in the provision of
|
||
independent locations (PTAL and PTAC), in fact, the median values for all participants showed a
|
||
time advantage during this period.
|
||
|
||
5-6
|
||
|
||
5.1.10 Test O-2 Unique Detections by MEOSAR System as Compared to Existing
|
||
System
|
||
Overall the O-2 Testing during Phase II of the MEOSAR D&E produced useful results, some
|
||
highlighting concerns to be addressed, and some clearly indicating the benefits of MEOSAR.
|
||
Summarizing results from all participants with respect to unique detections by the MEOSAR and
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR systems leads to three prevailing key observations:
|
||
•
|
||
MEOSAR produced an extremely large number of detect only (unlocated and encoded only)
|
||
cases relative to the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system,
|
||
•
|
||
There were always some beacon activations that were recorded by LEOSAR/GEOSAR only,
|
||
and when independent locations or confirmed positions were involved these statistics indicate
|
||
a failure by MEOSAR to record actual beacon activations,
|
||
•
|
||
Similarly, but more expected, the increased coverage capabilities of MEOSAR were
|
||
demonstrated as MEOSAR recorded many actual beacon activations with independent
|
||
locations or confirmed positions that went undetected by the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system,
|
||
mostly likely due to gaps in periods of satellite visibility for LEOSAR.
|
||
With regard to the collection of statistics and the analysis methodology, the following observations
|
||
were common among most participants:
|
||
•
|
||
The size of the data set is sometimes reduced, but overall, performance statistics do not
|
||
significantly change when the AOI is applied,
|
||
•
|
||
Networking of MEOLUTs appears to increase the amount of detect only cases, have limited
|
||
impact in other categories, and overall did not significantly impact key observations.
|
||
The single most significant outcome for the O-2 test lies in the large numbers of detect only cases
|
||
recorded by the MEOSAR system only. Follow-on analysis performed by several participants
|
||
indicated that a majority of these cases appeared to be system generated anomalies (i.e., not real
|
||
beacons). Ultimately, JC-29 developed related data distribution procedures that would help mitigate
|
||
the impact of these suspect alerts in the short term (during EOC), but further important work remains
|
||
to address this matter.
|
||
And while the lack of MEOSAR data for some actual beacon activations needs attention as well, the
|
||
significant number of MEOSAR only cases with independent location and confirmed position
|
||
soundly demonstrates the value that MEOSAR data adds to the current system.
|
||
5.1.11 Test O-3 Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert Traffic in the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
Ground Segment Network
|
||
According to document C/S R.018, the O-3 test should:
|
||
•
|
||
Evaluate the volume of 406 MHz MEOSAR distress alert messages exchanged between
|
||
MCCs, compare it to the traffic for the existing system (LEOSAR and GEOSAR), and
|
||
|
||
5-7
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
Provide additional information on the combined totals and data volumes in bytes and
|
||
corresponding bandwidths
|
||
With respect to the volume of MEOSAR distress alert messages exchanged between MCCs during
|
||
the overall test time span, the major difference was noted between MEOSAR-ready MCCs which
|
||
were connected to a MEOLUT versus those MEOSAR-ready MCCs that were not connected to a
|
||
MEOLUT.
|
||
Those MEOSAR-ready MCCs that were not connected to a MEOLUT transmitted MEOSAR
|
||
message traffic at a lower volume than LEOSAR/GEOSAR message traffic, due to the production of
|
||
data from their local LEOLUT/GEOLUT systems. In this case, the MEOSAR message traffic was
|
||
less than one half that of the LEOSAR/GEOSAR message traffic.
|
||
Those MEOSAR-ready MCCs that were connected to a MEOLUT transmitted a MEOSAR message
|
||
traffic at a greater volume than MCC LEOSAR/GEOSAR message traffic. Calculating the ratio
|
||
between the MEOSAR Data Volume versus the LEOSAR/GEOSAR Data Volume, for most of the
|
||
participants, the MEOSAR Data Volume ranges between 1 and 4 times the LEOSAR/GEOSAR Data
|
||
Volume, except for FMCC that showed a ratio which ranges from 4 to 9. These ratios can also be
|
||
derived from the Bandwidth occupancy (because a fixed value of 1024 bytes per message was
|
||
considered) as follows:
|
||
Standalone
|
||
CONNECTED TO A MEOLUT
|
||
NOT CONNECTED TO A MEOLUT
|
||
FMCC
|
||
NMCC (QMS)\*
|
||
SPMCC
|
||
USMCC
|
||
ITMCC (QMS)\*
|
||
JAMCC
|
||
SPMCC
|
||
LEO/GEOSAR BW
|
||
0.00696201
|
||
0.018908
|
||
0.017221
|
||
0.008359
|
||
0.016849
|
||
0.009513
|
||
0.017512
|
||
MEOSAR BW
|
||
0.03107630
|
||
0.019615
|
||
0.060967
|
||
0.020178
|
||
0.000602
|
||
0.001606
|
||
0.007331
|
||
COMBINED
|
||
0.03785096
|
||
0.038522
|
||
0.078188
|
||
0.028536
|
||
0.017444
|
||
0.011118
|
||
0.024843
|
||
RATIO
|
||
4.46
|
||
1.04
|
||
3.54
|
||
2.41
|
||
0.04
|
||
0.17
|
||
0.42
|
||
Networking
|
||
CONNECTED TO A MEOLUT
|
||
NOT CONNECTED TO A MEOLUT
|
||
FMCC
|
||
NMCC (QMS)\*
|
||
SPMCC
|
||
USMCC
|
||
ITMCC (QMS)\*
|
||
JAMCC
|
||
SPMCC
|
||
LEO/GEOSAR BW
|
||
0.00904303
|
||
0.017792
|
||
0.016674
|
||
0.008752
|
||
0.017250
|
||
0.010172
|
||
0.017793
|
||
MEOSAR BW
|
||
0.07895902
|
||
0.045551
|
||
0.045352
|
||
0.032272
|
||
0.000433
|
||
0.003481
|
||
0.020796
|
||
COMBINED
|
||
0.08798943
|
||
0.063327
|
||
0.062026
|
||
0.041022
|
||
0.017665
|
||
0.013653
|
||
0.038589
|
||
RATIO
|
||
8.73
|
||
2.56
|
||
2.72
|
||
3.69
|
||
0.03
|
||
0.34
|
||
1.17
|
||
(QMS)\*: QMS data included.
|
||
Each participant presented different LEOSAR/GEOSAR bandwidth occupancy, but in general, for
|
||
MCC to MCC communications, the LEOSAR/GEOSAR message traffic bandwidth was below
|
||
0.02 kb/s. This figure includes the QMS message traffic for non-nodal MCCs.
|
||
Considering the distribution of operational alert messages only and taking into account that most
|
||
MCCs provided an overall MEOSAR message traffic which was below 4 times their
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR message traffic, we concluded that the MEOSAR bandwidth between MCCs
|
||
kept below 0.08 kb/s, except for the FMCC case which reached the figure of 0.09 kb/s in the
|
||
networking mode.
|
||
|
||
5-8
|
||
|
||
Therefore, in these conditions (MCC being connected to a MEOLUT, no orbitography, test reference
|
||
or self-test beacons exchanged and the overall test time span considered), and considering the worst
|
||
case presented by France, the LEOSAR/GEOSAR/MEOSAR combined bandwidth used per MCC
|
||
for transmission of messages to other MCCs kept below 0.1 kb/s.
|
||
The analysis above takes into account neither traffic peaks nor the communications with
|
||
RCCs/SPOCs which in some situations presented some differences with respect to the MCC to MCC
|
||
communications, due to the MCC configuration context.
|
||
This configuration context is related with the MCC behavior after confirmation of the alert (e.g.,
|
||
some MEOSAR-ready MCCs during D&E behaved as LEOSAR/GEOSAR MCC after confirmation
|
||
of alerts not sending messages), the distance match criterion of 10 km, transmission of conflict
|
||
messages as they were received from the MEOLUT (without any time restriction between conflict
|
||
messages) and the number of SPOCs involved in every particular alert (given the special
|
||
characteristics of some areas, two SPOCs could be defined to cover the same area, therefore, alerts
|
||
for that area are sent duplicated).
|
||
Given this configuration context, some message traffic peaks to the SPOCs were identified, mainly
|
||
related with conflict alerts which were transmitted to the SPOC destinations right after those conflict
|
||
messages were received from the MEOLUT. Those traffic peaks kept below a bandwidth of 1 kb/s in
|
||
15 minutes (i.e., below 80 SIT185 messages of 1,400 bytes each in 15 minutes).
|
||
It had to be taken into account that a significant number of suspect MEOSAR alerts could have
|
||
impacted the Test O-3 results (see documents JC-29/4/5 (Norway) and JC-29/4/11 (USA) about
|
||
suspect MEOSAR alerts).
|
||
5.1.12 Test O-4 406 MHz Alert Data Distribution Procedures
|
||
Test O-4 analyses (counts) alerts by MCC distribution category (e.g., first alert with no location,
|
||
position confirmation DOA and encoded position, redundant DOA) in order to assess and improve
|
||
MCC alert data distribution procedures. Results presented by France, Italy and the USA compare
|
||
counts in the MEOSAR and LEOSAR/GEOSAR systems by MCC processing category, but have not
|
||
directly led to modifications in MCC data distribution procedures.
|
||
Significant differences in counts between the two systems reflect:
|
||
•
|
||
inherent system capabilities (e.g., only the MEOSAR system can generate independent
|
||
location with one burst),
|
||
•
|
||
the relatively limited implementation of the space and ground segments in the MEOSAR
|
||
system, and
|
||
•
|
||
differences in MCC alert data distribution procedures (e.g., continued transmission after
|
||
position confirmation in the MEOSAR system).
|
||
|
||
5-9
|
||
|
||
The higher number of alert sites (and solutions) in the MEOSAR system reflects a high detection
|
||
capability, but also reflects a high incidence of suspect (i.e., uncorroborated) MEOSAR alerts, as
|
||
described in the analysis for test O-2 (per section 5.1.10).
|
||
As reported by France, the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system generates significantly more redundant alerts
|
||
than the MEOSAR system (89% vs. 53% in standalone mode). This is likely due in large part to two
|
||
factors:
|
||
a) alerts are sent after position confirmation only in the MEOSAR system (making
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR alerts redundant and not transmitted after position confirmation); and
|
||
b) the LEOSAR/GEOSAR ground segment is more fully implemented (thereby increasing
|
||
opportunities for redundancy).
|
||
France and Italy reported that a higher percentage of MEOSAR first alerts contained DOA position
|
||
when MEOLUTs operated in standalone mode, per data extracted in the table below. This is curious,
|
||
given that MEOLUT networking should increase the number of TOA/FOA measurements available
|
||
to the MEOLUT for given beacon bursts and thus increase the probability of location. Some possible
|
||
factors are identified below:
|
||
a) communication delays hamper the benefit of MEOLUT networking (e.g., a MEOLUT
|
||
distributes an unlocated first alert prior to receiving or processing networked TOA/FOA data
|
||
that would have enabled a DOA position to be computed);
|
||
b) networked TOA/FOA data is largely redundant due to lack of coordinated satellite tracking
|
||
schedules between MEOLUTs (i.e., different MEOLUTs are tracking the same satellites at
|
||
the same time);
|
||
c) the high incidence of suspect (uncorroborated) alerts, while MEOLUTs are networked,
|
||
increases the number of unlocated first alerts distributed between MCCs (e.g., an
|
||
uncorroborated burst for an Italian coded beacon detected by the Norway MEOLUT could be
|
||
networked to the MEOLUTs in France and Cyprus, and distributed as a unlocated alert by the
|
||
NMCC, CYMCC and FMCC to the ITMCC); and
|
||
d) other factors coincident with the test periods affects results (e.g., poorer satellite visibility in
|
||
the period when MEOLUTs were networked).
|
||
Standalone Mode
|
||
Networking Mode
|
||
# With
|
||
DOA
|
||
# Total
|
||
% with
|
||
DOA
|
||
# With
|
||
DOA
|
||
# Total
|
||
% with
|
||
DOA
|
||
France
|
||
|
||
|
||
11.5
|
||
|
||
|
||
8.2
|
||
Italy
|
||
|
||
|
||
21.6
|
||
|
||
|
||
19.8
|
||
Total
|
||
|
||
|
||
17.0
|
||
|
||
|
||
14.3
|
||
MEOSAR First Alerts with DOA Position (Standalone and Networking Mode)
|
||
The USA reported than only 3.1% of MEOSAR first alerts contained independent location (in
|
||
standalone mode), compared to 26.3% in the LEOSAR/GEOSAR system. Per comparable data
|
||
reported by France, 11.5% (69 / 601) of MEOSAR first alerts contained independent location versus
|
||
17.7% (38 / 215) of LEOSAR/GEOSAR first alerts. As reported by the USA, it is expected that the
|
||
|
||
5-10
|
||
|
||
availability of first alert DOA locations (i.e., near real-time) will increase as more MEOSAR
|
||
satellites become available for use and when MEOLUT networking is performed.
|
||
5.1.13 Test O-5 SAR/Galileo Return Link Service
|
||
Test O-5 has been postponed to Phase III.
|
||
5.1.14 Test O-6 Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Benefits of the MEOSAR System
|
||
The results from O-6 were generally positive.
|
||
Seventeen incidents were reported for test O-6 in Phase II of the MEOSAR D&E. Six countries
|
||
provided data; twelve of the seventeen incidents were from Australia and New Zealand.
|
||
In eleven incidents MEOSAR provided a time advantage for detection of the beacon and/or a time
|
||
advantage for generating a location. The time advantage varied from 5 minutes to 284 minutes.
|
||
The benefit of the time advantage to an RCC is difficult to characterise. In some incidents a time
|
||
advantage is not likely to affect the successful outcome; however people in distress are rescued
|
||
sooner. In other incidents (for example Incident 4) the time advantage was critical to the successful
|
||
outcome of the rescue.
|
||
In two incidents MEOSAR provided the only detection in a successful rescue. In another incident,
|
||
MEOSAR provided the only location.
|
||
There were three incidents where MEOSAR did not provide an advantage. In two of those, the initial
|
||
location provided by MEOSAR was highly inaccurate due to a moving beacon.
|
||
5.1.15 Test O-7 MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution – Impact on Independent Location
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
Based on reports provided by France and the USA, the quality factor and location accuracy were
|
||
correlated in 58% to 72% of cases where an assessment was possible. For the French MEOLUT, the
|
||
correlation was higher in networking mode (65%) than in stand-alone mode (58%). For USA
|
||
MEOLUTs, all results were reported for stand-alone mode and the correlation was higher when a
|
||
distance threshold was included in the analysis (72% vs. 69%). The algorithm used to compute the
|
||
quality factor is vendor specific, and the French and USA MEOLUTs are provided by different
|
||
vendors.
|
||
O-7 test results do not prove the operational and technical effectiveness of the quality factor, as
|
||
reported by France. However, as reported by the USA, correlations between the quality factor and
|
||
location accuracy provide evidence that RCCs could be provided with a reliable quality factor and
|
||
that an MCC algorithm could be implemented to distribute alerts based on a significant change in the
|
||
quality factor.
|
||
|
||
5-11
|
||
|
||
5.2
|
||
Recommendations for the Conduct of Subsequent D&E Phases
|
||
5.2.1
|
||
Test T-1 (Processing Threshold and System Margin)
|
||
It is recommended to maintain the test in Phase III as foreseen, in order to evaluate the space segment
|
||
improvement and the updates/upgrades of the MEOLUTs.
|
||
5.2.2
|
||
Test T-2 (Impact of Interference)
|
||
Canada and Test coordinators should collaborate during MEOSAR D&E Phase III and any other test
|
||
campaigns that might be impacted by B.8 testing at CTEC. Specifically, Canada and Test
|
||
coordinators should:
|
||
•
|
||
schedule MEOSAR D&E testing, MEOSAR space segment commissioning and SGB testing
|
||
with CTEC B.8 Testing (Translation and Transmitter Frequencies) which is routinely
|
||
scheduled in the third full week of the month),
|
||
•
|
||
when circumstances dictate, de-conflict CTEC B.8 Testing with unexpected re-testing,
|
||
•
|
||
Use the finalised schedule with the dates and times of B.8 test runs provided by CTEC after
|
||
the fact, to help to investigate any anomalies or unexpected results which might have been
|
||
caused by inadvertent scheduling of MEOSAR D&E Phase testing coincidental with CTEC
|
||
B.8 Testing.
|
||
5.2.3
|
||
Test T-3 (MEOLUT Valid/Complete Message Acquisition)
|
||
It is recommended to maintain the test in Phase III as foreseen, in order to evaluate the space segment
|
||
improvement and the updates/upgrades of the MEOLUTs.
|
||
It is suggested that participants optionally analyse the processing anomalies following the C/S T.020
|
||
methodology.
|
||
5.2.4
|
||
Test T-4 (Independent Location Capability)
|
||
It is recommended that further analyses be conducted to evaluate the relationship between location
|
||
Expected Horizontal Error (EHE) and various parameters (e.g., DOP, number of satellites used in
|
||
location determination, C/No measurements, etc.).
|
||
It is suggested that participants optionally analyse the processing anomalies following the C/S T.020
|
||
methodology.
|
||
5.2.5
|
||
Test T-5 (Independent 2D Location Capability for Operational Beacons)
|
||
It is recommended to continue monitoring the 406 MHz spectrum and it is suggested that participants
|
||
optionally analyze the detection rates per channel and per satellite type (L-band vs. S-band).
|
||
It is recommended to evaluate in detail the MEOLUT's ability to locate (within test T-5) slowly
|
||
moving beacons (float-free/aboard of moving vessels).
|
||
|
||
5-12
|
||
|
||
5.2.6
|
||
Test T-6 (MEOSAR System Capacity)
|
||
It is recommended to maintain the test in Phase III. It is suggested to include an optional networking
|
||
test T-6/T-7 to evaluate the potential risk of processor overload when exchanging TOA/FOA data.
|
||
5.2.7
|
||
Test T-7 (Networked MEOLUT Advantage)
|
||
It is recommended to maintain the test in Phase III as foreseen, in order to evaluate the advancement
|
||
in MEOLUT Networking.
|
||
5.2.8
|
||
Test T-8 (Combined MEO/GEO Operation Performance (Optional))
|
||
T-8 testing was not completed in Phase II.
|
||
5.2.9
|
||
Test O-1 Potential Time Advantage
|
||
Given that there were no significant differences in test results for AOI versus MCC service area, it is
|
||
recommended that Phase III analysis be performed for the MCC service area only.
|
||
Recognizing the bias produced by the GEOSAR alerts on the PTAE measurement, consider
|
||
analysing MEOSAR detect-only cases versus LEOSAR and GEOSAR detect cases separately.
|
||
5.2.10 Test O-2 Unique Detections by MEOSAR System as Compared to Existing
|
||
System
|
||
Given that there were no significant differences in test results for AOI versus MCC service area, it is
|
||
recommended that Phase III analysis be performed for the MCC service area only.
|
||
5.2.11 Test O-3 Volume of MEOSAR Distress Alert Traffic in the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
Ground Segment Network
|
||
It is suggested to perform O-3 test again in Phase III, focusing not only on the MCC to MCC primary
|
||
communication paths, but also on the MCC to SPOC communication paths and MCC to MCC
|
||
secondary communication paths.
|
||
5.2.12 Test O-4 406 MHz Alert Data Distribution Procedures
|
||
As approved by the Council in December 2015, document C/S A.001 (Data Distribution Plan) has
|
||
been updated with alert data distribution procedures for LEOSAR/GEOSAR/MEOSAR (LGM)
|
||
capable MCCs. Given that the primary purpose of test O-4 is to validate (and improve) data
|
||
distribution procedures for the MEOSAR operational system, further analysis of test O-4 should be
|
||
based on agreed data distribution procedures for LGM capable MCCs.
|
||
5.2.13 Test O-5 SAR/Galileo Return Link Service
|
||
Test O-5 has been postponed to Phase III.
|
||
|
||
5-13
|
||
|
||
5.2.14 Test O-6 Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Benefits of the MEOSAR System
|
||
As only six countries provided results for Phase II of O-6, Cospas-Sarsat Participants should be
|
||
encouraged to report incidents with MEOSAR data to develop a better understanding of MEOSAR
|
||
across a broader range of RCCs.
|
||
Most the examples in test O-6 for Phase II concentrated on the time of detection and time of first
|
||
location. More examples of incidents with known rescue location are needed in Phase III to allow for
|
||
analysis of MEOSAR location data and the advantages and disadvantages to an RCC.
|
||
5.2.15 Test O-7 MEOSAR Alert Data Distribution –Impact on Independent Location
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
Based on document JC-29/3/19 (USA), C/S operational and technical documents have been updated
|
||
to distribute alerts based on a significant improvement in the Expected Horizontal Error and to
|
||
provide the Expected Horizontal Error to RCCs. Per document C/S T.019 (section 5.10), the
|
||
MEOLUT shall produce an Expected Horizontal Error for every independent location that contains
|
||
the true location with a probability of 95 2%. Further analysis of the Expected Horizontal Error
|
||
should be performed for test O-7 in Phase III.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 5 -
|
||
|
||
A-1
|
||
|
||
ANNEX A
|
||
DETAILED LOG OF PHASE II TESTS
|
||
Week
|
||
Date Start
|
||
(yyyy-mm-dd)
|
||
Test
|
||
Test
|
||
Run
|
||
Time 1st Tx
|
||
(yyyy-mm-dd UTC)
|
||
Time last Tx
|
||
(yyyy-mm-dd UTC)
|
||
Beacon
|
||
simulator
|
||
Comments
|
||
2015/25
|
||
2015-06-18
|
||
T-6
|
||
|
||
2015-06-18
|
||
2015-06-19
|
||
Maryland
|
||
Exact transmission slot to be
|
||
provided by France
|
||
2015/25
|
||
2015-06-16
|
||
T-6
|
||
|
||
2015-06-16
|
||
2015-06-17
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
Exact transmission slot to be
|
||
provided by France
|
||
2015/16
|
||
2015/19
|
||
2015-04-20
|
||
O-1
|
||
O-2
|
||
O-3
|
||
O-4
|
||
O-6
|
||
O-7
|
||
Not applicable
|
||
Not applicable
|
||
Not applicable O-tests in MEOLUT network mode
|
||
2015/04
|
||
2015/15
|
||
2015-01-19
|
||
O-1
|
||
O-2
|
||
O-3
|
||
O-4
|
||
O-6
|
||
O-7
|
||
Not applicable
|
||
Not applicable
|
||
Not applicable O-tests in MEOLUT stand-alone
|
||
mode
|
||
2015/19
|
||
2015-05-07
|
||
T-4/T-7
|
||
|
||
2015-05-07 14:00:00
|
||
2015-05-08 14:00:00
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
2015/19
|
||
2015-05-06
|
||
T-4/T-7
|
||
|
||
2015-05-06 14:00:00
|
||
2015-05-07 14:00:00
|
||
Florida
|
||
2015/19
|
||
2015-05-05
|
||
T-4/T-7
|
||
|
||
2015-05-05 14:00:00
|
||
2015-05-06 14:00:00
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
2015/19
|
||
2015-05-04
|
||
T-4/T-7
|
||
|
||
2015-05-04 14:00:00
|
||
2015-05-05 14:00:00
|
||
Maryland
|
||
2015/17
|
||
2015/18
|
||
2015-04-20
|
||
T-5/T-7
|
||
|
||
2015-04-20 14:00:00
|
||
2015-05-01 14:00:00
|
||
Many
|
||
locations
|
||
See details in the beacon
|
||
transmission schedule available
|
||
on the D&E FTP server
|
||
2015/14
|
||
2015/15
|
||
2015-03-30
|
||
T-5
|
||
|
||
2015-03-30 14:00:00
|
||
2015-04-10 14:00:00
|
||
Many
|
||
locations
|
||
See details in the beacon
|
||
transmission schedule available
|
||
on the D&E FTP server
|
||
2015/14
|
||
2015-04-16
|
||
T-4
|
||
|
||
2015-04-16 14:00:00
|
||
2015-04-17 14:00:00
|
||
Florida
|
||
Confirmed
|
||
2015/14
|
||
2015-04-14
|
||
T-3
|
||
|
||
2015-04-14 14:00:00
|
||
2015-04-15 14:00:00
|
||
Florida
|
||
Confirmed
|
||
2015/14
|
||
2015-03-31
|
||
T-4/T-7
|
||
Dry
|
||
run
|
||
2015-03-31 15:00:00
|
||
2015-03-31 21:00:00
|
||
Maryland
|
||
Dry run of the USA of the
|
||
MEOLUT networking test T-4/T-7
|
||
2015/13
|
||
2015-03-26
|
||
T-4
|
||
|
||
2015-03-26 23:00:00
|
||
2015-03-27 23:00:00
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
Note: RESCHEDULED
|
||
2015/13
|
||
2015-03-25
|
||
T-4
|
||
1b
|
||
2015-03-25 12:00:00
|
||
2015-03-26 12:00:11
|
||
Maryland
|
||
Re-run of the Maryland
|
||
transmission (see line below)
|
||
2015/13
|
||
2015-03-24
|
||
T-4
|
||
1a
|
||
2015-03-24 17:00:00
|
||
2015-03-25 06:00:00
|
||
Maryland
|
||
First part of transmission (early
|
||
stop of the simulator at 06:00 UTC
|
||
due to a simulator issue)
|
||
2015/12
|
||
2015-03-19
|
||
T-4
|
||
|
||
2015-03-19 14:00:00
|
||
2015-03-20 14:00:00
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
2015/11
|
||
2015-03-17
|
||
T-4
|
||
|
||
2015-03-17 14:00:00
|
||
2015-03-18 14:00:00
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
CANCELLED
|
||
|
||
A-2
|
||
|
||
2015/10
|
||
2015-03-04
|
||
T-3
|
||
|
||
2015-03-04 14:00:00
|
||
2015-03-05 14:00:00
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
2015/10
|
||
2015-03-02
|
||
T-3
|
||
|
||
2015-03-02 14:00:00
|
||
2015-03-03 14:00:00
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
Two Frequencies transmitted
|
||
(406.064 and 406.070 MHz
|
||
instead of only one, 406.064MHz)
|
||
2015/10
|
||
2015-03-xx
|
||
T-3
|
||
|
||
-
|
||
Florida
|
||
CANCELLED
|
||
2015/09
|
||
2015-02-26
|
||
T-3
|
||
|
||
2015-02-26 14:00:00
|
||
2015-02-27 14:00:00
|
||
Maryland
|
||
2015/07
|
||
2015-02-12
|
||
T-1
|
||
|
||
2015-02-12 14:00:00
|
||
2015-02-13 14:00:00
|
||
Florida
|
||
2015/07
|
||
2015-02-10
|
||
T-1
|
||
|
||
2015-02-10 14:00:00
|
||
2015-02-11 14:00:00
|
||
Hawaii
|
||
2015/06
|
||
2015-02-05
|
||
T-1
|
||
|
||
2015-02-05 14:00:00
|
||
2015-02-06 14:00:00
|
||
Maryland
|
||
2015/06
|
||
2015-02-03
|
||
T-1
|
||
|
||
2015-02-03 16:00:00
|
||
2015-02-04 16:00:00
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
2015/03
|
||
2015-01-13
|
||
Dry run
|
||
T-4/T-7
|
||
-
|
||
2015-01-13 13:00:00
|
||
2015-01-13 15:00:00
|
||
Toulouse
|
||
Dry run using the script of test T-4
|
||
2014/15
|
||
2014/20
|
||
2014-04-07
|
||
O-1
|
||
O-2
|
||
O-3
|
||
O-4
|
||
O-6
|
||
O-7
|
||
|
||
2014-04-07 00:00:00
|
||
2014-05-12 00:00:00
|
||
Not applicable
|
||
O-tests only in MEOLUT stand-
|
||
alone mode (no MEOLUT
|
||
networking)
|
||
|
||
B-1
|
||
|
||
ANNEX B
|
||
LIST OF ACRONYMS FOR OPERATIONAL TESTS
|
||
B.1
|
||
Test O-1
|
||
TMANU
|
||
Time of first MEOSAR Alert Notification Unlocated
|
||
TMANE
|
||
Time of first MEOSAR Alert Notification Encoded
|
||
TMANL
|
||
Time of first MEOSAR Alert Notification Location
|
||
TMANC
|
||
Time of MEOSAR Position Confirmation (Ambiguity Resolution)
|
||
TLANU
|
||
Time of first LEOSAR Alert Notification Unlocated
|
||
TLANE
|
||
Time of first LEOSAR Alert Notification Encoded
|
||
TLANL
|
||
Time of first LEOSAR Alert Notification Location
|
||
TLANC
|
||
Time
|
||
of
|
||
LEOSAR/GEOSAR
|
||
Alert
|
||
Position
|
||
Confirmation
|
||
(Ambiguity
|
||
Resolution)
|
||
TGANU
|
||
Time of first GEOSAR Alert Notification Unlocated (no encoded position)
|
||
TGANE
|
||
Time of first GEOSAR Alert Notification Encoded
|
||
Latitude
|
||
Based on encoded position, independent position or ground truth information
|
||
Longitude
|
||
Based on encoded position, independent position or ground truth information
|
||
B.2
|
||
Test O-2
|
||
LGST
|
||
LEO/GEO Start Time
|
||
LGET
|
||
LEO/GEO End Time
|
||
LGDT
|
||
LEO/GEO Data Type (U=Unlocated, E=Encoded, D=Doppler, C=Confirmed)
|
||
MST
|
||
MEO Start Time
|
||
MET
|
||
MEO End Time
|
||
MDT
|
||
MEO Data Type (U=Unlocated, E=Encoded, D=DOA, C=Confirmed)
|
||
Latitude
|
||
Based on encoded position, independent position or ground truth information
|
||
Longitude
|
||
Based on encoded position, independent position or ground truth information
|
||
B.3
|
||
Test O-3
|
||
MTT
|
||
MEO Transmission Time
|
||
MST
|
||
MEO SIT Type
|
||
LGTT
|
||
LEO/GEO Transmission Time
|
||
LGST
|
||
LEO/GEO SIT Type
|
||
|
||
B-2
|
||
|
||
B.4
|
||
O-4
|
||
FA UNL
|
||
First Alert, no location
|
||
FA ENC
|
||
First Alert with location, encoded position only
|
||
FA DOA
|
||
First Alert with location, DOA position only
|
||
FA DOA ENC CFM
|
||
First Alert with location, DOA/encoded Position Confirmation (dependent event)
|
||
FA DOA ENC DIF
|
||
First Alert with location, DOA/encoded Position Conflict (dependent event)
|
||
NC DOA DOA DIF
|
||
position Not Confirmed, DOA/DOA position conflict
|
||
NC DOA ENC DIF
|
||
position Not Confirmed, DOA/encoded position conflict
|
||
NC ENC ENC DIF
|
||
position Not Confirmed, encoded/encoded position conflict/update
|
||
CA DOA DOA CFM
|
||
Confirmation Alert, new DOA to previous DOA
|
||
CA ENC DOA CFM
|
||
Confirmation Alert14, new DOA to previous/new encoded
|
||
CA DOA ENC CFM
|
||
Confirmation Alert, new encoded to previous DOA
|
||
CT CFM
|
||
Continued Transmission15 event, DOA and/or Encoded positions, no position
|
||
conflict
|
||
CT DOA DIF
|
||
Continued Transmission event, DOA position conflict
|
||
CT ENC DIF
|
||
Continued Transmission event, encoded position conflict/update
|
||
RD DOA ENC
|
||
Redundant data (DOA/Encoded dependent beacon event and none of the above)
|
||
RD UNL
|
||
Redundant data (Unlocated dependent beacon event and none of the above)
|
||
B.5
|
||
O-6
|
||
Type of Analysis
|
||
(Real-time/Retrospective)
|
||
The report could be based on a distress where MEOSAR System
|
||
played a role in the Search and Rescue Mission in Real-Time
|
||
(Real-Time), or could be based on a LEOSAR/GEOSAR case that
|
||
has been analysed later trying to assess the benefits/deficits that
|
||
MEOSAR data would have provided to the Search and Rescue
|
||
Mission retrospectively (Retrospective), as if that MEOSAR data
|
||
would have been available at that time.
|
||
Date and Time
|
||
Date and Time in UTC
|
||
Location
|
||
Name of the Location of the Incident.
|
||
Incident Type
|
||
Situation of the vehicle/person in distress (sinking vessel, road
|
||
accident, walker injured…)
|
||
Beacon Type
|
||
EPIRB/ELT/PLB
|
||
Beacon Environment
|
||
(land/sea/cliff/forest/dessert…)
|
||
Geographical environment of the vehicle/person in distress.
|
||
Beacon Speed
|
||
(static/moving/drifting…)
|
||
Speed of the beacon.
|
||
Local Time
|
||
Local Time. This information could be complemented with the
|
||
lighting conditions (Get dark/Night)
|
||
Local Weather Conditions
|
||
(winds, ice, hot, cold…)
|
||
Weather conditions endanger not only the persons in distress but
|
||
also the Search and Rescue personnel.
|
||
Resources moved
|
||
(Helicopter/Vessel/Aircraft…)
|
||
Resources or means used in the rescue.
|
||
People Involved
|
||
People involved in the incident
|
||
People Rescued
|
||
People rescued
|
||
|
||
B-3
|
||
|
||
C/S MEOSAR Alert
|
||
(Only/First/Other)
|
||
The MEOSAR alert received by the RCC from Cospas-Sarsat could
|
||
be the Only alert received or the First alert received. Other
|
||
situations are possible, as for example, the alert was first detected
|
||
by MEOSAR but first located by LEOSAR, in such cases, a short
|
||
description could be provided here.
|
||
Detection Time
|
||
(Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Here the Advantage or No Advantage can be indicated for
|
||
Detection Time. Between parenthesis the difference in minutes can
|
||
be expressed.
|
||
Location Time
|
||
(Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Here the Advantage or No Advantage can be indicated for Location
|
||
Time. Between parenthesis the difference in minutes can be
|
||
expressed.
|
||
Location Accuracy
|
||
(Advantage/No Advantage)
|
||
Here the Advantage or No Advantage can be indicated for Location
|
||
Accuracy. Between parenthesis the observed error in Nautical
|
||
Miles/Kilometres can be expressed.
|
||
B.6
|
||
O-7
|
||
Status
|
||
Status of the alert site (beacon activation) when redundant condition occurred
|
||
- FA = First Alert with DOA location;
|
||
- CA = Confirmation Alert (confirmed but no data beyond);
|
||
- NC = Not Confirmed (but beyond first alert with DOA location);
|
||
- CT = Continued Transmission;
|
||
- PC = Position Conflict.;
|
||
- – – = (Not recorded).
|
||
ActLat
|
||
the actual latitude as determined from external information
|
||
ActLon
|
||
the actual longitude as determined from external information
|
||
NewSolId
|
||
internal reference to the new solution record (if not available, use 0)
|
||
NewLat
|
||
the latitude for the redundant solution
|
||
NewLon
|
||
the longitude for the redundant solution
|
||
NewQF
|
||
the quality factor for the redundant solution
|
||
ExistSolId
|
||
internal reference to the existing solution record (if not available, use 0)
|
||
ExistLat
|
||
the latitude for the existing solution (which the redundant one matches)
|
||
ExistLon
|
||
the longitude for the existing solution
|
||
ExistQF
|
||
the quality factor for the existing solution
|
||
- END OF DOCUMENT -
|
||
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat
|
||
1250 Boul. René-Lévesque West, Suite 4215, Montreal (Quebec) H3B 4W8 Canada
|
||
Telephone: +1 514 500 7999 / Fax: +1 514 500 7996
|
||
Email: mail@cospas-sarsat.int
|
||
Website: www.cospas-sarsat.int |