Ryan Malloy
4ed92efd69
Cospas-Sarsat specification summaries moved to reference/ for internal use only. Links updated to point to official cospas-sarsat.int site. The extracted images remain in public/ for use in other pages.
7578 lines
230 KiB
Markdown
7578 lines
230 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: "G007: Handbook On Distress Alert Messages For Rescue Coordination Centres"
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description: "Official Cospas-Sarsat G-series document G007"
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sidebar:
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badge:
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text: "G"
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variant: "note"
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# Extended Cospas-Sarsat metadata
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documentId: "G007"
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series: "G"
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seriesName: "General"
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documentType: "overview"
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isLatest: true
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issue: 3
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revision: 3
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documentDate: "October 2024"
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originalTitle: "Handbook On Distress Alert Messages"
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---
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> **📋 Document Information**
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>
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> **Series:** G-Series (General)
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> **Version:** Issue 3 - Revision 3
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> **Date:** October 2024
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> **Source:** [Cospas-Sarsat Official Documents](https://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/documents-pro/system-documents)
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---
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___________________________________________________________________
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HANDBOOK ON DISTRESS ALERT MESSAGES
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FOR
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RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRES (RCCs),
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SEARCH AND RESCUE POINTS OF CONTACT (SPOCs)
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AND
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IMO SHIP SECURITY COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
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C/S G.007
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Issue 3 – Revision 3
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___________________________________________________________________
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HANDBOOK ON DISTRESS ALERT MESSAGES FOR
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RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRES (RCCs),
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SEARCH AND RESCUE POINTS OF CONTACT (SPOCs) AND
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IMO SHIP SECURITY COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
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HISTORY
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Issue
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Revision
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Date
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Comments
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Approved by Council (CSC-41)
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Approved by Council (CSC-43)
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Approved by Council (CSC-45)
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Approved by Council (CSC-47)
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Approved by Council (CSC-49)
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Approved by Council (CSC-51)
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Approved by Council (CSC-53)
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Approved by Council (CSC-57)
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Approved by Council (CSC-59)
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Approved by Council (CSC-62)
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Approved by Council (CSC-64)
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Approved by Council (CSC-66)
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Approved by Council (CSC-67)
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Approved by Council (CSC-69)
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Approved by Council (CSC-71)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Page
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INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1–1
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1.1
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Overview ........................................................................................................... 1–1
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1.2
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Document Organisation .................................................................................... 1–1
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1.3
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Cospas-Sarsat .................................................................................................... 1–1
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1.4
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The Cospas-Sarsat System ................................................................................ 1–2
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1.5
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Reference Documents ....................................................................................... 1–6
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COSPAS-SARSAT BEACONS ................................................................................. 2–1
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2.1
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Beacon Types .................................................................................................... 2–1
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2.2
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Characteristics of a 406-MHz Beacon .............................................................. 2–5
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2.3
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The Beacon Message ........................................................................................ 2–6
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2.4
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Hexadecimal Identity of a 406-MHz Beacon ................................................... 2–7
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2.5
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Direction Finding on 406-MHz Beacons .......................................................... 2–9
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2.6
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Return Link Service (RLS) ............................................................................... 2–9
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2.7
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GNSS Positions .............................................................................................. 2–10
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2.8
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Beacon Registration ........................................................................................ 2–11
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2.9
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International Beacon Registration Database (IBRD)...................................... 2–12
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2.10
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Beacon Regulation .......................................................................................... 2–14
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2.11
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Beacon Testing ............................................................................................... 2–14
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2.12
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Inadvertent Alert ............................................................................................. 2–15
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COSPAS-SARSAT SATELLITE SYSTEMS........................................................... 3–1
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3.1
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MEOSAR .......................................................................................................... 3–1
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3.2
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LEOSAR ........................................................................................................... 3–6
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3.3
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GEOSAR ........................................................................................................ 3–12
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MISSION CONTROL CENTRES ............................................................................ 4–1
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4.1
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General Principles ............................................................................................. 4–2
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4.2
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MCC Messages ................................................................................................. 4–4
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4.3
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Alerts with Invalid or Suspect Data ................................................................ 4–11
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COSPAS-SARSAT DISTRESS MESSAGES ........................................................... 5–1
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5.1
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Paragraph 1: Message Type .............................................................................. 5–2
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5.2
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Paragraph 2: Current Message Number and MCC Beacon Reference ............. 5–3
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5.3
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Paragraph 3: Beacon Message Information ...................................................... 5–3
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5.4
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Paragraph 4: Alert Position Information ........................................................... 5–8
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5.5
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Paragraph 5: Other Information ...................................................................... 5–12
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5.6
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Paragraph 6: Remarks ..................................................................................... 5–14
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5.7
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End of Message ............................................................................................... 5–15
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EXAMPLES OF BEACON INCIDENTS
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6-1
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6.1
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An Unlocated Detection to a Confirmed Update
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6-1
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6.2
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From Unlocated Alert to Position Confirmation
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6-7
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6.3
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A Position Confirmed Alert as the First Alert
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6-13
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6.4
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A MEOSAR Alert Confirmed by a LEOSAR Alert
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6-14
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6.5
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A Position Conflict Alert
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6-16
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6.6
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A Notification of Country of Registration Alert
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6-21
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6.7
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An Unresolved Doppler Position Match Alert
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6-23
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6.8
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ELT(DT) Alerts
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6-25
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6.9
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Cancellation Alerts
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6-29
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6.10
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Sample SIT 985 Message with SGB Characteristics Based on TAC Number 6-30
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6.11
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A Ship Security Alert
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6-31
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6.12
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An Alert with an Invalid Beacon Message
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6-34
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6.13
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An Alert with a Satellite Manoeuvre Warning
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6-34
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6.14
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An Interferer Alert
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6-36
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FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
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7-1
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LIST OF ANNEXES
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Page
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Annex A: Acronyms and Terminology ................................................................................ A-1
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Annex B: List of MID (Country) Codes .............................................................................. B-1
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Annex C: Cospas-Sarsat Data Distribution Regions ........................................................... C-1
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Annex D: How to Use the IBRD ......................................................................................... D-1
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LIST OF FIGURES
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Page
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Figure 1.1: An Overview of the Cospas-Sarsat Beacon Detection System ........................... 1–3
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Figure 1.2: A Sample SIT 185 Message ................................................................................ 1–6
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Figure 2.1: Distress Beacon Types ......................................................................................... 2–1
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Figure 2.2: The GISIS Maritime Security Website Interface................................................. 2–4
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Figure 2.3: A Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) Beacon ................................................... 2–4
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Figure 2.4: Beacon with Hex ID 3EF42AF43F81FE0 ........................................................... 2–8
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Figure 2.5: Decode of Beacon 3EF42AF43F81FE0 .............................................................. 2–9
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Figure 2.6: Information Graphic on Sources of False Alerts ............................................... 2–15
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Figure 3.1: A Schematic View of the Galileo Constellation .................................................. 3–2
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Figure 3.2: Footprint of a GPS MEOSAR Satellite ............................................................... 3–2
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Figure 3.3: An Overview of the MEOSAR System ............................................................... 3–3
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Figure 3.4: DOA Location Error Smaller than the Associated Expected-Accuracy Value .. 3–4
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Figure 3.5: Additional Expected-Accuracy-Related Boundary ............................................. 3–5
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Figure 3.6: Probability of the Actual Beacon Location Being Within the Expected Accuracy-
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Radius and Two-Times Expected Accuracy-Radius Circles .............................. 3–5
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Figure 3.7: Four Passes of a LEOSAR Satellite .................................................................... 3–6
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Figure 3.8: Footprint of LEOSAR Satellite (Sarsat-10) ......................................................... 3–7
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Figure 3.9: Global coverage of a LEOSAR satellite .............................................................. 3–8
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Figure 3.10: A Doppler Curve for a Hypothetical FGB ......................................................... 3–9
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Figure 3.11: Two Doppler Locations from a LEOSAR Satellite Pass ................................. 3–10
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Figure 3.12: Confirmation by Two LEOSAR Passes .......................................................... 3–11
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Figure 3.13: Footprint of GEOSAR Satellite (MSG-2) ....................................................... 3–12
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Figure 4.1: A Schematic View of the MCC Network ............................................................ 4–1
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Figure 4.2: Two Doppler Locations from a LEOSAR Satellite Pass for an EPIRB .............. 4–5
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Figure 4.3: Confirmation of LEOSAR Data by a MEOSAR Detection ................................ 4–6
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Figure 4.4: Example of an Unresolved Doppler Match ....................................................... 4–10
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Figure 5.1: A Sample SIT 185 Message ................................................................................ 5–1
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Figure 6.1: Sequence of Four SIT 185 Messages Sent to a SAR Service in Example 6-1 .... 6–1
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Figure 6.2: Sequence of Three Beacon Messages Sent in Example 6.2 ................................ 6–7
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Figure 6.3: Footprint of the GEOSAR INSAT-3A Satellite .................................................. 6–8
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Figure 6.4: LEOSAR Initial Alert ........................................................................................ 6–10
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Figure 6.5: Confirmation of Position Using a LEOSAR Alert ............................................ 6–12
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Figure 6.6: The Two SIT 185 Messages in Example 6.4 .................................................... 6–14
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Figure 6.7: ICAO 24-bit Addressing ................................................................................... 6–17
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Figure 6.8: GEOSAR GNSS Position Alert ........................................................................ 6–18
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Figure 6.9: LEOSAR Position Conflict Alert ...................................................................... 6–20
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Figure 6.10 : Graphical Representation of the NOCR Alert Message ................................. 6–22
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Figure 6.11: Unresolved Doppler Position Match ............................................................... 6–24
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Figure 6.12: Ship Security Unlocated and Initial Alert ........................................................ 6–33
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Figure 6.13: 406 MHz Interferer Alert ................................................................................. 6–37
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Figure C.1: Western DDR Map ............................................................................................. C–1
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Figure C.2: North West Pacific DDR Map ............................................................................ C–3
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Figure C.3: South West Pacific DDR Map ............................................................................ C–4
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Figure C.4: Central DDR Map ............................................................................................... C–5
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Figure C.5: South Central DDR Map ..................................................................................... C–7
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Figure C.6: Eastern DDR Map ............................................................................................... C–8
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LIST OF TABLES
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Page
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Table 2.1: Maximum Precision of the FGB Location Protocols .......................................... 2–10
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Table 2.2: Precision of the FGB Location Protocols with only Coarse Position ................. 2–11
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Table 4.1: Determining if Two Locations for a Beacon are Independent .............................. 4–3
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Table 5.1: Message Content for SIT 185 Messages ............................................................... 5–2
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Table 5.2: GNSS Position Uncertainty ................................................................................ 5–13
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1–1
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INTRODUCTION
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1.1
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Overview
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The purpose of this document is to provide Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) personnel and
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Search and Rescue Point of Contact (SPOC) personnel with an overview of the Cospas-Sarsat
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System and an understanding of the Cospas-Sarsat distress alert messages and their contents.
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This will allow RCCs and SPOCs to manage the response to search and rescue (SAR) incidents
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involving Cospas-Sarsat distress alerts in an informed manner.
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In the document, SAR Service will be used as a generic term to include both RCCs and SPOCs.
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The document also provides an overview of Cospas-Sarsat Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)
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alerts, which are similar to search and rescue distress alerts except that the notification of the
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alert is sent to a Competent Authority rather than a SAR Service.
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In the document, Responsible Agency will be used as a generic term to include SAR Services
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and Competent Authorities.
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1.2
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Document Organisation
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Section 1: provides a basic overview of the Cospas-Sarsat System.
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Section 2: provides information on Cospas-Sarsat distress beacons.
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Section 3: gives a brief overview of the satellite systems used by Cospas-Sarsat and the data
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produced using those satellite systems.
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Section 4: explains how a Mission Control Centre (MCC) processes beacon detection and
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location data and how the data is sent to Responsible Agencies.
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Section 5: provides detailed information on the types and contents of Cospas-Sarsat 406 MHz
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distress alert messages.
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Section 6: gives examples of 406 MHz distress alert messages sent to Responsible Agencies.
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Section 7: lists some questions that are frequently asked by personnel of Responsible
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Agencies and provides appropriate answers.
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1.3
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Cospas-Sarsat
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The International Cospas-Sarsat Programme is a satellite-based search and rescue distress alert
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detection system. The system was established in 1979 by Canada, France, the United States
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and the former Soviet Union.
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The name Cospas-Sarsat is formed from two acronyms. Cospas is an acronym for the Russian
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words "Cosmicheskaya Sistema Poiska Avariynich Sudov" which translates to "Space System
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1–2
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for the Search of Vessels in Distress". Sarsat is an acronym for Search and Rescue Satellite-
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Aided Tracking.
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The Mission Statement of the Programme states: “The International Cospas-Sarsat Programme
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provides accurate, timely and reliable distress alert and location data to help search and rescue
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authorities assist persons in distress.”
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The objective of the Cospas-Sarsat System is to reduce, as far as possible, delays in the
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provision of distress alerts to Responsible Agencies, and the time required to locate a distress
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and to provide assistance. These delays have a direct impact on the probability of survival of
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the person in distress at sea or on land.
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To achieve this objective, Cospas-Sarsat participant governments and agencies implement,
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maintain, co-ordinate and operate a satellite system capable of detecting distress alert
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transmissions from distress beacons that comply with Cospas-Sarsat specifications and
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performance standards, and of determining their position anywhere on the globe. The distress
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alert and location data are provided by Cospas-Sarsat Participants to the relevant Responsible
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Agencies.
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Cospas-Sarsat co-operates with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the
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International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Telecommunication Union
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(ITU) and other international organisations to ensure the compatibility of the Cospas-Sarsat
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distress alerting services with the needs, standards and applicable recommendations of the
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international community.
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Further information about the Programme can be found on the Cospas-Sarsat website
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(www.cospas-sarsat.int).
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A list of acronyms used in this document is provided in Annex A.
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1.4
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The Cospas-Sarsat System
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The Cospas-Sarsat system consists of:
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•
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distress beacons that send transmissions on 406 MHz,
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•
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satellites that process and/or relay the signals transmitted by distress beacons,
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•
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a Ground Segment that consists of:
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o
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ground receiving stations called Local User Terminals (LUTs) which process the
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satellite signals,
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o
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Mission Control Centres (MCCs) that provide the distress alert data to Responsible
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Agencies. Each Responsible Agency is supported by an MCC that sends beacon
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detection and location data (known as beacons alerts) to the Responsible Agency.
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As the name suggests, the Responsible Agency is responsible for managing the
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response to the beacon alerts,
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1–3
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o
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Return Link Service Provider (RLSP) that provides the service offered by some
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GNSS systems that sends a notification to the distress beacon after it has been
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detected by the Cospas-Sarsat System. (see section 2.6).
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Figure 1.1: An Overview of the Cospas-Sarsat Beacon Detection System
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The steps in Figure 1.1 are explained in the following sections.
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1.4.1
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Step 1: Distress Beacons
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There are four types of Cospas-Sarsat distress beacons:
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1.
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Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs), including ELTs for distress tracking
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(ELT(DT)s), are designed for aviation use;
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2.
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Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) are designed for
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maritime use;
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3.
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Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) are intended for use by an individual person
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(i.e., not necessarily linked to an aircraft or a ship); and
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4.
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Ship Security Alerting System (SSAS) beacons are designed for security situations
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for SOLAS vessels. Unlike the other types of beacons that have alert messages
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sent to a SAR Service, all SSAS alerts are sent to the Competent Authority for the
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country of registration of the SSAS beacon.
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Each type of distress beacon has different characteristics (such as duration of continuous
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operation (battery life) and beacon activation method) but all work in the same manner
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- by transmitting an emergency message on 406 MHz. A unique hexadecimal identifier
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1–4
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(known as the Hex ID of the beacon) can be extracted from the emergency message. The
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Hex ID includes the country of registration for the beacon.
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A distress beacon may contain an internal receiver capable of determining a Global
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Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) location or may be capable of receiving data from
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an external device able to supply a GNSS location. The GNSS systems includes the
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American Global Positioning System (GPS), the European Galileo system, the Russian
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Glonass system and the BDS of China (P. R. of). The GNSS location may be transmitted
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as part of the emergency message and is also known as an encoded location.
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1.4.2
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Step 2: Search & Rescue Satellites
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The Cospas-Sarsat System uses three different satellite systems to detect distress
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beacons. The three satellite systems have different characteristics, but all provide beacon
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detection and location data:
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1.
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The MEOSAR (Medium-altitude Earth Orbit Search and Rescue) satellites are the
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most recent addition to the Cospas-Sarsat System. MEOSAR satellites orbit the
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Earth at altitudes between 19,000 and 24,000 kilometres.
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2.
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The LEOSAR (Low-altitude Earth Orbit Search and Rescue) satellites were the
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original satellites used in the Cospas-Sarsat system. LEOSAR satellites orbit the
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Earth in near-polar orbits at altitudes between 700 and 1,000 kilometres.
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3.
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The GEOSAR (Geostationary Earth Orbit Search and Rescue) satellites appear
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stationary from the Earth. The GEOSAR satellites are in orbit approximately
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36,000 kilometres from the Earth.
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1.4.3
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Step 3: Local User Terminals
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Each satellite system has its own type of LUT (Local User Terminal) that tracks the
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satellites and processes the signals received from the satellites.
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The MEOSAR system has ground stations called MEOLUTs; each MEOLUT tracks
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multiple MEOSAR satellites simultaneously. Using Difference of Arrival (DOA)
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techniques (described in section 3.1), a MEOLUT that receives data that has been
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relayed from a beacon through three or more satellites can compute a location estimate
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for that beacon.
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The LEOSAR system has LEOLUTs. Each LEOLUT has a single antenna that tracks a
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LEOSAR satellite when in view. The LEOLUT collects data from the satellite. A
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LEOLUT uses Doppler techniques (described in section 3.2) to generate location data.
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The GEOSAR system has GEOLUTs. Each GEOLUT receives data from one satellite
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(as the GEOSAR satellite is always in view) and collects and processes the data from
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that satellite. A GEOLUT is unable to generate a location for a beacon unless the beacon
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transmits a GNSS position.
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Each LUT forwards detection and location data to its associated Mission Control Centre.
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1–5
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1.4.4
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Step 4: Mission Control Centres
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The Mission Control Centres (MCCs) form a network that distributes the beacon
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detection data around the world. Each MCC receives data from its LUTs and also data
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from the network of MCCs. The MCC processes data for each beacon incident, using
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the unique Hex ID of the beacon to identify all the detections associated with the same
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beacon incident.
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For each incident alert received the MCC determines the responsible MCC for the
|
||
distribution of that alert. If it is itself the responsible MCC, it determines the Responsible
|
||
Agency or Agencies to be informed of the beacon activation and sends the data to the
|
||
Responsible Agency directly. Otherwise, the MCC sends the data through the MCC
|
||
network to the responsible MCC that can deliver it to the relevant Responsible Agency.
|
||
1.4.5
|
||
Step 5: Responsible Agencies
|
||
A Responsible Agency is either an RCC or SPOC (for ELT, EPIRB and PLB
|
||
activations), or a Competent Authority (for SSAS activations). The Responsible Agency
|
||
receives beacon alerts from its associated MCC. Each beacon alert contains beacon
|
||
detection data for the related beacon incident and may also have location data. The
|
||
messages sent between an MCC, and its national Responsible Agencies are a matter of
|
||
national sovereignty and are not explicitly defined by Cospas-Sarsat. The message
|
||
formats described in this document are specified by Cospas-Sarsat for communications
|
||
between an MCC and a foreign Responsible Agency. However, most MCCs use the
|
||
same format (or something very similar to it) to communicate with their national
|
||
Responsible Agencies.
|
||
The information that is distributed by an MCC is structured in a format known as Subject
|
||
Indicator Type (SIT) format. In particular, the information that is sent from an MCC to
|
||
a Responsible Agency is usually a plain text message in a format known as a SIT 185
|
||
format. An example of a SIT 185 message is shown in Figure 1.2. The fields of the
|
||
SIT 185 message are explained in detail in sections 5 and 6.
|
||
ELT(DT) data is only transmitted to the Location of Aircraft in Distress Repository
|
||
(LADR) by the nodal MCC associated with the destination MCC (or by another nodal
|
||
MCC on its behalf), in a special message format. This message format is not explained
|
||
further in this Handbook.
|
||
|
||
1–6
|
||
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 12590 AUMCC REF C00F429578002C1
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER – PLB
|
||
SERIAL NO 0042334
|
||
HEX ID C00F429578002C1
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 512/NEWZEALAND
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL NIL
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY NIL
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 08 JAN 17 0354 UTC BY SARSAT 10
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - NIL
|
||
DOA - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A - 41 14 S 172 31 E PROB 79 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 48 20 S 135 51 E PROB 21 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0280 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Figure 1.2: A Sample SIT 185 Message
|
||
1.5
|
||
Reference Documents
|
||
The Cospas-Sarsat documents listed below are available free-of-charge from the Cospas-
|
||
Sarsat web site at www.cospas-sarsat.int:
|
||
•
|
||
C/S A.001 – Cospas-Sarsat Data Distribution Plan (DDP)
|
||
This document provides requirements for the exchange of alert and System data between
|
||
MCCs and Responsible Agencies.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S A.002 – Cospas-Sarsat Mission Control Centre Standard Interface Description
|
||
(SID)
|
||
This document provides information on message content and formats for the automatic
|
||
exchange of data between MCCs and to Responsible Agencies. It also describes the
|
||
message content and format used by MCCs to send data for ELT(DT)s to the LADR.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S A.005 – Cospas-Sarsat Mission Control Centre Performance Specification and
|
||
Design Guidelines
|
||
This document provides the specific performance requirements for a Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
Mission Control Centre (MCC).
|
||
|
||
1–7
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
C/S G.003 – Introduction to the Cospas-Sarsat System.
|
||
This document provides detailed information of the System history, Programme
|
||
Management, concept of operation and a description of the various components. It is the
|
||
ideal document to read to obtain a general understanding of the Cospas-Sarsat System.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S G.005 – Cospas-Sarsat Guidelines on 406 MHz Beacon Coding, Registration and
|
||
Type Approval.
|
||
This document was developed as an aide to help in understanding the beacon coding and
|
||
the processes of registration and type approval. It also complements and assists in the
|
||
understanding of some of the more complex details in the beacon technical specification
|
||
document, C/S T.001.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S G.010 – MCC Handbook.
|
||
This document describes responsibilities and functions of an MCC and MCC operators.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S P.011 – Cospas-Sarsat Programme Management Policy.
|
||
This high-level document provides information on all aspects of the System and its
|
||
management. In the main, it is intended for senior Managers.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S S.007 – Handbook of Beacon Regulations
|
||
This document provides a summary of regulations issued by Cospas-Sarsat Participants
|
||
and other countries regarding the carriage of 406 MHz beacons, and includes
|
||
information on the coding and registration of 406 MHz beacons in each country.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S T.001 – Specifications for Cospas-Sarsat 406 MHz Distress Beacons
|
||
This document defines the specifications for the development and manufacture of
|
||
406 MHz distress First-Generation Beacons (FGBs) and the beacon message content.
|
||
•
|
||
C/S T.018 – Specifications for Second-Generation Cospas-Sarsat 406 MHz Distress
|
||
Beacons
|
||
This document defines the specifications for the development and manufacture of
|
||
406 MHz distress Second-Generation Beacons (SGBs) and the beacon message content.
|
||
Other materials, such as sets of videos, graphics, images, history book, Information Bulletin
|
||
and published articles are available free-of-charge from the Cospas-Sarsat website at
|
||
www.cospas-sarsat.int under the Media Gallery tab.
|
||
Documents listed below are available from the International Maritime Organization
|
||
(www.imo.org) or the International Civil Aviation Organization (www.icao.int) for a fee:
|
||
•
|
||
Doc 9731 – AN/958 – IAMSAR Manual (International Aeronautical and Maritime
|
||
Search and Rescue Manual),
|
||
•
|
||
Doc 8585 – “Designators for Aircraft Operating Agencies, Aeronautical Authorities and
|
||
Services”,
|
||
•
|
||
Doc 10054 – “Manual on Location of Aircraft in Distress and Flight Recorder Data
|
||
Recovery”,
|
||
|
||
1–8
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
[Doc 10165 – “Manual on Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System (GADSS)”].
|
||
- END OF SECTION 1 -
|
||
|
||
2–1
|
||
|
||
COSPAS-SARSAT BEACONS
|
||
2.1
|
||
Beacon Types
|
||
The Cospas-Sarsat System provides alerting services for the following four types of beacons:
|
||
1.
|
||
Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs), including ELT(DT)s, are designed for aviation
|
||
use;
|
||
2.
|
||
Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) are designed for maritime use;
|
||
3.
|
||
Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) are intended for use by an individual person (i.e., not
|
||
necessarily linked to an aircraft or a ship); and
|
||
4.
|
||
Ship Security Alerting System (SSAS) beacons are designed for security situations for
|
||
SOLAS vessels.
|
||
Figure 2.1: Distress Beacon Types
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
2–2
|
||
|
||
2.1.1
|
||
ELTs
|
||
ELTs are designed for use in aircraft.
|
||
Most ELTs are installed in aircraft so that they activate on impact. An automatic
|
||
activation is triggered by strong acceleration or deceleration on a “G” sensor device.
|
||
These ELTs can also be activated manually by the crew in the cockpit.
|
||
A distress tracking ELT, or ELT(DT), may be activated by the aircraft avionics system
|
||
when it detects an unusual in-flight situation, as defined by ICAO in Global Aeronautical
|
||
Distress and Safety System (GADSS) documents, that indicates that the aircraft is in
|
||
imminent danger of crashing. These ELTs can also be activated manually by the crew
|
||
in the cockpit. An ELT(DT) can only be deactivated by the same means used for
|
||
activation (i.e., by avionics or manually).
|
||
Other ELT models than ELT(DT) that are carried on an aircraft may have to be activated
|
||
manually.
|
||
Except for ELT(DT)s, all ELTs are required to have a minimum duration of continuous
|
||
operation (battery life) of 24 hours. ELT(DT)s are required to have a minimum duration
|
||
of continuous operation (battery life) of 370 minutes and may be powered by the aircraft.
|
||
2.1.2
|
||
EPIRBs
|
||
EPIRBs are designed for maritime use and float in water. An EPIRB is required to have
|
||
positive buoyancy in water to ensure that the antenna is vertically upright, providing the
|
||
best antenna performance for beacon transmission.
|
||
There are two activation mechanisms for EPIRBs. EPIRBs can have an automatic
|
||
activation switch that incorporates a water sensor. When the sensor comes in contact
|
||
with water for a few seconds, the EPIRB will self-activate. EPIRBs with an automatic
|
||
activation switch can also be manually activated.
|
||
Other EPIRB models can only be manually activated.
|
||
A float-free EPIRB is housed in an enclosure that deploys (using a pressure-sensitive
|
||
hydrostatic release unit) the EPIRB when the enclosure is submerged. The float-free
|
||
EPIRB has an automatic activation switch that activates when it comes in contact with
|
||
water.
|
||
A non-float-free EPIRB is either loose in the vessel or mounted on a manual release
|
||
bracket. Note that an EPIRB with an automatic activation switch is disabled while
|
||
mounted in a manual release bracket and will not activate, even if it comes in contact
|
||
with water while in the bracket.
|
||
All type-approved EPIRBs are required to have a minimum duration of continuous
|
||
operation (battery life) of 24 hours; however, GMDSS requires a minimum duration of
|
||
continuous operation (battery life) of 48 hours.
|
||
|
||
2–3
|
||
|
||
2.1.3
|
||
PLBs
|
||
PLBs are designed to be worn or carried by individuals rather than attached to an aircraft
|
||
or vessel. PLBs are smaller and lighter than ELTs and EPIRBs.
|
||
In some countries, PLBs are permitted for use in aviation and maritime situations but
|
||
are not necessarily designed for those environments. For example, PLBs are not required
|
||
to float in water, and even if a PLB does float in water, it may not keep its antenna
|
||
upright affecting the performance of the PLB.
|
||
PLBs are manually activated only and are required to have a minimum battery life of 24
|
||
hours.
|
||
2.1.4
|
||
SSAS Beacons
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat provides alerting services for the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS). An
|
||
SSAS beacon is activated in case of attempted piracy or terrorism and appropriate law
|
||
enforcement or military forces can then be dispatched. SSAS beacons are carried under
|
||
the IMO’s Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and are usually fitted in the bridge
|
||
of a ship.
|
||
SSAS beacon transmissions are processed in the same manner as distress alerts by the
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat System except that all messages relating to SSAS beacons are sent to the
|
||
Competent Authority (per SOLAS Convention, Chapter XI-2, Regulation 6.2.1).
|
||
Messages relating to SSAS beacons are not sent to a SAR Service unless the SAR
|
||
Service is also the Competent Authority for the country of registration encoded in the
|
||
beacon.
|
||
SSAS beacons can only be activated manually.
|
||
The SSAS contact details for ship security competent authorities are made available by
|
||
IMO Member States in the IMO Global Integrated Shipping Information System
|
||
(GISIS) database at https://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx. The Maritime Security
|
||
button, after appropriate login, provides access to “Proper recipients of SSAS alerts”.
|
||
States that allow use of SSAS beacons have also identified their ship security competent
|
||
authority to their associated MCC.
|
||
|
||
2–4
|
||
|
||
Figure 2.2: The GISIS Maritime Security Website Interface
|
||
Figure 2.3: A Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) Beacon
|
||
2.1.5
|
||
ELT(DT)
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat has developed specifications for distress tracking of aircraft in-flight.
|
||
These Emergency Locator Transmitter for Distress Tracking beacons (ELT(DT)s) are
|
||
compliant with ICAO GADSS requirements for Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
2–5
|
||
|
||
to transmit accurate position information at least every minute, which should allow an
|
||
aircraft crash site to be located within six nautical miles (6 NM).
|
||
These requirements are described in the ICAO document 10054, the Manual on Location
|
||
of Aircraft in Distress and Flight Recorder Data Recovery. An ADT capability will be
|
||
required in most new commercial aircraft from the beginning of 2025.
|
||
Although an ELT(DT) will share many characteristics with existing ELTs, an ELT(DT)
|
||
may have some key differences:
|
||
•
|
||
activation by an automatic triggering event including unusual attitude, altitude or
|
||
speed or total loss of propulsion or thrust,
|
||
•
|
||
a more rapid transmission schedule,
|
||
•
|
||
every ELT(DT) will have a GNSS receiver and will be able to provide an accurate
|
||
GNSS position with each burst,
|
||
•
|
||
an ELT(DT) may be capable of being activated remotely by request from a
|
||
responsible agency. The remote activation would use the Return Link Service
|
||
(RLS) mechanism currently in development,
|
||
•
|
||
a cancellation message which will indicate the activation event is no longer active
|
||
(for example, the events generating the automatic triggering have returned to
|
||
normal values).
|
||
LUTs and MCCs have different processing rules for an ELT(DT); for example, locations
|
||
are not merged as the ELT(DT) is assumed to be on a fast-moving aircraft.
|
||
2.2
|
||
Characteristics of a 406-MHz Beacon
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat type-approved 406-MHz-beacon models are compatible with Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
satellites and comply with requirements of the 406-MHz First-Generation Beacon (FGB)
|
||
specification standard described in Cospas-Sarsat document C/S T.001 or the requirements of
|
||
406 MHz Second Generation Beacon (SGB) specification standard described in Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
document C/S T.018. Beacons are verified by thorough testing at Cospas-Sarsat accepted test
|
||
facilities for characteristics including compatibility of RF-characteristics and signal
|
||
waveform, digital message structure, beacon performance at different temperature conditions,
|
||
and minimum duration of continuous operation.
|
||
The list of type-approved 406 MHz beacon models is maintained by the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
Secretariat and may be seen on the Cospas-Sarsat website.
|
||
Except for ELT(DT)s, most FGB types transmit a 5-Watt radio frequency burst of
|
||
approximately 0.5-second duration every 50 seconds, where the first burst occurs
|
||
approximately 50 seconds after activation of the beacon. Exceptions include ELT (AF)s
|
||
activated by G-switch or deformation sensor (for which the first-burst delay is no more than
|
||
15 seconds) and SSAS beacons. SGBs transmit on a varying schedule where the transmission
|
||
occurs less frequently as the duration of the transmission continues, as a means to conserve
|
||
the beacon’s battery capacity.
|
||
|
||
2–6
|
||
|
||
For FGB and SGB ELT(DT)s, bursts are transmitted every 5 seconds in the first 120 seconds
|
||
after activation, and less frequently afterwards. ELT(DT)s start transmitting no more than 5
|
||
seconds after activation. All ELT(DT)s have a cancellation function, whereby activation of an
|
||
ELT(DT) can be cancelled by the same means by which it was initiated.
|
||
FGBs transmit distress signals on a specified frequency channel within the 406 MHz frequency
|
||
band (i.e., between 406.0 and 406.1 MHz) based on the beacon model (e.g., 406.025 MHz or
|
||
406.040 MHz). SGBs transmit distress signals across the allocated 406 MHz frequency band
|
||
(using “spread-spectrum” modulation) which provides protection against interference
|
||
occurring in specific portions of the 406 MHz frequency band. All SGBs have a cancellation
|
||
function.
|
||
The burst transmitted includes a digital message that contains information that can be used to
|
||
determine the Hex ID of the beacon.
|
||
2.3
|
||
The Beacon Message
|
||
The transmission from a distress beacon contains a digital message, as further described in
|
||
sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 below.
|
||
More detailed information on beacon coding can be obtained from Cospas-Sarsat document
|
||
C/S T.001, “Specification for [FGB] Cospas-Sarsat 406 MHz Distress Beacons”, Cospas-
|
||
Sarsat document C/S T.018, “Specification for Second-Generation Cospas-Sarsat 406 MHz
|
||
Distress Beacons” and document C/S G.005, “Cospas-Sarsat Guidelines on 406-MHz Beacon
|
||
Coding, Registration and Type Approval”. Each document is available from the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
website at www.cospas-sarsat.int.
|
||
2.3.1 The First Generation Beacon Message
|
||
The FGB “message” transmitted by the beacon is either a short message of 112 bits or a long
|
||
message of 144 bits.
|
||
Every FGB “message” begins with 24 bits of synchronisation data. These bits allow the start
|
||
of a valid FGB message to be identified. The remaining bits in the FGB message contain data
|
||
that is organised depending on the beacon coding protocol used for the beacon. Every FGB
|
||
“message” has a unique 15 Hex ID that includes the country of beacon registration.
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat has developed two major categories of FGB message protocols, User protocols,
|
||
and Location protocols:
|
||
•
|
||
User protocols are short FGB messages that consist of 112 bits of data that include the
|
||
beacon identification and other important SAR information, but do not allow for
|
||
encoded GNSS position data,
|
||
•
|
||
Location protocols are long FGB messages that consist of 144 bits of data that include
|
||
encoded GNSS position data (if available) as well as beacon identification data.
|
||
Both the User and Location protocols have various subtypes that provide a coding suited to
|
||
the individual beacon. For example, the EPIRB-MMSI Location Protocol contains a field to
|
||
|
||
2–7
|
||
|
||
store the last six (6) digits of the MMSI (the country code provides the first three (3) digits for
|
||
the MMSI). A beacon with an EPIRB-MMSI protocol must be programmed with the known
|
||
MMSI of the vessel that carries the EPIRB. In contrast, the Serial Location Protocols contain
|
||
a field to store a 24-bit serial identification number. A beacon with a Serial Protocol can be
|
||
programmed by the manufacturer using serial numbers provided by the national beacon
|
||
authority.
|
||
A portion of the FGB ELT(DT) beacon message includes a rotating field, where some
|
||
transmissions include the three-letter designator (3LD) of the aircraft operator, and other
|
||
transmissions include a more precise GNSS location.
|
||
2.3.2 The Second Generation Beacon Message
|
||
The SGB message consists of 250 bits, of which 48 bits are within a rotating field type. The
|
||
use of a rotating field expands the amount of information that can be provided in the beacon
|
||
message by including certain kinds of information in one rotating field type and other kinds
|
||
of information in another rotating field type. Every SGB has a fixed identification consisting
|
||
of Type Approval Certificate (TAC) number and serial number that is independent of the
|
||
encoding of vessel or aircraft identification information in the beacon message. Every SGB
|
||
message has a unique 23 Hex ID that includes the country of beacon registration.
|
||
Compared to the FGB message, the additional bits in the SGB message enable additional
|
||
information to be provided, including a more precise GNSS position and the time that the
|
||
GNSS position was updated.
|
||
2.4
|
||
Hexadecimal Identity of a 406-MHz Beacon
|
||
Every beacon has a Unique Identification Number (UIN, also known as the beacon Hex ID).
|
||
The Hex ID for an FGB consists of 15 hexadecimal characters. For example,
|
||
3EF42AF43F81FE0 is the Hex ID of an Australian EPIRB. The Hex ID is displayed on the
|
||
beacon (see Figure 2.4). While a SGB has a 15 Hex ID that is backwards compatible with the
|
||
15 Hex IDs assigned to FGBs, the complete Hex ID for a SGB consists of 23 hexadecimal
|
||
characters.
|
||
Some information from the FGB or SGB message sent to RCCs and SPOCs within the SIT 185
|
||
text message is not available in the 15 Hex ID and 23 Hex ID.
|
||
|
||
2–8
|
||
|
||
Figure 2.4: Beacon with Hex ID 3EF42AF43F81FE0
|
||
The Hex ID is used operationally as the identification in Cospas-Sarsat distress alert messages
|
||
sent to Responsible Agencies. The Hex ID can be decoded to provide a variety of information
|
||
about the beacon, depending on the protocol used to encode it. Beacon coding protocols are
|
||
described in documents C/S T.001 and C/S T.018 (available on the Cospas-Sarsat website).
|
||
All Hex IDs include a country of registration provided as a MID (Maritime Identification
|
||
Digit) code, a three-digit identity. A list of all MID codes used by Cospas-Sarsat is provided
|
||
in Annex B of this document.
|
||
Hex IDs can be decoded using a software tool, also available on the Cospas-Sarsat website.
|
||
Figure 2.5 shows the result of decoding the Hex ID of the beacon from Figure 2.4 using the
|
||
decode tool on the Cospas-Sarsat website.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
2–9
|
||
|
||
Figure 2.5: Decode of Beacon 3EF42AF43F81FE0
|
||
2.5
|
||
Direction Finding on 406-MHz Beacons
|
||
Most 406 MHz FGBs and some SGBs transmit a quasi-continuous secondary signal on
|
||
121.5 MHz to enable suitably equipped SAR forces to home on the distress beacon using radio
|
||
direction finding techniques (see ICAO-IMO document 9731 known as the “IAMSAR
|
||
Manual”).
|
||
Homing on the 406-MHz burst is also being undertaken by some SAR authorities. Direction
|
||
finding on 406 MHz allows specially equipped SAR aircraft to accurately track the course to
|
||
the 406-MHz beacon, even if the signal is not continuously transmitted (see section 5.5.1 for
|
||
406 MHz beacon channels).
|
||
2.6
|
||
Return Link Service (RLS)
|
||
The Return Link Service (RLS) provides notification to a 406 MHz beacon that an alert
|
||
transmitted by the beacon has been detected by a LUT and distributed via the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
MCC network to the MCC whose service area covers the beacon confirmed position (see
|
||
section 4.1.3 for a description of the MCC reference position). This service is intended to
|
||
provide acknowledgement of the reception of the alert message to persons in distress and is
|
||
only available for 406 MHz beacons coded to provide a return link.
|
||
Once notified that an RLS-capable beacon has been located, the RLSP interfaces to the Ground
|
||
Segment for transmitting return link messages to appropriate satellites, which, in turn, transmit
|
||
return link messages (RLMs) to the transmitting beacon. After receipt of the return link
|
||
message by the beacon, subsequent beacon transmissions include the return link message
|
||
receipt status, and a notification that includes the receipt status is distributed via the Cospas-
|
||
Sarsat MCC network to the designated RLSP. Once notified that the beacon has received the
|
||
return link message, the RLSP interfaces to the relevant ground segment which will cease
|
||
transmitting return link messages to satellites. Illustration of RLS is provided at Figure 1.1.
|
||
Further information on the Return Link Service is provided in document C/S R.012.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
2–10
|
||
|
||
2.7
|
||
GNSS Positions
|
||
A distress beacon with GNSS capability is able to transmit a GNSS position as part of its
|
||
beacon message. There are two mechanisms used to derive the GNSS position: either the
|
||
distress beacon has an internal GNSS receiver, or the distress beacon receives the GNSS data
|
||
from an external device that connects to the beacon.
|
||
If the distress beacon with GNSS capability does not provide a GNSS position (for example,
|
||
as the internal receiver cannot derive a GNSS position as it cannot track sufficient GNSS
|
||
satellites), default values are transmitted in the beacon message that indicate that there is no
|
||
encoded GNSS position available.
|
||
Distress beacons that transmit GNSS position data are coded with a Location protocol;
|
||
however, for FGBs, the particular Location protocol used affects the precision of the GNSS
|
||
position data that can be sent in a beacon message. Table 2.1 lists the precision for the FGB
|
||
Location protocols.
|
||
Table 2.1: Maximum Precision of the FGB Location Protocols
|
||
Protocol
|
||
Maximum Difference
|
||
Equivalent Distance at Equator
|
||
User Location
|
||
2 minutes
|
||
3.7 kilometres
|
||
Standard Location
|
||
2 seconds
|
||
60 metres
|
||
National Location
|
||
2 seconds
|
||
60 metres
|
||
RLS
|
||
2 seconds
|
||
60 metres
|
||
ELT(DT)
|
||
2 seconds
|
||
60 metres
|
||
In some situations, a beacon message may have errors that result in the LUT not being able to
|
||
produce a fine GNSS position. Instead, a coarse GNSS position is produced. Table 2.2 shows
|
||
the coarse precision for the Location protocols that may have a coarse precision GNSS
|
||
position.
|
||
Additional information:
|
||
According to document C/S T.001 section “Internal Navigation Device Performance”, for
|
||
FGBs coded with the Standard, National, or RLS Location protocols, the GNSS receiver
|
||
accuracy must be below 500m.
|
||
For suspected moving beacons, RCC operators should take into account that the beacon may
|
||
have drifted between the time the GNSS position has first been encoded in the beacon message
|
||
and the time a new GNSS position information is sent to the RCC or SPOC within a SIT 185
|
||
message including this GNSS position.
|
||
Specifically, for FGBs other than ELT(DT)s in in-flight mode:
|
||
1.
|
||
a maximum 52.5-second period (up to 120-second period for ELT(DT) in post-crash
|
||
mode) may occur between the time the GNSS receiver processes the GNSS position and
|
||
the time this position is encoded in the beacon burst and sent to the satellite,
|
||
2.
|
||
the refresh rate of the internal GNSS receivers is defined such as:
|
||
|
||
2–11
|
||
|
||
a)
|
||
new beacons type-approved after 2022 should update their GNSS location
|
||
between 4 minutes 25 seconds and 15 minutes (i.e., the GNSS position provided
|
||
in a new SIT 185 message can be up to 15-minute old),
|
||
b)
|
||
new beacons type-approved between 2014 and 2022 should update their GNSS
|
||
location at least once every 30 minutes (i.e., the GNSS position provided in a new
|
||
SIT 185 message can be up to 30-minute old),
|
||
c)
|
||
it is not specified for beacons type-approved before 2014 (i.e., the GNSS position
|
||
provided in a new SIT 185 message can be more than 30-minute old).
|
||
Consequently, RCCs and SPOCs may receive SIT 185 messages updating the beacon
|
||
position information for which only the independent position (i.e., the DOA or the
|
||
Doppler position) has been updated, and therefore, still containing GNSS position
|
||
information that has been refreshed several minutes prior to the timestamp indicated in
|
||
the SIT 185 message.
|
||
For most beacons, the refresh rate of their internal GNSS receiver is available on the
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat website at https://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/beacons-pro/experts-beacon-
|
||
information/approved-beacon-models-tacs?view=tac\_beacons, selecting the TAC
|
||
number and searching for the field “Encoded Position Data Update Interval [Fix]”.
|
||
(See also sections 5.3.8 “Source of GNSS Position Data” and 5.4.7 “Summary Guidance for
|
||
the Use of Position Data”.)
|
||
Table 2.2: Precision of the FGB Location Protocols with only Coarse Position
|
||
Protocol
|
||
Maximum Difference\*
|
||
Equivalent Distance at Equator
|
||
Standard Location
|
||
7 minutes 30 seconds
|
||
13.9 kilometres
|
||
National Location
|
||
1 minute
|
||
1.9 kilometres
|
||
RLS
|
||
15 minutes
|
||
27.8 kilometres
|
||
ELT(DT)
|
||
15 minutes
|
||
27.8 kilometres
|
||
* Assumes all available bits are used to provide the coarse position; see section 5.8.1.
|
||
Note: For SGBs, the precision of the GNSS position provided to Distress authorities is
|
||
approximately 10 metres.
|
||
Note: All ELT(DT)s are required to have a GNSS capability, and the GNSS location is normally
|
||
considered the primary location data for an ELT(DT). A DOA location is only provided for an
|
||
ELT(DT) if the MEOLUT is commissioned to provide DOA location for fast-moving beacons.
|
||
LEOLUT Doppler location is not provided to SAR services for ELT(DT)s.
|
||
2.8
|
||
Beacon Registration
|
||
As each beacon has a unique Hex ID, it is possible for each country to maintain a beacon
|
||
database to store supplementary information about a beacon, such as contact details for its
|
||
owner, other emergency contacts and details of any associated vessel or aircraft.
|
||
|
||
2–12
|
||
|
||
A country can either provide its own beacon database or use the Cospas-Sarsat International
|
||
Beacon Registration Database (IBRD). Details of beacon databases can be found under the
|
||
“406-MHz-Beacon Registers” section of the Contact Lists on the Cospas-Sarsat web site.
|
||
2.9
|
||
International Beacon Registration Database (IBRD)
|
||
Despite the clear advantage of registration, a significant number of beacons are not properly
|
||
registered due to a lack of registration facilities in a number of countries. Furthermore, a
|
||
number of beacon registers do not have 24-hour points of contact easily accessible by
|
||
Responsible Agencies. Therefore, Cospas-Sarsat provides the International Beacon
|
||
Registration Database (IBRD).
|
||
2.9.1
|
||
International Regulations and Purpose of the IBRD
|
||
IMO policy, as stated in IMO Assembly Resolution A.887(21), adopted on
|
||
25 November 1999, provides in paragraph 2 that “every State requiring or allowing the
|
||
use of these GMDSS systems should make suitable arrangements for ensuring
|
||
registrations of these identities are made, maintained and enforced.” These arrangements
|
||
are further clarified in paragraph 12 which provides that “Every State should maintain a
|
||
suitable national database or co-ordinate with other States of their geographical area to
|
||
maintain a joint database”.
|
||
ICAO policy on registration of ELTs is contained in Chapter 5 of the ICAO Convention,
|
||
which provides that “States shall make arrangements for a 406 MHz ELT register.
|
||
Register information regarding the ELT shall be immediately available to search and
|
||
rescue authorities. States shall ensure that the register is updated whenever necessary.”
|
||
It is, therefore, the sole responsibility of States to provide the appropriate regulatory
|
||
environment, facilities and resources that are required for an effective registration
|
||
process. The IBRD is a means designed by Cospas-Sarsat to assist with the registration
|
||
process when, due to a lack of resources, States have not implemented facilities for a
|
||
national register. States may choose to selectively allow registration of beacons in the
|
||
IBRD by beacon type. The IBRD is also meant to assist States in making their
|
||
registration data available to SAR authorities on a 24-hour basis, seven days per week.
|
||
However, it is not designed to become the unique central repository for all beacon
|
||
registration data.
|
||
In providing the IBRD and making the IBRD available to States and users under their
|
||
jurisdiction, Cospas-Sarsat does not accept or take over the specific responsibilities of
|
||
States as stated by IMO and ICAO and declines all responsibilities or liabilities that
|
||
might be associated with the registration of any data in the IBRD, or its availability or
|
||
unavailability to SAR authorities.
|
||
When States choose to allow the registration of data from users under their jurisdiction
|
||
in the IBRD, or upload national registration data into the IBRD, they retain full and
|
||
exclusive responsibility for the integrity of such data, its accuracy and its availability to
|
||
SAR. In this regard, Cospas-Sarsat does not provide any guaranty as to the continuous
|
||
operation of the IBRD.
|
||
|
||
2–13
|
||
|
||
2.9.2
|
||
Using the IBRD
|
||
The IBRD is designed to be freely available to users with no access to national
|
||
registration facilities and to Administrations who wish to avail themselves of the facility
|
||
to make their national beacon registration data more available to SAR services.
|
||
However, direct registration of beacons in the IBRD is not allowed for the country codes
|
||
of Administrations that have informed Cospas-Sarsat of their decision to control the
|
||
registration of beacons under their jurisdiction, whether in the IBRD or in their own
|
||
national registration databases.
|
||
The IBRD provides various levels of access to:
|
||
a)
|
||
beacon owners who wish to register their beacons when no registration facility
|
||
exists in their country and the responsible Administration has agreed to allow
|
||
direct registration in the IBRD;
|
||
b)
|
||
Administrations who control the registration of beacons identified with their
|
||
country code, but wish to make registration data available to international
|
||
Responsible Agencies via the IBRD;
|
||
c)
|
||
Responsible Agencies that need to access beacon registration data to efficiently
|
||
process distress alerts; and
|
||
d)
|
||
other authorised government entities or agencies for the purpose of controlling the
|
||
proper coding or registration of beacons.
|
||
The functional requirements for the IBRD are provided in the document C/S D.001
|
||
“Functional Requirements for the Cospas-Sarsat International Beacon Registration
|
||
Database” and the IBRD operations policy is defined in the document C/S D.004,
|
||
“Operations Plan for the Cospas-Sarsat International Beacon Registration Database”.
|
||
Access to the IBRD (www.406registration.com) is controlled by user codes assigned by
|
||
the Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat (www.cospas-sarsat.int) in accordance with Council
|
||
guidelines. Administrations wishing to use the IBRD should designate a National Point
|
||
of Contact. Cospas-Sarsat will accept designations from the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
Representative or, for non-participating countries, the IMO or the ICAO Representative
|
||
for that country.
|
||
The Secretariat will provide each National IBRD Point of Contact with user
|
||
identifications and passwords to be used by:
|
||
•
|
||
National Data Providers for registration of beacons with their country code(s),
|
||
•
|
||
Responsible Agencies for IBRD queries,
|
||
•
|
||
authorised shore-based service facilities and inspectors to verify proper coding and
|
||
actual registration of the beacon.
|
||
These IBRD user identifications and passwords should be distributed within each
|
||
country under the responsibility of the National IBRD Point of Contact.
|
||
|
||
2–14
|
||
|
||
In case of forgotten password, Responsible Agencies are invited to urgently contact their
|
||
National IBRD Point of Contact to retrieve their account details. If this is not possible,
|
||
contact the Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat (www.cospas-sarsat.int), noting the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
Secretariat, situated in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, is defined as an administrative body
|
||
which is consequently not reachable 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
|
||
Detailed rules for accessing the IBRD are provided in the document C/S D.004.
|
||
Annex D contains a guide to assist a Responsible Agency using the IBRD.
|
||
2.10 Beacon Regulation
|
||
International regulations applicable to 406 MHz beacons are contained in document
|
||
C/S S.007; they include performance standards for 406 MHz beacons and guidelines to avoid
|
||
false alerts, information on beacon maintenance and testing, as well as guidance on beacon
|
||
protocols permitted by the country of registration.
|
||
2.11 Beacon Testing
|
||
406 MHz beacons are designed with a self-test capability for evaluating key performance
|
||
characteristics. Initiating the beacon self-test function will not generate a distress alert in the
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat System. However, it will use some of the beacon's limited battery power and
|
||
should only be used in accordance with the beacon manufacturer's guidance.
|
||
On occasions, a Responsible Agency may wish to activate an operational 406 MHz beacon;
|
||
for example, for SAR training purposes. As the beacon activation may be detected and treated
|
||
as a live incident by the Cospas-Sarsat System, all activations for non-distress purposes must
|
||
be approved in advance.
|
||
Requests to conduct a live beacon activation should be directed to the MCC that services the
|
||
location in which the activation is planned and, if the location is not within the country of
|
||
registration, the MCC responsible for the country in which the beacon is registered. When
|
||
making a request the following information should be provided:
|
||
•
|
||
Objective of the activation,
|
||
•
|
||
Description of the event,
|
||
•
|
||
Location,
|
||
•
|
||
Date, time and duration,
|
||
•
|
||
Beacon Hex ID (15 hexadecimal characters for an FGB or an SGB, or 23 hexadecimal
|
||
characters for an SGB),
|
||
•
|
||
Point of contact.
|
||
The responsible MCC will advise other MCCs of the planned beacon activation.
|
||
If the homing signal on the beacon will be active, relevant aviation authorities must also be
|
||
advised of the planned beacon activation.
|
||
|
||
2–15
|
||
|
||
2.12 Inadvertent Alert
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat provides guidance on its website in case of inadvertent alerts occur, as follows:
|
||
“If a beacon is inadvertently activated, the beacon immediately should be turned off if
|
||
possible. If the beacon does not have an “off” function, it should be shielded from the sky by
|
||
placing it in a metal container (a solid metal box or a refrigerator, for example).
|
||
Because an alert likely will be received by the satellites even if the beacon was on for only a
|
||
short time, you should immediately contact the agency in your region responsible for
|
||
managing Cospas-Sarsat distress alerts to prevent unnecessary assignment of search and
|
||
rescue resources that may be needed for a real emergency somewhere else.
|
||
If your region has a Cospas-Sarsat Mission Control Centre in the "Contact Lists" (select “MCC
|
||
– Mission Control Centre” from the drop-down choices), please notify the centre in your area.
|
||
Otherwise select “SPOC – SAR Point of Contact” from the "Contact Lists" and notify them
|
||
of your inadvertent alert.
|
||
The "Contact Lists" are available under our Professional website.
|
||
There is no penalty for inadvertent activation of a beacon if there was no malicious intent.”
|
||
When reported to an MCC, the source of the alert should be categorized as depicted in the
|
||
graphic below.
|
||
Figure 2.6: Information Graphic on Sources of False Alerts
|
||
- END OF SECTION 2 -
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–1
|
||
|
||
COSPAS-SARSAT SATELLITE SYSTEMS
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat uses three satellite systems, MEOSAR, LEOSAR and GEOSAR. Further
|
||
information on each satellite system can be found on the Cospas-Sarsat web site (www.cospas-
|
||
sarsat.int).
|
||
All the satellite systems have equipment known as a SAR payload placed on satellites that
|
||
have been designed for and are primarily used for other purposes. The two general categories
|
||
of equipment are:
|
||
1.
|
||
SAR Repeater (SARR): A SAR repeater receives a beacon transmission on 406 MHz
|
||
and retransmits the transmission on a different frequency, 1544 MHz. A SAR repeater
|
||
is sometimes called a bent pipe as it simply redirects the signal from the beacon back to
|
||
the earth for reception by a LUT. SARR instruments are carried on all Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
satellites. The satellite must have mutual visibility to the beacon and the LUT for
|
||
detection to occur.
|
||
2.
|
||
SAR Processor (SARP): A SAR processor receives a beacon transmission on 406 MHz
|
||
and stores the time of arrival, the received frequency and the beacon message in a buffer.
|
||
The data in the buffer is re-transmitted until overwritten by a more recent detection. The
|
||
retransmitted signal uses the 1544 MHz frequency. SARP instruments are carried only
|
||
on the LEOSAR satellites.
|
||
The three satellite systems are described in more detail in the following sections with a
|
||
description of the beacon detection and location data that can be determined by a LUT
|
||
associated with the satellite system.
|
||
Every satellite has a footprint on the Earth’s surface. The footprint is the area that the satellite
|
||
can see at sea level on the Earth’s surface. A satellite can only detect signals from beacons
|
||
that are within its footprint. The footprints shown in the following sections (for example,
|
||
Figure 3.2) show the maximum footprint with a zero-degree elevation.
|
||
3.1
|
||
MEOSAR
|
||
The MEOSAR space segment consists of SAR repeaters placed on the satellites of the Global
|
||
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS):
|
||
•
|
||
GPS satellites operated by the United States,
|
||
•
|
||
Russian Federation Glonass navigation satellites,
|
||
•
|
||
European Galileo navigation satellites
|
||
•
|
||
Chinese BDS navigation satellites.
|
||
These MEOSAR satellites orbit the Earth at altitudes between 19,000 and 24,000 kilometres,
|
||
a range considered as a medium-altitude Earth orbit. The radius of a MEOSAR satellite
|
||
footprint is about 6,000 to 7,000 kilometres. MEOSAR is designed to provide continuous
|
||
global coverage of the Earth.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–2
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.1: A Schematic View of the Galileo Constellation
|
||
(which is one of the constellations of the MEOSAR System)
|
||
The footprint of a GPS MEOSAR satellite is shown in Figure 3.2.
|
||
Figure 3.2: Footprint of a GPS MEOSAR Satellite
|
||
A MEOLUT tracks multiple MEOSAR satellites in view at the same time. Typically, a
|
||
MEOLUT has a number of antennas, and each antenna tracks a separate MEOSAR satellite.
|
||
r = 7,000 km
|
||
z = 24,000 km
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–3
|
||
|
||
Upon receiving a transmission (a beacon burst) from a 406 MHz distress beacon via a
|
||
MEOSAR satellite, a MEOLUT will generally measure two key values: the Time of Arrival
|
||
(TOA) and the Frequency of Arrival (FOA). Assuming reception of beacon transmissions
|
||
through at least three distinct MEOSAR satellites, MEOLUT processing can provide a two-
|
||
dimensional (longitude and latitude) beacon location using a combination of time difference
|
||
of arrival (TDOA) and frequency difference of arrival (FDOA) computations. The location
|
||
computed by a MEOLUT is known as a difference of arrival (DOA) location. Three-
|
||
dimensional locations (i.e., with the addition of a computed altitude) are possible when the
|
||
beacon burst is relayed to a MEOLUT via four or more MEOSAR satellites.
|
||
Figure 3.3: An Overview of the MEOSAR System
|
||
In Figure 3.3 above, distress beacons (EPIRB, PLB or ELT) transmit a 406 MHz signal that is
|
||
detected by MEOSAR satellites in the BDS, GPS, Glonass and Galileo constellations. The
|
||
beacon transmission is relayed on 1544 MHz and detected by a MEOLUT. Beacon and
|
||
location data is sent from the MEOLUT to an MCC and then to a Responsible Agency to
|
||
initiate a response. The diagram also shows the Return Link Service offered by MEOSAR. A
|
||
message can be sent to particular MEOSAR satellites that are capable of sending a return link
|
||
message to a beacon with return link functionality.
|
||
In addition to calculating beacon locations using a single burst relayed by different satellites,
|
||
subsequent bursts can then be used to refine the beacon location. A location generated using
|
||
more than a single burst is known as a multi-burst location.
|
||
A MEOLUT may produce any of four possible forms of data:
|
||
1.
|
||
A beacon detection without location: A beacon is detected but there is no location data
|
||
associated with the detection.
|
||
2.
|
||
A beacon detection with a GNSS position: A beacon is detected and there is a GNSS
|
||
position encoded in the beacon message.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–4
|
||
|
||
3.
|
||
A DOA (Difference of Arrival) location: A beacon is detected, and using DOA
|
||
techniques, the MEOLUT is able to generate an independent estimate of the location of
|
||
the beacon. Typically, three or more satellites must detect the beacon to generate a DOA
|
||
location. A DOA location may be generated from a single burst from a beacon.
|
||
4.
|
||
A DOA location and a GNSS position: A beacon is detected; the beacon message
|
||
contains a GNSS position and a DOA position is also generated.
|
||
All ELT(DT)s are required to be capable of transmitting a GNSS location in the beacon
|
||
message. A DOA location is only provided to Distress Authorities for an ELT(DT) if the
|
||
MEOLUT is commissioned to provide DOA locations for fast-moving beacons.
|
||
Expected Accuracy for DOA Location
|
||
For each DOA location, an Expected Accuracy (i.e., estimated error) value is computed.
|
||
Information on the Expected Accuracy, also known as the Expected Horizontal Error (EHE),
|
||
is provided in the SIT 185 message as described in Paragraph 4.
|
||
This value is the radius of the circle centered on the DOA location that should contain the true
|
||
beacon location with a 95% probability. In other words, there is a 95% probability that the
|
||
location error, which is defined as the distance between the DOA location and the actual
|
||
beacon location, is lower than the Expected-Accuracy value.
|
||
The Figure below illustrates the configuration for which the DOA location error is lower than
|
||
the associated Expected-Accuracy value, with the corresponding confidence percentage.
|
||
Figure 3.4: DOA Location Error Smaller than the Associated
|
||
Expected-Accuracy Value
|
||
Additional details on the Expected Accuracy for DOA Location:
|
||
The Expected-Accuracy specification is further refined to ensure that Expected-Accuracy
|
||
values associated with a DOA location provide a confident reflection of the location error, and
|
||
in particular that the Expected Accuracy does not overestimate the location error in any
|
||
significant way.
|
||
This situation should
|
||
happen for
|
||
95% of the
|
||
MEOSAR DOA
|
||
locations
|
||
MEOSAR
|
||
DOA location
|
||
Actual beacon
|
||
location
|
||
Expected
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
Location
|
||
error
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–5
|
||
|
||
In addition to the 95% confidence, Expected-Accuracy values must meet the following
|
||
requirement (per section 5.10 of document C/S T.019 – EHE). Namely, to ensure that the
|
||
associated Expected-Accuracy value does not underestimate the MEOSAR location error, the
|
||
DOA location error must be smaller than two times the associated Expected-Accuracy value
|
||
at minimum 99% of the time. In other words, there is only a maximum 1% probability that the
|
||
DOA location error is greater than two times the Expected-Accuracy value.
|
||
The Figure below illustrates this additional Expected-Accuracy-related boundary:
|
||
Figure 3.5: Additional Expected-Accuracy-Related Boundary
|
||
Figure 3.6: Probability of the Actual Beacon Location Being Within the Expected
|
||
Accuracy-Radius and Two-Times Expected Accuracy-Radius Circles
|
||
95% probability
|
||
that the location error
|
||
be below the
|
||
Expected-Accuracy
|
||
value
|
||
Expected
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
>99% probability that the location
|
||
error be below 2 x Expected
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
<1% probability that the
|
||
location error be above
|
||
2 x Expected Accuracy
|
||
2 x Expected
|
||
Accuracy
|
||
Contains the actual location with a 95% probability
|
||
Contains the actual location with a >99% probability
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–6
|
||
|
||
3.2
|
||
LEOSAR
|
||
The LEOSAR satellites are low-altitude (between 700 and 1000 kilometres above the Earth)
|
||
spacecraft in near-polar orbits. As the LEOSAR satellite’s revolution takes about 105 minutes,
|
||
two successive paths of the same satellite are separated, due to the Earth rotation, by
|
||
approximately 25 degrees.
|
||
Figure 3.7: Four Passes of a LEOSAR Satellite
|
||
In Figure 3.7 above, at 1200 UTC, the satellite passes over Australia in a near-polar orbit. The
|
||
orbit can be in either direction (i.e., north to south, or south to north). At 0145 UTC (i.e., 105
|
||
minutes later), the satellite has completed a full polar orbit but due to the rotation of the Earth,
|
||
at 0145 UTC, the satellite is now approximately 25 degrees further west. A LEOSAR satellite
|
||
covers the surface of the Earth approximately every 12 hours.
|
||
The LEOSAR constellation has a minimum of four satellites; in June 2022, there were four
|
||
operational LEOSAR satellites in the constellation.
|
||
Global, non-continuous coverage of the Earth is achieved. The coverage is not continuous
|
||
because polar orbiting satellites can only view a relatively small portion of the Earth at any
|
||
given time. The radius of the footprint is about 3,000 kilometres. Figure 3.8 shows the footprint
|
||
of a LEOSAR satellite.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–7
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.8: Footprint of LEOSAR Satellite (Sarsat-10)
|
||
The LEOSAR satellites cannot detect distress alerts until the satellite is in a position where it
|
||
can receive transmission bursts from the distress beacon, in other words, when the beacon is
|
||
in the footprint of the satellite. The LEOSAR satellites transmit a distress alert that the
|
||
LEOLUT receives when the LEOLUT is in the footprint of the satellite. Since the LEOSAR
|
||
satellites also have a SAR Processor, the satellites store distress beacon information and
|
||
rebroadcast it continuously, so that the stored data can be received by a LEOLUT when the
|
||
satellite comes within view of the LEOLUT, thereby providing global coverage (with inherent
|
||
time delays).
|
||
r = 3,000 km
|
||
z = 900 km
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–8
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.9: Global coverage of a LEOSAR satellite
|
||
In Figure 3.9 above, the footprint of a LEOSAR satellite is shown at two times. The first
|
||
footprint (on the left) only contains a beacon. The LEOSAR satellite detects the beacon and
|
||
stores the detection data in its SAR Processor. The second footprint (on the right) shows the
|
||
satellite at a later time. The footprint contains another beacon and a LEOLUT. The LEOSAR
|
||
satellite is able to download the detection data from the first beacon using the global coverage
|
||
provided by the SAR Processor. The second beacon, as it is in the same footprint as the
|
||
LEOLUT, can be directly relayed to the LEOLUT using the SAR Repeater on the LEOSAR
|
||
satellite. Detections using the SAR Repeater are known as local detections.
|
||
The LEOSAR system calculates the location of distress events using Doppler processing
|
||
techniques. Doppler processing is based upon the principle that the frequency of the distress
|
||
beacon, as “heard” by the satellite instrument, is affected by the relative velocity of the satellite
|
||
with respect to the beacon. By monitoring the change of the frequency of the received beacon
|
||
signal from different beacon transmission bursts, and, knowing the exact position and velocity
|
||
of the satellite, a LEOLUT is able to calculate two possible locations for the beacon. The two
|
||
locations are equidistant from the satellite at the time when the satellite was closest to the
|
||
beacon (the time of closest approach, or TCA).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–9
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.10: A Doppler Curve for a Hypothetical FGB
|
||
In Figure 3.10 above, the plot has the time of detection on the x-axis and the frequency of the
|
||
detection by the LEOSAR satellite on the y-axis. Each FGB burst (shown with the inverted
|
||
triangle) occurs approximately every 50 seconds. Due to the Doppler Effect, the beacon
|
||
frequency is initially detected at a higher frequency than the actual transmitted frequency, and
|
||
it then decreases as the satellite passes closer to the beacon. When the satellite is at the closest
|
||
point to the beacon (known as the TCA, or Time of Closest Approach), the frequency matches
|
||
the actual frequency of the beacon. By analysing the shape of the Doppler curve, a LEOLUT
|
||
can calculate the distance of the beacon from the satellite at the TCA, this produces two
|
||
possible locations for the beacon known as the Doppler A-side and Doppler B-side.
|
||
The two Doppler locations are known as the A-side and the B-side of the Doppler solution;
|
||
they are also known as the A-position and the B-position. The LEOLUT generates a
|
||
probability for each of the two Doppler locations taking into account the Doppler effect of the
|
||
earth’s rotation.
|
||
Time of Closest Approach
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–10
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.11: Two Doppler Locations from a LEOSAR Satellite Pass
|
||
In Figure 3.11 above, note that the two locations (Doppler A and Doppler B) are equidistant
|
||
from the satellite at the time of closest approach (TCA).
|
||
The process of determining which of the two Doppler locations is the location of the beacon
|
||
is known as position confirmation (or ambiguity resolution). The Doppler location that is not
|
||
the location of the beacon is known as the mirror or image location.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–11
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.12: Confirmation by Two LEOSAR Passes
|
||
In Figure 3.12 above, this example continues the previous Figure 3.11. A second LEOSAR
|
||
satellite pass has produced two new Doppler locations, Doppler A2 and Doppler B2. The
|
||
location of the beacon would be confirmed by the matching of Doppler B1 (from the first
|
||
satellite pass) and Doppler A2 (from the second satellite pass). Both Doppler A1 and Doppler
|
||
B2 can now be determined to be mirror (image) locations.
|
||
A LEOLUT may use data from a GEOLUT to help generate the Doppler location for a given
|
||
beacon. This is known as LEO-GEO processing.
|
||
A LEOLUT may produce any of four possible forms of data:
|
||
1.
|
||
A beacon detection without location: A beacon is detected but there is no location data
|
||
associated with the detection. Typically, this is due to the LEOLUT receiving
|
||
insufficient bursts in order to perform the Doppler processing to produce locations.
|
||
2.
|
||
A beacon detection with a GNSS position. A beacon is detected and there is a GNSS
|
||
position encoded in the beacon message.
|
||
3.
|
||
Two Doppler locations. A beacon is detected, and using Doppler techniques, the
|
||
LEOLUT generates two possible estimates of the location of the beacon. The two
|
||
locations are known as the A-position and the B-position. The LEOLUT will also
|
||
generate a probability for each of these positions.
|
||
4.
|
||
Two Doppler locations and an encoded GNSS position. A beacon is detected, the beacon
|
||
message contains a GNSS position, and two Doppler locations are also generated.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
3–12
|
||
|
||
Although a LEOLUT may be able to compute a Doppler location for a beacon that is fast-
|
||
moving, the accuracy of that location is not expected to meet the requirements of the GADSS
|
||
for an ELT(DT), and all Doppler locations are filtered for ELT(DT)s. All ELT(DT)s are
|
||
required to be capable of transmitting a GNSS location in the beacon message, and the GNSS
|
||
location is considered to be the primary location data for the ELT(DT).
|
||
3.3
|
||
GEOSAR
|
||
The GEOSAR satellites orbit the Earth at an altitude of approximately 36,000 kilometres, with
|
||
an orbit period of 24 hours, thus appearing fixed relative to the Earth at approximately 0-
|
||
degree latitude (i.e., over the equator). A single geostationary satellite has a footprint with a
|
||
radius of approximately 7,500 kilometres and provides GEOSAR coverage of about one third
|
||
of the globe. Due to their positions over the equator, the GEOSAR satellites are unable to
|
||
detect beacons north or south of about 70 degrees of latitude. Figure 3.13 shows the footprint
|
||
of the GEOSAR satellite MSG-2.
|
||
Figure 3.13: Footprint of GEOSAR Satellite (MSG-2)
|
||
A GEOLUT may produce either of two possible forms of data:
|
||
1.
|
||
A beacon detection: A beacon is detected but there is no GNSS position data associated
|
||
with the detection.
|
||
2.
|
||
A beacon detection with an encoded GNSS position. A beacon is detected, and the
|
||
beacon message contains a position generated by the GNSS equipment in the beacon.
|
||
A GEOLUT has no means to compute an independent location for a beacon.
|
||
– END OF SECTION 3 –
|
||
r = 7,500 km
|
||
z = 36,000 km
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
4–1
|
||
|
||
MISSION CONTROL CENTRES
|
||
Each MCC has a service area and provides beacon alert data to Responsible Agencies within
|
||
that service area. For example, the Norwegian MCC (NMCC) provides beacon alert data to
|
||
the Responsible Agencies in the following countries/regions: Denmark, Estonia, Faroe
|
||
Islands, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden. Similar
|
||
information for all MCCs and their supported Responsible Agencies can be found on the
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat website.
|
||
MCCs are organized in a nodal network that allows efficient distribution of beacon alert data
|
||
around the world. This nodal network is comprised of six Data Distribution Regions (DDRs),
|
||
in which each DDR has a nodal (or hub) MCC that distributes alerts between other MCCs that
|
||
are not nodes; see Figure 4.1. MCCs send beacon alert data to a Responsible Agency outside
|
||
their service area using the MCC nodal network. For example, the Norwegian MCC (NMCC)
|
||
distributes an alert for the Algerian RCC via the nodal French MCC (FMCC), which then
|
||
distributes the alert to nodal Spanish MCC (SPMCC), which then distributes the alert the
|
||
Algerian MCC (ALMCC) which delivers the alert to the Algerian RCC.
|
||
Figure 4.1: A Schematic View of the MCC Network
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
4–2
|
||
|
||
In Figure 4.1 above, there are six Data Distribution Regions (DDRs): the Western DDR
|
||
(WDDR), the Central DDR (CDDR), the South Central DDR (SCDDR), the North-West
|
||
Pacific DDR (NWPDDR), the Eastern DDR (EDDR) and the South-West Pacific DDR
|
||
(SWPDDR). Data distribution between DDR regions is performed by the nodal MCCs. Within
|
||
the CDDR, all MCCs are able to distribute data directly with other CDDR MCCs; in all other
|
||
DDRs, data distribution between MCCs in the DDR is also performed via the nodal MCC.
|
||
An MCC therefore receives beacon alert data from its local LUTs and also from other MCCs.
|
||
An MCC processes the beacon alert data with the objective of providing timely, accurate and
|
||
reliable beacon alert data to the relevant Responsible Agencies. The MCC filters out redundant
|
||
data to ensure that a Responsible Agency is not distracted or confused by unnecessary data.
|
||
The MCC network and the data processing rules are described in document C/S A.001 known
|
||
as the Data Distribution Plan (DDP).
|
||
4.1
|
||
General Principles
|
||
An MCC follows three basic principles when processing and forwarding data as follows.
|
||
4.1.1
|
||
Timeliness
|
||
An MCC provides timely data. The MCC does not wait for additional data before
|
||
sending data.
|
||
For example, if an MCC receives a beacon detection with no location, the MCC does
|
||
not wait before sending to a Responsible Agency, just in case no more data is received.
|
||
Instead the MCC would forward the beacon detection data to the Responsible Agency
|
||
and, if more data is received, would send the additional data to the Responsible Agency
|
||
later.
|
||
For aircraft distress tracking, ICAO requires that location data be provided at least once
|
||
a minute while the aircraft is in a potential distress situation. For this reason, all
|
||
ELT(DT) location data is forwarded to the associated MCC for processing.
|
||
4.1.2
|
||
Redundancy
|
||
An MCC attempts to minimize redundant data sent.
|
||
For example, if an MCC receives a GNSS position for a beacon, it will forward that
|
||
location to the appropriate Responsible Agency. If the MCC receives another beacon
|
||
detection with no location data (e.g., from another satellite), it will normally not forward
|
||
that data to the Responsible Agency. If the MCC received another detection with the
|
||
same GNSS position, it would similarly not forward this redundant location data.
|
||
As another example, if an MCC receives Doppler position data from two LEOLUTs for
|
||
satellite S-13 with the same TCA for the same beacon, then the MCC will not send the
|
||
second Doppler solution unless it has reason to believe that the new data may be of better
|
||
quality.
|
||
|
||
4–3
|
||
|
||
An MCC will send updates that would otherwise be considered redundant to allow a
|
||
Responsible Agency to know that a beacon is still active. For example, MEOSAR
|
||
position data will be sent every 15 minutes after position confirmation for beacons other
|
||
than ELT(DT)s, even if the latest detection does not provide better quality data.
|
||
4.1.3
|
||
Confirmation:
|
||
Beacon position data is unconfirmed until it has been confirmed on the basis of
|
||
information provided by two independent sources. Position confirmation requires that
|
||
two positions for a beacon are from independent sources and match within 20 kilometres
|
||
of each other, as specified in document C/S A.001. An MCC reference position is an
|
||
approximation of the beacon position generated or selected by the MCC, based on a
|
||
match of positions from independent sources within 20 kilometres. The MCC reference
|
||
position is used as the reference position to determine if subsequent position data is
|
||
deemed a position update or a position conflict, based on the 20-kilometre distance
|
||
threshold match. The MCC reference position may be further updated based on new
|
||
position data that matches the current MCC reference position within 20 kilometres.
|
||
A reference to a “position confirmed” alert or “position confirmation” in this document
|
||
does not imply that any specific position provided in the associated alert message is the
|
||
actual beacon position. Further information on the use of position data included in the
|
||
alert message is provided in section 5.4.
|
||
Two locations are independent if they are two different types of location, or for two
|
||
Doppler locations or for two DOA locations, if they are derived from different beacon
|
||
events, as outlined in the following table.
|
||
Table 4.1: Determining if Two Locations for a Beacon are Independent
|
||
GNSS
|
||
Doppler
|
||
DOA
|
||
GNSS
|
||
No
|
||
Yes
|
||
Yes
|
||
Doppler
|
||
Yes
|
||
Different satellites or time
|
||
(TCA) difference of at
|
||
least 20 minutes\*
|
||
Yes
|
||
DOA
|
||
Yes
|
||
Yes
|
||
Each satellite set has a
|
||
unique satellite or a time
|
||
difference of at least 30
|
||
minutes
|
||
* Two pairs of Doppler locations are not independent if each Doppler location matches a Doppler
|
||
location in the other solution; see “Unresolved Doppler Match” Section 4.2.6.
|
||
Note that the independence of two encoded GNSS position cannot be determined as the two
|
||
positions come from the same source, i.e., the GNSS unit on (or attached to) the beacon.
|
||
Section 7.22 provides clarifying examples of independence.
|
||
Position is not confirmed for ELT(DT)s, which are assumed to be fast-moving.
|
||
|
||
4–4
|
||
|
||
4.2
|
||
MCC Messages
|
||
The following sections describe the message types sent to a Responsible Agency by an MCC.
|
||
The complete messages are described in section 5, and examples are provided in section 6.
|
||
4.2.1
|
||
Initial Alert (Unlocated) and Initial Location Alert
|
||
An initial alert indicates that a beacon has been detected.
|
||
An initial alert with no location information is known as an unlocated beacon alert and
|
||
its message type is “INITIAL ALERT (UNLOCATED)”.
|
||
An unlocated beacon alert is sent to the Responsible Agencies associated with the
|
||
country of registration contained in the beacon message.
|
||
Although an unlocated beacon alert has no location data, the beacon message provides
|
||
useful data to a Responsible Agency. The beacon message contains the Hex ID of the
|
||
beacon. If the beacon is registered in the country’s beacon registration database or the
|
||
IBRD, the owner and emergency contacts can be determined. As well, some beacon
|
||
messages contain the MMSI of a vessel or a call sign of an aircraft which allows the
|
||
Responsible Agency to contact the vessel or aircraft associated with the beacon.
|
||
The message type for the first alert with location is “INITIAL LOCATED ALERT”,
|
||
unless there is a “position conflict” as described in section 4.2.3. The first located alert
|
||
may contain an MCC reference position, if the alert contains a GNSS position that
|
||
matches a Doppler or DOA position, as discussed in section 4.2.2.
|
||
The Responsible Agency informed of alerts with location data depends on the type of
|
||
beacon. For ELTs, EPIRBs and PLBs the location data is used to determine the SAR
|
||
Service informed of the alert. For SSAS beacons the location data does not affect the
|
||
Competent Authority informed as only the Competent Authority associated with the
|
||
country of registration is informed of an SSAS beacon activation.
|
||
For an ELT, EPIRB or PLB, an MCC sends an initial located alert to any SAR Service
|
||
relevant to the unconfirmed location data contained in the alert. For example, if a
|
||
LEOLUT generates two Doppler locations for a New Zealand EPIRB, one in the Fiji
|
||
RCC service area and another in the New Zealand RCC service area, the Australian
|
||
MCC will send an initial alert to both the Fiji RCC and the New Zealand RCC.
|
||
|
||
4–5
|
||
|
||
Figure 4.2: Two Doppler Locations from a LEOSAR Satellite Pass for an EPIRB
|
||
In the Figure 4.2 above, (that also appeared as Figure 3.11), a LEOSAR satellite has
|
||
produced two Doppler locations (Doppler A and Doppler B) for a New Zealand EPIRB.
|
||
As the Doppler A position is in the Fiji service area, the Fiji RCC will be sent an initial
|
||
alert with both Doppler locations. As the Doppler B position is in the New Zealand
|
||
service area, the New Zealand RCC will be sent an initial alert with both Doppler
|
||
locations.
|
||
Prior to position confirmation, every located alert is sent to each Responsible Agency
|
||
that previously received an alert for the beacon activation, as well the Responsible
|
||
Agencies responsible for a location in the new alert. This enables all involved
|
||
Responsible Agencies to coordinate a response.
|
||
A Responsible Agency may be able to use the unconfirmed location data along with
|
||
other information in responding to the incident. For example, additional information
|
||
from a phone call to an emergency contact using the beacon registration details or a flare
|
||
sighting near an unconfirmed location may assist the tasking of resources.
|
||
4.2.2
|
||
Position Confirmed Alert
|
||
A position confirmed alert contains an MCC reference position, which is the result of
|
||
two matching independent locations, as described in section 4.1.3 above. When a
|
||
position is confirmed, the message type is “POSITION UPDATE ALERT” if an alert
|
||
with position information was previously sent, or “INITIAL LOCATED ALERT” if
|
||
no position information was previously sent. The presence of an MCC reference position
|
||
indicates that position is confirmed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
4–6
|
||
|
||
A position confirmed alert is sent to all Responsible Agencies that have received alert
|
||
messages about the beacon activation.
|
||
For example, if an initial alert from an EPIRB is sent to the Fiji RCC and the New
|
||
Zealand RCC as the alert had two Doppler locations generated by a LEOLUT, when the
|
||
location is confirmed as in New Zealand, the alert will be sent to both the Fiji RCC and
|
||
the New Zealand RCC. The position confirmed alert informs the Fiji RCC that the
|
||
beacon position has now been confirmed to be outside the Fiji RCC service area.
|
||
Figure 4.3: Confirmation of LEOSAR Data by a MEOSAR Detection
|
||
In the Figure 4.3 above, DOA location data from the MEOSAR system has confirmed
|
||
the beacon location with the Doppler B1 location. As MCC reference position is in the
|
||
service area of New Zealand, the New Zealand RCC will be sent the alert. As an initial
|
||
alert had been sent to the Fiji RCC due to the earlier Doppler A1 location, the alert will
|
||
also be sent to the Fiji RCC.
|
||
The first alert sent from an MCC to a Responsible Agency provides an MCC reference
|
||
position when the first alert contains position data (DOA or Doppler) and a matching
|
||
GNSS position.
|
||
The method used by the MCC to generate the MCC reference position from the matching
|
||
independent locations is not defined by Cospas-Sarsat. Instead, the specifications state
|
||
that this position may be formed by a merge of matching locations which may be based
|
||
on a weighting factor assigned to each matching location. Each Responsible Agency
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
4–7
|
||
|
||
should consult with its supporting MCC to obtain information on the method used to
|
||
generate the MCC reference position by that MCC.
|
||
Position is not confirmed for ELT(DT)s, which are assumed to be fast-moving. If an
|
||
ELT(DT) alert is sent with matching GNSS and DOA positions, then the message type
|
||
is “DOA POSITION MATCH”.
|
||
4.2.3
|
||
Position Conflict Alert
|
||
Except for ELT(DT)s, if an MCC receives new location data that does not match any of
|
||
the previous location data for that beacon within 20 kilometres, then the new location
|
||
data is labelled as “in conflict”. For ELT(DT)s, position data in previous alerts is not
|
||
referenced in the processing of new position data, thus a position conflict can only occur
|
||
for an ELT(DT) if the GNSS and DOA positions in the new alert are “in conflict”.
|
||
The MCC filters some conflict data (for example, if the new location data is of lesser
|
||
quality) but otherwise sends a position conflict alert to indicate that the new location
|
||
data does not match previously sent location data.
|
||
A fast-moving beacon (for example, on an aircraft) other than an ELT(DT) will typically
|
||
generate an initial alert followed by a series of conflict alerts, as all the alerts after the
|
||
initial alert will not match. The trail of conflicts may provide a path for the fast-moving
|
||
beacon.
|
||
It is possible for a Responsible Agency to receive a conflict alert as the first message.
|
||
For example, if an MCC receives a DOA location and a GNSS position as the first alert
|
||
for a beacon, and if the DOA location and the GNSS position do not match, the MCC
|
||
will send a conflict message to the relevant Responsible Agencies.
|
||
Prior to position confirmation, for ELTs, EPIRBs and PLBs, if non-matching locations
|
||
are in the area of responsibility of different SAR Services, all the SAR Services would
|
||
receive a conflict alert.
|
||
4.2.4
|
||
Position Update Alert
|
||
An MCC will send an update alert if it receives beacon detection data that is not
|
||
redundant. Cospas-Sarsat has a very detailed definition of when an update is sent, but
|
||
from the Responsible Agency perspective, an update will be sent when the MCC has
|
||
additional data or better-quality data, or to indicate that the beacon is still active and
|
||
transmitting.
|
||
An update can be sent before and after confirmation of the location.
|
||
Prior to position confirmation, a new alert with DOA position that is otherwise
|
||
redundant will be sent every five (5) minutes for all beacon types except ELT(DT)s.
|
||
To prevent too many MEOSAR alerts from being sent to a Responsible Agency after
|
||
position confirmation, a MEOSAR alert with DOA position matching the MCC
|
||
|
||
4–8
|
||
|
||
reference position that is not better quality will only be sent every 15 minutes. A
|
||
MEOSAR alert with DOA position that does not match the MCC reference position and
|
||
is not better quality will only be sent every ten (10) minutes. An alert with a better-
|
||
quality DOA position (based on the expected horizontal error) is always sent, as
|
||
specified in document C/S A.001. Position is not confirmed for ELT(DT)s, which are
|
||
assumed to be fast-moving.
|
||
For all beacon types except ELT(DT)s, an updated alert with GNSS position is sent if
|
||
the new GNSS position differs from previously sent GNSS position by three (3) to
|
||
twenty (20) kilometres or, for an FGB, if the new GNSS position is refined (i.e., more
|
||
precise) and no previous GNSS position was refined.
|
||
In general terms, a new alert for an ELT(DT) is sent to the Responsible Agency every
|
||
five (5) seconds within the first 30 seconds after beacon activation. More specifically, if
|
||
the “reference” detection time of the new ELT(DT) alert is within 30 seconds of the
|
||
earliest “reference” detection time received, then the alert is sent if:
|
||
a) no other alert has been sent with a reference time within three (3) seconds of the new
|
||
alert’s reference time; or
|
||
b) the new alert has GNSS position (and no other alert with GNSS position has been
|
||
sent with a reference time within three (3) seconds of the new alert’s reference time);
|
||
or
|
||
c) the new alert has DOA position (and no other alert with DOA position has been sent
|
||
with a reference time within three (3) seconds of the new alert’s reference time).
|
||
Note that ELT(DT)s transmit every five (5) seconds for the first 120 seconds after
|
||
activation, so the three (3)-second threshold noted above effectively results in alerts
|
||
being every five (5) seconds.
|
||
The new alert is also sent if, based on service area information available to the MCC, it
|
||
contains DOA or GNSS position located in a service area for which the Responsible
|
||
Agency has not previously been sent an alert.
|
||
In addition, if the current reference (detection) time is at least ten (10) minutes more
|
||
recent than the reference time for all previously sent alerts, then the MCC sends the
|
||
“best” solution with a reference time more recent than the reference time for all
|
||
previously sent alerts, where the priority is given to a GNSS position (SGB) or refined
|
||
GNSS position (FGB). Until MCCs have implemented distribution of the “best” new
|
||
solution, they send a new alert with GNSS or DOA position, if the new reference time
|
||
is at least ten (10) minutes after the reference time for all previously sent alerts.
|
||
4.2.5
|
||
Notification of Country of Beacon Registration Alert
|
||
A Notification of Country of Registration (NOCR) alert is sent to the SAR Service
|
||
associated with the country of registration in the beacon message. An NOCR is not sent
|
||
to the Competent Authority for an SSAS alert as all SSAS alert messages are sent to the
|
||
|
||
4–9
|
||
|
||
Competent Authority associated with the country of registration and hence there is no
|
||
need for an NOCR alert.
|
||
For example, if a PLB with a country of registration of New Zealand is detected outside
|
||
the New Zealand Search and Rescue Region (SRR), the RCC in New Zealand will be
|
||
sent an NOCR alert.
|
||
An MCC that processes an ELT, EPIRB or PLB location in its service area will generate
|
||
the NOCR and send the NOCR through the MCC network as required.
|
||
An NOCR alert is similar to an unlocated alert in that both alerts are sent based on the
|
||
country of registration. However, an NOCR alert is only sent when there is a location
|
||
associated with a beacon; an unlocated initial alert is sent when there is no location
|
||
associated with the beacon.
|
||
An NOCR alert permits a SAR Service to commence a search for beacon registration
|
||
details before a request is received from the SAR Service that is responding to the beacon
|
||
incident. It also enables the national SAR Service in the country of registration to offer
|
||
assistance, as appropriate, for the rescue of their fellow citizens.
|
||
4.2.6
|
||
Unresolved Doppler Position Match Alert
|
||
An Unresolved Doppler Position Match occurs when the two Doppler locations from
|
||
one beacon event match the two Doppler locations from another beacon event prior to
|
||
position confirmation. Since neither Doppler location can be ruled out as the actual
|
||
position, neither of the two Doppler locations is confirmed by the second pair of Doppler
|
||
locations.
|
||
Figure 4.4 shows an unresolved Doppler match that occurred in 2011. One LEOSAR
|
||
satellite, Sarsat S-08, tracked on the red path and produced two Doppler locations
|
||
(shown as purple dots). LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-11 tracked on the purple path at a later
|
||
time and produced two Doppler locations (shown as red dots). The unresolved Doppler
|
||
match does not confirm a location (as both of the two possible locations are still
|
||
potentially valid). Note that in 2011 the matching distance for position matches was 50
|
||
kilometres; but has since changed to 20 kilometres.
|
||
|
||
4–10
|
||
|
||
Figure 4.4: Example of an Unresolved Doppler Match
|
||
4.2.7
|
||
Interferer Alert
|
||
Some MCCs transmit 406 MHz interferer alerts to SAR Services using the SIT 185
|
||
message format.
|
||
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has allocated the 406 MHz band for
|
||
low power distress beacons. Nevertheless, there are unauthorised signal sources in
|
||
various areas of the world radiating in the 406.0 – 406.1 MHz range. Interferers degrade
|
||
the performance of the Cospas-Sarsat System and reduce the ability of the System to
|
||
detect and locate real beacon messages. Suitably equipped LUTs in the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
System are used to detect and locate the source of some of these interferers. Unlike the
|
||
processing of 406 MHz digital beacon signals, no identification code is available from
|
||
an interferer. An interfering source can only be identified by determining its location.
|
||
Persistent interferers are reported by MCCs to ITU through their national spectrum
|
||
management agencies.
|
||
4.2.8
|
||
User Cancellation Alert
|
||
A user cancellation message is sent when three separate cancellation messages have been
|
||
received from the beacon with detect times within 110 seconds, with no intervening non-
|
||
cancellation messages. The FGB and SGB specifications require that the user cancellation
|
||
function only be activated by the same source that originally activated the beacon.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
4–11
|
||
|
||
4.3
|
||
Alerts with Invalid or Suspect Data
|
||
In some cases, the beacon detection data or location data is invalid or may be inaccurate for
|
||
various reasons. The SIT 185 message sent to a Responsible Agency by an MCC will indicate
|
||
these situations.
|
||
4.3.1
|
||
Transmissions with an Invalid Beacon Message
|
||
The data transmitted in the message from a distress beacon includes error-correcting
|
||
codes that allow a LUT to detect and to fix some errors in the data. If there are too many
|
||
errors in the beacon message, the LUT cannot correct the errors and the message is
|
||
treated as invalid. As well, for all beacon messages that the LUT receives correctly, the
|
||
MCC performs additional validation of the beacon message and if data has invalid values
|
||
(e.g., an invalid country code), the whole beacon message is also treated as invalid.
|
||
An MCC will send the Hex ID associated with an invalid beacon message, but the
|
||
Responsible Agency should note that the Hex ID is unreliable and should be treated with
|
||
caution. Other data, including GNSS position data, from the beacon message is not sent
|
||
to the Responsible Agency as the data may be invalid.
|
||
A beacon alert with an invalid beacon message does include the DOA or Doppler
|
||
position data. Even if the beacon message is invalid, the DOA and Doppler location data
|
||
are still reliable.
|
||
4.3.2
|
||
Suspect Doppler Locations
|
||
Doppler locations may be suspect for a number of reasons. An MCC will note any such
|
||
Doppler locations when sent to a Responsible Agency.
|
||
If the LEOSAR satellite that detected the beacon has recently completed a satellite
|
||
manoeuvre, the location of the satellite in space may be different from the location used
|
||
by the LEOLUT to calculate the Doppler locations. Doppler locations with a detect time
|
||
(TCA) within 24 hours after a satellite manoeuvre are noted as suspect when sent, if the
|
||
expected location error resulting from the manoeuvre may exceed ten (10) kilometres.
|
||
The LEOLUT calculates the Doppler locations using time and frequency data from the
|
||
satellite. Factors that contribute to the quality of the locations produced include the
|
||
number of beacon bursts, the angle of the satellite to the beacon and the relationship of
|
||
the TCA to the timing of the bursts. Any Doppler locations generated by poor quality
|
||
data are noted as suspect and should be treated with caution by a Responsible Agency.
|
||
An MCC performs a satellite footprint check on all locations. The footprint check
|
||
ensures that any location associated with an alert was visible to the satellite(s) that
|
||
reported the beacon. The footprint check uses a minus five (5) degree elevation in its
|
||
calculation to provide some assurance that the location is indeed outside of the footprint.
|
||
If the MCC determines that one of the Doppler locations in a LEOSAR detection is
|
||
outside the footprint of the LEOSAR satellite that detected the beacon, the message sent
|
||
will note that the location data is suspect.
|
||
|
||
4–12
|
||
|
||
4.3.3
|
||
Uncorroborated MEOSAR Alerts
|
||
A MEOSAR alert detected by only a single satellite and only a single beacon burst with
|
||
no previous alert for the beacon activation that contains data from a different beacon
|
||
burst or satellite is deemed uncorroborated and is treated as suspect. Normally these
|
||
uncorroborated detections are only sent to a Responsible Agency if:
|
||
a)
|
||
the beacon is a Distress Tracking ELT (ELT(DT));
|
||
b)
|
||
the reporting MEOLUT meets relevant requirements for generating processing
|
||
anomalies; or
|
||
c)
|
||
it is known that the beacon ID associated with the MEOSAR alert is registered.
|
||
If such a detection is sent to a Responsible Agency, the message will note that this is a
|
||
single uncorroborated detection and note if the associated beacon ID is registered. Such
|
||
alerts should be treated with caution since they may not correspond to actual beacon
|
||
transmissions.
|
||
The validity of an uncorroborated MEOSAR alert (i.e., the validity of the associated
|
||
beacon ID and/or encoded position) can be substantiated by the presence of
|
||
corroborating information, such as:
|
||
a)
|
||
another alert for the same beacon ID;
|
||
b)
|
||
beacon registration data for the specific beacon ID (and information provided
|
||
about the use of the beacon by the point of contact identified in the beacon
|
||
registration);
|
||
c)
|
||
a vessel or aircraft ID in the alert message (and related registration information for
|
||
this ID); or
|
||
d)
|
||
correlation between the beacon type indicated on the alert message and the beacon
|
||
type(s) designated for the associated Type Approval Certificate (TAC) number (if
|
||
a TAC number is provided on the alert message).
|
||
Relevant information for “Type Approval Certificate Numbers” is located on the
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
website
|
||
https://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/beacons-pro/experts-
|
||
beaconinformation/approvedbeacon-models-tacs?view=tac\_beacons.
|
||
4.3.4
|
||
Suspect DOA Locations
|
||
DOA locations provided include an estimate of accuracy. For example, a DOA location
|
||
with an accuracy estimate of 20 nautical miles should be within 20 nautical miles of the
|
||
beacon, 95% of the time.
|
||
Any DOA location with a large accuracy estimate should be treated with caution.
|
||
If a satellite footprint check indicates that the DOA location is outside the footprint of
|
||
any of the MEOSAR satellites that detected the beacon, the message sent will note that
|
||
the location is suspect.
|
||
|
||
4–13
|
||
|
||
4.3.5
|
||
Suspect GNSS Positions
|
||
A GNSS position that fails the satellite footprint check is suppressed and is not
|
||
transmitted.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 4 -
|
||
|
||
5–1
|
||
|
||
COSPAS-SARSAT DISTRESS MESSAGES
|
||
An MCC sends beacon alerts to Responsible Agencies in SIT 185 format. A SIT (Subject
|
||
Indicator Type) 185 is a plain text message with information regarding the beacon activation.
|
||
Examples of SIT 185 messages are presented and analysed in section 6. Figure 5.1 contains
|
||
an example SIT 185 message for an FGB.
|
||
080401Z JAN 2017
|
||
FROM AUMCC
|
||
TO RCC WELLINGTON
|
||
BT
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 12590 AUMCC REF C00F429578002C1
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER – PLB
|
||
SERIAL NO 0042334
|
||
HEX ID C00F429578002C1
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 512/NEWZEALAND
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL NIL
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY NIL
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 08 JAN 17 0354 UTC BY SARSAT 10
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - NIL
|
||
DOA - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A - 41 14 S 172 31 E PROB 79 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 48 20 S 135 51 E PROB 21 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0282 MHZ
|
||
TAC NO 0176
|
||
BEACON MODEL – STANDARD COMMS, AUSTRALIA MT410, MT410G
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Figure 5.1: A Sample SIT 185 Message
|
||
SIT 185 messages may include a preamble. The format of the preamble is determined by the
|
||
sending MCC. In Figure 5.1, the four-line preamble includes the day and time of transmission
|
||
in UTC and the identification of the originating MCC (AUMCC) and recipient (the RCC
|
||
Wellington). The characters BT (for Begin Transmission) indicate the end of the preamble in
|
||
the sample message above. As the format of the preamble is dependent on the MCC and is not
|
||
part of the formal specification for SIT 185 messages, no preamble will be shown in following
|
||
examples of SIT 185 messages.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
5–2
|
||
|
||
When information with respect to a message field is not available, or is unknown or irrelevant,
|
||
dependent upon the message type and beacon protocol, the distress message will indicate
|
||
“NIL” for that message field, or, for certain message fields, the message field may be omitted.
|
||
A Cospas-Sarsat SIT 185 message consists of six (6) paragraphs. Table 5.1 lists the paragraphs
|
||
of a SIT 185 message.
|
||
Table 5.1: Message Content for SIT 185 Messages
|
||
PARAGRAPH\#
|
||
TITLE
|
||
1.
|
||
MESSAGE TYPE
|
||
M
|
||
2.
|
||
CURRENT MESSAGE NUMBER
|
||
M
|
||
MCC BEACON REFERENCE
|
||
M
|
||
3.
|
||
BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
M
|
||
TYPE OF BEACON
|
||
O
|
||
IDENTIFICATION
|
||
O
|
||
BEACON HEX ID
|
||
M
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION
|
||
O
|
||
BEACON NUMBER
|
||
O
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL
|
||
O
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE
|
||
O
|
||
SOURCE OF GNSS POSITION DATA
|
||
O
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE
|
||
O
|
||
4.
|
||
ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
M
|
||
DETECTION TIME & SPACECRAFT
|
||
M
|
||
GNSS
|
||
POSITION,
|
||
TIME
|
||
OF
|
||
UPDATE
|
||
AND
|
||
ALTITUDE
|
||
O
|
||
MCC REFERENCE POSITION
|
||
O
|
||
DOA POSITION AND ALTITUDE
|
||
O
|
||
A POSITION & PROBABILITY
|
||
O
|
||
B POSITION & PROBABILITY
|
||
O
|
||
5.
|
||
OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
M
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY
|
||
M
|
||
OTHER ENCODED INFORMATION
|
||
O
|
||
6.
|
||
REMARKS
|
||
M
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
M
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1. "M" means that the field is mandatory
|
||
2. "O" means that the field may be omitted if the value is NIL.
|
||
5.1
|
||
Paragraph 1: Message Type
|
||
For an alert from a ship security (SSAS) beacon, the message type begins with “SHIP
|
||
SECURITY COSPAS-SARSAT”.
|
||
For an alert from a Distress Tracking ELT (ELT(DT)), the message type begins with
|
||
“DISTRESS TRACKING COSPAS-SARSAT”.
|
||
|
||
5–3
|
||
|
||
For all other beacon types, the beacon alert message type begins with “DISTRESS COSPAS-
|
||
SARSAT”.
|
||
The message types are described in section 4.2 and are listed here:
|
||
•
|
||
“INITIAL ALERT (UNLOCATED)”
|
||
•
|
||
“INITIAL LOCATED ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“POSITION CONFLICT ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“DOA POSITION MATCH ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“POSITION UPDATE ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“NOTIFICATION OF COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“USER CANCELLATION ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“UNRESOLVED DOPPLER POSITION MATCH ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“ROTATING FIELD UPDATE ALERT”
|
||
•
|
||
“UPDATED ALERT UNLOCATED”
|
||
5.2
|
||
Paragraph 2: Current Message Number and MCC Beacon Reference
|
||
The current message number is a sequential message number assigned by the transmitting
|
||
MCC to each message sent to a specific Responsible Agency. Responsible Agencies should
|
||
ensure that they do not miss any message numbers.
|
||
The MCC beacon reference is a unique designator supplied by the MCC to identify all
|
||
messages sent for that beacon. Some MCCs use an integer and other MCCs use the beacon 15
|
||
Hex ID for this message field.
|
||
Responsible Agencies wishing to discuss a particular alert with an MCC can assist the MCC
|
||
by quoting the message number and the MCC reference designator of the alert.
|
||
5.3
|
||
Paragraph 3: Beacon Message Information
|
||
This paragraph provides key information about the beacon derived from the 406 MHz beacon
|
||
message. Any message field in this paragraph with a value “NIL” may be omitted. If the
|
||
beacon message is invalid, then the only message field provided without a “NIL” value in this
|
||
section is the Hex ID and the following note is included:
|
||
“DATA DECODED FROM THE BEACON MESSAGE IS NOT RELIABLE”
|
||
5.3.1
|
||
Type of Beacon
|
||
The beacon type is the general category of the beacon protocol used to code the beacon.
|
||
The protocol is provided as well as any identification fields. For example, the last six
|
||
digits of the MMSI are shown for beacons coded with an EPIRB-MMSI protocol.
|
||
|
||
5–4
|
||
|
||
It should be noted that some beacons are coded inappropriately for the environment in
|
||
which they are used. For example, there have been real world examples of EPIRBs being
|
||
used as PLBs in the Himalayan Mountains. Some countries allow PLBs to be coded with
|
||
an ELT protocol for use on an aircraft.
|
||
Examples of the different identification fields are shown in the following sections.
|
||
5.3.1.1
|
||
Serial Number
|
||
A serial number is assigned by the country of registration. The serial number does
|
||
not provide any further identification by itself; the relevant beacon database of the
|
||
country of registration must be searched for further details.
|
||
BEACON TYPE USER LOCATION – EPIRB (NON FLOAT FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 0106717
|
||
5.3.1.2
|
||
Aircraft Operator Designator and Serial Number
|
||
Aircraft operator designators are provided by ICAO in the airline designators
|
||
document, published as ICAO document 8585 – “Designators for Aircraft
|
||
Operating Agencies, Aeronautical Authorities and Services”. These designators
|
||
are 3-letter codes like BAW for British Airways or QFA for QANTAS.
|
||
Each operator designator can have a serial number from 1 to 4095.
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION – ELT
|
||
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR DESIGNATOR AND SERIAL NO QFA 0543
|
||
5.3.1.3
|
||
Aircraft 24-Bit Address
|
||
The ICAO 24-bit aircraft address is allocated to States to uniquely identify aircraft
|
||
worldwide. The Appendix to Chapter 9 of the ICAO Annex 10, Aeronautical
|
||
Communications document provides the worldwide scheme for the allocation,
|
||
assignment and application of aircraft addresses. The 24-bit address is presented
|
||
as six hexadecimal characters in the Cospas-Sarsat distress alert message.
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION – ELT
|
||
AIRCRAFT 24-BIT ADDRESS 7C5E8A ASSIGNED TO AUSTRALIA
|
||
5.3.1.4
|
||
Radio Callsign
|
||
The Radio callsign allocations can be obtained from the ITU website: www.itu.int.
|
||
BEACON TYPE USER LOCATION - EPIRB
|
||
RADIO CALLSIGN VHN-259
|
||
|
||
5–5
|
||
|
||
5.3.1.5
|
||
MMSI
|
||
The “all” nine-digit MMSI is formed by adding the country code provided in the
|
||
country of registration field to the six trailing digits provided in the “MMSI” vessel
|
||
identification field.
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION - EPIRB
|
||
MMSI ALL 9 DIGITS 563004940
|
||
HEX ID 4664026980FFBFF
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 563/SINGAPORE
|
||
In the above example, the “all” nine-digit MMSI is 563004940 composed of the
|
||
country code 563 and the six trailing digits 004940.
|
||
5.3.1.6
|
||
MMSI with AIS ID
|
||
The SGB message may contain a MMSI and an automatic identification system
|
||
(AIS) ID. The AIS is an automatic tracking system that uses transceivers on ships
|
||
to improve maritime safety. The AIS ID always has a prefix of “974”, which is
|
||
not encoded in the SGB message. A sample is provided below.
|
||
BEACON TYPE - EPIRB
|
||
MMSI 366123456
|
||
EPIRB-AIS ID 974 0123
|
||
TAC 12260 SERIAL NO 13750
|
||
HEX ID ADD4BF935B61 574A670007B
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 366/USA
|
||
5.3.2
|
||
Identification
|
||
Other information may be decoded from the 406 MHz message and may be used by the
|
||
servicing MCC to provide information with respect to an aircraft 24-bit address country
|
||
assignment and its registration marking.
|
||
AIRCRAFT 24-BIT ADDRESS 7C5E8A ASSIGNED TO AUSTRALIA
|
||
5.3.3
|
||
Beacon Hex ID
|
||
The Hex ID is the 15 character hexadecimal representation of a beacon identification
|
||
code as described in section 2.4.
|
||
5.3.4
|
||
Country of Beacon Registration
|
||
The three-digit country code, based on the list provided by the International
|
||
Telecommunication Union (ITU) is provided, followed by the name of the country of
|
||
beacon registration.
|
||
A list of the three-digit country codes is given at Annex B of this document and is also
|
||
provided on the Cospas-Sarsat web site (www.cospas-sarsat.int).
|
||
|
||
5–6
|
||
|
||
5.3.5
|
||
Beacon Number
|
||
For the first beacon on board the vessel or aircraft, the message field will be identified
|
||
as zero (0). Other beacons on board the vessel or aircraft will be identified as 1 to 63 and
|
||
A to Z. All the other programmed information will remain the same (e.g., MMSI, Radio
|
||
Callsign, Aircraft Identifier, etc.).
|
||
Different protocols will allow different numbers of beacons to be recorded.
|
||
5.3.6
|
||
Homing Signal
|
||
Homing Signal Interpretation:
|
||
•
|
||
“NIL”, means no homing transmitter,
|
||
•
|
||
“121.5”, means a 121.5 MHz homing signal in addition to the 406 MHz satellite
|
||
signal,
|
||
•
|
||
“MARITIME”, means Maritime 9 GHz Search and Rescue Radar Transponder
|
||
(SART) in addition to 406 MHz,
|
||
•
|
||
“NIL OR NOT 121.5”, means no homing transmitter or homing transmitter
|
||
other than 121.5 MHz
|
||
•
|
||
“OTHER”, means a nationally assigned homing signal has been included in the
|
||
beacon.
|
||
5.3.7
|
||
Activation Type
|
||
A beacon can be activated either manually or automatically.
|
||
The activation type provides information with respect to the switching mechanism built
|
||
into the beacon; i.e., some beacons can only be activated manually, and others can be
|
||
activated automatically or manually. For example, a float-free EPIRB will indicate
|
||
“automatic or manual” activation in the distress alert message, an ELT (including an
|
||
ELT(DT)) can be either activated automatically because of a strong acceleration or
|
||
deceleration on the “G” sensor, or manually by the crew in the cockpit. An ELT(DT)
|
||
can also be activated due to the aircraft avionics detecting an anomalous condition, in
|
||
which case the activation type indicates “AUTOMATIC BY EXTERNAL MEANS
|
||
(AVIONICS)”.
|
||
Ship security alert messages always indicate “MANUAL” activation as SSAS beacons can
|
||
only be activated manually.
|
||
The type of beacon activation is not available in all beacon coding protocols.
|
||
For FGB User Protocol beacons, this information is not protected, i.e., is not subject to
|
||
automated error detection and correction, and thus should be treated with caution.
|
||
|
||
5–7
|
||
|
||
5.3.8
|
||
Source of GNSS Position Data
|
||
This message field indicates whether the GNSS location data was provided to the beacon
|
||
by an internal or external GNSS device.
|
||
The update rate for a beacon with an internal GNSS device depends on the model of
|
||
beacon. (See also sections 2.7 “GNSS Positions” and 5.4.7 “Summary Guidance for the
|
||
Use of Position Data”).
|
||
Regardless of a beacon model’s designed GNSS position update period, its GNSS
|
||
position may not be updated if the beacon’s visibility to GNSS satellites is significantly
|
||
obstructed.
|
||
An FGB designed to accept position data from an external device prior to beacon
|
||
activation should be provided with position data by the external device at intervals not
|
||
longer than 20 minutes for EPIRBs and PLBs and 1 minute for ELTs. If the navigation
|
||
input fails or is not available, the FGB will retain the last valid position for four (4) hours
|
||
after which the GNSS position will be set to default values.
|
||
SGB ELT(DT)s retain the last valid GNSS for 24 hours after which the GNSS position
|
||
will be set to default values.
|
||
Note: If the beacon receives its encoded location from an external navigation system, it
|
||
is possible that this location may have been derived from a source that is not a satellite
|
||
(GNSS) navigation system.
|
||
5.3.9
|
||
Emergency Code
|
||
A provision exists in some beacon coding protocols to indicate the nature of distress in
|
||
accordance with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) maritime emergency
|
||
codes. These codes can indicate “Fire/Explosion”, “Flooding”, “Collision”,
|
||
“Grounding”, “Listing”, “in Danger of Capsizing”, “Sinking”, “Disabled and Adrift” or
|
||
“Unspecified Distress”.
|
||
A provision also exists in the beacon coding to indicate non-maritime emergencies, and
|
||
these include an indication of a fire, if medical assistance is required, or if disabled.
|
||
This message field is not protected; i.e., it is not subject to automated error detection and
|
||
correction. As a consequence, the information provided for this message field should be
|
||
treated with caution.
|
||
Currently there are no beacons type-approved with this capability and in most cases no
|
||
emergency code is available. However, there are some beacons that have been coded by
|
||
default to indicate “unspecified distress”.
|
||
|
||
5–8
|
||
|
||
5.4
|
||
Paragraph 4: Alert Position Information
|
||
Detection information (including detection time and satellite) and position information
|
||
associated with the beacon alert is provided in Paragraph 4.
|
||
5.4.1
|
||
Detection Time and Spacecraft ID
|
||
For MEOSAR alerts, the detection time provided with the prefix “DETECTED AT” is
|
||
the time of the first burst. As a MEOSAR detection may be detected by many satellites,
|
||
the Spacecraft ID is shown as “MEOSAR”. As the alert may be a multi-burst detection,
|
||
the time of the last MEOSAR burst in this alert is on the following line.
|
||
For LEOSAR alerts with Doppler location, the detection time is the time of closest
|
||
approach (TCA) of the satellite to the beacon. Note that the actual time that the LEOSAR
|
||
satellite first detected the beacon can be either slightly before or after the TCA, but the
|
||
TCA provides a common point in time for processing. The time is followed on the same
|
||
line by “LEOSAR” and the identity of the satellite which provided the alert data. The
|
||
LEOSAR satellites are identified as Sarsat or Cospas. For a combined LEOSAR-
|
||
GEOSAR solution, the identity of the LEOSAR satellite is given.
|
||
For LEOSAR alerts without Doppler location, the detection time is the time of the last
|
||
beacon burst.
|
||
For GEOSAR alerts, the detection time is the time of the first beacon burst. The time is
|
||
followed on the same line by “GEOSAR” and the identity of the satellite which provided
|
||
the alert data. The GEOSAR satellites are identified as GOES (Geostationary
|
||
Operational Environmental Satellite; USA), MSG/MTG (Meteosat Second/Third
|
||
Generation; EUMETSAT), Electro-L and Louch-5 (Russia), and INSAT and GSAT
|
||
(India).
|
||
Except for a MEOSAR alert with matching first and last detection times on the alert
|
||
message, an alert may include multiple bursts, in which case it cannot be assumed that
|
||
the GNSS position for an ELT(DT) was computed at the reported detection time.
|
||
5.4.2
|
||
Position Information (General)
|
||
An example of position information is shown below:
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - NIL
|
||
DOA - 05 10.1 S 178 01.4 E ESTIMATED ERROR 002 NMS
|
||
ALTITUDE NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER B - NIL
|
||
|
||
5–9
|
||
|
||
There may be multiple locations shown in this field. A position confirmed alert will have
|
||
an MCC reference position and will also show the locations from the most recently
|
||
processed detection used to confirm the location. Similarly, a position update alert sent
|
||
after the position confirmation will have the current MCC reference position and will
|
||
also show the locations from the most recently processed detection.
|
||
Noting that the uncertainty of a refined GNSS position is two (2) seconds of latitude and
|
||
longitude (about 60 metres at the equator), a refined GNSS position is generally the most
|
||
accurate position for a beacon, provided that the GNSS position has been updated
|
||
recently or the beacon is not moving. Further information about GNSS position updates
|
||
is provided in section 5.3.8. In accordance with document C/S A.001, a refined GNSS
|
||
position is not confirmed (i.e., not confirmed as representing the actual beacon position)
|
||
until it matches a Doppler or DOA position within twenty (20) kilometres; this
|
||
requirement for a match with position data from an independent source addresses the
|
||
possibility that the initial GNSS position after beacon activation may be inaccurate (e.g.,
|
||
provide a previously computed GNSS position) due to a beacon malfunction.
|
||
Summary guidance for the Use of Position Data is provided in section 5.4.7.
|
||
Section 6 provides examples of real distress alerts and illustrates how the position data
|
||
is shown in this field. If the value for a specific position field is “NIL”, then the
|
||
associated data line may be omitted from the alert message.
|
||
5.4.3
|
||
GNSS Position, Time of Update and Altitude
|
||
The GNSS field is the latitude and longitude of the GNSS position. The GNSS update
|
||
time for an FGB is always shown as “within 4 hours of detection time” as the system
|
||
does not record the time that the GNSS position was generated. If a GNSS position of
|
||
the FGB has not updated within four hours on a beacon, the beacon stops transmitting
|
||
the GNSS position (and would be shown as “NIL” in the GNSS field). As discussed in
|
||
section 2.7, the precision of the GNSS position is dependent on the FGB protocol used
|
||
and whether a fine or coarse GNSS position is received by the LUT.
|
||
For SGBs, information about time of the GNSS location is provided, if available:
|
||
•
|
||
for ELT(DT)s, “TIME OF GNSS POSITION UPDATE:” followed by the
|
||
update time,
|
||
•
|
||
otherwise, “TIME SINCE GNSS LOCATION GENERATED: [nn]
|
||
MINUTES”.
|
||
For SGBs and FGB ELT(DT)s, if the altitude is available, it has the title “ALTITUDE
|
||
OF GNSS LOCATION” and is provided in both metres and feet.
|
||
If GNSS position currency information is available for an FGB ELT(DT), then the
|
||
following text is included:
|
||
“UPDATE TIME WITHIN [AAAA] OF DETECTION TIME” where “[AAAA]” is:
|
||
•
|
||
- “0 - 2 SECONDS”,
|
||
|
||
5–10
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
- “2 - 60 SECONDS”, or
|
||
•
|
||
- “1 MINUTE TO 4 HOURS”
|
||
5.4.4
|
||
MCC Reference Position
|
||
If there is an MCC reference position, the latitude and longitude are provided. This
|
||
position may be formed by a merge of matching locations, which may be based on a
|
||
weighting factor assigned by the MCC to each matching location.
|
||
5.4.5
|
||
DOA Position and Altitude
|
||
The DOA field provides the latitude and longitude of the DOA location, the estimated
|
||
error (i.e., expected accuracy) of the DOA location in nautical miles, and the altitude of
|
||
the DOA location from the mean sea level in metres. If the estimated error value is
|
||
greater than 277.8 kilometres (150 nautical miles), the error is shown as “OVER 150
|
||
NMS”. If the estimated error is not available or the reporting MEOLUT is not
|
||
commissioned to meet MEOSAR IOC requirements for DOA position accuracy and the
|
||
reliability of the expected horizontal error (EHE) as specified in document C/S T.020,
|
||
then the estimated error is shown as “UNKNOWN”. Further information about the DOA
|
||
position expected accuracy is provided in section 3.1 above.
|
||
The DOA altitude is not verified as part of MEOLUT commissioning and is indicated
|
||
by “NIL” or omitted.
|
||
5.4.6
|
||
Doppler A and B Positions and Probability
|
||
The “DOPPLER A” and the “DOPPLER B” fields provide any Doppler locations and
|
||
their probabilities. Further information about the reliability and expected accuracy of
|
||
Doppler location data is provided in Paragraph 5.
|
||
5.4.7
|
||
Summary Guidance for the Use of Position Data
|
||
GNSS Position
|
||
The GNSS position is transmitted by the beacon and determined by a navigation source
|
||
in, or connected to, the beacon (such as aircraft/vessel navigation consoles).
|
||
The GNSS position uncertainty that is provided in the “OTHER INFORMATION”
|
||
section of the alert message may vary, as per section 2.7 above.
|
||
The GNSS position transmitted in a beacon distress message might be a stale/old
|
||
position if the beacon subsequently becomes detached from an external navigation
|
||
source providing the position to the beacon.
|
||
Note: The GNSS position is primarily derived from global navigation satellite systems
|
||
(such as GALILEO, GPS, GLONASS, BDS, etc.) but could, on some occasions, include
|
||
|
||
5–11
|
||
|
||
positions from other external, non-GNSS based systems, which may be subject to
|
||
degradation of accuracy over time.
|
||
MCC Reference Position
|
||
An approximation of the beacon position estimated or selected by the MCC, based on a
|
||
match of positions from independent sources within 20 kilometres. The MCC Reference
|
||
position is used to determine if subsequent position data is deemed a position update or
|
||
a position conflict, based on the 20-kilometre distance threshold match. The MCC
|
||
reference position may be further updated based on new position data that matches the
|
||
current MCC reference position within 20 kilometres. There is no standard algorithm
|
||
for computing the MCC Reference position; contact the associated MCC for further
|
||
information about its algorithm
|
||
DOA Position
|
||
A position computed by a MEOLUT, based on signals received from multiple MEOSAR
|
||
satellites relaying the same beacon transmissions.
|
||
A MEOLUT can normally provide a position from a single beacon transmission.
|
||
MEOLUTs typically calculate an estimated error for each position, which is the radius
|
||
of the circle that is centered on the estimated location and contains the true location with
|
||
a probability of about 95%.
|
||
When the estimated error is not available, then in the case of a stationary beacon, the
|
||
positions shall meet the following accuracy requirements:
|
||
a)
|
||
at least 90% should be within five (5) kilometres, from a single beacon
|
||
transmission; and
|
||
b)
|
||
at least 95% should be within five (5) kilometres, after ten (10) minutes of beacon
|
||
transmissions.
|
||
When a DOA location is computed from a single beacon transmission, then the two
|
||
detection times provided in Paragraph 4 of the alert message are the same.
|
||
Finally, the beacon altitude may also be provided by the MEOLUT. The DOA altitude
|
||
is not verified as part of MEOLUT commissioning and is set to “NIL” or omitted until
|
||
further notice.
|
||
Doppler Position
|
||
A Doppler position is computed by a LEOLUT based on signals received from a
|
||
LEOSAR satellite. If a Doppler position is provided without the “SUSPECT” reliability
|
||
warning (in the “OTHER INFORMATION” section of the alert message), the Doppler
|
||
position should be accurate within five (5) kilometres 95% of the time. The SIT 185
|
||
message provides the probability that each of two provided Doppler positions (i.e., an
|
||
“A” position and a “B” position) correspond to the real position.
|
||
|
||
5–12
|
||
|
||
The “OTHER INFORMATION” section of the SIT 185 message provides further
|
||
information about position data that is “SUSPECT” (e.g., due to a satellite footprint
|
||
check or a satellite manoeuvre).
|
||
Note: More detailed information on SIT 185 message content can be obtained by
|
||
contacting your supporting MCC, or by reviewing document C/S A.002 on the Cospas-
|
||
Sarsat website (www.cospas-sarsat.int).
|
||
5.5
|
||
Paragraph 5: Other Information
|
||
Other information obtained by the MCC that may be valuable to SAR authorities. This
|
||
information includes:
|
||
a)
|
||
Doppler position reliability if suspect due to less than ideal satellite pass geometry
|
||
processing parameters;
|
||
b)
|
||
Doppler position reliability if suspect due to a satellite manoeuvre (when an error greater
|
||
than ten (10) kilometres is suspected);
|
||
c)
|
||
Doppler or DOA position reliability if suspect due to failure of satellite footprint check;
|
||
d)
|
||
determination of an image (incorrect) position using a footprint check prior to Doppler
|
||
location ambiguity resolution; and
|
||
e)
|
||
if the beacon message is invalid then the warning is given that the data decoded from
|
||
the beacon message is not reliable.
|
||
If Doppler position is provided without a warning that its reliability is suspect, then it is
|
||
expected that the Doppler position is accurate within five (5) kilometres. Note that a nominal
|
||
Doppler solution (i.e., one generated when satellite pass geometry is ideal, as specified in
|
||
document C/S T.005), is required to be accurate within five (5) kilometres in 95% of cases.
|
||
The MCC may also provide additional information in this section; for example, the identity of
|
||
the LUT that processed the beacon message or beacon database registry information.
|
||
5.5.1
|
||
Detection Frequency
|
||
The frequency is the actual frequency of the beacon transmission as determined by the
|
||
LUT. As of 2025, Cospas-Sarsat distress FGBs were using 406.025 MHz,
|
||
406.028 MHz, 406.031 MHz, 406.037 MHz, 406.040 MHz and 406.076 MHz channels
|
||
(an updated list of frequencies in use can be found at Annex H of document C/S T.012).
|
||
If the actual frequency is not available for an FGB, then the value “406 MHZ” is
|
||
provided. The center frequency value “406.05 MHZ” is reported for SGB alerts
|
||
without DOA position.
|
||
Knowledge of the individual frequencies may assist Responsible Agencies when tasking
|
||
aircraft with a 406 MHz direction finding capability.
|
||
|
||
5–13
|
||
|
||
5.5.2
|
||
Other Encoded Information
|
||
Other information may be decoded and provided from the 406 MHz message, including:
|
||
•
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat beacon type approval certificate (“TAC”) number from which the
|
||
beacon model and manufacturer can be ascertained,
|
||
•
|
||
the precision of the GNSS position.
|
||
When GNSS position data is present, its uncertainty, which is the maximum possible
|
||
difference between the GNSS position processed by the beacon and the GNSS position
|
||
transmitted in the SIT 185 Message, is provided in the following format in Paragraph 5,
|
||
where the degree of uncertainty is provided in Table 5.2.
|
||
“GNSS POSITION UNCERTAINTY PLUS-MINUS [X MINUTES/SECONDS] OF
|
||
LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE.”
|
||
Table 5.2: GNSS Position Uncertainty
|
||
Uncertainty
|
||
Comments
|
||
2 MINUTES
|
||
FGB User location protocol
|
||
2 SECONDS
|
||
ELT(DT), RLS, standard and national location protocol,
|
||
maximum resolution (FGB only)
|
||
15 MINUTES ELT(DT), RLS protocol, minimum resolution (FGB only)
|
||
30 MINUTES FGB Standard location protocol, minimum resolution\*
|
||
4 MINUTES
|
||
FGB National location protocol, minimum resolution\*
|
||
10 METRES
|
||
SGBs
|
||
* For standard and national location protocols, the reported degree of uncertainty assumes that
|
||
the associated FGB is coded with an older methodology, in which the last bit available to report
|
||
a coarse GNSS position may not be used. The actual uncertainty is one fourth the reported
|
||
uncertainty (i.e., 7 minutes 30 seconds for standard location protocol and one (1) minute for
|
||
national location protocol, as noted in section 2.6), if it is known that the associated beacon is
|
||
coded with a newer methodology in which all bits available to report a coarse GNSS position
|
||
are used. Based on the Type Approval Certificate (TAC) number associated with the beacon
|
||
model, as provided in Paragraph 5, further information about the uncertainty of a coarse GNSS
|
||
position may be available on the Cospas-Sarsat website link for “Type Approval Certificate
|
||
Numbers”.
|
||
If an SGB has no GNSS position capability, “BEACON DOES NOT HAVE GNSS
|
||
POSITION CAPABILITY” is indicated in the alert message.
|
||
For SGBs, other information is provided from the beacon message, if available:
|
||
•
|
||
“ELAPSED TIME SINCE ACTIVATION: [nn] HOURS”, where the time since
|
||
activation is truncated, and
|
||
|
||
5–14
|
||
|
||
•
|
||
“REMAINING BATTERY CAPACITY: BETWEEN [nn] AND [nnn]
|
||
PERCENT”.
|
||
If information on beacon characteristics is available for the TAC number encoded in the
|
||
beacon message, then this statement is provided: “BEACON CHARACTERISTICS
|
||
PER TAC DATABASE PROVIDED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE”. The
|
||
corresponding information on beacon characteristics is provided in a SIT 985 message.
|
||
5.6
|
||
Paragraph 6: Remarks
|
||
Additional information may be provided at the discretion of the originating MCC in this
|
||
paragraph and may include value-added information from the MCC operator.
|
||
For ship security alerts, advice is included that the alert will need to be processed in accordance
|
||
with relevant security procedures.
|
||
In alert messages for an ELT(DT), the following is included in the alert: “THIS DISTRESS
|
||
TRACKING MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO APPROPRIATE SAR AUTHORITIES”
|
||
and “PROCESS THIS ALERT ACCORDING TO RELEVANT REQUIREMENTS”.
|
||
Administrations should follow defined national SAR procedures for responding to the
|
||
activation of an ELT(DT). As the alert is likely emanating from an aircraft still in flight,
|
||
“DISTRESS TRACKING” alert messages should be sent to an Aeronautical RCC (ARCC)
|
||
which should rapidly liaise with relevant ATSU(s) and airline operator(s) as specified in
|
||
dedicated annexes to the ICAO Convention, IAMSAR Manual (ICAO document DOC 9731),
|
||
and GADSS documentation.
|
||
The following is included in the alert message for Return Link Service (RLS) beacons:
|
||
•
|
||
“THIS BEACON HAS [RLS-ID] RETURN LINK CAPABILITY
|
||
where RLS-ID identifies the RLS provider (e.g., GALILEO or GLONASS) when available.
|
||
The alert message for a RLS beacon also indicates:
|
||
•
|
||
RLM
|
||
TYPE-[X]
|
||
[RECEIVED/CAPABLE]
|
||
([AUTO/MANUAL]
|
||
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT)
|
||
where:
|
||
-
|
||
[X] is replaced with “1” or “2”. TYPE-1 provides “AUTOMATIC”
|
||
acknowledgement and TYPE-2 provides “MANUAL” acknowledgment; only
|
||
TYPE-1 beacons are currently authorized.
|
||
-
|
||
“[RECEIVED/CAPABLE]” is replaced with “RECEIVED” or “CAPABLE”,
|
||
-
|
||
“[AUTO/MANUAL]” is replaced with “AUTOMATIC” or “MANUAL”.
|
||
|
||
5–15
|
||
|
||
5.7
|
||
End of Message
|
||
This text is added to the message to give an unambiguous indication to the message recipient
|
||
that there is no further information.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 5 -
|
||
|
||
6–1
|
||
|
||
EXAMPLES OF BEACON INCIDENTS
|
||
This section contains examples of beacon incidents and the distress alerts sent to Distress
|
||
authorities. Some examples are based on real-world incidents; others have been modified or
|
||
created to demonstrate specific aspects of beacon processing. All examples are for FGBs,
|
||
except when it is explicitly noted that an example is for an SGB.
|
||
Space and Ground Segment situations described in these examples do not reflect the current
|
||
status and should be used for training purpose only.
|
||
6.1
|
||
An Unlocated Detection to a Position Confirmed Update
|
||
This incident shows how information relating to an EPIRB with the Hex ID:
|
||
BEEE4634B00028D is presented to a SAR Service as four consecutive SIT 185 messages.
|
||
The four SIT 185 messages demonstrate a common sequence of messages received by a SAR
|
||
Service. Figure 6.1 provides a graphical depiction of the message sequence.
|
||
Figure 6.1: Sequence of Four SIT 185 Messages Sent to a SAR Service
|
||
in Example 6.1
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–2
|
||
|
||
6.1.1
|
||
An Initial (Unlocated) Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL ALERT (UNLOCATED)
|
||
2. MSG NO 00189 AUMCC REF BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER - EPIRB (NON FLOAT-FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 101676
|
||
HEX ID BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL NIL
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE NIL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY NIL
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 15 MAR 23 1230 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 15 MAR 23 1230 UTC
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - NIL
|
||
DOA - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A – NIL
|
||
DOPPLER B - NIL
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0280 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
The type of alert is listed in Paragraph 1. This example is an initial alert. An initial alert
|
||
that does not have a position is often called an “unlocated” alert.
|
||
2.
|
||
Paragraph 2 lists the message number of 00189 and an MCC beacon reference. The
|
||
message number allows all messages between an MCC and a SAR Service to be
|
||
uniquely identified. A SAR Service can use the message number to check that there are
|
||
no missing messages. The MCC beacon reference is used to identify the beacon incident;
|
||
all alerts for this beacon incident will use the same beacon reference. The Australian
|
||
MCC uses the Hex ID of the beacon as the reference, other MCCs may use a different
|
||
reference system.
|
||
3.
|
||
The initial alert contains the beacon Hex ID in Paragraph 3. In the example, the Hex ID
|
||
also appears in Paragraph 2 as the AUMCC reference.
|
||
4.
|
||
Paragraph 4 contains the detection time of the first MEOSAR burst of “15 MAR 23
|
||
1230 UTC”. The next data line contains the detection time of the last MEOSAR burst
|
||
used in this alert. In this example, the times of the first and last burst are the same,
|
||
indicating that this is a single burst solution.
|
||
|
||
6–3
|
||
|
||
5.
|
||
Paragraph 3 lists the country of registration. For this example, the country of registration
|
||
is Australia.
|
||
6.
|
||
This alert was an unlocated detection, and Paragraph 4 lists no positions. The positions
|
||
are all shown as “NIL” to indicate that no position information is available. If the value
|
||
for a specific position is “NIL”, then the associated data line may be omitted from the
|
||
alert message.
|
||
As this is an unlocated detection, the alert is sent to the SAR Service associated with
|
||
country of registration for the beacon. In this example, the alert is sent to the Australian
|
||
JRCC as the beacon has Australia as the country of registration.
|
||
7.
|
||
Paragraph 3 contains information about the beacon. In this case, the serial number of the
|
||
EPIRB is “101676”. The serial number of the EPIRB can be used to look up the beacon
|
||
in the Australian beacon registry. If the beacon is registered, the contact details may
|
||
allow the Australian JRCC to commence responding to this initial detection.
|
||
|
||
6–4
|
||
|
||
6.1.2
|
||
An Initial Alert with a MEOSAR Location
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 00190 AUMCC REF BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
3. BEACON INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER - EPIRB (NON FLOAT-FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 101676
|
||
HEX ID BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 15 MAR 23 1230 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 15 MAR 16 1237 UTC
|
||
DOA - 17 47.2 S 146 04.5 E ESTIMATED ERROR 005 NMS
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0280 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
This is an initial alert with a location. The location shown in Paragraph 4 is a DOA
|
||
(Difference of Arrival) or MEOSAR location. The location is shown with an estimated
|
||
error, and, in this example, the beacon will be located within five (5) nautical miles of
|
||
the location, 95% of the time.
|
||
2.
|
||
The DOA Altitude value is not provided until further notice and is omitted in this sample
|
||
message.
|
||
3.
|
||
The DOA Position Conflict Alert message below is sent because the distance between
|
||
the DOA position which was independently processed by the Cospas-Sarsat System, and
|
||
the GNSS position which was processed by the GNSS receiver associated with the FGB
|
||
ELT(DT), is at least 20 km.
|
||
4.
|
||
Fields in paragraphs 3 and 4 with a “NIL” value have been omitted.
|
||
5.
|
||
The reference in Paragraph 2 (the Hex ID of the beacon) is used by the SAR Service to
|
||
associate this alert to the same beacon incident as the alert shown in section 6.1.1.
|
||
6.
|
||
Paragraph 4 contains the detection time of the first burst, “15 MAR 23 1230 UTC”
|
||
and the detection time of the last burst, “15 MAR 23 1237 UTC”. As the two times
|
||
are different, this a multi-burst solution.
|
||
|
||
6–5
|
||
|
||
6.1.3
|
||
A Position Confirmed Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT POSITION UPDATE ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 00191 AUMCC REF BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER - EPIRB (NON FLOAT-FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 101676
|
||
HEX ID BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 15 MAR 23 1248 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 15 MAR 23 1248 UTC
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - 17 47.5 S 146 06.2 E
|
||
DOA - 17 47.6 S 146 07.4 E ESTIMATED ERROR 005 NMS
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0280 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
A position confirmed alert (in this case, with title “Position Update Alert”) is sent when
|
||
two independent locations match, as described in section 4.1.3. In this example, the DOA
|
||
(MEOSAR) location shown in Paragraph 4 has matched the location in the previous alert
|
||
in section 6.1.2. See the description of “Confirmation” in section 4.1.3.
|
||
2.
|
||
The MCC reference position shown in Paragraph 4 is determined based on a weighting
|
||
factor assigned to each previous DOA location. The AUMCC merges DOA locations to
|
||
produce an MCC reference position. Other MCCs may use other methods to determine
|
||
the MCC reference position.
|
||
|
||
6–6
|
||
|
||
6.1.4
|
||
A Position Confirmed Update Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT POSITION UPDATE ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 00194 AUMCC REF BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER - EPIRB (NON FLOAT-FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 101676
|
||
HEX ID BEEE4634B00028D
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 15 MAR 23 1301 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 15 MAR 23 1301 UTC
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - 17 47.6 S 146 05.3 E
|
||
DOA - 17 47.9 S 146 04.5 E ESTIMATED ERROR 002 NMS
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0280 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
If the SAR service is configured to receive ongoing updates after position confirmation,
|
||
the MCC will send an update to the MCC reference position in a number of conditions;
|
||
e.g., if a solution with matching DOA position is processed with a data time at least 15
|
||
minutes after the most recent data time of previous message with DOA position, or if a
|
||
Doppler solution is processed for a new beacon event.
|
||
2.
|
||
In this example, the updated MCC reference position was computed based on a
|
||
weighting factor assigned to each previous DOA position.
|
||
|
||
6–7
|
||
|
||
6.2
|
||
From Unlocated Alert to Position Confirmation
|
||
The following incident has similar SIT 185 messages to those in section 6.1 but demonstrates
|
||
detections from the GEOSAR and LEOSAR systems. The incident shows the SIT 185
|
||
messages sent to a SAR Service for an EPIRB with Hex ID BEEE43FCF8001AD. The three
|
||
SIT 185 messages for this incident are depicted in Figure 6.2.
|
||
6.2.1
|
||
A GEOSAR Unlocated Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL ALERT (UNLOCATED)
|
||
2. MSG NO 12301 AUMCC REF BEEE43FCF8001AD
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER - EPIRB (NON FLOAT FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 0065342
|
||
HEX ID BEEE43FCF8001AD
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL NIL
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY NIL
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 27 APR 24 1557 UTC BY GEOSAR INSAT-3D
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - NIL
|
||
DOA - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER B - NIL
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
LUT ID 4191 BANGALORE GEOLUT, INDIA
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0286 MHZ
|
||
TAC 0107
|
||
BEACON MODEL - ACR, USA RLB-32
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Figure 6.2: Sequence of Three Beacon Messages Sent in Example 6.2
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–8
|
||
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Paragraph 4 states that the detection was by satellite INSAT-3D, a geostationary
|
||
satellite. The beacon is expected to be located within the footprint of the INSAT-3D
|
||
satellite which is centred at (0° N, 082° E). See Figure 6.3 below.
|
||
2.
|
||
No position information is shown in Paragraph 4, since this is an unlocated initial
|
||
detection of the beacon.
|
||
Figure 6.3: Footprint of the GEOSAR INSAT-3D Satellite
|
||
In the Figure 6.3 above, the outline of the footprint is shown by the yellow line. The
|
||
position of the INSAT-3D satellite is shown by the yellow diamond in the centre of
|
||
the footprint.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–9
|
||
|
||
6.2.2
|
||
A LEOSAR Initial Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 12307 AUMCC REF BEEE43FCF8001AD
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER LOCATION - EPIRB (NON FLOAT FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 0065342
|
||
HEX ID BEEE43FCF8001AD
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL NIL
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY NIL
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 27 APR 23 1653 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 12
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - NIL
|
||
DOA - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A - 43 04.04 S 147 15.75 E PROB 83 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 51 45.19 S 167 48.58 W PROB 17 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
THE B POSITION IS LIKELY TO BE AN IMAGE POSITION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0277 MHZ
|
||
TAC 0107
|
||
BEACON MODEL - ACR, USA RLB-32
|
||
LUT ID 6011
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Paragraph 4 indicates that the detection was made by LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-12, a
|
||
when it passed by the beacon. Paragraph 5 reports that the detection was further received
|
||
by the LEOLUT 6011 in Cape Town, South Africa when Sarsat-12 and this LEOLUT
|
||
were in mutual visibility.
|
||
2.
|
||
Paragraph 5 indicates that the B position is the likely image position. Figure 6.4 shows
|
||
the Doppler locations on a map. The B position is outside the footprint of INSAT-3D,
|
||
the geostationary satellite that provided the first detection. Although image
|
||
determination provides a strong indicator that the A position is the “real” position, image
|
||
determination is not used by Cospas-Sarsat to provide confirmation of a position.
|
||
|
||
6–10
|
||
|
||
Figure 6.4: LEOSAR Initial Alert
|
||
The yellow line is the track (path) of the LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-12. The orange
|
||
outline is the footprint of Sarsat-12 at the TCA (Time of Closest Approach) of the
|
||
beacon. The two Doppler locations generated by this pass are shown. The location
|
||
of the LEOLUT 6011 in Cape Town, South Africa is also shown.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–11
|
||
|
||
6.2.3
|
||
A LEOSAR Position Confirmed Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT POSITION UPDATE ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 63523 AUMCC REF BEEE43FCF8001AD
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER LOCATION - EPIRB (NON FLOAT FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 0065342
|
||
HEX ID BEEE43FCF8001AD
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 27 APR 23 1716 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 10
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - 43 03.25 S 147 15.96 E
|
||
DOPPLER A - 43 02.89 S 147 15.91 E
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0276 MHZ
|
||
TAC 0107
|
||
BEACON MODEL - ACR, USA RLB-32
|
||
LEOLUT 6011
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
The position has been confirmed using data from a second LEOSAR detection (satellite
|
||
Sarsat-10 shown in Paragraph 4) that matches a Doppler position from the previous
|
||
initial alert. See the description of “Confirmation” in section 4.1.3.
|
||
2.
|
||
The matching Doppler A position is provided along with the MCC reference position in
|
||
Paragraph 4. In this example, the MCC reference position computed by the MCC from
|
||
the initial and subsequent alerts is biased to the location that is more likely to be accurate
|
||
(as the magnitude of the error ellipse is less). The Doppler A position information
|
||
provides for a means to ensure that the MCC processing is normal and enables the SAR
|
||
Service to reference the individual (un-merged) position in planning its SAR response.
|
||
3.
|
||
The A position of the Sarsat-10 pass matches the A position of the initial alert from
|
||
Sarsat-12 which results in an MCC reference position being computed (see Figure 6.5).
|
||
|
||
6–12
|
||
|
||
Figure 6.5: Confirmation of Position Using a LEOSAR Alert
|
||
In the Figure 6.5 above, the yellow line is the track of LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-10.
|
||
The orange outline is the footprint of Sarsat-10 at the TCA for this beacon. The two
|
||
Doppler locations generated by this pass are shown. The Doppler A position for this
|
||
detection matches the Doppler A position from the previous detection (see Figure 6.4)
|
||
and confirms the location.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–13
|
||
|
||
6.3
|
||
A Position Confirmed Alert as the First Alert
|
||
In this example, the first alert received by the SAR Service is a position confirmed alert. The
|
||
presence of a position in the field titled “MCC REFERENCE” indicates that position is
|
||
confirmed, based on the matching of two independent locations, as described in section 4.1.3
|
||
above.
|
||
6.3.1
|
||
A Position Confirmed Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 00463 AUMCC REF 3EEC7B9076FFBFF
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION – EPIRB
|
||
SERIAL NO 2107
|
||
HEX ID 3EEC7B9076FFBFF
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY INTERNAL DEVICE
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 03 APR 23 1124 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 03 APR 23 1124 UTC
|
||
GNSS - 25 40.07S 113 39.00E
|
||
UPDATE TIME WITHIN 4 HOURS OF DETECTION TIME
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - 25 39.5 S 113 37.3 E
|
||
DOA - 25 39.5 S 113 37.3 E ESTIMATED ERROR 004 NMS
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0402 MHZ
|
||
GNSS POSITION UNCERTAINTY PLUS-MINUS 2 SECONDS OF
|
||
LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Paragraph 4 shows that this alert has a DOA position and a GNSS position.
|
||
2.
|
||
As the DOA position and GNSS position match (the two positions are approximately
|
||
three (3) kilometres apart and so are within the twenty-kilometre matching criterion) and
|
||
are independent, the position is confirmed.
|
||
3.
|
||
The AUMCC does not merge a DOA position and a GNSS position to produce an MCC
|
||
reference position. Instead, the AUMCC uses the DOA position as the MCC reference
|
||
position. Other MCCs may merge the DOA and GNSS position to produce the MCC
|
||
reference position.
|
||
4.
|
||
Paragraph 5 provides the uncertainty of the GNSS position as two (2) seconds of latitude
|
||
and longitude, about 60 metres at the equator. A GNSS position with two (2) seconds of
|
||
uncertainty is generally the most accurate position for a beacon, provided that the GNSS
|
||
position has been updated recently or the beacon is not moving.
|
||
|
||
6–14
|
||
|
||
6.4
|
||
A MEOSAR Alert Confirmed by a LEOSAR Alert
|
||
The beacon with the Hex ID: C809C70A34D34D1 is first detected with a MEOSAR location
|
||
that is later confirmed with LEOSAR location data. Figure 6.6 depicts the two messages.
|
||
Figure 6.6: The Two SIT 185 Messages in Example 6.4
|
||
6.4.1
|
||
An Initial Alert from the MEOSAR System
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 05714 AUMCC REF C809C70A34D34D1
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE USER - EPIRB USER
|
||
MMSI ALL 9 DIGITS 576774000
|
||
HEX ID C809C70A34D34D1
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 576/VANUATU
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL 0
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 17 OCT 23 0637 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 17 OCT 23 0637 UTC
|
||
DOA – 22 53.34 S 170 15.06 E ESTIMATED ERROR UNKNOWN
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.035 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Paragraph 4 indicates that this is a MEOSAR alert and provides the initial position. The
|
||
estimated error is shown as “UNKNOWN” because the reporting MEOLUT is not
|
||
commissioned to meet MEOSAR IOC requirements for DOA position accuracy and the
|
||
reliability of the estimated error.
|
||
2.
|
||
The MMSI for the vessel is formed by using the country code (576) and the beacon
|
||
information of 774000. The MMSI is therefore 576774000.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–15
|
||
|
||
6.4.2
|
||
A Position Confirmed Alert using LEOSAR Data
|
||
A later LEOSAR detection provides further position information that is used to
|
||
confirm the position for the beacon with Hex ID: C809C70A34D34D1, as shown
|
||
below. See the description of “Confirmation” in section 4.1.3.
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT POSITION UPDATE ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 05717 AUMCC REF C809C70A34D34D1
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE USER - EPIRB USER
|
||
MMSI ALL 9 DIGITS 576774000
|
||
HEX ID C809C70A34D34D1
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 576/VANUATU
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL 0
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 17 OCT 23 0647 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 10
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - 22 53.34 S 170 15.06 E
|
||
DOPPLER A - 22 50.15 S 170 13.76 E
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0370 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
The MCC reference position is identical to the previously received DOA position as the
|
||
Doppler location matches the DOA position.
|
||
2.
|
||
The AUMCC has used the previous DOA location as the MCC reference position and
|
||
has not merged the DOA location with the matching Doppler location. Other MCCs may
|
||
merge the matching DOA and Doppler location to produce the MCC reference position
|
||
or use the Doppler location as the MCC reference position.
|
||
|
||
6–16
|
||
|
||
6.5
|
||
A Position Conflict Alert
|
||
The following example with an ELT with Hex ID 2DC753D464FFBFF shows an incident
|
||
where two positions generated do not match and a conflict alert is sent to the SAR Service.
|
||
The example is based on a real-world incident but amended for presentation. (The actual
|
||
format of SIT 185 messages sent by the USMCC differs somewhat from those shown in
|
||
these examples. Note that the USMCC sends national formatted messages to its national
|
||
SAR Services rather than SIT 185 messages.)
|
||
6.5.1
|
||
A GEOSAR GNSS Position Alert
|
||
The initial GEOSAR detection provides GNSS position information for the beacon
|
||
with Hex ID 2DC753D464FFBFF:
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 72554 USMCC REF 42321
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION PROTOCOL - ELT
|
||
AIRCRAFT 24-BIT ADDRESS A9EA32 ASSIGNED TO USA
|
||
HEX ID 2DC753D464FFBFF
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 366/USA
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL NIL
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE NIL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL DEVICE
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 28 APR 23 1702 UTC BY GEOSAR GOES 17
|
||
GNSS - 33 31.27 N 083 56.93 W
|
||
UPDATE TIME WITHIN 4 HOURS OF DETECTION TIME
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
LUT ID 5123
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0248 MHZ
|
||
GNSS POSITION UNCERTAINTY PLUS-MINUS 2 SECONDS OF
|
||
LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Paragraph 4 shows the detection was made by the GOES-17 geostationary satellite.
|
||
2.
|
||
Paragraph 4 provides the GNSS position detected by the GOES-17 satellite. The GNSS
|
||
position is within the USMCC service area.
|
||
3.
|
||
Paragraph 3 indicates that the GNSS position was provided by an external device and
|
||
no further updates to the GNSS position will be possible under normal activation.
|
||
4.
|
||
Paragraph 5 provides the uncertainty of the GNSS position.
|
||
|
||
6–17
|
||
|
||
5.
|
||
Some message fields are “NIL” in Paragraph 3. Message fields containing “NIL” in
|
||
Paragraph 4 have been omitted.
|
||
6.
|
||
The "AIRCRAFT 24-BIT ADDRESS A9EA32" (in paragraph 3 of the message) is
|
||
equivalent to the bit sequence “101010011110101000110010”. As noted in Figure 6.7
|
||
below, the ICAO 24-bit allocation for the USA is “1010”. Since the first four bits of the
|
||
address match that value, paragraph 3 indicates that this address is assigned to the USA.
|
||
The remaining 20 bits are used to code the individual US aircraft
|
||
7.
|
||
SIT 185 messages sent by the USMCC contain a 5-digit alert site number associated
|
||
with the beacon activation (e.g., 42321) as the “USMCC REF” in Paragraph 2. This
|
||
number is unique to a beacon activation and if the same beacon is activated again at a
|
||
different time, the 5-digit alert site number will be different.
|
||
Figure 6.7: ICAO 24-bit Addressing
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–18
|
||
|
||
Figure 6.7 above, contains an extract from the ICAO document [Annex 10
|
||
Vol III] concerning 24-bit addressing. The table shows that the allocation of
|
||
addresses uses the four-bit sequence 1010 to indicate a US aircraft.
|
||
Figure 6.8: GEOSAR GNSS Position Alert
|
||
In the Figure 6.8 above, the footprint of the GEOSAR satellite GOES-17 is shown
|
||
in yellow and the location of the GOES-17 is shown by the yellow diamond. The
|
||
location of the GNSS position provided in the beacon message is shown by the green
|
||
triangle in the USA.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–19
|
||
|
||
6.5.2
|
||
A Position Conflict Alert from a LEOSAR Position
|
||
The alert in this example is a LEOSAR detection that has two Doppler locations and
|
||
a GNSS position. Since neither Doppler location matches the GNSS position, a
|
||
position conflict alert is generated.
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT POSITION CONFLICT ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 72555 USMCC REF 42321
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION PROTOCOL – ELT
|
||
AIRCRAFT 24-BIT ADDRESS A9EA32 ASSIGNED TO USA
|
||
HEX ID 2DC753D464FFBFF
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 366/USA
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL DEVICE
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 28 APR 23 1702 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 10
|
||
GNSS - 33 31.27 N 083 56.93 W
|
||
UPDATE TIME WITHIN 4 HOURS OF DETECTION TIME
|
||
DOPPLER A - 33 09.82 N 085 19.92 W PROB 56 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 44 41.41 N 144 00.65 W PROB 44 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
RELIABILITY OF DOPPLER POSITION DATA - SUSPECT DUE TO TECHNICAL
|
||
PARAMETERS
|
||
POSITION CONFLICT BASED ON DISTANCE SEPARATION AT LEAST 20 KM
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0247 MHZ
|
||
GNSS POSITION UNCERTAINTY PLUS-MINUS 2 SECONDS OF LATITUDE AND
|
||
LONGITUDE
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
The two Doppler positions shown in Paragraph 4 do not match the GNSS position. The
|
||
closer Doppler, the A position (33° 10’ N, 085° 19’ W) is some 285 kilometres from the
|
||
GNSS position (33° 31’ N, 083° 57’ W). As the positions do not match, a position
|
||
conflict alert is sent to the RCC.
|
||
2.
|
||
In Paragraph 5, the Doppler position has been assessed as suspect due to technical
|
||
parameters. The satellite pass geometry (Cross Track Angle 23.7 degrees) is such that
|
||
the Doppler locations were near the edge of the satellite footprint and were assessed as
|
||
suspect. See Figure 6.9. As the Doppler positions are suspect, the GNSS position is more
|
||
likely to be the real beacon position than the Doppler positions, but the matching of
|
||
position data from independent sources is required to determine the real position of the
|
||
beacon.
|
||
|
||
6–20
|
||
|
||
Figure 6.9: LEOSAR Position Conflict Alert
|
||
In the Figure 6.9 above, the footprint of LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-10 at the TCA is
|
||
shown in orange, the yellow line is the track (path) of the satellite. The two Doppler
|
||
locations generated for this beacon detection are shown on the map. A position
|
||
conflict alert is generated as neither Doppler location is within the matching distance
|
||
of 20 kilometres of the GNSS position.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–21
|
||
|
||
6.6
|
||
A Notification of Country of Registration Alert
|
||
6.6.1
|
||
An NOCR Alert
|
||
An NOCR alert is sent by an MCC to the country of registration for a beacon located
|
||
inside the service area of the MCC. In this example, the beacon with the Hex ID
|
||
C809C70A34D34D1 which is a Vanuatu EPIRB has locations in the Brazilian
|
||
MCC’s service area. The Brazilian MCC would send the NOCR to the Vanuatu SAR
|
||
Service via the MCC Network.
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT NOTIFICATION OF COUNTRY OF BEACON
|
||
REGISTRATION ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 05714 AUMCC REF C809C70A34D34D1
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE USER - EPIRB USER
|
||
MMSI ALL 9 DIGITS 576774000
|
||
HEX ID C809C70A34D34D1
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 576/VANUATU
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL 0
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 17 MAY 23 0637 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 10
|
||
DOPPLER A - 18 33.54 S 062 15.06 W PROB 60 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 22 53.34 S 043 21.60 W PROB 40 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
LUT ID 7101 BRAZILIA, BRAZIL
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0370 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
A Notification of Country of Registration (NOCR) alert message is sent to the country
|
||
of beacon registration by an MCC that has an alert with a position inside its service area
|
||
when the MCC has no other location within the SAR region of the country of beacon
|
||
registration. The NOCR alert message is intended to alert the SAR Service responsible
|
||
for the country code when the SAR Service would not otherwise be sent a located alert
|
||
for the beacon.
|
||
2.
|
||
In the alert message above the Brazilian MCC (BRMCC), in whose service area the
|
||
beacon was located, transmitted a NOCR alert message to the Australian MCC
|
||
(AUMCC) via the USA MCC (USMCC) for forwarding to the Vanuatu authorities. As
|
||
Vanuatu is serviced by the Noumea RCC in New Caledonia, the AUMCC has forwarded
|
||
the NOCR alert to Noumea RCC for delivery to the Vanuatu SAR Service.
|
||
3.
|
||
A graphical representation of the NOCR alert message is provided in Figure 6.10.
|
||
|
||
6–22
|
||
|
||
Figure 6.10: Graphical Representation of the NOCR Alert Message
|
||
In the Figure 6.10 above, the yellow line is the track of LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-
|
||
10. The footprint of Sarsat-10 at the TCA is shown in orange. As the beacon has a
|
||
country of registration of Vanuatu and has location data in the Brazilian MCC
|
||
service area, the Brazilian MCC sends a NOCR via the MCC network. In this case,
|
||
the NOCR would be sent via the United Status MCC, the Australian MCC and the
|
||
New Caledonian SPOC to the Vanuatu SPOC.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–23
|
||
|
||
6.7
|
||
An Unresolved Doppler Position Match Alert
|
||
6.7.1
|
||
A LEOSAR Unresolved Doppler Position Match Alert
|
||
An unresolved Doppler position match alert is sent when two independent LEOSAR
|
||
detections match both possible Doppler locations prior to position confirmation. In
|
||
this example, the first detection is not shown. The second detection generated the
|
||
unresolved Doppler position match alert.
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT UNRESOLVED DOPPLER POSITION MATCH ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 55408 AUMCC REF CDC9D64D41934D1
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE USER LOCATION - EPIRB USER
|
||
MMSI ALL 9 DIGITS 622120320
|
||
HEX ID CDC9D64D41934D1
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 622/EGYPT
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL 0
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY NIL
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 17 MAY 23 0900 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 11
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE - NIL
|
||
DOA - NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A - 36 34.74 N 000 22.26 W PROB 99 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 31 03.12 N 026 24.30 E PROB 01 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
WARNING: AMBIGUITY IS NOT RESOLVED
|
||
LUT ID 6011 CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0368 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
When both pairs of Doppler positions meet the match criterion prior to ambiguity
|
||
resolution for different satellite passes on similar orbital paths as shown in Figure 6.11,
|
||
an unresolved Doppler position match alert will be generated. (Note that in previous
|
||
example from 2011, the match criterion was 50 kilometres. The match criterion has since
|
||
been changed to 20 kilometres, also, the figure below is not to scale.)
|
||
2.
|
||
For the example above the following two pairs of Doppler locations were received:
|
||
Satellite Sarsat-10
|
||
TCA 0704 UTC, 17 May 2023,
|
||
A. 36° 18.1’ N - 000° 01.4’ E
|
||
B. 31° 05.0’ N - 025° 55.1’ E
|
||
Satellite Sarsat-11
|
||
TCA 0900 UTC, 17 May 2023,
|
||
A. 36° 34.7’ N - 000° 22.3’ W
|
||
B. 31° 03.1’ N - 026° 24.3’ E
|
||
|
||
6–24
|
||
|
||
3.
|
||
Both the A pair and B pair locations from the two satellites were within 20 kilometres
|
||
and this is depicted in Figure 6.8. As a consequence, ambiguity in position cannot be
|
||
resolved and an unresolved Doppler position match alert is transmitted.
|
||
4.
|
||
As a consequence, a warning will be inserted in the alert message in Paragraph 5
|
||
indicating that ambiguity has not been resolved.
|
||
5.
|
||
Although ambiguity is unresolved (i.e., position is unconfirmed), the new “A” position
|
||
is likely the true position based on its probability (99 percent).
|
||
Figure 6.11: Unresolved Doppler Position Match
|
||
In the Figure 6.11 above, the red line is the track of LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-10. The purple line is
|
||
the track of LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-11. The two Doppler locations generated by the Sarsat-10 pass
|
||
are shown as the two red triangles. The two Doppler locations generated by the Sarsat-11 pass are
|
||
shown as the two purple triangles. As both sets of Doppler positions match, neither location is
|
||
confirmed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–25
|
||
|
||
6.8
|
||
ELT(DT) Alerts
|
||
An ELT(DT) alert is sent after an ELT(DT) has been activated: manually by the crew,
|
||
automatically by the beacon when a probable crash has been detected (G-switch), or
|
||
automatically by the avionics when an aeroplane is in a distress condition.
|
||
6.8.1
|
||
An FGB ELT(DT) Alert
|
||
The DOA Position Conflict Alert message below is sent because the distance between
|
||
the DOA position which was independently processed by the Cospas-Sarsat System
|
||
and the GNSS position which was processed by the GNSS receiver associated with
|
||
the FGB ELT(DT), is at least 20 km away.
|
||
1. DISTRESS TRACKING COSPAS-SARSAT DOA POSITION CONFLICT ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 21013 CMCC REF 1D1200F03BBFDFF
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE ELT DISTRESS TRACKING
|
||
AIRCRAFT 24 BIT ADDRESS 01E077 ASSIGNED TO G BRITAIN
|
||
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR DESIGNATOR MMB
|
||
HEX ID 1D1200F03BBFDFF
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 232/G BRITAIN
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL DEVICE
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 04 AUG 23 101501 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 04 AUG 23 101501 UTC
|
||
GNSS - 61 54.40 N 045 37.53 W
|
||
UPDATE TIME WITHIN 2 – 60 SECONDS OF DETECTION TIME
|
||
ALTITUDE OF GNSS LOCATION BETWEEN 1600 AND 2200 METRES
|
||
(BETWEEN 5200 AND 7200 FEET)
|
||
DOA - 62 00.1 N 046 06.2 W
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
GNSS POSITION UNCERTAINTY PLUS-MINUS 2 SECONDS OF LATITUDE
|
||
AND LONGITUDE
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0400 MHZ
|
||
POSITION CONFLICT BASED ON DISTANCE SEPARATION OF AT LEAST
|
||
20 KM
|
||
ELT(DT) POSITION DOES NOT REFERENCE ANY PREVIOUS POSITION
|
||
6. REMARKS
|
||
THIS DISTRESS TRACKING MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO APPROPRIATE
|
||
SAR AUTHORITIES
|
||
PROCESS THIS ALERT ACCORDING TO RELEVANT REQUIREMENTS
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
|
||
6–26
|
||
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Paragraph 1: The beacon message type is “DISTRESS TRACKING”.
|
||
2.
|
||
Paragraph 2: The beacon type is “ELT”, and the beacon subtype is “DISTRESS
|
||
TRACKING” for ELT(DT). The beacon is an FGB, since the beacon type does not
|
||
indicate “SGB”.
|
||
3.
|
||
Paragraph 3 provides the ICAO 24-bit address and the aircraft flag decoded from this
|
||
ICAO 24-bit address,
|
||
4.
|
||
Paragraph 3 also provides the 3-Letter Designator (3LD) of the airline operator (as
|
||
encoded in the FGB ELT(DT) rotating field) from which the airline can be identified per
|
||
ICAO document DOC 8585,
|
||
5.
|
||
Paragraph 4: For an FGB ELT(DT), the altitude of the GNSS position is provided within
|
||
a predetermined range of altitude values, in metres (and feet),
|
||
6.
|
||
Paragraph 6: See section 5.6 above for more information about “relevant requirements”.
|
||
|
||
6–27
|
||
|
||
6.8.2
|
||
An SGB ELT(DT) Alert
|
||
The DOA Position Match Alert message below is sent because the distance between the DOA
|
||
position that was independently processed by the Cospas-Sarsat System computed by the
|
||
MEOLUT and the GNSS position that was processed by the GNSS receiver associated with
|
||
the SGB ELT(DT) is less than 20 km.
|
||
1. DISTRESS TRACKING COSPAS-SARSAT DOA POSITION MATCH ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 00192 AUMCC REF B274FA041FD4710
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SGB – ELT DISTRESS TRACKING
|
||
AIRCRAFT 24 BIT ADDRESS 7100CE ASSIGNED TO SAUDI ARABIA
|
||
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR DESIGNATOR SVA
|
||
TAC 16001 SERIAL NO 509
|
||
HEX ID B274FA041FD4 7100CEA3F00
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 403/SAUDI
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE AUTOMATIC BY BEACON (G-SWITCH/PROBABLE CRASH)
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 03 MAY 23 085310 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 03 MAY 23 085310 UTC
|
||
GNSS - 02 24.40 N 046 04.11 E
|
||
TIME OF GNSS POSITION UPDATE: 03 MAY 23 085308 UTC
|
||
TIME SINCE GNSS LOCATION GENERATED: 0 MINUTES
|
||
ALTITUDE OF GNSS LOCATION: 125 METRES (410 FEET)
|
||
DOA - 02 25.1 N 046 06.2 E ESTIMATED ERROR 001NMS
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON CHARACTERISTICS PER TAC DATABASE PROVIDED IN A SEPARATE
|
||
MESSAGE
|
||
GNSS POSITION UNCERTAINTY PLUS-MINUS 10 METRES
|
||
ELAPSED TIME SINCE ACTIVATION: 0 HOURS
|
||
REMAINING BATTERY CAPACITY BETWEEN 75 AND 100 PERCENT
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.05 MHZ
|
||
ELT(DT) POSITION DOES NOT REFERENCE ANY PREVIOUS POSITION
|
||
6. REMARKS
|
||
THIS DISTRESS TRACKING MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO APPROPRIATE
|
||
SAR AUTHORITIES.
|
||
PROCESS THIS ALERT ACCORDING TO RELEVANT REQUIREMENTS.
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
|
||
6–28
|
||
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Paragraph 3: The beacon type is “SGB ELT”, and the beacon subtype is “DISTRESS
|
||
TRACKING”,
|
||
2.
|
||
Paragraph 3: The beacon has been activated by the G-switch, indicating a likely crash
|
||
of the airplane.
|
||
3.
|
||
Paragraph 4: Time since GNSS location is provided by the SGB.
|
||
4.
|
||
Paragraph 4: The altitude of the GNSS location is an accurate value provided in metres
|
||
(and feet).
|
||
5.
|
||
Paragraph 5: For all SGBs, uncertainty of GNSS position provided in the alert message
|
||
is approximately 10 metres.
|
||
6.
|
||
Paragraph 5: SGBs may provide their remaining battery capacity within a range of
|
||
percentage values.
|
||
7.
|
||
Paragraph 6: Because of the large frequency spectrum that characterize an SGB, the
|
||
value is set to “406.05 MHZ” for any SGB if no DOA position is provided, otherwise
|
||
it is set to the actual detected value.
|
||
|
||
6–29
|
||
|
||
6.9
|
||
Cancellation Alerts
|
||
A cancellation is sent to indicate that the activation event is no longer active (for example,
|
||
hereafter, the events generating the ELT(DT) automatic triggering have returned to normal
|
||
values). An activation can only be cancelled using the same means that triggered the activation
|
||
(i.e., by avionics or manually). This cancellation message is for an SGB ELT(DT);
|
||
cancellation messages may also be sent for FGB ELT(DT)s and for other types of SGBs.
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1. Paragraph 1: The beacon message type is “USER CANCELLATION ALERT”.
|
||
2. Paragraph 3: The beacon was previously activated by the avionics, and the condition that
|
||
prompted the activation has returned to normal. The beacon type indicates “SGB”, and a
|
||
corresponding 23 Hexadecimal ID is provided in “HEX ID” line.
|
||
3. Paragraph 5: The System has received at least three (3) cancellation messages from the
|
||
beacon within 110 seconds, with no intervening “non-cancellation message”, and the
|
||
message indicates “CANCELLATION CONFIRMED”.
|
||
1. DISTRESS TRACKING COSPAS-SARSAT USER CANCELLATION ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 00192 AUMCC REF B274FA041FD4710
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SGB – ELT DISTRESS TRACKING
|
||
AIRCRAFT 24 BIT ADDRESS 7100CE ASSIGNED TO SAUDI ARABIA
|
||
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR DESIGNATOR SVA
|
||
TAC 16001 SERIAL NO 509
|
||
HEX ID B274FA041FD4 7100CEA3F00
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 403/SAUDI
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE AUTOMATIC BY EXTERNAL MEANS (AVIONICS)
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 03 MAY 24 085810 UTC BY MEOSAR
|
||
ALERT LAST DETECTED AT 03 MAY 24 085310 UTC
|
||
DOA – 02 25.1 N 046 06.2 E ESTIMATED ERROR UNKNOWN
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
ELT(DT) POSITION DOES NOT REFERENCE ANY PREVIOUS POSITION
|
||
CANCELLATION CONFIRMED
|
||
BEACON CHARACTERISTICS PER TAC DATABASE PROVIDED
|
||
IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE
|
||
REMAINING BATTERY CAPACITY BETWEEN 75 AND 100 PERCENT
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0510 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS
|
||
THIS DISTRESS TRACKING MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO APPROPRIATE
|
||
SAR AUTHORITIES
|
||
PROCESS THIS ALERT ACCORDING TO RELEVANT REQUIREMENTS
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
|
||
6–30
|
||
|
||
6.10 Sample SIT 985 Message with SGB Characteristics Based on TAC Number
|
||
In the following sample, the reference (REF) is provided as a 15 HEX ID and a 5-digit alert
|
||
site number. The associated MCC sends a single SIT 985 message to a Distress authority to
|
||
accompany the first SIT 185 alert message sent to the Distress authority for the SGB
|
||
activation, as available, based on the TAC number encoded in the beacon message.
|
||
1. BEACON OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
|
||
2. MSG NO 00192 AUMCC REF ADD481135B60000 - 21348
|
||
3. HEX ID ADD481135B60 00000000000
|
||
4. CHARACTERISTICS FOR TAC 12345
|
||
– MANUFACTURER: APPLIED TECHNOLOGY CORP.
|
||
- BEACON MODEL: XXXYYY-01234
|
||
- BEACON TYPE: PLB
|
||
- BEACON SUBTYPE: FLOAT-FREE
|
||
- TEMPERATURE RANGE: -40C +55C
|
||
- HOMING: 121.5=5 MW - 406=25 MW - AIS=20 MW
|
||
- NAV DEVICE: GALILEO, GLONASS
|
||
- STROBE: BRIGHTNESS=0.75 CANDELA, DUTY-CYCLE=15 FLASH/MINUTE
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
|
||
6–31
|
||
|
||
6.11
|
||
A Ship Security Alert
|
||
SSAS (Ship Security Alert System) beacons are processed in the same manner as EPIRBs,
|
||
ELTs and PLBs, except that the SIT 185 message is not sent to the SAR Service associated
|
||
with the beacon location; instead, the SIT 185 message is sent to the Competent Authority in
|
||
the country of registration. Typically, the Competent Authority has a security focus rather than
|
||
the rescue focus of a SAR Service.
|
||
In the following example of a ship security alert, the beacon is first detected as an unlocated
|
||
initial alert and then as an initial located alert with two Doppler locations.
|
||
6.11.1 An Unlocated Ship Security Alert
|
||
1. SHIP SECURITY COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL ALERT(UNLOCATED)
|
||
2. MSG NO 00285 AUMCC REF 401917C900FFBFF
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION - SHIP SECURITY
|
||
MMSI ALL 9 DIGITS 512573000
|
||
HEX ID 401917C900FFBFF
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 512/NEWZEALAND
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL DEVICE
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 07 JAN 23 2020 UTC BY GEOSAR GOES 17
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
LUT ID 5123
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0278 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS
|
||
THIS IS A SHIP SECURITY ALERT.
|
||
PROCESS THIS ALERT ACCORDING TO RELEVANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
This is an example of a ship security alert transmitted to a competent authority. MCCs
|
||
would transmit this alert to the AUMCC for forwarding to the New Zealand relevant
|
||
authority irrespective of the location of the alert.
|
||
2.
|
||
The activation type provided in Paragraph 3 will always indicate “MANUAL” for an
|
||
SSAS beacon, which can only be activated manually.
|
||
3.
|
||
The graphics depiction of this alert is provided in Figure 6.12.
|
||
|
||
6–32
|
||
|
||
6.11.2 A Ship Security Initial Alert with Positions
|
||
An initial located alert is generated for the same beacon with two Doppler locations.
|
||
1. SHIP SECURITY COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 00286 AUMCC REF 401917C900FFBFF
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE STANDARD LOCATION - SHIP SECURITY
|
||
MMSI ALL 9 DIGITS 512573000
|
||
HEX ID 401917C900FFBFF
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 512/NEWZEALAND
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL DEVICE
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 07 JAN 23 2023 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 13
|
||
DOPPLER A - 29 05 N 090 18 W PROB 76 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 40 13 N 039 02 W PROB 24 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
THE B POSITION IS LIKELY TO BE AN IMAGE POSITION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0278 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS THIS IS A SHIP SECURITY ALERT.
|
||
PROCESS THIS ALERT ACCORDING TO RELEVANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
A second alert was received for this beacon incident. A ship security alert is processed
|
||
like any other beacon incident except that the SIT 185 message is sent to the Competent
|
||
Authority for the country of registration.
|
||
2.
|
||
This ship security beacon has the capability to provide a GNSS position (as it is coded
|
||
with a Location protocol) but in this case, no GNSS position was transmitted in the
|
||
beacon message received by the LEOLUT.
|
||
3.
|
||
Doppler position B with 24% probability has been further identified as being the likely
|
||
image position given the initial GEOSAR detection. See the graphics in Figure 6.12.
|
||
|
||
6–33
|
||
|
||
Figure 6.12: Ship Security Unlocated and Initial Alert
|
||
In the Figure 6.12 above, the orange line indicates the track of LEOSAR satellite
|
||
Sarsat-13. The orange area is the footprint of Sarsat-13 at the TCA for the beacon.
|
||
The GOES-17 footprint is indicated by the yellow line. The section of the Sarsat-13
|
||
footprint that overlaps with the GOES-17 footprint is shaded in light grey. The
|
||
Doppler B location generated by the Sarsat-13 pass is outside the GOES-17
|
||
footprint, and hence, is reported as likely to be the image position.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
6–34
|
||
|
||
6.12
|
||
An Alert with an Invalid Beacon Message
|
||
A beacon message is invalid when a LUT is unable to correct errors in the beacon message or
|
||
the MCC detects an invalid value associated with the beacon message. All the fields in an
|
||
invalid beacon message are omitted or reported as “NIL” in the SIT 185 message, except for
|
||
the Hex ID which (even though it is reported) may also be invalid. Any DOA or Doppler
|
||
location data is valid and is reported in the SIT 185 message.
|
||
6.12.1
|
||
An Alert with an Invalid Beacon Message
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 79416 AUMCC REF 7722B4600017491
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
DATA DECODED FROM THE BEACON MESSAGE IS NOT RELIABLE
|
||
HEX ID 7722B4600017491
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 09 JUN 23 0701 UTC BY LEOSAR COSPAS 14
|
||
DOPPLER A - 18 36.66 S 146 11.05 E PROB 66 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 13 02.22 S 171 15.38 E PROB 34 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0367 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
Despite the error detection and correction capability of the system, the LUT was not able
|
||
to correct all errors in the beacon message received for this particular detection. As a
|
||
consequence, Paragraph 3 indicates that the decoded data is not reliable and the various
|
||
beacon message fields are omitted because they are not reliable.
|
||
2.
|
||
Note that the Hex ID of the beacon “7722B4600017491” decodes as an orbitography
|
||
beacon with an invalid country code which suggests the Hex ID is invalid and should be
|
||
treated with caution by an RCC. The Hex ID for every invalid beacon message should
|
||
be treated with caution, since the invalid information may not be evident from the
|
||
decoded Hex ID.
|
||
3.
|
||
The invalid beacon message does not imply that the Doppler location is invalid as the
|
||
Doppler location is generated from the beacon transmission, not the contents of the
|
||
beacon message. The Doppler location in alerts with an invalid beacon message has been
|
||
used to rescue persons in distress.
|
||
6.13
|
||
An Alert with a Satellite Manoeuvre Warning
|
||
The Cospas-Sarsat LEOSAR satellites sometimes have to undergo a manoeuvre to adjust the
|
||
orbit of the satellite. After the satellite orbit has changed, LEOLUTs may have inaccurate orbit
|
||
information for the satellite and may generate a position that is outside normal accuracy. A
|
||
warning is included in SIT 185 messages for 24 hours after a satellite manoeuvre when the
|
||
expected error for Doppler positions computed with data from a manoeuvred satellite may
|
||
exceed ten (10) kilometres.
|
||
|
||
6–35
|
||
|
||
6.13.1 An Initial Alert (with a Satellite Manoeuvre Warning)
|
||
An
|
||
initial
|
||
alert
|
||
has
|
||
been
|
||
generated
|
||
for
|
||
the
|
||
beacon
|
||
with
|
||
Hex
|
||
ID
|
||
“BEEE43A58C0022D” but the satellite used to determine the position has recently
|
||
undergone a manoeuvre for which the maximum expected impact in Doppler location
|
||
accuracy has exceeded ten (10) kilometres within 24 hours of this manoeuvre.
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT INITIAL LOCATED ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 76380 AUMCC REF BEEE43A58C0022D
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
BEACON TYPE SERIAL USER LOCATION - EPIRB (NON FLOAT FREE)
|
||
SERIAL NO 0059747
|
||
HEX ID BEEE43A58C0022D
|
||
COUNTRY OF BEACON REGISTRATION 503/AUSTRALIA
|
||
BEACON NUMBER ON AIRCRAFT OR VESSEL NIL
|
||
HOMING SIGNAL 121.5 MHZ
|
||
ACTIVATION TYPE MANUAL
|
||
GNSS POSITION PROVIDED BY NIL
|
||
EMERGENCY CODE NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 14 JAN 23 2310 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 11
|
||
GNSS - NIL
|
||
MCC REFERENCE – NIL
|
||
DOPPLER A - 39 15.04 S 151 15.77 E PROB 54 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 37 56.05 S 144 36.48 E PROB 46 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
RELIABILITY OF DOPPLER POSITION DATA SUSPECT DUE TO
|
||
SATELLITE MANOEUVRE
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0280 MHZ
|
||
TAC 0139
|
||
BEACON MODEL - STANDARD COMMS, AUSTRALIA MT400
|
||
6. REMARKS NIL
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Notes:
|
||
1.
|
||
This alert was generated within 24 hours of a manoeuvre of the Sarsat-11
|
||
satellite and contains a related warning in Paragraph 5.
|
||
|
||
6–36
|
||
|
||
6.14
|
||
An Interferer Alert
|
||
An interferer is a signal transmitting between 406.0 to 406.1 MHz that does not have the
|
||
correct signal structure for a Cospas-Sarsat distress beacon. Interferers with a location are
|
||
reported to the appropriate spectrum authority. While there is no defined SIT 185 message
|
||
format for reporting interferer alerts, the sample message below is provided per national
|
||
procedure.
|
||
6.14.1 An Initial Interferer Alert
|
||
1. DISTRESS COSPAS-SARSAT 406 MHZ INTERFERER ALERT
|
||
2. MSG NO 37533 THMCC REF 88047/88048
|
||
3. BEACON MESSAGE INFORMATION
|
||
HEX ID NIL
|
||
4. ALERT POSITION INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTED AT 16 MAY 23 0311 UTC BY LEOSAR SARSAT 13
|
||
DOPPLER A - 17 40 N 096 11 E PROB 50 PERCENT
|
||
DOPPLER B - 16 59 N 099 34 E PROB 50 PERCENT
|
||
5. OTHER INFORMATION
|
||
DETECTION FREQUENCY 406.0170 MHZ
|
||
6. REMARKS
|
||
PLEASE ADVISE YOUR SPECTRUM AGENCY OF ANY PERSISTENT INTERFERER
|
||
END OF MESSAGE
|
||
Note:
|
||
1.
|
||
An interferer does not have a Hex ID, so no Hex ID is provided in Paragraph 3.
|
||
An interferer reference number is provided in Paragraph 2.
|
||
2.
|
||
The comments in Paragraph 6 request that the spectrum agency be advised of
|
||
persistent interferers.
|
||
|
||
6–37
|
||
|
||
Figure 6.13: 406-MHz Interferer Alert
|
||
In the Figure 6.13 above, the yellow line marks the track of LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-
|
||
13. The footprint for Sarsat-13 at the TCA for the interferer detection is shown by the
|
||
orange outline. The two Doppler locations for the interferer are shown.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 6 –
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
7–1
|
||
|
||
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
|
||
7.1
|
||
What is the difference between an RCC and a SPOC?
|
||
Answer: An RCC is a Rescue Coordination Centre and provides a SAR response
|
||
within a declared SAR region designated by IMO and ICAO. Cospas-Sarsat uses the
|
||
term SPOC (SAR Point of Contact) as a generic term to refer to the SAR agencies
|
||
sent SIT 185 alerts by an MCC. Many but not all SPOCs are RCCs. The list of SPOCs
|
||
with their contact details is available on the Cospas-Sarsat website.
|
||
7.2
|
||
What Cospas-Sarsat training is available for Distress authority personnel?
|
||
Answer: Cospas-Sarsat document C/S P.015 includes a description of a model
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat training course for SAR Service personnel.
|
||
7.3
|
||
My Distress authority needs to discuss the contents of a Cospas-Sarsat distress
|
||
alert with an MCC. Where can it find contact information for the MCC?
|
||
Answer: The contact information for MCCs is provided on the Cospas-Sarsat website
|
||
(www.cospas-sarsat.int).
|
||
7.4
|
||
My Distress authority has a question on a particular aspect of the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
system and is unable to find the answer in the Handbook. Who should the
|
||
Distress authority contact to discuss the matter?
|
||
Answer: The Distress authority should contact its supporting MCC in the first
|
||
instance for assistance. To establish your supporting MCC check Annex C and then
|
||
the Cospas-Sarsat website (www.cospas-sarsat.int) for the MCC contact details.
|
||
7.5
|
||
What is the Hex ID? Why does a Distress authority need to know this Hex ID
|
||
when the serial identity of the beacon is provided in Paragraph 3 in a manner
|
||
that can be clearly understood by Distress authority personnel?
|
||
Answer: See section 2.4 for an explanation of Hex ID. MCCs worldwide use this Hex
|
||
ID in the main to refer to a beacon and to undertake searches for specific beacon
|
||
activations in their system. It should be noted that the Hex ID is unique and no two
|
||
identical Hex IDs should exist on two different beacons. Furthermore, most 406 MHz
|
||
beacon registration databases use the Hex ID as the primary field. Distress authority
|
||
personnel will facilitate discussions with MCCs on distress alerts if reference is made
|
||
to the Hex ID. The serial identity provided for some beacon protocols in Paragraph 3
|
||
of the alert message received by the Distress authority is decoded from the Hex ID
|
||
and provides information in respect of the beacon coding protocol used, the beacon
|
||
type and the specific identity of the source or carrier, such as the Callsign.
|
||
7.6
|
||
How can I decode the 15 character Hex ID?
|
||
Answer: There are several stand-alone programs available for this purpose. The
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat website provides an online capability.
|
||
|
||
7–2
|
||
|
||
7.7
|
||
Why has the Distress authority received a MEOSAR alert but not a LEOSAR
|
||
alert for a beacon? Why does the LEOSAR system sometimes detect a beacon
|
||
but not the MEOSAR system?
|
||
Answer: The system may provide a MEOSAR detection but not a LEOSAR detection
|
||
if there is no LEOSAR satellite that has passed over the beacon. The LEOSAR
|
||
satellites do not continuously cover the surface of the earth, but each LEOSAR
|
||
satellite covers the earth in approximately 12 hours. Alternatively, a LEOSAR
|
||
satellite may have passed over the beacon, but the beacon transmission may have
|
||
been shielded from the LEOSAR satellite, such as when the beacon is in a
|
||
mountainous region, a canyon or gorge.
|
||
The LEOSAR satellites have a lower altitude orbit (between 700 and 1000
|
||
kilometres) so are able to detect weaker signals than the MEOSAR satellites which
|
||
have an altitude of 19,000 to 24,000 kilometres. The weaker signal may be due to a
|
||
damaged beacon or shielding if the beacon is activated indoors for example.
|
||
7.8
|
||
The Distress authority has received multiple CONFLICT alerts for the same
|
||
LEOSAR beacon event, i.e., same satellite, same beacon Hex ID and same TCA
|
||
(± 20 minutes). Why is this?
|
||
Answer: In all probability, the alerts are from different LEOLUTs, albeit the same
|
||
beacon event. Different LEOLUTs may generate different Doppler locations because
|
||
different beacon bursts were available from the satellite due to the different LEOLUT
|
||
locations, detection capability or time of acquisition. Different processing algorithms
|
||
or orbital configuration data could result in different Doppler locations, even when
|
||
two LEOLUTs use the same beacon bursts. A subsequent Doppler position conflict
|
||
alert for the same beacon event is transmitted unless the new alert is determined to be
|
||
of poorer quality.
|
||
7.9
|
||
The TCA in the LEOSAR distress alert just received is some four (4) hours old.
|
||
Why is this?
|
||
Answer: This happens when a LEOLUT tracks a particular satellite which it had not
|
||
tracked for many hours and receives the recorded detection from an earlier orbit. It is
|
||
assumed that the beacon had not been detected on subsequent passes by that particular
|
||
satellite.
|
||
7.10
|
||
Position update alerts are being received multiple times after position
|
||
confirmation, but the MCC reference position provided is changing. Why is
|
||
this? Furthermore, why is the GNSS position remaining constant during this
|
||
exchange?
|
||
Answer: In some MCCs, an MCC reference position is calculated based on the most
|
||
current location data and the historical locations that meet the distance matching
|
||
criterion. The MCC reference position may be biased to the location with the smaller
|
||
likely error. No two locations will be identical even when the same data from a
|
||
satellite is used for processing. The GNSS position will remain constant if it was
|
||
received from an external source that is not providing updates, if the beacon is not
|
||
|
||
7–3
|
||
|
||
designed to provide updates (likely an older beacon model), or if a Location Protocol
|
||
FGB’s location has not changed by at least four (4) seconds of latitude and longitude.
|
||
(Since its component longitude and latitude are each rounded to the nearest four (4)
|
||
seconds, a Location Protocol FGB’s position could change by nearly six (6) seconds
|
||
without a change in the GNSS position; i.e., Square Root of (4\*4 + 4\*4) = 5.66.)
|
||
7.11
|
||
Paragraph 5 of a Cospas-Sarsat distress alert reports that the Doppler A
|
||
position is probably the image location, and it has a probability of 79%. Does
|
||
this mean that B position is confirmed? Furthermore, why is the A position with
|
||
a higher probability considered the image position? Is there a problem with the
|
||
location processing?
|
||
Answer: The determination that one position is probably an image does not indicate
|
||
that the other position is confirmed; confirmation of a Doppler location only occurs
|
||
by matching it with independent locations. On occasion, the Doppler location with
|
||
the lesser probability is in fact the real position of the distress, so this should not be
|
||
construed as an anomaly. The reference to “image position” is made when one
|
||
position in a Doppler solution is within the footprint of another satellite that detected
|
||
the beacon, and the other Doppler position is not within the satellite footprint.
|
||
7.12
|
||
The SAR Service has received a 406 MHz interferer alert. What should the RCC
|
||
do with this information?
|
||
Answer: Persistent 406 MHz interferer transmissions negatively impact the
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat system and should be turned off. They should be reported to the
|
||
national spectrum agency, who may deal with them directly (for internal sources) or
|
||
report them to the ITU (for foreign sources). More information on 406 MHz
|
||
interference is provided in the Cospas-Sarsat document C/S A.003, “Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
System Monitoring and Reporting”.
|
||
7.13
|
||
What does it mean when the alert states that the GNSS position update time is
|
||
within four (4) hours of detection time? Why isn’t a precise time provided?
|
||
Answer: Unfortunately, the time associated with the GNSS position is not part of the
|
||
beacon transmission as there are not enough data bits available to transmit the time.
|
||
The alert states that the location was updated within four (4) hours of the detection
|
||
time because the 406 MHz Beacon Specification (C/S T.001) requires that GNSS
|
||
position not be transmitted if it has not been updated within four (4) hours.
|
||
An alert indicating an “internal” source for the GNSS position is likely within a few
|
||
minutes of the detection time (although the beacon is not required to update its GNSS
|
||
position). In addition, when the GNSS position changes on a subsequent alert, the
|
||
update time of the GNSS position is between the two reported detection times.
|
||
|
||
7–4
|
||
|
||
7.14
|
||
The alert provides 6 Hex characters for an ELT 24-bit address. What is the 24-
|
||
bit address and how is it useful to a SAR Service? Is there a database that lists
|
||
all these six (6) Hex characters?
|
||
Answer: The aircraft 24-bit address is used in applications which require the routing
|
||
of information to or from individual, suitably equipped aircraft. Examples of this are
|
||
the aeronautical fixed telecommunication network (AFTN), SSR Mode S, and the
|
||
airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS). The 24-bit address transmitted by an
|
||
ELT is expressed as six hexadecimal characters in the distress alert and can be used
|
||
to identify the precise aircraft provided an appropriate database is maintained. The
|
||
24-bit address can also identify the country that assigned it, and thus assist an RCC
|
||
in its fact-finding efforts. The allocation of 24-bit aircraft addresses, formerly known
|
||
as Mode S addresses, is described in the ICAO convention, Chapter 9 of Annex 10,
|
||
Volume III. Alternatively, contact your State-aircraft-registration authority.
|
||
7.15
|
||
How is it useful for the Distress authority to be notified that the GNSS position
|
||
was provided by an external device? Is it useful for the Distress authority to
|
||
know that the activation type is “NIL”?
|
||
Answer: The advice that the GNSS position is provided by an external device
|
||
indicates that the beacon does not have an integral GNSS which can provide updated
|
||
positions as long as the beacon remains active. An external input from a ship’s or
|
||
aircraft’s GNSS (or other navigation system) will indicate that the GNSS position is
|
||
unlikely to be updated after initial activation (as the beacon is usually separated from
|
||
the external input).
|
||
The activation type is only available with the user protocol and not supported in any
|
||
of the location protocols. A manual activation type indicates that the beacon was
|
||
activated by a survivor. A manual or automatic activation type indicator is probably
|
||
not useful.
|
||
7.16
|
||
Paragraph 3 of the Cospas-Sarsat distress alert provides information on
|
||
“beacon number on aircraft or vessel”. What is the significance of this
|
||
information? Why does this Paragraph often indicate “NIL” or “0” (zero)?
|
||
Answer: Certain beacon coding protocols, e.g., Maritime User and Radio Callsign
|
||
User protocols, allow multiple beacons to be coded with the same callsign or MMSI.
|
||
In order to differentiate between these beacons on board the same vessel and to
|
||
provide a unique Hex ID, the beacon is coded with a specific beacon number, 0 to 9
|
||
and A to Z. If the vessel carries only one such coded beacon, then the specific number
|
||
will be zero. Receiving a distress alert with the specific beacon number given as, say
|
||
1, indicates that there are additional beacons on board the vessel.
|
||
7.17
|
||
The Distress authority has received an alert for the first time for a beacon
|
||
indicating a position conflict alert. How is this possible when the Distress
|
||
authority did not receive a prior alert?
|
||
Answer: For non-SSAS alerts, the initial alert might have been transmitted to another
|
||
SAR Service because the initial location or locations were in that SAR Service’s
|
||
|
||
7–5
|
||
|
||
SRR. The subsequent alert, which is in conflict, contains positions in the subject SAR
|
||
Service’s SRR.
|
||
Alternatively, the position conflict alert sent to the Distress authority may contain a
|
||
GNSS position that does not match either the DOA or Doppler location in the alert.
|
||
7.18
|
||
The Distress authority has reported that it has received message number 00533
|
||
from its support MCC as per Paragraph 2 of the distress alert message.
|
||
However, the previous message number received was 00530. The Distress
|
||
authority wishes to account for all messages and requests an explanation.
|
||
Answer: A communication problem could cause messages to be missed. The Distress
|
||
authority should request the support MCC to retransmit any missing messages.
|
||
7.19
|
||
Why does the MCC send regular communication checks to my SAR Service?
|
||
Should I respond to the communication check?
|
||
Answer: The IMO and ICAO have noted that there are known and documented
|
||
problems in regard to SAR Services initiating SAR action in response to Cospas-
|
||
Sarsat distress alerts. It was further noted that there were cases where the Cospas-
|
||
Sarsat System successfully delivered distress alerts but the SAR Service did not
|
||
respond. It was recognised that the fault lay in the SAR response system and not with
|
||
the delivery of alerts by Cospas-Sarsat MCCs.
|
||
For this reason, IMO and ICAO have requested that Cospas-Sarsat MCCs undertake
|
||
regular communication checks with the SAR Services they support.
|
||
SAR Services should respond promptly to the MCC when they receive a
|
||
communication check.
|
||
7.20
|
||
Are there examples of how independence is determined when matching
|
||
locations?
|
||
Answer: Here are some examples of how an MCC determines if two locations can be
|
||
used to determine a matching location:
|
||
A GNSS position from a MEOLUT and a GNSS position from a LEOLUT can not
|
||
confirm location, even if the two GNSS positions are the same, as the two GNSS
|
||
positions come from the same source (the beacon) and can never be assumed to be
|
||
independent.
|
||
A Doppler location and a GNSS position confirm a location if the two locations match
|
||
(i.e., are within 20 kilometres of each other) as a Doppler location and a GNSS
|
||
position are independent of each other.
|
||
Data from LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-10 gives two Doppler locations (L1 and L2) and
|
||
DOA data from a MEOLUT gives location L3. If L1 and L3 match, then the MCC
|
||
will provide an MCC reference position derived from L1 and L3.
|
||
A Doppler location generated by satellite Sarsat-12 from one LEOLUT and a Doppler
|
||
location generated by satellite Sarsat-12 with the same TCA from a different
|
||
|
||
7–6
|
||
|
||
LEOLUT would not confirm the location as the Doppler locations are from the same
|
||
beacon event.
|
||
Data from LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-12 gives two Doppler locations (L1 and L2) and
|
||
data from LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-12 gives two Doppler locations (L3 and L4). If
|
||
the second pair of locations have a different TCA (i.e., are from a different satellite
|
||
pass) and only L1 and L3 match, then the location is confirmed. The MCC will
|
||
provide an MCC reference position derived from L1 and L3.
|
||
Data from LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-10 gives two Doppler locations (L1 and L2) and
|
||
data from LEOSAR satellite Sarsat-12 gives two Doppler locations (L3 and L4), and
|
||
there are two matches, both L1 and L3, as well as L2 and L4. This situation is known
|
||
as an Unresolved Doppler Match and the second pair of Doppler locations does not
|
||
confirm a location.
|
||
A DOA location with three satellites (X1, X2, X3) with time T1 and a DOA location
|
||
with four satellites (X2, X3, X6, X7) with time T2. If the two locations match, then
|
||
if the times are not within two (2) seconds and as each satellite set has a unique
|
||
satellite combination (X1 is not in the second set and X6 is not in the first set), the
|
||
location is confirmed.
|
||
A DOA location with three satellites (X1, X2, X3) with time T1 and a DOA location
|
||
with four satellites (X1, X2, X3, X4) with time T2. If the times are within 30 minutes,
|
||
then as the satellite sets are not different (the first set of satellites is contained in the
|
||
second set) the location is not confirmed, even if the two locations match. If two DOA
|
||
locations match and the data times for the two alerts differ by at least 30 minutes,
|
||
then the location is confirmed, regardless of the sets of satellites.
|
||
Data from a LEOLUT gives two Doppler locations: the A-position has a probability
|
||
of 97% and the B-location has a probability of 3%. Despite the strong indication that
|
||
the A-position is the real location of the beacon, the location is not confirmed as in
|
||
some cases the location of the beacon will be the B-position.
|
||
An MCC may be able to use footprint information to indicate which of two Doppler
|
||
locations is likely to be the image location (i.e., the location that is not the location of
|
||
the beacon). For example, if a beacon is detected by a GEOSAR satellite and there
|
||
are two Doppler locations from a LEOSAR detection, and if one location is outside
|
||
the footprint of the GEOSAR satellite, then it is likely that this is the image location.
|
||
Despite this information, footprint determination is not used to confirm a location.
|
||
See section 6.2 for an example of this processing.
|
||
7.21
|
||
How is the nine-digit MMSI formed using the six digits provided in a SIT 185?
|
||
Answer: For beacons coded with an MMSI protocol, Paragraph 3 of the SIT 185
|
||
provides the last six digits of the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI). The
|
||
nine-digit MMSI is formed by adding the six digits to the country code provided in
|
||
the country of registration field.
|
||
Note that some countries have more than one country code (known as the Maritime
|
||
Identification Digits (MID)). For example, Panama has seven country codes, so there
|
||
could be seven nine-digit MMSIs with the same last six digits provided in Paragraph
|
||
|
||
7–7
|
||
|
||
3. If the beacon has not been correctly coded with correct MID, then the resulting
|
||
nine-digit MMSI will not be correct.
|
||
Similarly, it is possible that a beacon with a particular MMSI is transferred to a
|
||
different vessel without the beacon being re-programmed with the MMSI of the new
|
||
vessel. Incidents have occurred where a beacon with an MMSI has been activated
|
||
that does not match the MMSI of the vessel in distress.
|
||
7.22
|
||
Why does a beacon take 50 seconds to transmit its first burst once activated?
|
||
Answer: Except for ELT(DT)s, Cospas-Sarsat FGBs are designed to have a 50-
|
||
second warm-up time to allow the oscillator frequency to stabilize before the beacon
|
||
begins transmitting. For the LEOSAR system, an unstable oscillator frequency would
|
||
probably generate an inaccurate location estimate.
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat FGB ELT(DT)s and SGBs require transmission of the first burst
|
||
shortly after beacon activation.
|
||
7.23
|
||
What is the difference between a coarse GNSS position and a refined GNSS
|
||
position?
|
||
Answer: The data transmitted in the message from a distress beacon includes error-
|
||
correcting codes that allow a LUT to fix some errors in the data. The data from an
|
||
FGB has two components known as PDF-1 (Protected Data Field 1) and PDF-2
|
||
(Protected Data Field 2). An FGB message may have a valid PDF-1 but an invalid
|
||
PDF-2 that cannot be corrected by the error-correcting codes.
|
||
An FGB message with a valid PDF-1 that contains GNSS position, and an invalid
|
||
PDF-2 will provide a coarse GNSS position. The coarse GNSS position is less
|
||
accurate than the refined GNSS position that is provided when both data fields are
|
||
valid.
|
||
For example, consider an FGB with a National Location protocol with the GNSS
|
||
position (33 23.73 S, 150 19.60 E). The GNSS position is contained in the beacon
|
||
message as a coarse GNSS position (33 24.00 S, 150 18.00 E) with an adjustment of
|
||
-0.27 minute latitude and +1.6 minute longitude. The coarse location is contained in
|
||
the PDF-1 field and the fine adjustment is contained in the PDF-2 field. If the PDF-1
|
||
field is valid but the PDF-2 field is invalid (as it has too many errors), the GNSS
|
||
position will be reported in the SIT 185 message as (33 24.00 S, 150 18.00 E). If the
|
||
LUT detects a later transmission that has valid PDF-1 and PDF-2 fields, then the
|
||
refined GNSS position of (33 23.73 S, 150 19.60 E) will be sent to the MCC.
|
||
SGB messages only contain a single error-correcting code and the precision of a
|
||
GNSS position is always the same for an SGB (i.e., approximately 10 metres).
|
||
The alert message sent from an MCC to a Distress authority indicates the precision
|
||
for a GNSS position.
|
||
7.24
|
||
Could the following confusing incident be explained? The New Zealand RCC
|
||
received an initial alert for beacon 400E70784B59A9F with two Doppler
|
||
locations and no GNSS position and later received a position confirmed alert for
|
||
|
||
7–8
|
||
|
||
beacon 400E70784AFFBFF containing a Doppler location and a GNSS position
|
||
that matched, and an MCC reference position. The MCC reference position was
|
||
near one of the Doppler locations in the initial alert. Were two beacons active?
|
||
If it was the same beacon, why were the Hex IDs different (but similar) and why
|
||
did the first detection not have a GNSS position?
|
||
Answer: There was only one beacon in this incident. The initial alert contained a
|
||
warning in Paragraph 3 that the data decoded from the beacon message was not
|
||
reliable. For this reason, the GNSS position, which is part of the beacon message,
|
||
was suppressed and not included in the first SIT 185 message sent to the New Zealand
|
||
RCC.
|
||
When a LUT receives a beacon message, it performs processing on the data to
|
||
produce the Hex ID. As the first beacon message was invalid, the LEOLUT did not
|
||
perform the processing on the Hex ID and this is why it is different (but similar) to
|
||
the Hex ID in the position confirmed alert. Any Hex ID associated with a SIT 185
|
||
with a warning that the data is not reliable should be treated with caution by a Distress
|
||
authority. Although the data in a beacon message may be invalid, the Doppler or
|
||
DOA locations in such a message are valid, as demonstrated in this incident, as one
|
||
of the Doppler locations in the initial alert was very near the actual location of the
|
||
beacon.
|
||
7.25
|
||
Where can a SAR Service get more information about the Return Link Service
|
||
function in the MEOSAR system?
|
||
Answer: The Return Link Service (RLS) is described in a video available at
|
||
https://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/search-and-rescue/programme-videos-en. A SAR
|
||
Service should contact its supporting MCC to obtain more information about the
|
||
RLS.
|
||
7.26
|
||
What is the difference between an LG MCC and an LGM MCC?
|
||
Answer: An LG MCC is an MCC that is only capable of processing LEOSAR and
|
||
GEOSAR data. An LGM MCC is an MCC that is capable of processing LEOSAR,
|
||
GEOSAR and MEOSAR data.
|
||
MEOSAR is the most recent satellite system added to the Cospas-Sarsat system.
|
||
Before the introduction of MEOSAR, all MCCs were LG MCCs. An LG MCC must
|
||
be upgraded and commissioned in order to become an LGM MCC.
|
||
7.27
|
||
Why does my Distress authority receive multiple DOA position update alerts
|
||
with the same detection time (as reported in Paragraph 3 of the SIT 185
|
||
message)?
|
||
Answer: This could occur for two reasons:
|
||
1) The new alert contains a DOA position with better expected accuracy, as indicated
|
||
in Paragraph 4.
|
||
|
||
7–9
|
||
|
||
2) While the new alert contains the same first detection time (per Paragraph 4), the
|
||
new alert contains new detection data, as indicated by the last detection time reported
|
||
in the subsequent data line. Except for ELT(DT)s, an updated DOA position alert is
|
||
sent if the new alert contains data that is newer than data in all previous alerts, by at
|
||
least five (5) minutes before position confirmation and at least 15 minutes after
|
||
position confirmation.
|
||
7.28
|
||
What is an ELT(DT)?
|
||
Answer: An ELT(DT) is a distress tracking ELT, which is Cospas-Sarsat’s version
|
||
of an Autonomous Distress Tracking device to comply with the requirements of
|
||
ICAO Annex 6. It is used to provide information about the location of an aircraft that
|
||
is in a potential distress situation. An ELT(DT) may be activated when an aircraft’s
|
||
avionics instrumentation has determined that the flight characteristics are sufficiently
|
||
abnormal that the aircraft is in imminent danger of an accident. An ELT(DT) may
|
||
also be activated manually by the crew or automatically due to the G-switch (probable
|
||
crash), like other ELTs.
|
||
7.29
|
||
Is an ELT(DT) like other ELTs?
|
||
Answer: Conceptually, an ELT(DT) is only required to meet ICAO Annex 6
|
||
requirements for Autonomous Distress Tracking devices. However, the Cospas-
|
||
Sarsat Beacon Performance Specifications (documents C/S T.001 and C/S T.018)
|
||
include provisions to ensure that an ELT(DT) will be designed to meet the same
|
||
standard requirements as an ELT(AF), ELT(AP) or ELT(AD), for capabilities such
|
||
as:
|
||
•
|
||
automatic G-switch activation,
|
||
•
|
||
beacon transmit frequency,
|
||
•
|
||
beacon message structure,
|
||
However, ELT(DT)s transmit very frequently soon after activation (i.e., every 5
|
||
seconds within the first 120 seconds), to help ensure that an accurate location is
|
||
provided in the event of an imminent crash. Unlike other ELT(s), ELT(DT)s may be
|
||
activated automatically while in flight due to the aircraft avionics detecting abnormal
|
||
flight characteristics. While other ELTs are required to have a 24-hour battery
|
||
capacity, an ELT(DT) is only required to have a 370-minute battery capacity, unless
|
||
it is crash-survivable.
|
||
7.30
|
||
If the aircraft is still in flight, why is this ELT(DT) alert message sent to the
|
||
Distress authority?
|
||
Answer: ELT(DT)s transmit automatically when the aircraft’s avionics detects
|
||
anomalous conditions indicating that the aircraft is in imminent danger of crashing.
|
||
In the first 120 seconds after activation, an ELT(DT) transmits every five (5) seconds
|
||
so that its location can be accurately determined in the event of a crash. Once an
|
||
aircraft crashes, its ELT(DT) (or other emergency equipment) may be unable to
|
||
transmit properly. In short, ELT(DT) alerts are sent to Distress authorities so that
|
||
|
||
7–10
|
||
|
||
these authorities can respond properly to an aircraft that is in imminent danger of
|
||
crashing.
|
||
In addition, nodal MCCs automatically send ELT(DT) incident alert data to the
|
||
Location of Aircraft in Distress Repository (LADR), which is operated for ICAO as
|
||
a part of the Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System.
|
||
- END OF SECTION 7 –
|
||
|
||
A-1
|
||
|
||
ANNEX A
|
||
ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY
|
||
ACRONYM
|
||
TERMINOLOGY
|
||
ACAS
|
||
Airborne Collision Avoidance System
|
||
ADT
|
||
Autonomous Distress Tracking
|
||
AFTN
|
||
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network
|
||
ALMCC
|
||
Algeria Mission Control Centre
|
||
ARCC
|
||
Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre
|
||
ARMCC
|
||
Argentina Mission Control Centre
|
||
ASMCC
|
||
South Africa Mission Control Centre
|
||
ATSU
|
||
Air Traffic Service Unit
|
||
AUMCC
|
||
Australia Mission Control Centre
|
||
BDS
|
||
BeiDou Navigation Satellite System of China (People’s Republic of)
|
||
BRMCC
|
||
Brazil Mission Control Centre
|
||
BT
|
||
Begin Transmission
|
||
C/S
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
CDDR
|
||
Central Data Distribution Region
|
||
CHMCC
|
||
Chile MCC
|
||
CMC
|
||
Cospas Mission Centre (Russian Federation)
|
||
CMCC
|
||
Canada Mission Control Centre
|
||
CNMCC
|
||
China Mission Control Centre
|
||
COSPAS
|
||
Cosmicheskaya Sistema Poiska Avariynich Sudov (Russian for Space
|
||
System for the Search of Vessels in Distress)
|
||
CSTA
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat Type Approval
|
||
CYMCC
|
||
Cyprus Mission Control Centre
|
||
DDP
|
||
Data Distribution Plan
|
||
DDR
|
||
Data Distribution Region
|
||
DOA
|
||
Difference of Arrival
|
||
EDDR
|
||
Eastern Data Distribution Region
|
||
EHE
|
||
Expected Horizontal Error
|
||
ELT
|
||
Emergency Locator Transmitter
|
||
ELT(DT)
|
||
Emergency Locator Transmitter for Distress Tracking
|
||
EPIRB
|
||
Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon
|
||
FGB
|
||
First Generation Beacon (per document C/S T.001)
|
||
FMCC
|
||
France Mission Control Centre
|
||
FOA
|
||
Frequency of Arrival
|
||
GADSS
|
||
Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System
|
||
Galileo
|
||
European global navigation satellite system
|
||
GEOLUT
|
||
Local User Terminal for GEOSAR
|
||
GEOSAR
|
||
Geostationary Earth Orbit Search and Rescue
|
||
GHz
|
||
Giga Hertz
|
||
GLONASS
|
||
Russian global navigation satellite system
|
||
GMDSS
|
||
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
|
||
|
||
A-2
|
||
|
||
ACRONYM
|
||
TERMINOLOGY
|
||
GNSS
|
||
Global Navigation Satellite System
|
||
GOES
|
||
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
|
||
GPS
|
||
Global Positioning System (USA)
|
||
GRMCC
|
||
Greece Mission Control Centre
|
||
Hex ID
|
||
Hexadecimal identifier
|
||
HKMCC
|
||
Hong Kong Mission Control Centre
|
||
IAMSAR
|
||
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
|
||
IBRD
|
||
International Beacon Registration Database
|
||
ICAO
|
||
International Civilian Aviation Organization
|
||
IDMCC
|
||
Indonesia Mission Control Centre
|
||
IMO
|
||
International Maritime Organization
|
||
INMCC
|
||
India Mission Control Centre
|
||
INSAT
|
||
Indian Satellite
|
||
ITMCC
|
||
Italy Mission Control Centre
|
||
ITU
|
||
International Telecommunication Union
|
||
JAMCC
|
||
Japan Mission Control Centre
|
||
JRCC
|
||
Joint Rescue Coordination Centre
|
||
KOMCC
|
||
Korea Mission Control Centre
|
||
LADR
|
||
Location of an Aircraft in Distress Repository
|
||
LEOLUT
|
||
Local User Terminal for LEOSAR
|
||
LEOSAR
|
||
Low-altitude Earth Orbit Search and Rescue
|
||
LP-STD
|
||
Location Protocol - Standard
|
||
LUT
|
||
Local User Terminal
|
||
LUT ID
|
||
Local User Terminal Identifier
|
||
MCC
|
||
Mission Control Centre
|
||
MEOLUT
|
||
Local User Terminal for MEOSAR
|
||
MEOSAR
|
||
Medium-altitude Earth Orbit Search and Rescue
|
||
MHz
|
||
Mega Hertz
|
||
MID
|
||
Maritime Identification Digits
|
||
MMSI
|
||
Maritime Mobile Service Identity
|
||
MSG
|
||
Message
|
||
MSG
|
||
Meteosat Second Generation (EUMETSAT Satellite)
|
||
MTG
|
||
Meteosat Third Generation (EUTMETSAT Satellite)
|
||
MYMCC
|
||
Malaysia Mission Control Center
|
||
NM
|
||
Nautical Mile
|
||
NMCC
|
||
Norway Mission Control Centre
|
||
NOCR
|
||
Notification of Country of Registration
|
||
NIMCC
|
||
Nigeria Mission Control Centre
|
||
NWPDDR
|
||
North-West Pacific Data Distribution Region
|
||
PAMCC
|
||
Pakistan Mission Control Centre
|
||
PDF
|
||
Protected Data Field
|
||
PEMCC
|
||
Peru Mission Control Centre
|
||
PLB
|
||
Personal Locator Beacon
|
||
|
||
A-3
|
||
|
||
ACRONYM
|
||
TERMINOLOGY
|
||
QAMCC
|
||
Qatar Mission Control Center
|
||
RCC
|
||
Rescue Coordination Centre
|
||
REF
|
||
Reference
|
||
RLM
|
||
Return Link Message
|
||
RLS
|
||
Return Link Service
|
||
RLSP
|
||
Return Link Service Provider
|
||
SAMCC
|
||
Saudi Arabia Mission Control Center
|
||
SAR
|
||
Search and Rescue
|
||
SARP
|
||
Search and Rescue Processor
|
||
SARR
|
||
Search and Rescue Repeater
|
||
SARSAT
|
||
Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking
|
||
SCDDR
|
||
South Central Data Distribution Region
|
||
SGB
|
||
Second Generation Beacon (per document C/S T.018)
|
||
SID
|
||
Standard Interface Description
|
||
SIMCC
|
||
Singapore Mission Control Centre
|
||
SIT
|
||
Subject Indicator Type
|
||
SOLAS
|
||
Safety of Life at Sea
|
||
SPMCC
|
||
Spain Mission Control Centre
|
||
SPOC
|
||
Search and Rescue Point of Contact
|
||
SRR
|
||
Search and Rescue Region
|
||
SSAS
|
||
Ship Security Alert System
|
||
SSR
|
||
Secondary Surveillance Radar
|
||
SWPDDR
|
||
South-West Pacific Data Distribution Region
|
||
TAC
|
||
Type-Approval Certificate (number)
|
||
TAMCC
|
||
ITDC Mission Control Centre (Chinese Taipei)
|
||
TCA
|
||
Time of Closest Approach
|
||
TDOA
|
||
Time Difference of Arrival
|
||
TGMCC
|
||
Togo Mission Control Center
|
||
THMCC
|
||
Thailand Mission Control Centre
|
||
TOA
|
||
Time of Arrival
|
||
TRMCC
|
||
Türkiye Mission Control Centre
|
||
UKMCC
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Mission
|
||
Control Centre
|
||
USMCC
|
||
USA Mission Control Centre
|
||
UTC
|
||
Universal Coordinated Time
|
||
VNMCC
|
||
Vietnam Mission Control Centre
|
||
WDDR
|
||
Western Data Distribution Region
|
||
Abbreviations and acronyms used in this document are also defined in document
|
||
C/S S.011 “Cospas-Sarsat Glossary”, available on the Cospas-Sarsat website at
|
||
https://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/documents-pro/system-documents
|
||
- END OF ANNEX A –
|
||
|
||
B-1
|
||
|
||
ANNEX B
|
||
LIST OF MID (COUNTRY CODES)
|
||
This table is a copy of the list of MID (Maritime Identification Digits) on the Cospas-Sarsat
|
||
website (as of 1 December 2021) (see also ITU website at https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
|
||
R/terrestrial/fmd/Pages/mid.aspx).
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
Adelie Land
|
||
|
||
ADE
|
||
ADELIELAND
|
||
Afghanistan
|
||
|
||
AFG
|
||
AFGHAN
|
||
Alaska (State of) (USA)
|
||
|
||
ALA
|
||
ALASKA
|
||
Albania
|
||
|
||
ALB
|
||
ALBANIA
|
||
Algeria
|
||
|
||
ALG
|
||
ALGERIA
|
||
American Samoa
|
||
|
||
ASA
|
||
SAMOA USA
|
||
Andorra
|
||
|
||
AND
|
||
ANDORRA
|
||
Angola
|
||
|
||
ANG
|
||
ANGOLA
|
||
Anguilla
|
||
|
||
ANA
|
||
ANGUILLA
|
||
Antigua and Barbuda
|
||
|
||
ANT
|
||
ANTIGUA
|
||
Antigua and Barbuda
|
||
|
||
ANT
|
||
ANTIGUA
|
||
Argentina
|
||
|
||
ARG
|
||
ARGENTINA
|
||
Armenia
|
||
|
||
ARM
|
||
ARMENIA
|
||
Aruba
|
||
|
||
ARU
|
||
ARUBA
|
||
Ascension Island
|
||
|
||
ASC
|
||
ASCENSION
|
||
Australia
|
||
|
||
AUS
|
||
AUSTRALIA
|
||
Austria
|
||
|
||
AUT
|
||
AUSTRIA
|
||
Azerbaijan
|
||
|
||
AZR
|
||
AZERBAIJAN
|
||
Azores
|
||
|
||
AZC
|
||
AZORES
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
|
||
BAA
|
||
BAHAMAS
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
|
||
BAA
|
||
BAHAMAS
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
|
||
BAA
|
||
BAHAMAS
|
||
Bahrain
|
||
|
||
BAH
|
||
BAHRAIN
|
||
Bangladesh
|
||
|
||
BAN
|
||
BANGLADESH
|
||
Barbados
|
||
|
||
BAR
|
||
BARBADOS
|
||
Belarus
|
||
|
||
BLR
|
||
BELARUS
|
||
Belgium
|
||
|
||
BEL
|
||
BELGIUM
|
||
Belize
|
||
|
||
BEZ
|
||
BELIZE
|
||
Benin
|
||
|
||
BEN
|
||
BENIN
|
||
Bermuda
|
||
|
||
BER
|
||
BERMUDA
|
||
Bhutan
|
||
|
||
BHU
|
||
BHUTAN
|
||
Bolivia
|
||
|
||
BOL
|
||
BOLIVIA
|
||
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
||
|
||
BOS
|
||
BOSNIAHERZ
|
||
Botswana
|
||
|
||
BOT
|
||
BOTSWANA
|
||
Brazil
|
||
|
||
BRA
|
||
BRAZIL
|
||
|
||
B-2
|
||
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
British Virgin Islands
|
||
|
||
BVI
|
||
VIRGIN GB
|
||
Brunei Darussalam
|
||
|
||
BRU
|
||
BRUNEI
|
||
Bulgaria
|
||
|
||
BUL
|
||
BULGARIA
|
||
Burkina Faso
|
||
|
||
BUF
|
||
BURKINA FS
|
||
Burundi
|
||
|
||
BUI
|
||
BURUNDI
|
||
Cambodia
|
||
|
||
CMB
|
||
CAMBODIA
|
||
Cambodia
|
||
|
||
CMB
|
||
CAMBODIA
|
||
Cameroon
|
||
|
||
CAM
|
||
CAMEROON
|
||
Canada
|
||
|
||
CAN
|
||
CANADA
|
||
Cape Verde
|
||
|
||
CAP
|
||
CAPE VERDE
|
||
Cayman Islands
|
||
|
||
CAY
|
||
CAYMAN IS
|
||
Central African Republic
|
||
|
||
CAR
|
||
CENAFR REP
|
||
Chad
|
||
|
||
CHA
|
||
CHAD
|
||
Chile
|
||
|
||
CHI
|
||
CHILE
|
||
China
|
||
|
||
CHN
|
||
CHINA
|
||
China
|
||
|
||
CHN
|
||
CHINA
|
||
China
|
||
|
||
CHN
|
||
CHINA
|
||
Chinese Taipei
|
||
|
||
TAI
|
||
TAIPEI
|
||
Christmas Island
|
||
|
||
CHR
|
||
CHRISTMAS
|
||
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
|
||
|
||
COC
|
||
COCOS ISLE
|
||
Colombia
|
||
|
||
COL
|
||
COLOMBIA
|
||
Comoros
|
||
|
||
COM
|
||
COMOROS
|
||
Comoros
|
||
|
||
COM
|
||
COMOROS
|
||
Congo
|
||
|
||
CON
|
||
CONGO
|
||
Cook Islands
|
||
|
||
COO
|
||
COOK ISLES
|
||
Costa Rica
|
||
|
||
COS
|
||
COSTA RICA
|
||
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
|
||
|
||
IVO
|
||
IVORY COAST
|
||
Croatia
|
||
|
||
CRT
|
||
CROATIA
|
||
Crozet Archipelago
|
||
|
||
CRP
|
||
CROZET
|
||
Cuba
|
||
|
||
CUB
|
||
CUBA
|
||
Cyprus
|
||
|
||
CYP
|
||
CYPRUS
|
||
Cyprus
|
||
|
||
CYP
|
||
CYPRUS
|
||
Cyprus
|
||
|
||
CYP
|
||
CYPRUS
|
||
Czech Republic
|
||
|
||
CZH
|
||
CZECH REP
|
||
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
|
||
|
||
KDR
|
||
KOREA NOR
|
||
Democratic Republic of the Congo
|
||
|
||
ZAI
|
||
ZAIRE
|
||
Denmark
|
||
|
||
DEN
|
||
DENMARK
|
||
Denmark
|
||
|
||
DEN
|
||
DENMARK
|
||
Djibouti
|
||
|
||
DJI
|
||
DJIBOUTI
|
||
Dominica
|
||
|
||
DOM
|
||
DOMINICA
|
||
Dominican Republic
|
||
|
||
DOR
|
||
DOMINICAN
|
||
Ecuador
|
||
|
||
ECU
|
||
ECUADOR
|
||
|
||
B-3
|
||
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
Egypt
|
||
|
||
EGY
|
||
EGYPT
|
||
El Salvador
|
||
|
||
ELS
|
||
ELSALVADOR
|
||
Equatorial Guinea
|
||
|
||
EQG
|
||
EQ GUINEA
|
||
Eritrea
|
||
|
||
ERT
|
||
ERITREA
|
||
Estonia
|
||
|
||
EST
|
||
ESTONIA
|
||
Eswatini
|
||
|
||
SWA
|
||
ESWATINI
|
||
Ethiopia
|
||
|
||
ETH
|
||
ETHIOPIA
|
||
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)1
|
||
|
||
FAL
|
||
FALKLAND I
|
||
Faroe Islands
|
||
|
||
FAR
|
||
FARO ISLE
|
||
Fiji
|
||
|
||
FIJ
|
||
FIJI
|
||
Finland
|
||
|
||
FIN
|
||
FINLAND
|
||
France
|
||
|
||
FRA
|
||
FRANCE
|
||
France
|
||
|
||
FRA
|
||
FRANCE
|
||
France
|
||
|
||
FRA
|
||
FRANCE
|
||
French Polynesia
|
||
|
||
PLY
|
||
POLYNESIA
|
||
Gabon
|
||
|
||
GAB
|
||
GABON REP
|
||
Gambia
|
||
|
||
GAM
|
||
GAMBIA
|
||
Georgia
|
||
|
||
GOG
|
||
GEORGIA
|
||
Germany
|
||
|
||
GER
|
||
GERMANY
|
||
Germany
|
||
|
||
GER
|
||
GERMANY
|
||
Ghana
|
||
|
||
GHA
|
||
GHANA
|
||
Gibraltar
|
||
|
||
GIB
|
||
GIBRALTAR
|
||
Greece
|
||
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
Greece
|
||
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
Greece
|
||
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
Greece
|
||
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
Greenland
|
||
|
||
GRN
|
||
GREENLAND
|
||
Grenada
|
||
|
||
GRA
|
||
GRENADA
|
||
Guadeloupe (French Dept. of)
|
||
|
||
GUA
|
||
GUADELOUPE
|
||
Guatemala
|
||
|
||
GUT
|
||
GUATEMALA
|
||
Guiana (French Dept. of)
|
||
|
||
GUI
|
||
GUIANA
|
||
Guinea
|
||
|
||
GUN
|
||
GUINEA REP
|
||
Guinea-Bissau
|
||
|
||
GUB
|
||
GUINEA BIS
|
||
Guyana
|
||
|
||
GUY
|
||
GUYANA
|
||
Haiti
|
||
|
||
HAI
|
||
HAITI
|
||
Honduras
|
||
|
||
HON
|
||
HONDURAS
|
||
Hong Kong, China
|
||
|
||
HKG
|
||
HONG KONG
|
||
Hungary
|
||
|
||
HUN
|
||
HUNGARY
|
||
Iceland
|
||
|
||
ICE
|
||
ICELAND
|
||
1 A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the
|
||
Northern Island concerning the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
|
||
|
||
B-4
|
||
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
India
|
||
|
||
IND
|
||
INDIA
|
||
Indonesia
|
||
|
||
INO
|
||
INDONESIA
|
||
Iran
|
||
|
||
IRN
|
||
IRAN
|
||
Iraq
|
||
|
||
IRQ
|
||
IRAQ
|
||
Ireland
|
||
|
||
IRE
|
||
IRELAND
|
||
Israel
|
||
|
||
ISR
|
||
ISRAEL
|
||
Italy
|
||
|
||
ITA
|
||
ITALY
|
||
Jamaica
|
||
|
||
JAM
|
||
JAMAICA
|
||
Japan
|
||
|
||
JPN
|
||
JAPAN
|
||
Japan
|
||
|
||
JPN
|
||
JAPAN
|
||
Jordan
|
||
|
||
JOR
|
||
JORDAN
|
||
Kazakhstan
|
||
|
||
KAZ
|
||
KAZAKHSTAN
|
||
Kenya
|
||
|
||
KEN
|
||
KENYA
|
||
Kerguelen Islands
|
||
|
||
KER
|
||
KERGUELEN
|
||
Kiribati
|
||
|
||
KIR
|
||
KIRIBATI
|
||
Korea (Republic of)
|
||
|
||
KOR
|
||
KOREA SOU
|
||
Korea (Republic of)
|
||
|
||
KOR
|
||
KOREA SOU
|
||
Kuwait
|
||
|
||
KUW
|
||
KUWAIT
|
||
Kyrgyz Republic
|
||
|
||
KYR
|
||
KYRGYZIA
|
||
Laos
|
||
|
||
LAO
|
||
LAO
|
||
Latvia
|
||
|
||
LAT
|
||
LATVIA
|
||
Lebanon
|
||
|
||
LEB
|
||
LEBANON
|
||
Lesotho
|
||
|
||
LES
|
||
LESOTHO
|
||
Liberia
|
||
|
||
LIB
|
||
LIBERIA
|
||
Liberia
|
||
|
||
LIB
|
||
LIBERIA
|
||
Libya
|
||
|
||
LBY
|
||
LIBYA
|
||
Liechtenstein
|
||
|
||
LIE
|
||
LIECHTEN
|
||
Lithuania
|
||
|
||
LIT
|
||
LITHUANIA
|
||
Luxembourg
|
||
|
||
LUX
|
||
LUXEMBOURG
|
||
Macao, China
|
||
|
||
MAC
|
||
MACAO
|
||
Madagascar
|
||
|
||
MAD
|
||
MADAGASCAR
|
||
Madeira
|
||
|
||
MAE
|
||
MADEIRA
|
||
Malawi
|
||
|
||
MAW
|
||
MALAWI
|
||
Malaysia
|
||
|
||
MLY
|
||
MALAYSIA
|
||
Maldives
|
||
|
||
MAV
|
||
MALDIVES
|
||
Mali
|
||
|
||
MLI
|
||
MALI
|
||
Malta
|
||
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
Malta
|
||
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
Malta
|
||
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
Malta
|
||
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
Malta
|
||
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
Marshall Islands
|
||
|
||
MAR
|
||
MARSHALL I
|
||
|
||
B-5
|
||
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
Martinique (French Dept. of)
|
||
|
||
MTQ
|
||
MARTINIQUE
|
||
Mauritania
|
||
|
||
MAA
|
||
MAURITANIA
|
||
Mauritius
|
||
|
||
MAU
|
||
MAURITIUS
|
||
Mexico
|
||
|
||
MEX
|
||
MEXICO
|
||
Micronesia
|
||
|
||
MIC
|
||
MICRONESIA
|
||
Moldova
|
||
|
||
MOL
|
||
MOLDOVA
|
||
Monaco
|
||
|
||
MON
|
||
MONACO
|
||
Mongolia
|
||
|
||
MNG
|
||
MONGOLIA
|
||
Montenegro
|
||
|
||
MNT
|
||
MONTENEGRO
|
||
Montserrat
|
||
|
||
MOT
|
||
MONTSERRAT
|
||
Morocco
|
||
|
||
MOR
|
||
MOROCCO
|
||
Mozambique
|
||
|
||
MOZ
|
||
MOZAMBIQUE
|
||
Myanmar
|
||
|
||
BUR
|
||
BURMA
|
||
Namibia
|
||
|
||
NAM
|
||
NAMIBIA
|
||
Nauru
|
||
|
||
NAU
|
||
NAURU
|
||
Nepal
|
||
|
||
NEP
|
||
NEPAL
|
||
Netherlands (The)
|
||
|
||
NET
|
||
NETHERLAND
|
||
Netherlands (The)
|
||
|
||
NET
|
||
NETHERLAND
|
||
Netherlands (The)
|
||
|
||
NET
|
||
NETHERLAND
|
||
Netherlands Antilles (formerly-).
|
||
Sint Maarten (Dutch part); Bonaire,
|
||
Sint Eustatius and Saba; and Curacao
|
||
|
||
NEA
|
||
N ANTILLES
|
||
New Caledonia
|
||
|
||
NCA
|
||
CALEDONIA
|
||
New Zealand
|
||
|
||
NZL
|
||
NEWZEALAND
|
||
Nicaragua
|
||
|
||
NIC
|
||
NICARAGUA
|
||
Niger
|
||
|
||
NIG
|
||
NIGER
|
||
Nigeria
|
||
|
||
NIA
|
||
NIGERIA
|
||
Niue
|
||
|
||
NIU
|
||
NIUE ISLE
|
||
North Macedonia (Republic of)
|
||
|
||
MKD
|
||
NORTH MAC
|
||
Northern Mariana Islands
|
||
|
||
MAI
|
||
MARIANA IS
|
||
Norway
|
||
|
||
NOR
|
||
NORWAY
|
||
Norway
|
||
|
||
NOR
|
||
NORWAY
|
||
Norway
|
||
|
||
NOR
|
||
NORWAY
|
||
Oman
|
||
|
||
OMN
|
||
OMAN
|
||
Pakistan
|
||
|
||
PAK
|
||
PAKISTAN
|
||
Palau
|
||
|
||
PAL
|
||
PALAU
|
||
Palestine
|
||
|
||
PAA
|
||
PALESTINE
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
B-6
|
||
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Panama
|
||
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
Papua New Guinea
|
||
|
||
PAP
|
||
PAPUA NG
|
||
Paraguay
|
||
|
||
PAR
|
||
PARAGUAY
|
||
Peru
|
||
|
||
PER
|
||
PERU
|
||
Philippines
|
||
|
||
PHI
|
||
PHILIPPINE
|
||
Pitcairn
|
||
|
||
PIT
|
||
PITCAIRN I
|
||
Poland
|
||
|
||
POL
|
||
POLAND
|
||
Portugal
|
||
|
||
POR
|
||
PORTUGAL
|
||
Puerto Rico
|
||
|
||
PUE
|
||
PUERTORICO
|
||
Qatar
|
||
|
||
QAT
|
||
QATAR
|
||
Réunion (La) (same country code for
|
||
Mayotte)
|
||
|
||
REU
|
||
REUNION
|
||
Romania
|
||
|
||
ROM
|
||
ROMANIA
|
||
Russian Federation
|
||
|
||
RUS
|
||
RUSSIA
|
||
Rwanda
|
||
|
||
RWA
|
||
RWANDA
|
||
Saint Kitts and Nevis
|
||
|
||
SKN
|
||
ST KITTS
|
||
Saint Lucia
|
||
|
||
SLU
|
||
ST LUCIA
|
||
Saint Paul and Amsterdam Islands
|
||
|
||
SPL
|
||
ST PAUL
|
||
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
|
||
|
||
SVG
|
||
ST VINCENT
|
||
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
|
||
|
||
SVG
|
||
ST VINCENT
|
||
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
|
||
|
||
SVG
|
||
ST VINCENT
|
||
Samoa
|
||
|
||
WSA
|
||
WEST SAMOA
|
||
San Marino
|
||
|
||
SAN
|
||
SAN MARINO
|
||
Sao Tome and Principe
|
||
|
||
SAO
|
||
SAO TOME
|
||
Saudi Arabia
|
||
|
||
SAU
|
||
SAUDI
|
||
Senegal
|
||
|
||
SEN
|
||
SENEGAL
|
||
Serbia
|
||
|
||
SER
|
||
SERBIA
|
||
Seychelles
|
||
|
||
SEY
|
||
SEYCHELLES
|
||
Sierra Leone
|
||
|
||
SIL
|
||
SIERRA LEO
|
||
Singapore
|
||
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
Singapore
|
||
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
Singapore
|
||
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
Singapore
|
||
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
Slovak Republic
|
||
|
||
SLV
|
||
SLOVAKIA
|
||
Slovenia
|
||
|
||
SVN
|
||
SLOVENIA
|
||
|
||
B-7
|
||
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
Solomon Islands
|
||
|
||
SOL
|
||
SOLOMON IS
|
||
Somalia
|
||
|
||
SOM
|
||
SOMALI
|
||
South Africa
|
||
|
||
SAF
|
||
SO AFRICA
|
||
South Sudan
|
||
|
||
SSD
|
||
SOUTHSUDAN
|
||
Spain
|
||
|
||
SPA
|
||
SPAIN
|
||
Spain
|
||
|
||
SPA
|
||
SPAIN
|
||
Sri Lanka
|
||
|
||
SRI
|
||
SRI LANKA
|
||
St. Helena
|
||
|
||
SHE
|
||
ST HELENA
|
||
St. Pierre and Miquelon (French Dept. of)
|
||
|
||
SPI
|
||
ST PIERRE
|
||
Sudan
|
||
|
||
SUD
|
||
SUDAN
|
||
Suriname
|
||
|
||
SUR
|
||
SURINAME
|
||
Sweden
|
||
|
||
SWE
|
||
SWEDEN
|
||
Sweden
|
||
|
||
SWE
|
||
SWEDEN
|
||
Switzerland
|
||
|
||
SWT
|
||
SWISS
|
||
Syria
|
||
|
||
SYR
|
||
SYRIA
|
||
Tajikistan
|
||
|
||
TJK
|
||
TAJIKISTAN
|
||
Tanzania
|
||
|
||
TAN
|
||
TANZANIA
|
||
Tanzania
|
||
|
||
TAN
|
||
TANZANIA
|
||
Thailand
|
||
|
||
THA
|
||
THAILAND
|
||
Timor-Leste
|
||
|
||
TIM
|
||
TIMORLESTE
|
||
Togo
|
||
|
||
TOG
|
||
TOGO
|
||
Tonga
|
||
|
||
TON
|
||
TONGA
|
||
Trinidad and Tobago
|
||
|
||
TAT
|
||
TRINIDAD
|
||
Tunisia
|
||
|
||
TUN
|
||
TUNISIA
|
||
Türkiye
|
||
|
||
TUR
|
||
TURKIYE
|
||
Turkmenistan
|
||
|
||
TKM
|
||
TURKMENIST
|
||
Turks and Caicos Islands
|
||
|
||
TUK
|
||
CAICOS IS
|
||
Tuvalu
|
||
|
||
TUV
|
||
TUVALU IS
|
||
Uganda
|
||
|
||
UGA
|
||
UGANDA
|
||
Ukraine
|
||
|
||
UKR
|
||
UKRAINE
|
||
United Arab Emirates
|
||
|
||
UAE
|
||
UAE
|
||
United Arab Emirates
|
||
|
||
UAE
|
||
UAE
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
United States of America
|
||
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
United States of America
|
||
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
|
||
B-8
|
||
|
||
Name
|
||
MID
|
||
Abrv 3 Abrv 10
|
||
United States of America
|
||
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
United States of America
|
||
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
United States of America
|
||
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
United States Virgin Islands
|
||
|
||
USV
|
||
VIRGIN US
|
||
Uruguay
|
||
|
||
URU
|
||
URUGUAY
|
||
Uzbekistan
|
||
|
||
UZB
|
||
UZBEKISTAN
|
||
Vanuatu
|
||
|
||
VAN
|
||
VANUATU
|
||
Vanuatu
|
||
|
||
VAN
|
||
VANUATU
|
||
Vatican City State
|
||
|
||
VAT
|
||
VATICAN
|
||
Venezuela
|
||
|
||
VEN
|
||
VENEZUELA
|
||
Vietnam
|
||
|
||
VIE
|
||
VIETNAM
|
||
Wallis and Futuna Islands
|
||
|
||
WAL
|
||
WALLIS IS
|
||
Yemen
|
||
|
||
YEM
|
||
YEMEN
|
||
Yemen
|
||
|
||
YEM
|
||
YEMEN
|
||
Zambia
|
||
|
||
ZAM
|
||
ZAMBIA
|
||
Zimbabwe
|
||
|
||
ZIM
|
||
ZIMBABWE
|
||
|
||
B-9
|
||
|
||
This table listing the MID codes in order uses data from the Cospas-Sarsat website
|
||
downloaded (as of 1 November 2019) (see also ITU website at https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
|
||
R/terrestrial/fmd/Pages/mid.aspx).
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Albania
|
||
ALB
|
||
ALBANIA
|
||
|
||
Andorra
|
||
AND
|
||
ANDORRA
|
||
|
||
Austria
|
||
AUT
|
||
AUSTRIA
|
||
|
||
Azores
|
||
AZC
|
||
AZORES
|
||
|
||
Belgium
|
||
BEL
|
||
BELGIUM
|
||
|
||
Belarus
|
||
BLR
|
||
BELARUS
|
||
|
||
Bulgaria
|
||
BUL
|
||
BULGARIA
|
||
|
||
Vatican City State
|
||
VAT
|
||
VATICAN
|
||
|
||
Cyprus
|
||
CYP
|
||
CYPRUS
|
||
|
||
Cyprus
|
||
CYP
|
||
CYPRUS
|
||
|
||
Germany
|
||
GER
|
||
GERMANY
|
||
|
||
Cyprus
|
||
CYP
|
||
CYPRUS
|
||
|
||
Georgia
|
||
GOG
|
||
GEORGIA
|
||
|
||
Moldova
|
||
MOL
|
||
MOLDOVA
|
||
|
||
Malta
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
|
||
Armenia
|
||
ARM
|
||
ARMENIA
|
||
|
||
Germany
|
||
GER
|
||
GERMANY
|
||
|
||
Denmark
|
||
DEN
|
||
DENMARK
|
||
|
||
Denmark
|
||
DEN
|
||
DENMARK
|
||
|
||
Spain
|
||
SPA
|
||
SPAIN
|
||
|
||
Spain
|
||
SPA
|
||
SPAIN
|
||
|
||
France
|
||
FRA
|
||
FRANCE
|
||
|
||
France
|
||
FRA
|
||
FRANCE
|
||
|
||
France
|
||
FRA
|
||
FRANCE
|
||
|
||
Malta
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
|
||
Finland
|
||
FIN
|
||
FINLAND
|
||
|
||
Faroe Islands
|
||
FAR
|
||
FARO ISLE
|
||
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
|
||
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
|
||
Northern Ireland
|
||
UKM
|
||
G BRITAIN
|
||
|
||
Gibraltar
|
||
GIB
|
||
GIBRALTAR
|
||
|
||
Greece
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
|
||
Croatia
|
||
CRT
|
||
CROATIA
|
||
|
||
Greece
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
|
||
B-10
|
||
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Greece
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
|
||
Greece
|
||
GRE
|
||
GREECE
|
||
|
||
Morocco
|
||
MOR
|
||
MOROCCO
|
||
|
||
Hungary
|
||
HUN
|
||
HUNGARY
|
||
|
||
Netherlands (The)
|
||
NET
|
||
NETHERLAND
|
||
|
||
Netherlands (The)
|
||
NET
|
||
NETHERLAND
|
||
|
||
Netherlands (The)
|
||
NET
|
||
NETHERLAND
|
||
|
||
Italy
|
||
ITA
|
||
ITALY
|
||
|
||
Malta
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
|
||
Malta
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
|
||
Ireland
|
||
IRE
|
||
IRELAND
|
||
|
||
Iceland
|
||
ICE
|
||
ICELAND
|
||
|
||
Liechtenstein
|
||
LIE
|
||
LIECHTEN
|
||
|
||
Luxembourg
|
||
LUX
|
||
LUXEMBOURG
|
||
|
||
Monaco
|
||
MON
|
||
MONACO
|
||
|
||
Madeira
|
||
MAE
|
||
MADEIRA
|
||
|
||
Malta
|
||
MAL
|
||
MALTA
|
||
|
||
Norway
|
||
NOR
|
||
NORWAY
|
||
|
||
Norway
|
||
NOR
|
||
NORWAY
|
||
|
||
Norway
|
||
NOR
|
||
NORWAY
|
||
|
||
Poland
|
||
POL
|
||
POLAND
|
||
|
||
Montenegro
|
||
MNT
|
||
MONTENEGRO
|
||
|
||
Portugal
|
||
POR
|
||
PORTUGAL
|
||
|
||
Romania
|
||
ROM
|
||
ROMANIA
|
||
|
||
Sweden
|
||
SWE
|
||
SWEDEN
|
||
|
||
Sweden
|
||
SWE
|
||
SWEDEN
|
||
|
||
Slovak Republic
|
||
SLV
|
||
SLOVAKIA
|
||
|
||
San Marino
|
||
SAN
|
||
SAN MARINO
|
||
|
||
Switzerland
|
||
SWT
|
||
SWISS
|
||
|
||
Czech Republic
|
||
CZH
|
||
CZECH REP
|
||
|
||
Türkiye
|
||
TUR
|
||
TURKIYE
|
||
|
||
Ukraine
|
||
UKR
|
||
UKRAINE
|
||
|
||
Russian Federation
|
||
RUS
|
||
RUSSIA
|
||
|
||
North Macedonia (Republic of)
|
||
MKD
|
||
NORTH MAC
|
||
|
||
Latvia
|
||
LAT
|
||
LATVIA
|
||
|
||
Estonia
|
||
EST
|
||
ESTONIA
|
||
|
||
Lithuania
|
||
LIT
|
||
LITHUANIA
|
||
|
||
Slovenia
|
||
SVN
|
||
SLOVENIA
|
||
|
||
Serbia
|
||
SER
|
||
SERBIA
|
||
|
||
Anguilla
|
||
ANA
|
||
ANGUILLA
|
||
|
||
Alaska (State of) (USA)
|
||
ALA
|
||
ALASKA
|
||
|
||
Antigua and Barbuda
|
||
ANT
|
||
ANTIGUA
|
||
|
||
B-11
|
||
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Antigua and Barbuda
|
||
ANT
|
||
ANTIGUA
|
||
|
||
Netherlands Antilles (formerly-).
|
||
Sint Maarten (Dutch part); Bonaire,
|
||
Sint Eustatius and Saba; and Curacao
|
||
NEA
|
||
N ANTILLES
|
||
|
||
Aruba
|
||
ARU
|
||
ARUBA
|
||
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
BAA
|
||
BAHAMAS
|
||
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
BAA
|
||
BAHAMAS
|
||
|
||
Bermuda
|
||
BER
|
||
BERMUDA
|
||
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
BAA
|
||
BAHAMAS
|
||
|
||
Belize
|
||
BEZ
|
||
BELIZE
|
||
|
||
Barbados
|
||
BAR
|
||
BARBADOS
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
CAN
|
||
CANADA
|
||
|
||
Cayman Islands
|
||
CAY
|
||
CAYMAN IS
|
||
|
||
Costa Rica
|
||
COS
|
||
COSTA RICA
|
||
|
||
Cuba
|
||
CUB
|
||
CUBA
|
||
|
||
Dominica
|
||
DOM
|
||
DOMINICA
|
||
|
||
Dominican Republic
|
||
DOR
|
||
DOMINICAN
|
||
|
||
Guadeloupe (French Dept. of)
|
||
GUA
|
||
GUADELOUPE
|
||
|
||
Grenada
|
||
GRA
|
||
GRENADA
|
||
|
||
Greenland
|
||
GRN
|
||
GREENLAND
|
||
|
||
Guatemala
|
||
GUT
|
||
GUATEMALA
|
||
|
||
Honduras
|
||
HON
|
||
HONDURAS
|
||
|
||
Haiti
|
||
HAI
|
||
HAITI
|
||
|
||
United States of America
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
|
||
Jamaica
|
||
JAM
|
||
JAMAICA
|
||
|
||
Saint Kitts and Nevis
|
||
SKN
|
||
ST KITTS
|
||
|
||
Saint Lucia
|
||
SLU
|
||
ST LUCIA
|
||
|
||
Mexico
|
||
MEX
|
||
MEXICO
|
||
|
||
Martinique
|
||
MTQ
|
||
MARTINIQUE
|
||
|
||
Montserrat
|
||
MOT
|
||
MONTSERRAT
|
||
|
||
Nicaragua
|
||
NIC
|
||
NICARAGUA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Puerto Rico
|
||
PUE
|
||
PUERTORICO
|
||
|
||
El Salvador
|
||
ELS
|
||
ELSALVADOR
|
||
|
||
St. Pierre and Miquelon
|
||
SPI
|
||
ST PIERRE
|
||
|
||
Trinidad and Tobago
|
||
TAT
|
||
TRINIDAD
|
||
|
||
B-12
|
||
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Turks and Caicos Islands
|
||
TUK
|
||
CAICOS IS
|
||
|
||
United States of America
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
|
||
United States of America
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
|
||
United States of America
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
|
||
United States of America
|
||
USA
|
||
USA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
PAN
|
||
PANAMA
|
||
|
||
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
|
||
SVG
|
||
ST VINCENT
|
||
|
||
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
|
||
SVG
|
||
ST VINCENT
|
||
|
||
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
|
||
SVG
|
||
ST VINCENT
|
||
|
||
British Virgin Islands
|
||
BVI
|
||
VIRGIN GB
|
||
|
||
United States Virgin Islands
|
||
USV
|
||
VIRGIN US
|
||
|
||
Afghanistan
|
||
AFG
|
||
AFGHAN
|
||
|
||
Saudi Arabia
|
||
SAU
|
||
SAUDI
|
||
|
||
Bangladesh
|
||
BAN
|
||
BANGLADESH
|
||
|
||
Bahrain
|
||
BAH
|
||
BAHRAIN
|
||
|
||
Bhutan
|
||
BHU
|
||
BHUTAN
|
||
|
||
China
|
||
CHN
|
||
CHINA
|
||
|
||
China
|
||
CHN
|
||
CHINA
|
||
|
||
China
|
||
CHN
|
||
CHINA
|
||
|
||
Chinese Taipei
|
||
TAI
|
||
TAIPEI
|
||
|
||
Sri Lanka
|
||
SRI
|
||
SRI LANKA
|
||
|
||
India
|
||
IND
|
||
INDIA
|
||
|
||
Iran
|
||
IRN
|
||
IRAN
|
||
|
||
Azerbaijan
|
||
AZR
|
||
AZERBAIJAN
|
||
|
||
Iraq
|
||
IRQ
|
||
IRAQ
|
||
|
||
Israel
|
||
ISR
|
||
ISRAEL
|
||
|
||
Japan
|
||
JPN
|
||
JAPAN
|
||
|
||
Japan
|
||
JPN
|
||
JAPAN
|
||
|
||
Turkmenistan
|
||
TKM
|
||
TURKMENIST
|
||
|
||
Kazakhstan
|
||
KAZ
|
||
KAZAKHSTAN
|
||
|
||
Uzbekistan
|
||
UZB
|
||
UZBEKISTAN
|
||
|
||
Jordan
|
||
JOR
|
||
JORDAN
|
||
|
||
Korea (Republic of)
|
||
KOR
|
||
KOREA SOU
|
||
|
||
Korea (Republic of)
|
||
KOR
|
||
KOREA SOU
|
||
|
||
Palestine
|
||
PAA
|
||
PALESTINE
|
||
|
||
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
|
||
KDR
|
||
KOREA NOR
|
||
|
||
Kuwait
|
||
KUW
|
||
KUWAIT
|
||
|
||
Lebanon
|
||
LEB
|
||
LEBANON
|
||
|
||
B-13
|
||
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Kyrgyz Republic
|
||
KYR
|
||
KYRGYZIA
|
||
|
||
Macao, China
|
||
MAC
|
||
MACAO
|
||
|
||
Maldives
|
||
MAV
|
||
MALDIVES
|
||
|
||
Mongolia
|
||
MNG
|
||
MONGOLIA
|
||
|
||
Nepal
|
||
NEP
|
||
NEPAL
|
||
|
||
Oman
|
||
OMN
|
||
OMAN
|
||
|
||
Pakistan
|
||
PAK
|
||
PAKISTAN
|
||
|
||
Qatar
|
||
QAT
|
||
QATAR
|
||
|
||
Syria
|
||
SYR
|
||
SYRIA
|
||
|
||
United Arab Emirates
|
||
UAE
|
||
UAE
|
||
|
||
United Arab Emirates
|
||
UAE
|
||
UAE
|
||
|
||
Tajikistan
|
||
TJK
|
||
TAJIKISTAN
|
||
|
||
Yemen
|
||
YEM
|
||
YEMEN
|
||
|
||
Yemen
|
||
YEM
|
||
YEMEN
|
||
|
||
Hong Kong, China
|
||
HKG
|
||
HONG KONG
|
||
|
||
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
||
BOS
|
||
BOSNIAHERZ
|
||
|
||
Adelie Land
|
||
ADE
|
||
ADELIELAND
|
||
|
||
Australia
|
||
AUS
|
||
AUSTRALIA
|
||
|
||
Myanmar
|
||
BUR
|
||
BURMA
|
||
|
||
Brunei Darussalam
|
||
BRU
|
||
BRUNEI
|
||
|
||
Micronesia
|
||
MIC
|
||
MICRONESIA
|
||
|
||
Palau
|
||
PAL
|
||
PALAU
|
||
|
||
New Zealand
|
||
NZL
|
||
NEWZEALAND
|
||
|
||
Cambodia
|
||
CMB
|
||
CAMBODIA
|
||
|
||
Cambodia
|
||
CMB
|
||
CAMBODIA
|
||
|
||
Christmas Island
|
||
CHR
|
||
CHRISTMAS
|
||
|
||
Cook Islands
|
||
COO
|
||
COOK ISLES
|
||
|
||
Fiji
|
||
FIJ
|
||
FIJI
|
||
|
||
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
|
||
COC
|
||
COCOS ISLE
|
||
|
||
Indonesia
|
||
INO
|
||
INDONESIA
|
||
|
||
Kiribati
|
||
KIR
|
||
KIRIBATI
|
||
|
||
Laos
|
||
LAO
|
||
LAO
|
||
|
||
Malaysia
|
||
MLY
|
||
MALAYSIA
|
||
|
||
Northern Mariana Islands
|
||
MAI
|
||
MARIANA IS
|
||
|
||
Marshall Islands
|
||
MAR
|
||
MARSHALL I
|
||
|
||
New Caledonia
|
||
NCA
|
||
CALEDONIA
|
||
|
||
Niue
|
||
NIU
|
||
NIUE ISLE
|
||
|
||
Nauru
|
||
NAU
|
||
NAURU
|
||
|
||
French Polynesia
|
||
PLY
|
||
POLYNESIA
|
||
|
||
Philippines
|
||
PHI
|
||
PHILIPPINE
|
||
|
||
Timor-Leste
|
||
TIM
|
||
TIMORLESTE
|
||
|
||
Papua New Guinea
|
||
PAP
|
||
PAPUA NG
|
||
|
||
B-14
|
||
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Pitcairn
|
||
PIT
|
||
PITCAIRN I
|
||
|
||
Solomon Islands
|
||
SOL
|
||
SOLOMON IS
|
||
|
||
American Samoa
|
||
ASA
|
||
SAMOA USA
|
||
|
||
Samoa
|
||
WSA
|
||
WEST SAMOA
|
||
|
||
Singapore
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
|
||
Singapore
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
|
||
Singapore
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
|
||
Singapore
|
||
SIN
|
||
SINGAPORE
|
||
|
||
Thailand
|
||
THA
|
||
THAILAND
|
||
|
||
Tonga
|
||
TON
|
||
TONGA
|
||
|
||
Tuvalu
|
||
TUV
|
||
TUVALU IS
|
||
|
||
Vietnam
|
||
VIE
|
||
VIETNAM
|
||
|
||
Vanuatu
|
||
VAN
|
||
VANUATU
|
||
|
||
Vanuatu
|
||
VAN
|
||
VANUATU
|
||
|
||
Wallis and Futuna Islands
|
||
WAL
|
||
WALLIS IS
|
||
|
||
South Africa
|
||
SAF
|
||
SO AFRICA
|
||
|
||
Angola
|
||
ANG
|
||
ANGOLA
|
||
|
||
Algeria
|
||
ALG
|
||
ALGERIA
|
||
|
||
Saint Paul and Amsterdam Islands
|
||
SPL
|
||
ST PAUL
|
||
|
||
Ascension Island
|
||
ASC
|
||
ASCENSION
|
||
|
||
Burundi
|
||
BUI
|
||
BURUNDI
|
||
|
||
Benin
|
||
BEN
|
||
BENIN
|
||
|
||
Botswana
|
||
BOT
|
||
BOTSWANA
|
||
|
||
Central African Republic
|
||
CAR
|
||
CENAFR REP
|
||
|
||
Cameroon
|
||
CAM
|
||
CAMEROON
|
||
|
||
Congo
|
||
CON
|
||
CONGO
|
||
|
||
Comoros
|
||
COM
|
||
COMOROS
|
||
|
||
Cape Verde
|
||
CAP
|
||
CAPE VERDE
|
||
|
||
Crozet Archipelago
|
||
CRP
|
||
CROZET
|
||
|
||
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
|
||
IVO
|
||
IVORYCOAST
|
||
|
||
Comoros
|
||
COM
|
||
COMOROS
|
||
|
||
Djibouti
|
||
DJI
|
||
DJIBOUTI
|
||
|
||
Egypt
|
||
EGY
|
||
EGYPT
|
||
|
||
Ethiopia
|
||
ETH
|
||
ETHIOPIA
|
||
|
||
Eritrea
|
||
ERT
|
||
ERITREA
|
||
|
||
Gabon
|
||
GAB
|
||
GABON REP
|
||
|
||
Ghana
|
||
GHA
|
||
GHANA
|
||
|
||
Gambia
|
||
GAM
|
||
GAMBIA
|
||
|
||
Guinea-Bissau
|
||
GUB
|
||
GUINEA BIS
|
||
|
||
Equatorial Guinea
|
||
EQG
|
||
EQ GUINEA
|
||
|
||
Guinea
|
||
GUN
|
||
GUINEA REP
|
||
|
||
Burkina Faso
|
||
BUF
|
||
BURKINA FS
|
||
|
||
B-15
|
||
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Kenya
|
||
KEN
|
||
KENYA
|
||
|
||
Kerguelen Islands
|
||
KER
|
||
KERGUELEN
|
||
|
||
Liberia
|
||
LIB
|
||
LIBERIA
|
||
|
||
Liberia
|
||
LIB
|
||
LIBERIA
|
||
|
||
South Sudan
|
||
SSD
|
||
SOUTHSUDAN
|
||
|
||
Libya
|
||
LBY
|
||
LIBYA
|
||
|
||
Lesotho
|
||
LES
|
||
LESOTHO
|
||
|
||
Mauritius
|
||
MAU
|
||
MAURITIUS
|
||
|
||
Madagascar
|
||
MAD
|
||
MADAGASCAR
|
||
|
||
Mali
|
||
MLI
|
||
MALI
|
||
|
||
Mozambique
|
||
MOZ
|
||
MOZAMBIQUE
|
||
|
||
Mauritania
|
||
MAA
|
||
MAURITANIA
|
||
|
||
Malawi
|
||
MAW
|
||
MALAWI
|
||
|
||
Niger
|
||
NIG
|
||
NIGER
|
||
|
||
Nigeria
|
||
NIA
|
||
NIGERIA
|
||
|
||
Namibia
|
||
NAM
|
||
NAMIBIA
|
||
|
||
Reunion (same country code for Mayotte)
|
||
REU
|
||
REUNION
|
||
|
||
Rwanda
|
||
RWA
|
||
RWANDA
|
||
|
||
Sudan
|
||
SUD
|
||
SUDAN
|
||
|
||
Senegal
|
||
SEN
|
||
SENEGAL
|
||
|
||
Seychelles
|
||
SEY
|
||
SEYCHELLE
|
||
|
||
St. Helena
|
||
SHE
|
||
ST HELENA
|
||
|
||
Somalia
|
||
SOM
|
||
SOMALI
|
||
|
||
Sierra Leone
|
||
SIL
|
||
SIERRA LEO
|
||
|
||
Sao Tome and Principe
|
||
SAO
|
||
SAO TOME
|
||
|
||
Eswatini
|
||
SWA
|
||
ESWATINI
|
||
|
||
Chad
|
||
CHA
|
||
CHAD
|
||
|
||
Togo
|
||
TOG
|
||
TOGO
|
||
|
||
Tunisia
|
||
TUN
|
||
TUNISIA
|
||
|
||
Tanzania
|
||
TAN
|
||
TANZANIA
|
||
|
||
Uganda
|
||
UGA
|
||
UGANDA
|
||
|
||
Democratic Republic of the Congo
|
||
ZAI
|
||
ZAIRE
|
||
|
||
Tanzania
|
||
TAN
|
||
TANZANIA
|
||
|
||
Zambia
|
||
ZAM
|
||
ZAMBIA
|
||
|
||
Zimbabwe
|
||
ZIM
|
||
ZIMBABWE
|
||
|
||
Argentina
|
||
ARG
|
||
ARGENTINA
|
||
|
||
Brazil
|
||
BRA
|
||
BRAZIL
|
||
|
||
Bolivia
|
||
BOL
|
||
BOLIVIA
|
||
|
||
Chile
|
||
CHI
|
||
CHILE
|
||
|
||
Colombia
|
||
COL
|
||
COLOMBIA
|
||
|
||
Ecuador
|
||
ECU
|
||
ECUADOR
|
||
|
||
B-16
|
||
|
||
MID
|
||
Name
|
||
Abrv 3
|
||
Abrv 10
|
||
|
||
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 2
|
||
FAL
|
||
FALKLAND I
|
||
|
||
Guiana (French Dept. Of)
|
||
GUI
|
||
GUIANA
|
||
|
||
Guyana
|
||
GUY
|
||
GUYANA
|
||
|
||
Paraguay
|
||
PAR
|
||
PARAGUAY
|
||
|
||
Peru
|
||
PER
|
||
PERU
|
||
|
||
Suriname
|
||
SUR
|
||
SURINAME
|
||
|
||
Uruguay
|
||
URU
|
||
URUGUAY
|
||
|
||
Venezuela
|
||
VEN
|
||
VENEZUELA
|
||
- END OF ANNEX B -
|
||
2 A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the
|
||
Northern Island concerning the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
|
||
|
||
C-1
|
||
|
||
ANNEX C
|
||
COSPAS-SARSAT DATA DISTRIBUTION REGIONS
|
||
C.1
|
||
WESTERN DDR
|
||
Figure C.1: Western DDR Map
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
C-2
|
||
|
||
Countries/Regions and MIDs Supported by the Western DDR MCCs:
|
||
ARMCC
|
||
Argentina
|
||
|
||
Falklands
|
||
Islands/Malvinas
|
||
|
||
BRMCC
|
||
Brazil
|
||
|
||
Ascension
|
||
|
||
CHMCC
|
||
Bolivia
|
||
|
||
Chile
|
||
|
||
Paraguay
|
||
|
||
Uruguay
|
||
|
||
CMCC
|
||
Canada
|
||
|
||
St. Pierre and
|
||
Miquelon
|
||
|
||
PEMCC
|
||
Peru
|
||
|
||
USMCC
|
||
Alaska
|
||
|
||
Aruba
|
||
|
||
Bahamas
|
||
308/309/311
|
||
Barbados
|
||
|
||
Belize
|
||
|
||
Bermuda
|
||
|
||
British Virgin
|
||
Islands
|
||
|
||
Cayman Islands
|
||
|
||
Colombia
|
||
|
||
Costa Rica
|
||
|
||
Cuba
|
||
|
||
Dominican
|
||
Republic 327
|
||
Ecuador
|
||
|
||
El Salvador
|
||
|
||
Grenada
|
||
|
||
Guatemala
|
||
|
||
Guyana
|
||
|
||
Haiti
|
||
|
||
Honduras
|
||
|
||
Jamaica
|
||
|
||
Marshall
|
||
Islands
|
||
|
||
Mexico
|
||
|
||
Micronesia
|
||
|
||
Netherlands
|
||
Antilles
|
||
|
||
Nicaragua
|
||
|
||
Northern
|
||
Mariana
|
||
Islands
|
||
|
||
Palau
|
||
|
||
Panama
|
||
351/352/353/354/
|
||
355/356/357/370/
|
||
371/372/373/374
|
||
Puerto Rico
|
||
|
||
St. Vincent
|
||
and the
|
||
Grenadines
|
||
375/376/377
|
||
Trinidad and
|
||
Tobago
|
||
|
||
Turks and
|
||
Caicos Islands
|
||
|
||
USA
|
||
338/366/367/368/
|
||
|
||
US Virgin
|
||
Islands
|
||
|
||
Venezuela
|
||
|
||
C-3
|
||
|
||
C.2 NORTH WEST PACIFIC DDR
|
||
Figure C.2: North West Pacific DDR Map
|
||
Countries/Regions and MIDs Supported by the North-West Pacific DDR MCCs
|
||
CNMCC
|
||
China (P.R. of)
|
||
412/413
|
||
HKMCC
|
||
Hong Kong,
|
||
China
|
||
|
||
Macao, China
|
||
|
||
Philippines
|
||
|
||
Democratic People’s
|
||
Rep. of Korea
|
||
|
||
JAMCC
|
||
Japan
|
||
431/432
|
||
KOMCC
|
||
Korea (Rep. of)
|
||
440/441
|
||
TAMCC
|
||
Chinese Taipei
|
||
|
||
VNMCC
|
||
Cambodia
|
||
514/515
|
||
Laos
|
||
|
||
Viet Nam
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
C-4
|
||
|
||
C.3 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC DDR
|
||
Figure C.3: South West Pacific DDR Map
|
||
Countries/Regions and MIDs Supported by the South West Pacific DDR MCCs
|
||
ASMCC
|
||
Angola
|
||
|
||
Botswana
|
||
|
||
Burundi
|
||
|
||
Dem. Rep. of
|
||
Congo 676
|
||
Eswatini
|
||
|
||
Lesotho
|
||
|
||
Malawi
|
||
|
||
Mozambique
|
||
|
||
Namibia
|
||
|
||
Rwanda
|
||
|
||
South Africa
|
||
|
||
St. Helena
|
||
|
||
Uganda
|
||
|
||
Zambia
|
||
|
||
Zimbabwe
|
||
|
||
AUMCC
|
||
Adelie Land
|
||
|
||
American
|
||
Samoa 559
|
||
Australia
|
||
|
||
Christmas Island
|
||
|
||
Cocos Islands
|
||
|
||
Cook Islands
|
||
|
||
Fiji
|
||
|
||
Kiribati
|
||
|
||
Nauru
|
||
|
||
New Caledonia
|
||
|
||
New Zealand
|
||
|
||
Niue
|
||
|
||
Papua New
|
||
Guinea 553
|
||
Saint Paul &
|
||
Amsterdam 607
|
||
Samoa
|
||
|
||
Solomon
|
||
Islands 557
|
||
Tonga
|
||
|
||
Tuvalu
|
||
|
||
Vanuatu
|
||
|
||
Wallis and
|
||
Futuna 578
|
||
IDMCC
|
||
Indonesia 525
|
||
Timor-Leste 550
|
||
SIMCC
|
||
Brunei
|
||
|
||
Malaysia
|
||
|
||
Myanmar
|
||
|
||
Singapore
|
||
563/564/565
|
||
THMCC
|
||
Thailand 567
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
C-5
|
||
|
||
C.4 CENTRAL DDR
|
||
Figure C.4: Central DDR Map
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
C-6
|
||
|
||
Countries/Regions and MIDs Supported by the Central DDR MCCs
|
||
CYMCC
|
||
Cyprus 209/210/212
|
||
FMCC
|
||
Andorra
|
||
|
||
Anguilla
|
||
|
||
Antigua and
|
||
Barbuda
|
||
304/305
|
||
Austria
|
||
|
||
Azores
|
||
|
||
Belgium
|
||
|
||
Chad
|
||
|
||
Djibouti
|
||
|
||
Comoros
|
||
|
||
Crozet
|
||
Archipelago 618
|
||
Dominica
|
||
|
||
France
|
||
226/227/228
|
||
French Guiana
|
||
|
||
French Polynesia
|
||
|
||
Germany
|
||
211/218
|
||
Gibraltar
|
||
|
||
Guadeloupe
|
||
|
||
Kerguelen
|
||
Islands 635
|
||
Liechtenstein
|
||
(Swiss) 252
|
||
Luxemburg
|
||
|
||
Madagascar
|
||
|
||
Madeira 255
|
||
Martinique
|
||
|
||
Mauritius
|
||
|
||
Monaco
|
||
|
||
Montserrat
|
||
|
||
Morocco
|
||
|
||
Netherlands
|
||
244/245/246
|
||
Pitcairn
|
||
|
||
Portugal
|
||
|
||
Reunion/Mayotte
|
||
|
||
Saint Kitts and
|
||
Nevis 341
|
||
Saint Lucia
|
||
|
||
Suriname
|
||
|
||
Switzerland
|
||
|
||
Tunisia 672
|
||
GRMCC
|
||
Greece 237/239/240
|
||
ITMCC
|
||
Albania
|
||
|
||
Bosnia &
|
||
Herzegovina
|
||
|
||
Croatia
|
||
|
||
Eritrea
|
||
|
||
Ethiopia
|
||
|
||
Israel
|
||
|
||
Italy
|
||
|
||
Kenya
|
||
|
||
Malta
|
||
215/248/249/256
|
||
Montenegro
|
||
|
||
North Macedonia
|
||
|
||
Palestine
|
||
|
||
San Marino
|
||
|
||
Serbia
|
||
|
||
Slovenia
|
||
|
||
Somalia
|
||
|
||
South Sudan
|
||
|
||
Sudan
|
||
|
||
Vatican City
|
||
|
||
NMCC
|
||
Denmark
|
||
219/220
|
||
Estonia
|
||
|
||
Faroe Islands
|
||
|
||
Finland
|
||
|
||
Greenland
|
||
|
||
Iceland
|
||
|
||
Latvia
|
||
|
||
Lithuania
|
||
|
||
Norway
|
||
257/258/259
|
||
Poland
|
||
|
||
Sweden 265/266
|
||
TRMCC
|
||
Afghanistan
|
||
|
||
Georgia\*
|
||
|
||
Iran
|
||
|
||
Iraq
|
||
|
||
Türkiye
|
||
|
||
Ukraine* 272
|
||
UKMCC
|
||
United Kingdom 232/233/234/235
|
||
Ireland 250
|
||
* See also CMC service area.
|
||
|
||
C-7
|
||
|
||
C.5 SOUTH CENTRAL DDR
|
||
Figure C.5: South Central DDR Map
|
||
Countries/Regions and MIDs Supported by the South-Central DDR MCCs
|
||
AEMCC
|
||
United Arab Emirates
|
||
470/471
|
||
ALMCC
|
||
Algeria
|
||
|
||
Burkina Faso
|
||
|
||
Egypt
|
||
|
||
Libya
|
||
|
||
Niger
|
||
|
||
NIMCC
|
||
Declared as “CNO”
|
||
See SPMCC
|
||
SAMCC
|
||
Bahrain
|
||
|
||
Jordan
|
||
|
||
Kuwait
|
||
|
||
Lebanon
|
||
|
||
Oman
|
||
|
||
Saudi Arabia
|
||
|
||
Syria
|
||
|
||
Yemen
|
||
473/475
|
||
SPMCC
|
||
Benin
|
||
|
||
Cameroon
|
||
|
||
Cape Verde
|
||
|
||
Central
|
||
African
|
||
Republic 612
|
||
Congo
|
||
|
||
Equatorial Guinea
|
||
|
||
Gabon
|
||
|
||
Gambia
|
||
|
||
Ghana
|
||
|
||
Guinea
|
||
|
||
Guinea-Bissau
|
||
|
||
Ivory Coast
|
||
|
||
Liberia
|
||
636/637
|
||
Mali
|
||
|
||
Mauritania
|
||
|
||
Sao Tome and
|
||
Principe 668
|
||
Senegal
|
||
|
||
Sierra Leone
|
||
|
||
Spain
|
||
224/225
|
||
Togo
|
||
|
||
Nigeria
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
C-8
|
||
|
||
C.6 EASTERN DDR
|
||
Figure C.6: Eastern DDR Map
|
||
Countries/Regions and MIDs Supported by the Eastern DDR MCCs
|
||
CMC
|
||
Armenia
|
||
|
||
Azerbaijan
|
||
|
||
Belarus
|
||
|
||
Bulgaria
|
||
|
||
Czech
|
||
Republic 270
|
||
Georgia\*
|
||
|
||
Hungary
|
||
|
||
Kazakhstan
|
||
|
||
Kyrgyz Rep.
|
||
|
||
Moldova
|
||
|
||
Mongolia
|
||
|
||
Romania
|
||
|
||
Russia
|
||
|
||
Tajikistan
|
||
|
||
Turkmenistan
|
||
|
||
Ukraine\*
|
||
|
||
Uzbekistan
|
||
|
||
INMCC
|
||
Bangladesh
|
||
|
||
Bhutan
|
||
|
||
India
|
||
|
||
Maldives
|
||
|
||
Nepal
|
||
|
||
Seychelles
|
||
|
||
Sri Lanka
|
||
|
||
Tanzania
|
||
674/677
|
||
PAMCC
|
||
Pakistan
|
||
|
||
* See also TRMCC service area.
|
||
- END OF ANNEX C -
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
D-1
|
||
|
||
ANNEX D
|
||
HOW TO USE THE IBRD
|
||
Annex D is sequence of slides that shows how a SAR Service can use the IBRD. Please send
|
||
an email to admin@406registration.com for any questions.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
D-2
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
D-3
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
D-4
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
D-5
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
D-6
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
D-7
|
||
|
||
– END OF ANNEX D –
|
||
– END OF DOCUMENT –
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat
|
||
1250 boulevard René-Lévesque West, Suite 4215, Montréal, Québec H3B 4W8 CANADA
|
||
Telephone: + 1 514 500 9993
|
||
Fax: + 1 514 500 7996
|
||
Email: mail@cospas-sarsat.int
|
||
Website www.cospas-sarsat.int |