coredns-rfc2136/plugin.go
Ryan Malloy 1d2d919728 Phase 1.4: UPDATE opcode handler + TSIG verification
Replaces the Phase-1.3 refuseUpdate() stub with a real RFC 2136 handler.
Caddy via caddy-dns/rfc2136 can now inject and remove records.

UPDATE message handling (update.go):
- Zone section validation: must be exactly one SOA-typed record naming
  a zone we're authoritative for. Returns FORMERR/NOTAUTH otherwise.
- Prerequisites (§3.2): name-exists, RRset-exists, name-NOT-exists,
  RRset-NOT-exists semantics implemented. First failure short-circuits
  with the spec's rcode (NXDOMAIN/NXRRSET/YXDOMAIN/YXRRSET).
- Updates (§3.4.2): add RR, delete RRset (CLASS=ANY+RDLEN=0), delete
  all RRsets at name (CLASS=ANY+TYPE=ANY), delete specific RR (CLASS=
  NONE).
- Apex SOA/NS protected: synthetic and cannot be added or removed via
  UPDATE. Apex wipe (TYPE=ANY at apex) also refused.
- Default TTL applied to incoming records with TTL=0.

TSIG (tsig.go + setup.go):
- setup() now populates dnsserver.Config.TsigSecret so the underlying
  dns.Server auto-verifies signatures via miekg/dns.
- checkTSIG() in ServeDNS gates UPDATEs: rejects if no TSIG, unknown
  key name, algorithm-downgrade attempt, or w.TsigStatus() != nil.
- No TSIG keys configured → all UPDATEs refused (safety default).
- Algorithm pinning prevents downgrade attacks (e.g. forced HMAC-MD5).

Tests (update_test.go): 11 new cases covering happy paths and every
error rcode. Total: 35 top-level test passes, 0 failures.

ServeDNS dispatch now calls handleUpdate after auth gate. The
refuseUpdate() stub is gone. UPDATE end-to-end via nsupdate requires
the custom CoreDNS image (Phase 2) to verify TSIG plumbing on the
dns.Server side.
2026-05-21 10:51:18 -06:00

210 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

// Package rfc2136 implements a CoreDNS plugin that accepts dynamic DNS
// updates per RFC 2136 (UPDATE opcode), authenticated via TSIG. The
// primary use case is self-hosted ACME DNS-01 cert automation: an ACME
// client (e.g. Caddy via caddy-dns/rfc2136) injects _acme-challenge TXT
// records into a delegated sub-zone that this plugin serves.
//
// Phase 1.3 status: store + query dispatch. ServeDNS now answers
// authoritatively for the configured zone(s) from the in-memory store
// (plus synthetic SOA/NS at apex). UPDATE handling still rejected —
// that lands in Phase 1.4. See plan at
//
// ~/.claude/plans/dood-does-coredns-offer-enumerated-piglet.md
package rfc2136
import (
"context"
"strings"
"github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
)
// DefaultTTL is the TTL applied to dynamically-added records when the
// Corefile doesn't specify one. 60s matches the short-lived nature of
// ACME challenge TXT records and keeps stale answers from lingering in
// resolver caches.
const DefaultTTL uint32 = 60
// RFC2136 is the plugin handler. One instance per Corefile server block.
type RFC2136 struct {
// Next is the downstream plugin in the chain.
Next plugin.Handler
// Zones is the set of canonical (dot-terminated, lowercase) zone
// names this instance is authoritative for. Queries outside these
// zones pass through to Next.
Zones []string
// TSIGKeys is keyed by canonical key name (lowercased, trailing
// dot). Empty means TSIG is disabled — UPDATEs without TSIG are
// rejected unconditionally in Phase 1.4.
TSIGKeys map[string]tsigKey
// TTL is applied to dynamically-injected records that don't carry
// an explicit TTL in the UPDATE message.
TTL uint32
// PersistPath, when non-empty, names a file the plugin writes a
// JSON snapshot of its in-memory store to on a periodic schedule.
// Empty means in-memory only (acceptable for ACME challenges).
PersistPath string
// Nameserver is the host returned in synthetic NS records and as
// the SOA's MNAME. Defaults (set in setup) to the first zone apex.
Nameserver string
// store holds the dynamic records. Always non-nil after setup.
store *recordStore
}
// Name implements plugin.Handler.
func (p *RFC2136) Name() string { return "rfc2136" }
// ServeDNS implements plugin.Handler.
//
// Dispatch:
//
// UPDATE opcode → rejected with REFUSED (Phase 1.4 implements properly).
// Query opcode:
// - Not in our zones → pass to Next.
// - Apex SOA → synthetic SOA.
// - Apex NS → synthetic NS.
// - Match in store → return RRset.
// - Name exists, wrong type → NODATA (NOERROR + SOA in authority).
// - Name doesn't exist → NXDOMAIN (NameError + SOA in authority).
func (p *RFC2136) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
if r.Opcode == dns.OpcodeUpdate {
// TSIG verification was performed by the underlying dns.Server
// (because setup.go populated dnsserver.Config.TsigSecret). We
// just need to check the result here.
if err := p.checkTSIG(w, r); err != nil {
log.Warningf("UPDATE rejected: %v", err)
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeRefused)
_ = w.WriteMsg(resp)
return dns.RcodeRefused, nil
}
return p.handleUpdate(w, r)
}
if len(r.Question) == 0 {
return plugin.NextOrFailure(p.Name(), p.Next, ctx, w, r)
}
q := r.Question[0]
zone := p.findZone(q.Name)
if zone == "" {
return plugin.NextOrFailure(p.Name(), p.Next, ctx, w, r)
}
// We're authoritative for this name. Build a reply.
msg := new(dns.Msg)
msg.SetReply(r)
msg.Authoritative = true
qname := strings.ToLower(dns.Fqdn(q.Name))
isApex := qname == zone
// Apex SOA / NS are synthetic.
if isApex {
switch q.Qtype {
case dns.TypeSOA:
msg.Answer = []dns.RR{p.syntheticSOA(zone)}
_ = w.WriteMsg(msg)
return dns.RcodeSuccess, nil
case dns.TypeNS:
msg.Answer = p.syntheticNS(zone)
_ = w.WriteMsg(msg)
return dns.RcodeSuccess, nil
}
}
// Look up the asked type in the store.
if rrs := p.store.Lookup(qname, q.Qtype); rrs != nil {
msg.Answer = rrs
_ = w.WriteMsg(msg)
return dns.RcodeSuccess, nil
}
// Special case: ANY at the apex isn't in the store but we have
// synthetic SOA + NS. Return them rather than NODATA.
if isApex && q.Qtype == dns.TypeANY {
msg.Answer = append(msg.Answer, p.syntheticSOA(zone))
msg.Answer = append(msg.Answer, p.syntheticNS(zone)...)
_ = w.WriteMsg(msg)
return dns.RcodeSuccess, nil
}
// Distinguish NODATA from NXDOMAIN.
if p.store.NameExists(qname) || isApex {
// NODATA: name exists, but not with this type.
msg.Ns = []dns.RR{p.syntheticSOA(zone)}
_ = w.WriteMsg(msg)
return dns.RcodeSuccess, nil
}
// NXDOMAIN: name doesn't exist anywhere in this zone.
msg.Rcode = dns.RcodeNameError
msg.Ns = []dns.RR{p.syntheticSOA(zone)}
_ = w.WriteMsg(msg)
return dns.RcodeNameError, nil
}
// findZone returns the longest matching zone for qname, or "" if qname
// is outside all configured zones. The returned zone is in canonical
// form (lowercase, trailing dot).
func (p *RFC2136) findZone(qname string) string {
qname = strings.ToLower(dns.Fqdn(qname))
// Longest-suffix wins so nested zones work correctly.
var best string
for _, z := range p.Zones {
if qname == z || strings.HasSuffix(qname, "."+z) {
if len(z) > len(best) {
best = z
}
}
}
return best
}
// syntheticSOA returns the SOA RR for a zone. Serial is derived from
// the store's monotonic generation counter — every UPDATE bumps it,
// so downstream observers can detect "something changed" without
// having to AXFR.
func (p *RFC2136) syntheticSOA(zone string) *dns.SOA {
return &dns.SOA{
Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
Name: zone,
Rrtype: dns.TypeSOA,
Class: dns.ClassINET,
Ttl: p.TTL,
},
Ns: p.Nameserver,
Mbox: "admin." + zone,
Serial: uint32(p.store.generation()),
Refresh: 3600, // 1 hour
Retry: 600, // 10 min
Expire: 604800, // 1 week
Minttl: 60, // negative-cache TTL
}
}
// syntheticNS returns the NS RRset for a zone. Currently a single NS
// pointing at p.Nameserver (the host that runs this plugin). For
// resiliency, future versions could accept multiple `nameserver`
// directives.
func (p *RFC2136) syntheticNS(zone string) []dns.RR {
return []dns.RR{
&dns.NS{
Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
Name: zone,
Rrtype: dns.TypeNS,
Class: dns.ClassINET,
Ttl: p.TTL,
},
Ns: p.Nameserver,
},
}
}