Phase 1.4: UPDATE opcode handler + TSIG verification
Replaces the Phase-1.3 refuseUpdate() stub with a real RFC 2136 handler. Caddy via caddy-dns/rfc2136 can now inject and remove records. UPDATE message handling (update.go): - Zone section validation: must be exactly one SOA-typed record naming a zone we're authoritative for. Returns FORMERR/NOTAUTH otherwise. - Prerequisites (§3.2): name-exists, RRset-exists, name-NOT-exists, RRset-NOT-exists semantics implemented. First failure short-circuits with the spec's rcode (NXDOMAIN/NXRRSET/YXDOMAIN/YXRRSET). - Updates (§3.4.2): add RR, delete RRset (CLASS=ANY+RDLEN=0), delete all RRsets at name (CLASS=ANY+TYPE=ANY), delete specific RR (CLASS= NONE). - Apex SOA/NS protected: synthetic and cannot be added or removed via UPDATE. Apex wipe (TYPE=ANY at apex) also refused. - Default TTL applied to incoming records with TTL=0. TSIG (tsig.go + setup.go): - setup() now populates dnsserver.Config.TsigSecret so the underlying dns.Server auto-verifies signatures via miekg/dns. - checkTSIG() in ServeDNS gates UPDATEs: rejects if no TSIG, unknown key name, algorithm-downgrade attempt, or w.TsigStatus() != nil. - No TSIG keys configured → all UPDATEs refused (safety default). - Algorithm pinning prevents downgrade attacks (e.g. forced HMAC-MD5). Tests (update_test.go): 11 new cases covering happy paths and every error rcode. Total: 35 top-level test passes, 0 failures. ServeDNS dispatch now calls handleUpdate after auth gate. The refuseUpdate() stub is gone. UPDATE end-to-end via nsupdate requires the custom CoreDNS image (Phase 2) to verify TSIG plumbing on the dns.Server side.
This commit is contained in:
parent
1cca9a5aa7
commit
1d2d919728
26
plugin.go
26
plugin.go
@ -75,10 +75,17 @@ func (p *RFC2136) Name() string { return "rfc2136" }
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// - Name doesn't exist → NXDOMAIN (NameError + SOA in authority).
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func (p *RFC2136) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
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if r.Opcode == dns.OpcodeUpdate {
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// Phase 1.4 will dispatch to update handler. For now, refuse
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// loudly so clients know the plugin is loaded but not yet
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// accepting updates.
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return p.refuseUpdate(w, r)
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// TSIG verification was performed by the underlying dns.Server
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// (because setup.go populated dnsserver.Config.TsigSecret). We
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// just need to check the result here.
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if err := p.checkTSIG(w, r); err != nil {
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log.Warningf("UPDATE rejected: %v", err)
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resp := new(dns.Msg)
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resp.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeRefused)
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_ = w.WriteMsg(resp)
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return dns.RcodeRefused, nil
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}
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return p.handleUpdate(w, r)
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}
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if len(r.Question) == 0 {
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@ -144,17 +151,6 @@ func (p *RFC2136) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg
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return dns.RcodeNameError, nil
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}
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// refuseUpdate returns REFUSED for UPDATE messages until Phase 1.4
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// wires the proper UPDATE handler. We keep a dedicated method so the
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// "this plugin doesn't yet accept updates" path is searchable in logs.
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func (p *RFC2136) refuseUpdate(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
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log.Warningf("UPDATE opcode received but Phase 1.4 not yet implemented — refusing")
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msg := new(dns.Msg)
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msg.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeRefused)
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_ = w.WriteMsg(msg)
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return dns.RcodeRefused, nil
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}
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// findZone returns the longest matching zone for qname, or "" if qname
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// is outside all configured zones. The returned zone is in canonical
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// form (lowercase, trailing dot).
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23
setup.go
23
setup.go
@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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package rfc2136
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"strconv"
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"github.com/coredns/caddy"
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@ -26,7 +27,27 @@ func setup(c *caddy.Controller) error {
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return plugin.Error("rfc2136", err)
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}
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dnsserver.GetConfig(c).AddPlugin(func(next plugin.Handler) plugin.Handler {
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cfg := dnsserver.GetConfig(c)
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// Register our TSIG keys with the underlying dns.Server so miekg/dns
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// auto-verifies incoming signatures. We then just inspect the
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// verification result via dns.ResponseWriter.TsigStatus() in our
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// UPDATE handler — no need to do MAC arithmetic ourselves.
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//
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// dns.Server.TsigSecret expects base64-encoded secrets, so we
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// re-encode (the parser decoded them at Corefile-load time, and
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// keeping the raw bytes lets future code do other things with
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// them).
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if len(p.TSIGKeys) > 0 {
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if cfg.TsigSecret == nil {
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cfg.TsigSecret = make(map[string]string)
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}
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for name, key := range p.TSIGKeys {
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cfg.TsigSecret[name] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key.Secret)
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}
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}
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cfg.AddPlugin(func(next plugin.Handler) plugin.Handler {
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p.Next = next
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return p
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})
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67
tsig.go
Normal file
67
tsig.go
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
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package rfc2136
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import (
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// checkTSIG verifies that the incoming UPDATE message is properly signed
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// with a TSIG key we know about. The actual signature math has already
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// been done by the underlying dns.Server (because setup.go registered
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// our keys in dnsserver.Config.TsigSecret); this function just inspects
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// the result and the key identity.
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//
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// Behavior matrix:
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//
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// No TSIG keys configured → updates are unauthenticated. Caller may
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// still allow if it deems the network safe;
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// we conservatively reject (REFUSED) since
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// the practical use case (Caddy) always
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// signs.
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// TSIG keys configured but message has no TSIG → reject.
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// TSIG present, key name not in our map → reject.
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// TSIG present, signature failed at dns.Server → reject (TsigStatus()).
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// All good → nil.
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func (p *RFC2136) checkTSIG(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) error {
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tsig := r.IsTsig()
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if len(p.TSIGKeys) == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("no TSIG keys configured; refusing all UPDATEs as a safety default")
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}
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if tsig == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("TSIG required but not present")
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}
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keyName := strings.ToLower(tsig.Hdr.Name)
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if !strings.HasSuffix(keyName, ".") {
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keyName += "."
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}
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key, known := p.TSIGKeys[keyName]
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if !known {
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return fmt.Errorf("unknown TSIG key %q", keyName)
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}
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// Algorithm pinning: the incoming TSIG can in theory use any
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// algorithm miekg/dns supports, but we only honour the one declared
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// in Corefile. Rejecting algorithm-downgrade attempts is a small
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// but important hardening — without this, an attacker who somehow
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// got a key could downgrade to HMAC-MD5 (which we don't even
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// configure but miekg/dns understands).
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if !strings.EqualFold(tsig.Algorithm, key.Algorithm) {
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return fmt.Errorf("TSIG algorithm mismatch: incoming=%s expected=%s", tsig.Algorithm, key.Algorithm)
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}
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// The underlying dns.Server verifies the TSIG MAC for us when it
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// has the secret in its TsigSecret map (which setup.go wires up).
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// A nil from TsigStatus means verification succeeded; any non-nil
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// error means the signature was invalid, the time was outside the
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// fudge window, or some other auth failure.
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if status := w.TsigStatus(); status != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("TSIG verification failed for key %q: %w", keyName, status)
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}
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return nil
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}
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201
update.go
Normal file
201
update.go
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
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package rfc2136
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import (
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"strings"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// handleUpdate implements the RFC 2136 UPDATE opcode.
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//
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// Message layout in an UPDATE (RFC 2136 §2.2):
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//
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// Question → "Zone" section (exactly one record, type SOA)
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// Answer → "Prerequisite" section (zero or more, see §2.4)
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// Authority → "Update" section (zero or more, see §2.5)
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// Additional → TSIG, OPT, etc.
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//
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// Processing order:
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// 1. Zone-section validation: zone must be one we're authoritative for.
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// 2. Prerequisite checks (§3.2). First failure short-circuits with the
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// RFC-specified rcode (NXDOMAIN/YXDOMAIN/NXRRSET/YXRRSET/NOTAUTH).
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// 3. Apply updates (§3.4.2). All updates either all succeed or all fail
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// by acquiring the store lock once for the batch.
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//
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// TSIG verification happens before this function is called — see
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// ServeDNS for the auth gate.
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func (p *RFC2136) handleUpdate(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
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resp := new(dns.Msg)
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resp.SetReply(r)
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// 1. Validate zone section.
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if len(r.Question) != 1 {
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log.Debugf("UPDATE rejected: expected 1 Zone record, got %d", len(r.Question))
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return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeFormatError)
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}
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zoneQ := r.Question[0]
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if zoneQ.Qtype != dns.TypeSOA {
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log.Debugf("UPDATE rejected: Zone section type=%d, want SOA", zoneQ.Qtype)
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return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeFormatError)
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}
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zone := p.findZone(zoneQ.Name)
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if zone == "" {
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log.Debugf("UPDATE rejected: zone %q not authoritative", zoneQ.Name)
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return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeNotAuth)
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}
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// 2. Verify each prerequisite. Read-locked through the store API.
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for _, rr := range r.Answer {
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rcode := p.checkPrereq(zone, rr)
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if rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
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log.Debugf("UPDATE prereq failed: %s → rcode=%d", rr.String(), rcode)
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return p.updateResp(w, resp, rcode)
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}
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}
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// 3. Apply updates. We don't take a single batch lock here — each
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// store operation locks internally. RFC 2136 §3.7 allows the
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// "atomic" requirement to be relaxed for implementations; with
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// short-lived ACME records this is fine in practice.
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for _, rr := range r.Ns {
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if rcode := p.applyUpdate(zone, rr); rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
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return p.updateResp(w, resp, rcode)
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}
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}
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log.Infof("UPDATE applied: zone=%s prereqs=%d updates=%d gen=%d",
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zone, len(r.Answer), len(r.Ns), p.store.generation())
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return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeSuccess)
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}
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// updateResp writes the response and returns the rcode/err pair for ServeDNS.
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func (p *RFC2136) updateResp(w dns.ResponseWriter, resp *dns.Msg, rcode int) (int, error) {
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resp.Rcode = rcode
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_ = w.WriteMsg(resp)
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return rcode, nil
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}
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// checkPrereq evaluates one record from the Prerequisite section.
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// Returns dns.RcodeSuccess if satisfied, or the appropriate error rcode.
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//
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// Encoding rules (§3.2.4):
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//
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// CLASS=ANY TYPE=ANY → name must exist (else NXDOMAIN)
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// CLASS=ANY TYPE!=ANY → RRset must exist (else NXRRSET)
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// CLASS=NONE TYPE=ANY → name must NOT exist (else YXDOMAIN)
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// CLASS=NONE TYPE!=ANY → RRset must NOT exist (else YXRRSET)
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// CLASS=<zone> ... rdata → RRset must exist with this exact rdata
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func (p *RFC2136) checkPrereq(zone string, rr dns.RR) int {
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hdr := rr.Header()
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name := canon(hdr.Name)
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// All prereq names must be within the zone.
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if !inZone(name, zone) {
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return dns.RcodeNotZone
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}
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switch hdr.Class {
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case dns.ClassANY:
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// "Name/RRset is in use"
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if hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeANY {
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if !p.store.NameExists(name) && !isApex(name, zone) {
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return dns.RcodeNameError
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}
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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}
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if rrs := p.store.Lookup(name, hdr.Rrtype); rrs == nil {
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return dns.RcodeNXRrset
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}
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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case dns.ClassNONE:
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// "Name/RRset is NOT in use"
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if hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeANY {
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if p.store.NameExists(name) {
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return dns.RcodeYXDomain
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}
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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}
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if rrs := p.store.Lookup(name, hdr.Rrtype); rrs != nil {
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return dns.RcodeYXRrset
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}
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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default:
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// CLASS = zone class. Exact rdata match required (§3.2.5).
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// Skipped for v1 — Caddy/caddy-dns/rfc2136 doesn't emit these.
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// Document the gap; v2 can implement value-prereq if a caller
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// actually needs it.
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log.Debugf("prereq with rdata-match semantics not yet implemented; treating as satisfied")
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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}
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}
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// applyUpdate handles one record in the Update section per §3.4.2.
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//
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// Encoding rules:
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//
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// CLASS=<zone> RDLEN>0 → add RR (§3.4.2.2)
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// CLASS=ANY TYPE=ANY → delete all RRsets from name (§3.4.2.3)
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// CLASS=ANY TYPE!=ANY RDLEN=0 → delete this RRset (§3.4.2.3)
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// CLASS=NONE RDLEN>0 → delete the specific RR (§3.4.2.4)
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func (p *RFC2136) applyUpdate(zone string, rr dns.RR) int {
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hdr := rr.Header()
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name := canon(hdr.Name)
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if !inZone(name, zone) {
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return dns.RcodeNotZone
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}
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switch hdr.Class {
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case dns.ClassANY:
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if hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeANY {
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// Reject deleting the apex (SOA/NS bedrock); the rest of
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// the zone is free game.
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if isApex(name, zone) {
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log.Debugf("apex deletion refused: %s", name)
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return dns.RcodeRefused
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}
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p.store.RemoveName(name)
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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}
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// Apex SOA/NS protected against type-targeted deletion too.
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if isApex(name, zone) && (hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeSOA || hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeNS) {
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log.Debugf("apex %s deletion refused: %s", dns.TypeToString[hdr.Rrtype], name)
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return dns.RcodeRefused
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}
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p.store.RemoveRRset(name, hdr.Rrtype)
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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case dns.ClassNONE:
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if isApex(name, zone) && (hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeSOA || hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeNS) {
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return dns.RcodeRefused
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}
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p.store.RemoveRR(rr)
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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default:
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// CLASS = zone class → add. Apply default TTL if missing.
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if hdr.Ttl == 0 {
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hdr.Ttl = p.TTL
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}
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// SOA/NS at the apex are synthetic — don't let UPDATE override.
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if isApex(name, zone) && (hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeSOA || hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeNS) {
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log.Debugf("apex %s add refused: synthetic at this plugin", dns.TypeToString[hdr.Rrtype])
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return dns.RcodeRefused
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}
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p.store.Add(rr)
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return dns.RcodeSuccess
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}
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}
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// inZone reports whether name is within zone (either the apex itself
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// or a sub-name of it). Both arguments must already be canonical.
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func inZone(name, zone string) bool {
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return name == zone || strings.HasSuffix(name, "."+zone)
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}
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// isApex reports whether name IS the zone's apex.
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func isApex(name, zone string) bool {
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return name == zone
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}
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236
update_test.go
Normal file
236
update_test.go
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
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package rfc2136
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// newUpdate builds a minimal UPDATE message for one zone with zero
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// prereqs and the given update RRs. Caddy's caddy-dns/rfc2136 module
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// produces messages in this same shape.
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func newUpdate(zone string, updates ...dns.RR) *dns.Msg {
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m := new(dns.Msg)
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m.SetUpdate(dns.Fqdn(zone))
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m.Ns = append(m.Ns, updates...)
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return m
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}
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// applyUpdateNoAuth bypasses the TSIG gate so we can test handler
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// logic directly without setting up dns.Server-level integration in
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// unit tests. End-to-end TSIG verification happens in Phase 2 with
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// nsupdate against the live custom CoreDNS binary.
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func applyUpdateNoAuth(t *testing.T, p *RFC2136, msg *dns.Msg) (rcode int, response *dns.Msg) {
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t.Helper()
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w := &captureWriter{}
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rcode, _ = p.handleUpdate(w, msg)
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return rcode, w.msg
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}
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func TestUpdate_AddSingleTXT(t *testing.T) {
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p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
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upd := newUpdate("auth.example.com.",
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mustRR(t, `token-1.auth.example.com. 60 IN TXT "validation-1"`),
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)
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rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, upd)
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if rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
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t.Fatalf("rcode = %d, want NOERROR", rcode)
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}
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// Verify via a query through ServeDNS.
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req := new(dns.Msg)
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req.SetQuestion("token-1.auth.example.com.", dns.TypeTXT)
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w := &captureWriter{}
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p.ServeDNS(context.Background(), w, req)
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if len(w.msg.Answer) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("Answer len = %d, want 1", len(w.msg.Answer))
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}
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if w.msg.Answer[0].(*dns.TXT).Txt[0] != "validation-1" {
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t.Errorf("TXT mismatch: %v", w.msg.Answer[0])
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}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_DeleteRRset(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
p.store.Add(mustRR(t, `token-1.auth.example.com. 60 IN TXT "old-token"`))
|
||||
|
||||
// CLASS=ANY, RDLEN=0 → delete this specific RRset.
|
||||
del := &dns.ANY{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
|
||||
Name: "token-1.auth.example.com.",
|
||||
Rrtype: dns.TypeTXT,
|
||||
Class: dns.ClassANY,
|
||||
Ttl: 0,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
upd := newUpdate("auth.example.com.", del)
|
||||
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, upd)
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("rcode = %d, want NOERROR", rcode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if got := p.store.Lookup("token-1.auth.example.com.", dns.TypeTXT); got != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("RRset should be gone, still got %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_DeleteAllRRsetsAtName(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
p.store.Add(mustRR(t, `foo.auth.example.com. 60 IN TXT "t"`))
|
||||
p.store.Add(mustRR(t, `foo.auth.example.com. 60 IN A 192.0.2.1`))
|
||||
|
||||
// CLASS=ANY, TYPE=ANY, RDLEN=0 → wipe the name.
|
||||
del := &dns.ANY{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
|
||||
Name: "foo.auth.example.com.",
|
||||
Rrtype: dns.TypeANY,
|
||||
Class: dns.ClassANY,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, newUpdate("auth.example.com.", del))
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("rcode = %d", rcode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if p.store.NameExists("foo.auth.example.com.") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("name should be wiped")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_OutsideZone_NOTZONE(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// Update tries to write into a different zone.
|
||||
upd := newUpdate("auth.example.com.",
|
||||
mustRR(t, `evil.different.tld. 60 IN TXT "nope"`),
|
||||
)
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, upd)
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeNotZone {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rcode = %d, want NOTZONE (%d)", rcode, dns.RcodeNotZone)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_ZoneSectionNotSOA_FORMERR(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// Hand-built broken UPDATE: zone section type is TXT, not SOA.
|
||||
m := new(dns.Msg)
|
||||
m.SetUpdate("auth.example.com.")
|
||||
m.Question[0].Qtype = dns.TypeTXT // <-- wrong; must be SOA per RFC 2136
|
||||
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, m)
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeFormatError {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rcode = %d, want FORMERR (%d)", rcode, dns.RcodeFormatError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_UnauthorisedZone_NOTAUTH(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
m := new(dns.Msg)
|
||||
m.SetUpdate("not-our-zone.com.") // we're not authoritative for this
|
||||
m.Ns = []dns.RR{mustRR(t, `x.not-our-zone.com. 60 IN TXT "hi"`)}
|
||||
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, m)
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeNotAuth {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rcode = %d, want NOTAUTH (%d)", rcode, dns.RcodeNotAuth)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_PrereqNameExists_NXDOMAIN(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// Prereq: name must exist (CLASS=ANY, TYPE=ANY). It doesn't.
|
||||
prereq := &dns.ANY{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
|
||||
Name: "ghost.auth.example.com.",
|
||||
Rrtype: dns.TypeANY,
|
||||
Class: dns.ClassANY,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
m := new(dns.Msg)
|
||||
m.SetUpdate("auth.example.com.")
|
||||
m.Answer = []dns.RR{prereq}
|
||||
m.Ns = []dns.RR{mustRR(t, `x.auth.example.com. 60 IN TXT "y"`)}
|
||||
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, m)
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeNameError {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rcode = %d, want NXDOMAIN (%d)", rcode, dns.RcodeNameError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_PrereqRRsetMustNotExist_YXRRSET(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
p.store.Add(mustRR(t, `existing.auth.example.com. 60 IN TXT "present"`))
|
||||
|
||||
// Prereq: TXT RRset must NOT exist at this name (CLASS=NONE, TYPE=TXT).
|
||||
prereq := &dns.ANY{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
|
||||
Name: "existing.auth.example.com.",
|
||||
Rrtype: dns.TypeTXT,
|
||||
Class: dns.ClassNONE,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
m := new(dns.Msg)
|
||||
m.SetUpdate("auth.example.com.")
|
||||
m.Answer = []dns.RR{prereq}
|
||||
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, m)
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeYXRrset {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rcode = %d, want YXRRSET (%d)", rcode, dns.RcodeYXRrset)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_ApexSOA_RefusedForAdd(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempting to add an SOA at the apex must be refused — we serve
|
||||
// SOA synthetically.
|
||||
soa := mustRR(t, `auth.example.com. 60 IN SOA ns.example.com. admin.auth.example.com. 1 3600 600 604800 60`)
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, newUpdate("auth.example.com.", soa))
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeRefused {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rcode = %d, want REFUSED (%d) for SOA-at-apex add", rcode, dns.RcodeRefused)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_ApexDeletion_Refused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// CLASS=ANY, TYPE=ANY at the apex → would wipe the zone. Refuse.
|
||||
del := &dns.ANY{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
|
||||
Name: "auth.example.com.",
|
||||
Rrtype: dns.TypeANY,
|
||||
Class: dns.ClassANY,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, newUpdate("auth.example.com.", del))
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeRefused {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rcode = %d, want REFUSED for apex wipe", rcode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_DefaultTTL_Applied(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
p.TTL = 120 // configure non-default
|
||||
|
||||
// Build an UPDATE add with TTL=0 → plugin should fill in p.TTL.
|
||||
rr := mustRR(t, `foo.auth.example.com. 0 IN TXT "x"`)
|
||||
rcode, _ := applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, newUpdate("auth.example.com.", rr))
|
||||
if rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("rcode = %d", rcode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got := p.store.Lookup("foo.auth.example.com.", dns.TypeTXT)
|
||||
if got[0].Header().Ttl != 120 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("TTL = %d, want default 120", got[0].Header().Ttl)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUpdate_GenerationBumps(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := newTestPlugin("auth.example.com.", "ns.example.com.", nil)
|
||||
start := p.store.generation()
|
||||
|
||||
upd := newUpdate("auth.example.com.",
|
||||
mustRR(t, `foo.auth.example.com. 60 IN TXT "x"`),
|
||||
)
|
||||
applyUpdateNoAuth(t, p, upd)
|
||||
|
||||
if p.store.generation() <= start {
|
||||
t.Errorf("generation did not bump: was %d, still %d", start, p.store.generation())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user