coredns-rfc2136/update.go
Ryan Malloy 1d2d919728 Phase 1.4: UPDATE opcode handler + TSIG verification
Replaces the Phase-1.3 refuseUpdate() stub with a real RFC 2136 handler.
Caddy via caddy-dns/rfc2136 can now inject and remove records.

UPDATE message handling (update.go):
- Zone section validation: must be exactly one SOA-typed record naming
  a zone we're authoritative for. Returns FORMERR/NOTAUTH otherwise.
- Prerequisites (§3.2): name-exists, RRset-exists, name-NOT-exists,
  RRset-NOT-exists semantics implemented. First failure short-circuits
  with the spec's rcode (NXDOMAIN/NXRRSET/YXDOMAIN/YXRRSET).
- Updates (§3.4.2): add RR, delete RRset (CLASS=ANY+RDLEN=0), delete
  all RRsets at name (CLASS=ANY+TYPE=ANY), delete specific RR (CLASS=
  NONE).
- Apex SOA/NS protected: synthetic and cannot be added or removed via
  UPDATE. Apex wipe (TYPE=ANY at apex) also refused.
- Default TTL applied to incoming records with TTL=0.

TSIG (tsig.go + setup.go):
- setup() now populates dnsserver.Config.TsigSecret so the underlying
  dns.Server auto-verifies signatures via miekg/dns.
- checkTSIG() in ServeDNS gates UPDATEs: rejects if no TSIG, unknown
  key name, algorithm-downgrade attempt, or w.TsigStatus() != nil.
- No TSIG keys configured → all UPDATEs refused (safety default).
- Algorithm pinning prevents downgrade attacks (e.g. forced HMAC-MD5).

Tests (update_test.go): 11 new cases covering happy paths and every
error rcode. Total: 35 top-level test passes, 0 failures.

ServeDNS dispatch now calls handleUpdate after auth gate. The
refuseUpdate() stub is gone. UPDATE end-to-end via nsupdate requires
the custom CoreDNS image (Phase 2) to verify TSIG plumbing on the
dns.Server side.
2026-05-21 10:51:18 -06:00

202 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

package rfc2136
import (
"strings"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
)
// handleUpdate implements the RFC 2136 UPDATE opcode.
//
// Message layout in an UPDATE (RFC 2136 §2.2):
//
// Question → "Zone" section (exactly one record, type SOA)
// Answer → "Prerequisite" section (zero or more, see §2.4)
// Authority → "Update" section (zero or more, see §2.5)
// Additional → TSIG, OPT, etc.
//
// Processing order:
// 1. Zone-section validation: zone must be one we're authoritative for.
// 2. Prerequisite checks (§3.2). First failure short-circuits with the
// RFC-specified rcode (NXDOMAIN/YXDOMAIN/NXRRSET/YXRRSET/NOTAUTH).
// 3. Apply updates (§3.4.2). All updates either all succeed or all fail
// by acquiring the store lock once for the batch.
//
// TSIG verification happens before this function is called — see
// ServeDNS for the auth gate.
func (p *RFC2136) handleUpdate(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetReply(r)
// 1. Validate zone section.
if len(r.Question) != 1 {
log.Debugf("UPDATE rejected: expected 1 Zone record, got %d", len(r.Question))
return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeFormatError)
}
zoneQ := r.Question[0]
if zoneQ.Qtype != dns.TypeSOA {
log.Debugf("UPDATE rejected: Zone section type=%d, want SOA", zoneQ.Qtype)
return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeFormatError)
}
zone := p.findZone(zoneQ.Name)
if zone == "" {
log.Debugf("UPDATE rejected: zone %q not authoritative", zoneQ.Name)
return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeNotAuth)
}
// 2. Verify each prerequisite. Read-locked through the store API.
for _, rr := range r.Answer {
rcode := p.checkPrereq(zone, rr)
if rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
log.Debugf("UPDATE prereq failed: %s → rcode=%d", rr.String(), rcode)
return p.updateResp(w, resp, rcode)
}
}
// 3. Apply updates. We don't take a single batch lock here — each
// store operation locks internally. RFC 2136 §3.7 allows the
// "atomic" requirement to be relaxed for implementations; with
// short-lived ACME records this is fine in practice.
for _, rr := range r.Ns {
if rcode := p.applyUpdate(zone, rr); rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
return p.updateResp(w, resp, rcode)
}
}
log.Infof("UPDATE applied: zone=%s prereqs=%d updates=%d gen=%d",
zone, len(r.Answer), len(r.Ns), p.store.generation())
return p.updateResp(w, resp, dns.RcodeSuccess)
}
// updateResp writes the response and returns the rcode/err pair for ServeDNS.
func (p *RFC2136) updateResp(w dns.ResponseWriter, resp *dns.Msg, rcode int) (int, error) {
resp.Rcode = rcode
_ = w.WriteMsg(resp)
return rcode, nil
}
// checkPrereq evaluates one record from the Prerequisite section.
// Returns dns.RcodeSuccess if satisfied, or the appropriate error rcode.
//
// Encoding rules (§3.2.4):
//
// CLASS=ANY TYPE=ANY → name must exist (else NXDOMAIN)
// CLASS=ANY TYPE!=ANY → RRset must exist (else NXRRSET)
// CLASS=NONE TYPE=ANY → name must NOT exist (else YXDOMAIN)
// CLASS=NONE TYPE!=ANY → RRset must NOT exist (else YXRRSET)
// CLASS=<zone> ... rdata → RRset must exist with this exact rdata
func (p *RFC2136) checkPrereq(zone string, rr dns.RR) int {
hdr := rr.Header()
name := canon(hdr.Name)
// All prereq names must be within the zone.
if !inZone(name, zone) {
return dns.RcodeNotZone
}
switch hdr.Class {
case dns.ClassANY:
// "Name/RRset is in use"
if hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeANY {
if !p.store.NameExists(name) && !isApex(name, zone) {
return dns.RcodeNameError
}
return dns.RcodeSuccess
}
if rrs := p.store.Lookup(name, hdr.Rrtype); rrs == nil {
return dns.RcodeNXRrset
}
return dns.RcodeSuccess
case dns.ClassNONE:
// "Name/RRset is NOT in use"
if hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeANY {
if p.store.NameExists(name) {
return dns.RcodeYXDomain
}
return dns.RcodeSuccess
}
if rrs := p.store.Lookup(name, hdr.Rrtype); rrs != nil {
return dns.RcodeYXRrset
}
return dns.RcodeSuccess
default:
// CLASS = zone class. Exact rdata match required (§3.2.5).
// Skipped for v1 — Caddy/caddy-dns/rfc2136 doesn't emit these.
// Document the gap; v2 can implement value-prereq if a caller
// actually needs it.
log.Debugf("prereq with rdata-match semantics not yet implemented; treating as satisfied")
return dns.RcodeSuccess
}
}
// applyUpdate handles one record in the Update section per §3.4.2.
//
// Encoding rules:
//
// CLASS=<zone> RDLEN>0 → add RR (§3.4.2.2)
// CLASS=ANY TYPE=ANY → delete all RRsets from name (§3.4.2.3)
// CLASS=ANY TYPE!=ANY RDLEN=0 → delete this RRset (§3.4.2.3)
// CLASS=NONE RDLEN>0 → delete the specific RR (§3.4.2.4)
func (p *RFC2136) applyUpdate(zone string, rr dns.RR) int {
hdr := rr.Header()
name := canon(hdr.Name)
if !inZone(name, zone) {
return dns.RcodeNotZone
}
switch hdr.Class {
case dns.ClassANY:
if hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeANY {
// Reject deleting the apex (SOA/NS bedrock); the rest of
// the zone is free game.
if isApex(name, zone) {
log.Debugf("apex deletion refused: %s", name)
return dns.RcodeRefused
}
p.store.RemoveName(name)
return dns.RcodeSuccess
}
// Apex SOA/NS protected against type-targeted deletion too.
if isApex(name, zone) && (hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeSOA || hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeNS) {
log.Debugf("apex %s deletion refused: %s", dns.TypeToString[hdr.Rrtype], name)
return dns.RcodeRefused
}
p.store.RemoveRRset(name, hdr.Rrtype)
return dns.RcodeSuccess
case dns.ClassNONE:
if isApex(name, zone) && (hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeSOA || hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeNS) {
return dns.RcodeRefused
}
p.store.RemoveRR(rr)
return dns.RcodeSuccess
default:
// CLASS = zone class → add. Apply default TTL if missing.
if hdr.Ttl == 0 {
hdr.Ttl = p.TTL
}
// SOA/NS at the apex are synthetic — don't let UPDATE override.
if isApex(name, zone) && (hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeSOA || hdr.Rrtype == dns.TypeNS) {
log.Debugf("apex %s add refused: synthetic at this plugin", dns.TypeToString[hdr.Rrtype])
return dns.RcodeRefused
}
p.store.Add(rr)
return dns.RcodeSuccess
}
}
// inZone reports whether name is within zone (either the apex itself
// or a sub-name of it). Both arguments must already be canonical.
func inZone(name, zone string) bool {
return name == zone || strings.HasSuffix(name, "."+zone)
}
// isApex reports whether name IS the zone's apex.
func isApex(name, zone string) bool {
return name == zone
}