8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
1ab88a25f7 coredns: hidden-primary architecture with AXFR for HE secondaries
Goal: serve the public DNS face via Hurricane Electric's free
secondary-DNS service (dns.he.net), with CoreDNS on dell01 acting as
the hidden primary. We edit zones here; HE pulls them via AXFR.

Changes:
- scripts/prepare-zones.sh:
  * SOA mname: ns1.vultr.com -> ns1.he.net (so the apex SOA reflects
    HE as the primary in published RDATA)
  * Strip ns?.vultr.com NS records from each zone and inject the five
    HE nameservers (ns1..ns5.he.net) as the authoritative NS set
- Corefile (shared `common` snippet):
  * Add `transfer { to * }` to authorize AXFR. Tried specific IPs +
    `*` mixed on the same line but CoreDNS silently fails to bind
    server blocks with that syntax; bare `to *` is the only form that
    actually starts the listeners. Trade-off: NOTIFY targeting is lost
    (HE polls per SOA refresh=3600s instead of being pushed). For DNS
    data this is fine since each record is publicly queryable anyway.

Verified AXFR end-to-end: `dig @dell01 -p 5353 acrazy.org AXFR +tcp`
returns 41 records with the new HE NS set and HE-rooted SOA.

Still needed (operator action):
- Firewall NAT for TCP/53 -> 172.16.1.15:5353 (so HE can connect in)
- Add each of the 91 zones at dns.he.net as Secondary DNS pointing
  at 154.27.180.210
- Update each domain's registrar NS records from Vultr -> HE
2026-05-16 15:49:42 -06:00
daf48b373d coredns: rename endpoint dns.l.supported.systems -> dns.supported.systems 2026-05-16 15:24:27 -06:00
b78cfb0b45 coredns: fix silently-broken healthcheck (distroless image has no wget)
The original healthcheck `wget -qO- http://127.0.0.1:8080/health` has
been failing since day one because the CoreDNS image is distroless —
no shell, no HTTP client. The container has been running in
"(unhealthy)" status the whole time without anyone noticing because
nothing depends_on it.

Replace with `/coredns -version`, which is the thinnest honest check
the image can support. For deeper liveness/readiness, scrape
:8081/health from outside the container.
2026-05-16 14:01:22 -06:00
3d47d67e89 coredns: production port defaults (5353 plain DNS, 8081 health)
Deployed to dell01.mer.idahomuellers.net with firewall NAT'ing
public requests in to host:5353/tcp+udp.

Port changes baked in as new defaults so future hosts inherit them:
- DNS_PORT: 1053 -> 5353 (dev was 1053 because avahi-daemon owns
  5353 on Arch desktops; production hosts typically don't run avahi
  and 5353 is the conventional non-privileged DNS port — mDNS uses
  multicast 224.0.0.251:5353 which never conflicts with a unicast bind)
- HEALTH_PORT: 8080 -> 8081 (8080 collided with a python3 service
  on dell01; 8081 is less commonly contested)
2026-05-16 13:59:33 -06:00
c1afe77b27 coredns: production Let's Encrypt cert via Caddy sidecar (DNS-01 + Vultr)
Replaces the self-signed dev cert flow with a real LE prod cert for
dns.l.supported.systems, issued and auto-renewed by a Caddy sidecar
using DNS-01 challenge against the Vultr API.

Components:
- caddy/Dockerfile builds Caddy 2.10.0 with caddy-dns/vultr plugin
  via xcaddy. GOTOOLCHAIN=auto so xcaddy can fetch newer Go on demand
  when plugin versions advance their minimum Go.
- caddy/Caddyfile uses DNS-01 with explicit public resolvers (1.1.1.1,
  9.9.9.9) for the propagation check. Without that, Docker's embedded
  DNS leaks the container into the host's split-horizon LAN DNS, which
  returns LAN IPs for ns1.vultr.com and the propagation check fails.
- docker-compose: caddy service shares ./caddy-data with coredns via a
  read-only subpath mount that excludes /acme (account private key).
- Healthcheck doubles as a symlinker: maintains stable cert.pem /
  key.pem names at /data/caddy/ and chmods cert files + their dirs to
  be readable by CoreDNS's nonroot user. Flips to "healthy" only once
  the symlinks dereference (i.e. cert exists), gating CoreDNS start
  via depends_on: service_healthy.
- Corefile unchanged — same /etc/coredns/certs/cert.pem path; only the
  bind-mount source switches from ./certs to ./caddy-data/caddy.
- New Makefile target: tls-up orchestrates the bring-up sequence.

Cert is valid until Aug 12 2026. Verified end-to-end:
  dig @127.0.0.1 -p 8853 +tls +tls-hostname=dns.l.supported.systems ...
  dig @127.0.0.1 -p 8443 +https +tls-hostname=dns.l.supported.systems ...
2026-05-14 01:34:57 -06:00
066ba1892a coredns: DoT (:853) + DoH (:443) listeners with self-signed cert
- New Corefile snippet (common) shared across plain DNS / DoT / DoH so
  zone-loading + forward + cache stay DRY across all three transports
- scripts/generate-certs.sh: openssl-only self-signed RSA cert with SANs
  for localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 / coredns / dns.local. Idempotent —
  skips regeneration if cert is valid >24h ahead; FORCE=1 to rotate.
- Key chmod is 0644 so the CoreDNS container's nonroot user can read it
  via the bind mount. Acceptable for local dev; production should mount
  real certs with proper UID/GID.
- DOT_PORT=8853, DOH_PORT=8443 (avoids Caddy already-on-443 collision)
- Makefile: `make certs`, `make test-tls`
- All three transports verified end-to-end (dig +tls, dig +https,
  curl with raw RFC 8484 wire format)
2026-05-14 01:12:25 -06:00
1f11c314b9 track .env (no secrets — port config only) 2026-05-12 01:51:22 -06:00
10867ee319 coredns: docker compose stack with Vultr zone import
- Auto plugin loads zones-prepared/*.zone (regex zone-name extraction)
- scripts/prepare-zones.sh transforms raw Vultr exports:
  * synthesizes SOA (omitted by Vultr; CoreDNS requires it)
  * prepends @ to leading-TAB apex lines to disambiguate owner inheritance
  * dot-terminates NS/MX/CNAME rdata so $ORIGIN doesn't double-suffix
- DNS_PORT defaults to 1053 (5353=avahi, 53=libvirt dnsmasq on this host)
- Forwards non-authoritative queries to 1.1.1.1/1.0.0.1/9.9.9.9
- Makefile targets: prep, up, down, reload, test, logs
- 91 zones loaded
2026-05-12 01:51:09 -06:00